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To my wife and my parents,
whose unflagging support never ceases to humble me
“Feynman was a truly great teacher. He prided himself on being able to devise
ways to explain even the most profound ideas to beginning students. Once, I
said to him, ‘Dick, explain to me, so that I can understand it, why spin one-half
particles obey Fermi-Dirac statistics.’ Sizing up his audience perfectly, Feynman
said, ‘I’ll prepare a freshman lecture on it.’ But he came back a few days later to
say, ‘I couldn’t do it. I couldn’t reduce it to the freshman level. That means we
don’t really understand it.’”
—David L. Goodstein, Feynman’s Lost Lecture
“Ah, but a man’s reach should exceed his grasp,
Or what’s a heaven for?”
—Robert Browning, Andrea del Sarto
“My life amounts to no more than one drop in a limitless ocean. Yet what is any
ocean, but a multitude of drops?”
—David Mitchell, Cloud Atlas
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I am surely not the first to note the great irony that words when viewed under the linguistic
microscope manifest a kaleidoscopically complex behavior that one despairs to limn; and
yet, when one urges one’s poor old Broca’s area tomarshal the samewith the greatest possi-
ble poetic force to proffer an appropriate amount of gratitude to the utmost deserving, they
prove a meager and paltry font that cannot even pretend to capture the merest soupçon of
the emotions that presumed to call them out for such lofty purpose. But I must try. I rely
on the charity of my acknowledgees to divine the truth of the thoughts that have left the
ensuing words behind as their bare and imperfect trace.
First, my committee: Kyle Johnson, Rajesh Bhatt, Seth Cable, and Luiz Amaral. They
were more than I could have hoped for: generous with their time, support, and criticism.
There were several points during the research that has found its way into this dissertation
when I did nomore than grope in the dark. I amgrateful that theywerewilling to do sowith
me and to shine a light whenever they could. I have learned so much from them not only
about language, but about how to study it; I could not have hoped for better role models of
diligence. I will greatly miss meeting with them regularly.
Kyle Johnson is one of the main reasons I came to UMass. When I did not have a chance
to meet with him during the open house due to him traveling, he called to chat with me by
phone instead, which I have not forgotten. His paper with Sigrid Beck on the dative alterna-
tion was so exciting to me as an undergraduate student—I had just gotten my first taste of
X-theory and argument structure from Stephen Wechsler and Steven Pinker and was hun-
gry for more—and I am so glad for the opportunity to have made use of their approach in
chapter 2. This work introduced me to the syntactic decompositional approach that I make
use of throughout the dissertation. Much more than this, though, Kyle has proven an excel-
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lent instructor and mentor. His first-semester syntax course ushered me into the world of
modern minimalist-style syntax, and his seminars introduced me to the multidominance
that I make use of herein. I also learned a lot from being his teaching assistant; he has a re-
markable way of finding a way to express an old idea that is just new enough to clear away
the cobwebs and set it into stark relief. Moreover, his classes were not only instructive but
hugely entertaining, merging complex theory with vaudevillian pastiche. This wit and pre-
sentational acuity is not only verbal but also visual. I recall clearly amoment in a seminar on
multidominance where he grasped onemarker in each hand, and proceeded to draw amul-
tidominance graphwith both simultaneously, beginning by setting themarkers to the same
point on the board and spreading his arms as far upward and outward as they could reach,
which resulted in no small amount of amusement on the part of the rapt student-spectators.
As an advisor, he has helped me navigate the well-known bogs and swamps of argument
structure through his gentle patience, his willingness to read through literature with me,
and his generosity. He has always been willing to meet when he has had the time, even
when that has meant multiple overlong meetings per week. I cannot express how grateful I
am for his generosity with ideas: many of the ideas in this dissertation, including all of the
major ones, have their ultimate source in something Kyle said. I have especially relied on
his unwillingness to feign understanding of bad or confusing ideas, which has led me to
avoid many pitfalls. His deliberate approach to the study of language, which insists every
idea must rest on solid conceptual, theoretical, and empirical foundations, is one I strive to
emulate. In addition, he seems to know something important about every topic one might
wish to bring up in discussion; this has led to the bloatedness of my reading list, which is
certain to last me a while yet.
Rajesh Bhatt’s second-semester syntax course is, ultimately, what led me to this disser-
tation topic. A term paper reexamining certain claims about adjectival passives led to a
generals papers discussing three classes of verbs that have odd behavior as adjectival pas-
sives. One of those classes of verbs are the cover/fill class discussed in chapter 4, and the
similarity of these to spray/load verbs is what resulted in the topic of this dissertation. Ev-
ery meeting with Rajesh has been a delight; his kindness and enthusiasm have gotten me
animated even on days when I was sure I had accomplished nothing since our last meeting.
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His ability to instantly see the predictions of an analysis, the problems or predictions that
could result, and what one would or could have to say to solve those problems is inspiring.
What’s more incredible is that this ability does not seem to rely on the idea having been de-
scribed particularly well, since I witnessed this behavior many times over when discussing
the barest suggestions of a thought.
Seth Cable showed me that complex semantics doesn’t have to be mysterious. His sec-
ond-semester semantics course, which introduced me to the more theoretically involved
areas of semantics, was transformational. Before it, my struggle to parse semantic formulae
and merely understand what they said was real. Afterward, the scales had fallen from my
eyes and I suddenly found myself able not only to understand what these formulae did,
but to see what they meant. The fact that I have been able to say anything (semi-)compre-
hensible about semantics in this dissertation is because of him. I am continually striving to
match the clarity and depth of discussion in his invaluable course handouts, which I have
often leaned on more than the original works they discuss. In meetings, Seth is attentive
and scary smart. Another UMass graduate student (whose identity I can’t recall) once accu-
rately observed that “Seth thinks in a straight line.” Often, I would be presenting some idea
or another, or even just some data, and I could glance up and see the gears already turning
in his mind. At some point soon after, the obvious path forward identified, he would begin
to describe what the certain conclusionwas one clear step at a time. Sometimes, I was lucky
and the obvious way forward he found was what I had been building towards but slowly.
Other times, I was unlucky and the rest of the handout lay exposed for the hodgepodge it
was. Another thing Seth is particularly good at is coming up with just the right example.
Many times, what I was proposing made a prediction that I had not seen. Seth has not only
seen these predictions, but uniformly come up with precisely the example to test them.
Unlike Kyle, Rajesh, and Seth, I only met with Luiz once. For this reason, I do not have
as complete an impression of him as I do of the other members of my committee. But I am
nevertheless very grateful to him for serving as my external member, and coming to that
meeting and my defense with piercing and important questions, which in my understand-
ing goes beyond what is expected of an external member.
And then there is the group I would consider my hidden committee, who taught me
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psycholinguisticsi: Brian Dillon, Lyn Frazier, and Shota Momma. While my dissertation
contains no psycholinguistics, I consider myself to me no less a psycholinguist than a syn-
tactician, thanks in no small part to their support. And indeed, the reason this dissertation
does not contain experimental work is because they taught me that one should run only
the necessary experiments, and none that were necessary suggested themselves. I was also
fortunate that all of them are willing to engage with questions of how linguistic theory in-
teracts with psycholinguistics in a way that accords equal respect to both—a trait shared by
too few. They have me how to do psycholinguistics in a way that interfaces with generative
grammar without attempting to supplant it, which I am incredibly grateful for.
Brian Dillon is a joy to work with. His cheerful optimism has often brushed away the
lingering clouds of doubt.Whenmymany attempts at follow-ups tomy first generals paper
on the processing of argument structure kept failing, he was always willing to listen and
help me find the next way to go forward. Even when that turned out to be a dead end, he
was willing to switch gears and work on a project based on a psycholinguistic prediction
raised by my second generals paper, which has proven to be quite a fruitful line of research
indeed. Not only this, but he was willing to get down into the weeds at every step of the
way, helping me revise and re-revise stimuli, showingme how to carry out new experimen-
tal procedures, showingme how to do the right statistical analysis (and how to interpret the
results correctly), and helping me make sense of the results. The pandemic has made me
miss (as I will continue to miss) the ability to drop by his office whenever he was around
to run something by him or get help interpreting a stubborn piece of data. His class on
statistics was the first time I felt like there was a way to really understand what the idea be-
hind the math was, and the ability to see the code of the Matrix like that was indispensable
for getting me through the hectic second course in the psychology statistics sequence. His
willingness to run me through the gauntlet of setting up an eye-tracking experiment and
analyzing data in the space of about a month is something I shall not soon forget.
I regret that I have not taken more advantage of my proximity to Lyn Frazier, who is
one of the indisputable giants in her field. Because of my poor scheduling abilities, I did
not get the chance to work with her much beyond my first generals paper. But she was the
one who taught me that the best psycholinguistics experiment is the simplest one you can
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run, and it’s even better if you don’t have to run one at all. In practice, this has motivated
me to try and develop more interesting psycholinguistic questions so that I could expand
mymethodological toolkit. Lyn always encouragedme to ask the deepest “why” questions.
I recall one meeting in particular where she asked me why I assumed that thematic roles
exist, which is a question I am still grappling with, and which has informed the approach
in this very much non-psycholinguistic dissertation in a profound way. Her impulse to ask
the big questions and skeptically reconsider the basis of familiar assumptions is one I hope
to properly emulate someday.
Shota Momma came to UMass in the Fall of 2019, while I began as a student in the Fall
of 2015. But this temporal gap belies the amount of influence and support he has given
me. He offered me a position as his research assistant during his first semester at UMass.
But I never got the impression that I was merely a research assistant; he treated me at our
meetings as an advisee, notmerely one to run experiments or code data (though this would
have been invaluable on its own!). He has taught me about speech production—not only
about its metholodogical nuts and bolts, but also about its true utility for understanding
human language. The breadth and audacity of his research program beggars belief, as he
uses speech production to probe not only how language is implemented in the architecture
of the mind, but also the very representations of language in truly new and exciting ways.
To use an analogy, I have found myself struggling to keep one plate spinning on the end of
its stick, while Shota found the time to not only help me with that plate, but also help me
start spinning up others while keeping all of his own going. His keen insight on how one
can test ideas in newways and identify new predictionsmarks a psycholinguistic fecundity
that I hope to have gleaned some of. To put things in perspective: when Shota came to
UMass, there were two experimental research programs that I had been working on over
the course of those four years; by the end of his first semester, I had to set down all of
them in a document to avoid losing track, and I believe the count came out to 10 or 12.
Beyond this, he has been very generous: my “extra” year of funding that supported the
time period in which much of the research and writing of this dissertation took place came
from a research assistantship that was part of his funding deal as a new hire. But due to
the pandemic, working from home, and being busy writing that dissertation, I ended up
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doing very little over the past year to merit being called a research assistant. Shota never
raised the issue, though he would have been right to, and I am immensely grateful for the
time that afforded to work on this project with few other concerns to occupy me.
Then there is Tom Roeper, who no less than my two committees has exerted a huge
influence on my thinking. Tom recruited me from a second-semester psycholinguistics and
language acquisition course to work on the recursion project, which is studying how the
deepest principles of grammar are reflected in the very beginnings of child language. Tom’s
approach to the study of language is one of eclecticism; whenever I have had the fortune
to meet with him, we have never ended up quite where I expected at the start, but we had
always covered some interesting and unexplored territory. As a consequence (or a cause?
It’s hard to say) of this eclecticism, he is an idea and example generator par excellence. His
ability to come up with examples that verge on the quirky, and yet whose clarity, applica-
bility, and reach is arresting and unquestionable, is supernatural. My computer and notes
are full of one-off observations he would make during our meetings that I would hastily
scratch down for “later investigation.”Of course, trying to keep upwith the amount ofwork
truly following up on every observation I could attribute to him would be futile. It seems
as though he could generate enough interesting data to fuel an entire research program
in an afternoon, without even trying. Beyond this, Tom is one of the most positive peo-
ple on the planet. While seeing a question from others could often make me preemptively
worry about some feature or other of an idea (rightfully and helpfully so), Tom’s questions
in pretty much every instance I can remember were the highest kind of praise, where he
would show through an on-the-spot example that some important prediction buried in the
analysis was, in fact, borne out; suggest a connection with some distant phenomenon that
was clearly relevant and whose mysteries could now be explored anew; and find some con-
nectionwith the deepest parts of grammar that was always present but not recognized. Just
about every single question I can remember from Tom directed at me or any other speaker
was like this, and they were all a delight. I am grateful to him for helping to disarm some
of my natural tendency toward cynicism and languor through his effusive positive energy.
Beyond those above who have advised me on mywork and whose spirit I hope to carry
on through it, I have had the happy chance to work with many other outstanding people
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at UMass. As a teaching and research assistant, I had the great fortune to work with not
only Kyle, Seth, Tom, Brian, Lyn, and Shota, but also with Nick LaCara, John Kingston, and
Magda Oiry. Nick made my first introduction to teaching linguistics much easier than it
could have beenwith his well-crafted handouts and clear guidance onwhat to teach in each
section and how to grade assignments. John Kingston afforded me a great deal of support
while I had to navigate TAing three sections of linguistics 101with himwhile taking a 4-day-
a-week stats course, and I hope to emulate the clarity and precision of his lecture materials.
And Magda Oiry was an immense help in dealing with a difficult situation as a teaching
assistant for an online 101 course that had been causingme no small amount ofworry (and I
am thankful for Joe Pater’s support with that one as well). I am also grateful to Alice Harris
for being my first point of contact with UMass, as she was the one who informed me of the
fortunate decision and gave me a wonderful first impression of this friendly department,
to Ana Arregui for helping me prepare for an interview, Gaja Jarosz for keeping me on
track with paperwork, and Lisa Green for serving as the Graduate Program Director for
my first-year cohort. In all these capacities, their generosity has exceeded all reasonability.
Of course, there is more to be thankful for than those who supported my research so
directly. Tom Maxfield proved a steadfast guard against the vagaries of the UMass admin-
istration, helping me navigate more funding issues than I can properly recall. Michelle
McBride has helped me navigate issues of registration and paperwork, and more besides.
When Rong and I were traveling during concerts of the Springfield Symphony Orchestra,
Michelle and Sharon would ensure our tickets would not go to waste—and while we were
simply grateful for that, they made the effort to repay us in kind by taking us to a lovely
dinner and piano show, a non-academic highlight ofmy time in the happy valley.While Bar-
bara Partee is an intellectual titan of the department, she is also a titan of its Gemütlichkeit. I
am grateful to her for her beginning-of-semester parties,1 and for her taking me and Rong
to concerts around the five colleges (at no charge to us!). I am also thankful to perennial
Visiting Professor Tom Ernst for many interesting and collegial conversations at dinner par-
ties over the years, and to Andrew Cohen for an excellent statistics course. Though I only
1Which I would humbly suggest start dedicating their beginnings to the drinking of tea. This would, of
course, allow one to refer to the event as the annual “Partee part-tea party,” which in my mind is simply too
good an opportunity to pass up.
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met with Jeremy Hartman twice, I wish I had more, as he provided important, interest-
ing, and unanticipated commentary both times; I am glad to have had him as the chair of
my generals papers. Linguistics is much the poorer for his absence. Of the departments I
was fortunate enough to sample in my open house tour, UMass stood out as the friendliest
and most collegial, and it is because of all of the great people mentioned in these previous
paragraphs (and others whose influence has been less direct but still acutely felt).
I am also thankful to so many of my fellow graduate students at UMass. While I don’t
think I can simply list everyone present at UMass during my tenure their, those not specif-
ically mentioned should know that they still have their presence in my heart. Leland Kus-
mer, IvyHauser, CoralHughto, BrandonPrickett,Maggie Baird, andLeahChapman formed
the core of the Spectrolunch/party group (along with the sometimes-participants Bethany
Dickerson, Alex Nyman, Max Nelson, and Erika Mayer). Treating spectrogram reading
as a Jumble-like puzzle helped liven up many busy and difficult weeks, not only because
of the diversion but because of the positive spirit they all brought. Regrettably, the pan-
demic seems to have put an end to Spectrolunch, and its most recent organizers have all
departed UMass—my hope is that this is only temporary; I would hate to see this tradi-
tion truly die, since it was a welcome source of good spirits. Beyond this, I am grateful
to Hsin-Lun Huang (who never fails to take everything one says in the utmost serious-
ness), Duygu Göksu, Kaden Holladay, Jyoti Iyer, Kimberly Johnson, Erika Mayer, Anissa
Neal, Rodica Ivan, Christopher Hammerly, Alex Göbel, Deniz Özyıldız, Petr Kusliy, Ka-
tia Vostrikova, Sakshi Bhatia, David Erschler, Jérémy Pasquereau, Andrew Lamont, and
Adina Camelia Bleotu (a visitor to the department) for many illuminating questions and
discussions about my research and others’ over the years. I am also grateful to my cohort—
Chris Hammerly, Alex Göbel, Brandon Prickett, Carolyn Anderson, and Jaieun Kim—for
“foreign of the week,” the Friday-morning homework sessions in the first-year office, and
the late night stats homework sessions (which were also attended by some stats students
not in this cohort). Those in the know will realize one name is missing from my cohort
here—because I must save the best for last.
I must also mention at least one undergraduate student at UMass that deserves special
thanks. While I am grateful to all of the students that have been in the classes I have been
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fortunate enough to TA for in many ways that resist description, I am especially grateful
to Barbora Hlachova for being an excellent research assistant on several experiments. Barb
is a patient and quick learner, and very accommodating. She was originally going to help
me run an eye-tracking experiment—and then COVID cut the legs out from under that one
before it could really get going. When I then made to develop an online speech production
version of the experiment (in collaboration with Shota), she was just as enthusiastic about
helping transcribe and analyze the speech data. Her conscientious assistance saved me a
lot of time and has let me progress much faster in this project than I otherwise could have.
Both the individuals above and the UMass Syntax, Psycholing, and Semantics work-
shops (whose regular participants overlap substantially with everyone I have listed up to
this point, with the important-to-note additions of the psychologists Jon Burnsky, Chuck
Clifton, and Adrian Staub) have my gratitude for presenting their own interesting work,
accepting my often misguided questions in good humor, and providing much useful feed-
back on early-and later-stage ideas; and on many abstracts over the years. For similar rea-
sons, thanks is due to the members of the eye-tracking and GAP/SPAM labs as well. Par-
ticularly helpful and encouraging feedback at conferences came from Bronwyn Bjorkman,
Gary Thoms, Beth Levin, Ryan Walter Smith, Jianrong Yu, Yining Nie, Faruk Akkuş, and
Byron Ahn. EmmaNguyen talked to me about her work on language acquisition in an area
that I was investigating in adult psycholinguistics, which provided much useful perspec-
tive and insight. Monica Do spoke to me about her work on speech production on the same
topic. Ming Xiang helped me put together an application for the NSF SBE postdoctoral re-
search fellowship; while it unfortunately wasn’t funded, she put a lot of effort into helping
me develop a project and proposal that I am proud of. Someday I promise I will go back
and pick up those threads. Bob Frank offered me a job as a computational linguist despite
me having little background in this area, which I am excited to begin, as it should let me
apply what I have learned over these past years in a new way. There are surely many other
people who have touched my life and helped me grow at UMass in ways that I have over-
looked and so failed to mention with the weight they deserve. I assure them that this is
accidental, and that their contributions are none the less appreciated for it.
The UMass library staff also merit some thanks for quickly responding to my requests
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for books and scanned articles (whichweremany, particularly over the previous twomonths).
I am amazed they got through them all.
As distant as the pre-UMass times seem at this moment, there were also those before
who have had a profound influence on my intellectual development. From UT Austin, I
want to especially thank Stephen Wechsler, Scott Myers, and Juan Colomina-Almiñana.
Stephen Wechsler taught my first real syntax course, which spurred my interest in argu-
ment structure that has driven me since. I had Scott Myers as an instructor for courses on
phonetics and “how to do experiments on language.” The course on phonetics was amodel
of clarity, and has inspired an interest in the psycholinguistics of speech perception that sim-
mers in the background ofmymind.Many times this knowledge of phonetics has savedme
when standing in front of a section of students with eager questions. The course on how
to do experiments was my first introduction to psycholinguistics and statistical analysis,
and my term paper in that class inspired the topic of my first generals paper at UMass. It is
unlikely that I would have become as interested in psycholinguistics as I amwithout Scott’s
teaching. Juan Colomina-Almiñana encouraged me to view myself as a researcher; while
our paper has unfortunately languished over the years, I am grateful for him inviting me
as a lowly and somewhat directionless undergraduate to collaborate on an extension of a
term paper I submitted to his class on Hispanic sociolinguistics. He was the first professor
to refer tome as a colleague—andwhen I was still an undergraduate! Me!—which afforded
me the mental perspective to view myself as someone who could do all of the things I was
interested in and reading about. I am truly grateful.
Still earlier than this were the professors of the distant pre-UT Austin era. At Texas State
University – San Marcos, I had the great fortune to take classes from Nancy Wilson. Her
courses on English writing took me from someone who fancied he could put together a
sentence to someone who actually could, and could moreover employ rhetorical devices in
service of loftier ideals, rather than as mere geegaws. Once she said to the class that “You’ll
never getmore feedback on your assignments than fromme,”whichwasn’t somuch a boast
as an accurate observation. I have done my best to follow this lead with my students. Her
feedback was not only technical, but substantive, as she would ask questions that would
push me to truly engage with what I was saying—after the first paper in her class, I made
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sure to never write down anything that I didn’t truly believe and think through first. She
approached me at the end of my first class with her and offered me a position at the Texas
State University Writing Center (which later led to me being able to get a job at the UT
AustinWriting Center while bypassing the usual tedious process of taking a semester-long
course on the theory and practice of writing centers). Having the opportunity to be a peer
writing consultant has proven transformational in my own writing; others have told me
that my writing is clear and well-organized—while I cannot speak to whether these claims
are entirely accurate, to the extent they are it is because of Nancy, the opportunities she
afforded me, and what she taught me about how to deploy writing with great skill.
Also at Texas StateUniversitywasAntonioGragera,whose course on the syntax of Span-
ish was my first real exposure to linguistic analysis, simplified though it was for a bunch
of language majors. Somewhat ironically, this course made me want to change my major
from Spanish to linguistics—though ultimately I ended up double majoring. Then there
was Agustín Cuadrado, whose courses on Spanish literature and film led to me buying far
more books byGarcía-Márquez, Borges, and other giants ofmagical realism than I can truly
hope to finish (though I did manage to finish Cien Años in its original precise and poetic
Spanish a few years ago, which I am eternally grateful to him for). And at Austin Commu-
nity College, there was Todd Phillips, whose Spanish language classes made so clear to me
that my earlier notions of foreign languages as mere substitution ciphers of English could
not have been farther from the truth (it was the verbal morphology that captured my heart
and mind—how efficient and unlike English!). There were also my non-academic Span-
ish instructors, my co-workers from my first job at Chick-fil-A—Chuy, Lulu, Mariana, José,
Adriana, Yesenia (and others whose names I’ve since lost to memory)—whose willingness
to speak Spanish with this gringo led to me internalizing Spanish in a way that has proven
fairly resilient over time.
Now I turn to my family, whose contributions to this dissertation are the deepest and
most subtle. My dad, though he might be surprised to know it, is ultimately responsible
for setting me down the path of linguistics. The fateful event was when he took me to a late
showing of the first of Peter Jackson’s films in The Lord of the Rings series. This led to me
becoming obsessed with J. R. R. Tolkien’s books, and his constructed languages therein,
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which was cemented by Helge Kåre Fauskanger’s excellent website Ardalambion. This in
turn led to an interest in linguistics that was stoked by the daughter of a family friend
(whose name I can’t recall) who was studying linguistics lending me John McWhorter’s
The Power of Babel. Due to the combination of this with my interest in Spanish, I ultimately
decided to major in linguistics and Hispanic linguistics as an undergraduate.
Beyond this, my dad andmom have never ceased to support me in all my ludicrous and
peregrine aspirations over the years. From paleontologist, to comic strip artist, to novelist,
to computer scientist, to sound engineer, to Spanish major, and finally(?), to linguist, they
have always been behind me. I recall one time in particular, during the comic strip artist
epoch, where I insisted upon getting professional quality Koh-I-Noor Rapidograph pens
for inking, and so mymomwent with me to a fancy pen store in downtown Austin where I
bought several pens that I didn’t really need to support a illusorily foreseen career. My dad
bought me several textbooks on Java to support my ambition to become a programmer,
and helped me get set up and debug. Many other stories like this could be told, but this
isn’t a biography. I also have to thank them for the bedrock of my education: I count myself
fortunate among the homeschooled to have made it where I am.
My brother and sister have not substantially played a role in my educational develop-
ment, but I amno less grateful to them. Being able to hang outwith them, play video games,
and cultivate an absolutely atrociously dry sense of humor over the years has been invalu-
able in shapingme.More distant relations also deserve their share of thanks: Grandma and
Grandpa, Dear and Papa, who always taught me to never stop with their steadfast faith in
and support of me. I am sad that Grandpa and Papa did not make it to the end of this
dissertation—I wish they were around for me to be able to properly convey my thanks.
Papa in particular was someone whose difficult to describe balance of sternness and utter
compassion makes him one of my role models. I also have to thank my uncles, aunts, and
cousins, for their encouragement and less direct though no less important support.
Mymother-in-law,柳小梅 (Liǔ Xiǎoméi), has also been a large source of support. As she
does not speak English, I will have to rely on Rong to convey these thoughts to her.妈妈
(Māma) has supported the research behind this dissertation quite directly by doing a lot
of cooking while she stayed with us for the first year of the COVID pandemic. She is also
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responsible for organizing much of my trip to China, and ensuring that I was never short
of ice for drinks while I was there (which, to the uninitiated, is a real concern). Rong also
tells me that she always takes my side in disagreements, which I find incredibly amusing
and sweet. The rest of Rong’s family is also sweet and supportive; though her brother Isaac
(who speaks English) is the only other one I have much interacted with directly, he, along
with 姥姥 (lǎolao), 大姨妈 (dà yímā), 大姨爹 (dà yídiē), 二姨妈 (èr yímā), 陈大夫 (Chén
dàifu),舅舅 (jiùjiu),舅妈 (jiùmā),姐姐 (jiějie), Frank, Charles,萌宝 (Méngbǎo), and 茵茵
(Yīnyīn) (and督督 (dūdū)) have welcomed me into the family with open arms and hearts.
And of course, I would be remiss to forget Tigger, Baxter, Einstein, Cody, and Sparky,
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What is the relationship between the word spray in the sentence John sprayed the paint
onto the wall and its identically pronounced counterpart in John sprayed the wall with the paint?
At some level, we recognize these two uses of spray as the same word. But the fact that they
combine with their arguments in different ways means they cannot be identical. The rela-
tionship between these two uses of spray—called the spray/load alternation—is productive
in a way that a descriptively adequate grammar of English should capture. Other verbs
show the same pattern, adults and children extend it to novel verbs, and children learn-
ing English overextend the pattern to non-alternating verbs. For these and other reasons,
precisely how to describe and explain the spray/load alternation has been well-studied.
I discuss two kinds of novel evidence that bear on the correct analysis of the spray/load
alternation. First, I wield the adverb again as a diagnostic of the syntactic and semantic
decomposition of spray/load verbs, which reveals a syntactic bracketing paradox. Second,
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I dive deep into hitherto little explored facts that reveal striking asymmetries between the
two kinds of objects of spray/load verbs. Goal objects are subject to restrictions onmovement
and nominalization that theme objects are not.
To account for these data, I propose an analysis that makes two theoretical contribu-
tions. First, the bracketing paradox revealed by again can be neatly resolved by a theory of
syntax that allows multidominance. Second, the asymmetries between theme and goal ob-
jects suggests goal objects are derived in English by the conflation of a phonologically null
preposition with the verb root, which reduces the asymmetries to facts about the syntax of
prepositions.
Finally, I compare my analysis to others empirically and theoretically. Empirically, my
analysis loses no significant ground to others’ and has the advantage of accounting for the
novel evidence discussed above. Theoretically, my approach requires only a simple and
independently motivated syntax and semantics; my analysis’ compatibility with this archi-
tectural simplicity constitutes an explanatory advantage compared to accounts that require
more theoretical machinery to achieve similar or lesser levels of descriptive adequacy.
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Relations between different words can tell us a lot about how language constructsmean-
ing. Words can be related in many ways. One way words can be related is by virtue of their
semantics, as with buy and sell. For any sentence containing the verb buy, we can construct
a corresponding sentence using the verb sell that has an approximately identical meaning.
(1) a. John bought a shirt from Bill.
b. Bill sold a shirt to John.
A general goal of a theory of grammar is to characterize regularity in a usefulway. Given the
observation that every sentence with the verb buy has a corresponding sentence containing
the verb sell that differs from it in predictable ways (and vice versa), a natural inclination is
posit some grammatical mechanism that would derive this regularity in a principled way.
However, a problem for this the relation between buy and sell is not a common one. Most
verbs do not have doublets that behave like this. The relation is not really all that regular,
and so in this particular case it is attributed to a quirk of these particular verbs, rather than
to some deep principle of the grammar.
And important question that this raises is howwe knowwhether two words are related
productively or only accidentally. As an example of the problem, considering the following
two pairs of sentences.
1
(2) a. They buy many books.
b. They bought many books.
(3) a. They deposited the money at the bank.
b. They secured the boat by the bank.
A quite reasonable view is that the words buy and bought in (2) are related in a way that
should be described by the correct theory of English grammar. In contrast, the words bank
and bank in (3) are not related in away that should be stated by the correct theory of English
grammar. What underlies these intuitions, and distinguishes them from the relationship
between buy and sell?
The relationship cannot be one of a shared phonological core.While buy and bought both
start with a /b/, this is the only phoneme they share. And while that phoneme occurs at
the beginning of both words, we would not seriously propose that every word beginning
with a /b/ is productively related to buy and bought. As a clear case in point, the words bank
and bank in (3) have identical phonological content, and yet we do not consider them to be
related, except in that accidental and grammatical irrelevant way we term homophony.
Of course, a shared common phonology can often help us identify relationships be-
tween words. In most cases, phonological processes do not affect words’ phonologies so
drastically as in the case of buy and bought. But the point I want to make here is simply
that we cannot use phonology as the sole means of identifying relations between words,
and any putative relation between words that we are inspired to investigate on the basis
of phonological similarity will never be stated in solely phonological terms in its accurate
characterization.1
We are thus left still struggling with how to properly characterize the relationship be-
tween words like buy and bought in a way that does not predict a relationship between bank
(financial institution) and bank (the land near the edge of a river). Adding syntax to our
phonology will not help us here either; while it is true that both buy and bought are of the
same syntactic category, so are the two banks. We cannot state the relationship in terms of
syntactic category, even with a caveat of shared phonology.
1Except possibly for Borer (2013), who proposes that lexical roots are identified only by their phonology—
though even she must build in a space for irregular past tense forms.
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Instead, the relationship seems to be statable at the level of semantics. The meaning of
buy and bought is identical with the exception that bought is used to describe an event that
occurred in the past and buy is used to describe one that occurs habitually (and has a non-
third-person singular subject). In contrast, the two banks do not seem to have any shared
meaning. While they are both descriptions of entities, they are true of very different sets of
entities (though perhaps the sets of entities they are true of are not entirely disjoint). Thus,
as long as we allow for some well-defined variation in meaning of the sort buy and bought
exemplify, we can characterize their relationship at the level of their semantic denotation.
A long-popular way of accounting for this “well-defined variation in meaning” is to
propose that buy and bought have internal structure. The shared part of this internal struc-
ture is what is responsible for the common semantics these words have; I will call it √buy.
The part of meaning that is not shared is related to when the event each describes takes
place relative to the time that a sentence containing each is uttered, so we can call it Tense.
Whether Tense is Past or Present influences the pronunciation of√buy. If Tense is Past, then
√buy is pronounced as bought; if Tense is Present, then √buy is pronounced as buy (or buys,
depending on the φ-features of the subject).
This way of characterizing the relationship between buy and bought is a very standard
one. It is useful in that it allows us to understand the relationship between the denotation
of buy and bought as being rule-governed: both have the meaning of the lexical constant
√buy, which composes with the denotation of either Past or Present in a predictable way,
to give rise to the meanings these words are associated with in (2). We could call this a
decompositional approach, since in order to capture the productive relationship between
buy and bought, we posited that each is decomposable into two parts: a shared component
√buy, and a different component Past or Present.
In this dissertation, I will analyze a relationship between words that is in some ways
similar to the one between buy and bought, and in some ways quite different. This relation-
ship is called “alternation.” What defines alternation is a syntactic difference between two
sentences that have to do with how a predicate’s arguments are arranged, where the predi-
cate seems to have an identical or near-identical meaning in each sentence. The fact of there
being a sharedmeaning is similar to the relationship we discussed between buy and bought.
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What distinguishes alternation from this has to do with the arrangement and/or interpre-
tation of the predicate’s arguments, which differ between the sentences that exemplify a
particular alternation.
The empirical domain I investigate is the spray/load alternation, exemplified in (4–5).2
(4) a. John sprayed the paint onto the wall. (theme-object structure)
b. John sprayed the wall with the paint. (goal-object structure)
(5) a. John loaded the boxes onto the truck. (theme-object structure)
b. John loaded the truck with the boxes. (goal-object structure)
The spray/load alternation refers to the fact that verbs like spray and load can occur in two
distinct structures, related to the realization of the non-agent arguments. Here, unlike in the
case of buy and bought, their phonology is identical—though this happens to be an acciden-
tal fact about English, and is not critical. What is important has to do with the arrangement
and interpretation of the arguments in each variant of the alternation. In the theme-object
structure, a theme argument (the paint/the boxes) occurs immediately following the verb,
while a goal argument (the wall/the truck) is the object of a preposition. In the goal-object
structure, a theme argument is the object of a preposition, while a goal argument occurs
immediately following the verb.3 I will provide better definitions for the terms “theme”
and “goal” in chapters 3 and 4; for now I use them loosely and rely on the charity of the
informed reader.
Like the contrast between buy and bought, the semantic relationship between the sen-
tences in the spray/load alternation is not one of identity. In the case of buy and bought this
is because of a difference in Tense. In the case of the spray/load alternation, Tense may re-
main constant. What is more, the meaning difference associated with the spray/load alterna-
tion is subtle, and not necessarily immediately apparent without provisioning the proper
examples. The semantic relationship between each variant of the spray/load alternation is
2A table of all the verbs that Levin (1993) identifies as participating in the spray/load alternation can be
found in the first table in the appendix to chapter 4. That table also summarizes some other properties of these
verbs that play a role in the discussion in chapters 3 and 4.
3The reason for the somewhat awkward phrasing of this paragraph is that I am attempting to remain theory-
neutral at this point regarding whether both of, e.g., the paint and the wall are arguments of the verb. Ultimately,
I will argue that neither the theme nor the goal is a semantic argument of the verb root.
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perhaps best described as “near-entailment,” with each member of the pair nearly but not
quite entailing the other. The reason for this near-entailment is something I will explain
shortly, and attempting to explain its source is one of the topics of chapters 3 and 4.
My approach to investigating this alternation is inspired by Peirce (1897)’s metaphor of
verbs as one of the atomic parts of a sentence. Under this view, a verb’s valency determines
the number and kind of arguments it combines with in the same way that a chemical’s
valency determines the number and kind of elements it can combine with. Ultimately, I ad-
vocate an increasingly popular view that this metaphor is not quite right: rather than verbs
being atoms, they aremolecules composed of a lexical core that contributes a basic event de-
scription and functional heads that impose further structure on that basic event type. One
clear example of this is Tense in the case of buy and bought; I will propose that there are
additional functional heads implicated in the relationship between the theme-object and
goal-object structures that do have an overt phonological reflex in English. This approach,
which decomposes what we might call “surface verbs” into complexes of functional heads
surrounding a lexical core, has been widely adopted in research on argument structure in
recent years (see Borer (2005b) and Harley (2011) for overviews).
What distinguishes my approach from previous approaches in this vein is that I pro-
vide a syntax and semantics that work together and which go “all the way down.” In other
words, I provide a fully fleshed out syntactic analysis of the spray/load alternation along
with a fully worked out compositional semantics. Prior work on the spray/load alternation
(and, indeed, prior work in this general approach to argument structure) tends to focus
on either syntax or semantics to the exclusion of the other (though, of course, there are
the rare, pleasant exceptions). The contribution of this dissertation is thus not only in the
analysis I propose, but also in the methodology used, which provides an example of how
to construct an analysis of argument structure phenomena that is fully integrated with an
independent syntax and semantics. In my view, the less bespoke theoretical machinery an
analysis requires, the more likely it is to be explanatory—perhaps even right.
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1.2 Setting the Stage
To get started, I will summarize some of themain issues that have been identified as part
of what a full account of the spray/load alternation should explain according to prior litera-
ture, and then provide an outline of the rest of the dissertation. One of the first things that
wemust establish is that the spray/load alternation is something that requires a grammatical
explanation, like the active-passive alternation. If one could simply memorize which verbs
occur with which structures, then there would be nothing to explain. We must determine
whether the two structures available to spray/load verbs are related in a productive way that
a proper grammatical analysis should explain.
It is clear that there must be some predictable relationship between the two structures
involved in the spray/load alternation, with evidence coming from acquisition. Children,
it seems, can pick up on this predictability and generalize (sometimes incorrectly) that
when they hear a particular verb used in one structure, it can be used in the other (Bower-
man 1982). Such overgeneralization occurs in both directions, showing that the relationship
must be derivable given either surface form as input.
(6) Theme-object → Goal-object:
a. E, 7;2: Look, Mom, I’m gonna pour it with water, my belly.
b. E, 4;11: I don’t want it because I spilled it of orange juice.
(Pinker 1989, (1.19) and Bowerman 1982, tab. 11.3, (13))
(7) Goal-object → Theme-object:
a. Mark, 4;7: And fill the little sugars up in the bowl how much you should.
b. E, 4;5: I’m going to cover a screen over me.
(Pinker 1989, (1.18) and Bowerman 1982, tab. 11.3, (5))
In addition, Pinker (1989) reports that children who were taught novel nonce verbs in only
the theme-object structure productively used them in the goal-object structure 78–100% of
the time.
Such evidence shows us that our model of grammar must be able to characterize a pro-
ductive relationship between the theme-object and goal-object structures of the spray/load
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alternation. We could write a descriptive rule that makes this relation explicit as follows
(after Hall 1965, p. 87).
(8) DP1 V DP2 PLOC DP3 ↔ DP1 V DP3 with DP2
Note that the relationship between the two structures is bidirectional—it does not assume
that one structure is basic.4 Given what we have seen, this makes sense because the pro-
ductivity of this alternation can go in both directions (Pinker 1989). Despite this, it is fairly
common to assume that the theme-object structure is the more basic of the two, with the
goal-object structure derived productively from it. We could imagine that one could rea-
son backward that the goal-object structure must have been derived from the theme-object
structure, and thereby generate it even if the process is not explicitly specified as productive
in that direction.
However, stating the relationship this way with no further restrictions would overgen-
erate for adult speakers. The fact that we refer to data like those in (6–7) as overgeneraliza-
tions makes this clear. In adult English, there are in fact verbs that occur in one or the other
structure only.
(9) a. John dumped water into the sink.
b. ★ John dumped the sink with water.
(10) a. ★ John covered the blanket onto the screen.
b. John covered the screen with the blanket.
At some level, it must be specifiedwhich verbs allow both frames. This means the grammar
must allow us to state which verbs occur in which structures. A simple approach to this
would be to say that each verb is simply marked for which frames it occurs in. Then, we
would not need a rule to relate them. The problem with this approach is that it would fail
to account for the productivity of the alternation. One of the interesting problems raised
by the spray/load alternation, then, is the problem of constrained productivity. A thought
about how to account for this constrained productivity is to seek not to find the relationship
between the theme-object and goal-object structures in a transformation, but instead to find
4This is not a feature of many analyses, including Hall (1965)’s original proposal.
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it elsewhere.Where exactly this “elsewhere” is remains a topic of debate; I make a proposal
about this in chapter 3.
One task that an explanation of the spray/load alternation faces, then, is its productivity.
In other words, it must provide some account of how the theme-object and goal-object
structures are related to one another syntactically and/or semantically. Rappaport & Levin
(1988) and Rappaport et al. (1993) note that there are (at least) three other properties to be
explained.
(11) a. The near paraphrase relation between the two variants must be captured;
b. The linking of the arguments should be predictable in terms of their theta-
roles;
c. The affected interpretation of the goal as direct argumentmust be accounted
for.
In the following subsections, I establish these four desiderata in more detail (acquisition/
productivity, paraphrasability, linking, and affectedness).
1.2.1 Acquisition
In his explanation of how the spray/load alternation is acquired as a productive rule,
Pinker (1989) considers the fact that the alternation is somewhat choosy: he reports that
not all verbs that occur in one of the two structures occur in both.
(12) a. John filled the glass with the water.
b. ★ John filled the water into the glass.
(13) a. ★ John poured the glass with the water.
b. John poured the water into the glass.
Pinker (1989)’s explanation relates these facts to the lexical semantics of the verbs: fill speci-
fies a result state, while pour specifies amanner of motion. The objects of each of these verbs
correspond to the entity that the verbs’ lexical semantics apply to. Verbs like spray/load are
primarily manner verbs, like pour. What distinguishes them from pour is that they produce
8
a predictable effect on the location that the moved object contacts, allowing them to be con-
ceptualized as change of state verbs like fill, which allows them to be realized using the
syntax of such verbs.
A problem for this account and others like it is that it is highly idiosyncratic to English.
For instance, while fill does not generally occur in the theme-object structure in English,
its Hindi translation equivalent भर bhar can freely occur in both the goal-object and theme-
object structures. Similar facts hold in Mandarin Chinese and German, as well as other
languages.5


















































“You have filled the entire room with nails.”
























































“I filled the bottle with some water.”


























“John filled the glass with water.”
5See Kim (1999) for a thorough discussion of cross-linguistic differences in the spray/load alternation, as
well as Mateu (2000, 2017), Damonte (2005), and Lewandowski (2014).
6Note that this sentence does not include any word that should be glossed as with. This speaks against any
potential cross-linguistic account of the spray/load alternation thatwould assign a crucial role towith in deriving
the alternation. I am not aware of any accounts like this, but it may be worth noting.
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Thus, Pinker’s explanation of why fill does not alternate fails to extend to Hindi, Mandarin,
and German, unless we assume that fill in these languages does not encode a result state.7
Other languages pose similar problems for this sort of account as well, as described by
Kim (1999) and Beavers (2017). Furthermore, this account may not be entirely adequate
for English either. At least some speakers can accept fill in the theme-object structure, and
pour is similarly acceptable for some speakers if full is added.8
(17) a. % The chef filled the mixture into the zucchini.
b. % John poured the glass full with/of water.
Pinker notes cases like (17b), considering them evidence for his approach. However, it is
unclear why verbs like spray can be associated with a result state in the absence of an adjec-
tive that specifies it, while pour requires this to be explicit.
1.2.2 Paraphrasability
What makes us consider the spray/load alternation an alternation has to do with the fact
that the meaning of the theme-object and goal-object structures are intuitively very similar.
Going beyond the level of intuition, Rappaport & Levin (1988) and Rappaport et al. (1993)
note that a goal-object sentence seems to entail a theme-object sentence, but not vice versa.
7This is claimed to be the case forMandarin in Pao (1996, p. 9) andGerman in Rosen (1996, p. 211). However,
for at least Mandarin, the facts may be more complicated; Rong Yin (p.c.) reports to me that if the theme is
modified by一些 yī xiē ‘some,’ it is indeed the case that neither structure necessarily encodes the fullness of
the goal. But if this is omitted (as in Pao 1996’s original examples), she reports that the variant in (15b) is most
naturally interpreted as indicating that the container is (contextually) completely full, while this is not the case
in the variant in (15a). However, Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.) reports tome that he does not feel there is a large difference
between English fill and Hindi भर bhar ‘fill’ with regards to encoding the fullness of the object, though this is
based on a snap judgment rather than the results of a full battery of semantic tests. I have not verified the
situation in German.
The proper diagnostic, of course, is to verifywhether these sentences are true in scenarioswhere the container
is not full, or equivalently whether negating the fullness of the container in a continuation would lead to a
contradiction. However, tests like these suggest to me that the origin of the intuition that the English verb fill
necessarily encodes fullness could be mistaken. For instance, examples like John filled the vase with a little bit of
water and then put the flowers in do not seem contradictory to me—clearly, the vase is not being described as
completely full (even contextually), because the flowers can be put into it without leading to a contradiction.
Instead, it is perhaps the case that fill, for some unknown reason, can only occur in the goal-object structure.
This structure might force a fullness interpretation on the goal object, or strongly favor one. Thus, the fullness
interpretation of fill could be due to the fact that fill, for independent reasons, can only occur in a goal-object
structure that imposes a holistic interpretation of the goal, rather than the other way around. See also the
discussion in chapter 4 around examples (11–12) and fn. 39. See also the discussion in chapter 5, section 5.3.1,
where I propose that the implicational reversal of syntax and lexical semantics might provide an alternative
source for a proposed link between manner/result lexical semantics and the spray/load alternation.
8I myself do not find these sentences fully acceptable, and others I have consulted have given different
judgments, so there appears to be interspeaker variation regarding this point.
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(18) a. John sprayed the wall with paint. → John sprayed paint onto the wall.
b. John sprayed paint onto the wall. ↛ John sprayed the wall with paint.
The reason for the unidirectional entailment has to do with the third property Rappaport
& Levin (1988) and Rappaport et al. (1993) mention: the affected interpretation of the goal,
which I will discuss in due course.9
1.2.3 Linking
In Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s and Rappaport et al. (1993)’s framework, arguments re-
ceive particular interpretations based on where they occur in an event structural template.
Such templates consist of broadly motivated logical predicates that combine with the rich
encyclopedic meaning of particular verbs that flesh them out. Theta-roles, in their system,
are a shorthand for referring towhere arguments occur in particular event structures. Based
on this structural information, linking rules determine how each argument projects into a
syntactic structure by assigning to each a grammatical function such as subject, object, indi-
rect object, or oblique. These grammatical functions are in turn, associated with particular
structural positions.10
Thus, what Rappaport & Levin (1988) and Rappaport et al. (1993) mean in (11b) is
that the event structural templates associated with each structure must provide enough
information to determine why, for instance, the wall occurs as the direct object in the goal-
object structure, while it appears in a PP in the theme-object structure (and vice versa for
paint).
9Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.) reports to me a different intuition regarding the source of the entailment asymmetry,
which I share. This intuition is that the goal-object structure seems to encode intentionality on the part of the
agent, while the theme-object structure does not. That is, if John sprayed the wall with paint, he meant to do
so. But if John sprayed paint onto the wall, it may well have been accidental. This idea is not one that has
been discussed in the literature on the spray/load alternation, as far as I can tell. I would suggest that it may be
derivable from the meaning of the goal-object structure, which (loosely speaking, for now) seems to entail that
the goal is holistically affected, while the theme-object structure does not. Correspondingly, John sprayed the wall
with paintmay describe a scenario (the wall having paint all over it) that is less likely to arise accidentally than
the scenario described by John sprayed paint onto the wall (which is compatible with scenarios in which only a
little paint is on the wall). This idea would locate the intuition about intentionality in the pragmatics; whether
this is the right move may be worth further examination.
10As Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s and Rappaport et al. (1993)’s concerns lie primarily in identifying the
contents of event structural templates, they do not spell out precisely how grammatical functions are related
to structural positions.
11
Different theories of argument structure would frame this point in a radically differ-
ent way. In particular, Harley (2011) and Borer (2005a,b, 2013) propose theories in which
theta-roles as such have no purchase. While we might use them as descriptive labels for
different kinds of things, they do not play any causal role in the grammar. Instead, it is the
syntax that determines the meaning of arguments, not the other way around. Thus, in Rap-
paport & Levin (1988)’s and Rappaport et al. (1993)’s system, a derivation begins in the
lexicon by associating a verb with an event structural template that then determines what
kind of syntactic structure is projected. In contrast, Harley (2011)’s and Borer (2005a,b,
2013)’s system would frame the question in the opposite way, asking how syntactic struc-
tures determine the different interpretations the arguments receive in each structure. It is
these interpretations that wemight refer to as theta-roles, but they would be understood as
a result of, rather than a cause of, a particular structure in which the arguments receiving
these interpretations occur.
1.2.4 Affectedness
Perhaps the most well-studied aspect of the spray/load alternation has been this seman-
tic difference between the two structures. Whichever argument is realized as the object is
interpreted as holistically or totally affected, while the prepositional argument need not be
(Beavers 2017).
(19) John loaded the hay onto the wagon, ...
a. ... but left some space for the grain.
b. ... filling it all up.
c. # ... but there was some hay left over.
(20) John loaded the wagon with the hay, ...
a. ... but there was some hay left over.
b. ... moving every last straw.
c. # ... but left some space for the grain. (from Beavers 2017, (12–13))
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When the hay is the object of load and the wagon its prepositional object, the wagon may be
completely full or not, but all of the hay must have been used up. In contrast, when the
wagon is the object and the hay the prepositional object, the wagon must be completely full,
though some hay may be left over. This effect interacts with contextual and pragmatic fac-
tors. As Rappaport & Levin (1985) and Pinker (1989) point out, it can be true to say The
vandal sprayed the statue with paint even if the entire statue isn’t covered; what is important
is that the statue as an artistic object is completely affected even if it is only partially cov-
ered with paint. Standard semantic factors related to quantized reference also play a role;
quantized objects show the effect, while non-quantized objects do not (Beavers 2017). Note
that while Rappaport & Levin (1988) and Rappaport et al. (1993) specifically state that
an explanation only for the holistic interpretation of a goal-object is required, these data
from Beavers (2017) show that both structures merit a similar explanation of why their ob-
ject is interpreted as holistically affected. Part of the reason for this fact being traditionally
overlooked could be due to the common use of mass nouns for the theme, meaning that
conditions on quantized reference are not met. This would defuse the holistic effect in the
theme-object structure.
As Beavers (2017) notes, while there aremany putative explanations of this fact, none of
them may actually be explanations as such, as oftentimes these accounts reduce to simply
restating this fact in one way or another. For instance, Tenny (1994) presents an account
that assigns a privileged role to the object in defining the contours of an event, which she
refers to as the Measuring-Out Constraint. This proposal describes some of the same pat-
terns regarding the relation between telicity and incremental themes as discussed in Krifka
(1998). While the Measuring-Out Constraint may be a valuable descriptive generalization,
we are left with the question of why only objects can measure out events. In other words,
why couldn’t the wagonmeasure out the event in (19), or the hay in (20)? Ifwe cannot explain
why it is that objects are privileged in this way, the Measuring-Out Constraint reduces to a
restatement of the difference, as Beavers (2017) notes.
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1.3 Overview
This dissertation investigates the spray/load alternation in a very different way from pre-
viouswork.While priorwork has focused primarily on the four issues just discussed, I focus
on two sets of facts that have previously been overlooked and unaddressed.
The first kind of fact has to do with the syntax and semantics of sentences that spray/
load verbs occur in as revealed by adverbial modification. I show in chapter 2, using new ev-
idence from the adverb again, that both the theme-object and goal-object structures display
an interesting paradox. It is possible to modify the object and the verb to the exclusion of
the rest of the PP, while at the same time it is possible to modify the object and the PP to the
exclusion of the verb. Given standard assumptions about syntax, this constitutes a brack-
eting paradox, which I resolve with a syntax that allows a node to have multiple mothers
(i.e., a syntax withmultidominance). The explanation of this first kind of fact places certain
implicit limits on accounts of the spray/load alternation. In particular, the fact that the verb
and the object can bemodified to the exclusion of the PPmakes analyses that crucially treat
the object of the preposition or the PP itself as an argument of the verb difficult to maintain.
Instead, the alternation must primarily have to do with the status of the “object,” which un-
der the multidominance analysis is semantically both an argument of the verb and of the
prepositional phrase.
In chapter 3, I investigate the second kind of fact, which has remained largely over-
looked, that shows that theme-objects and goal-objects of spray/load verbs differ syntacti-
cally. The relevant data come from non-agentive uses and nominalizations of spray/load
verbs. The proposed resolution is that the goal-object structure involves the incorporation
of a null preposition with the verbal root, which accounts for this asymmetry, and consti-
tutes my account of the spray/load alternation. Chapter 4 continues to investigate the P-con-
flation analysis, where I refine Rapoport (2014)’s account of the holistic effect, and extend
the P-conflation analysis to account for non-agentive transitive uses of spray/load verbs.
Following the presentation of my analysis, chapter 5 presents a detailed comparison of
how my approach fares compared to prior work on the spray/load alternation. I describe in
detail several previous accounts of the spray/load alternation (Brinkmann 1995; Damonte
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2005; D’Elia 2016; Larson 1990, 2014; Mateu 2000, 2017; Rappaport & Levin 1988; Wunder-
lich 1997), with particular care paid to a careful evaluation of how they address acquisi-
tion, near-paraphrasability, linking, and affectedness. Then, I turn to an evaluation of my
account, discussing how it could account for the same four desiderata. As described above,
my account is aimed at explaining new sets of facts relevant to the spray/load alternation;
it is crucial to verify that focusing primarily on these facts has not led to an analysis that is
incapable of addressing the four desiderata as well.
Finally, chapter 6 examines the general utility of my approach. Ultimately, I conclude
that even if the specific claims made in this dissertation were found lacking, there are ad-
vantages in how I approach the study of argument structure alternations that would be
worth preserving. In particular, I argue that an adequate approach to argument structure
must combine fully fleshed out syntactic and semantic analyses. These syntactic and se-
mantic analyses should integrate seamlessly with existing models of syntax and semantic
composition to the extent possible. Achieving explanatory adequacy in the domain of ar-
gument structure favors the reuse of existing, well-established theoretical machinery over
the introduction of purpose-built grammatical devices that have little applicability outside
of the particular phenomenon under consideration.
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CHAPTER 2
AGAIN AND THE STRUCTURE OF SPRAY/LOAD
VERBS
2.1 Introduction
Owing to the vastness of the prior literature on the spray/load alternation, it is perhaps
surprising that I should not start by reviewing some of this work, and instead leave this
for later (in chapter 5). There is good reason for this: my investigation does not take this
prior literature as its starting point. Rather than startingwith an examination of acquisition,
linking properties, or the holistic effect, I examine the syntax and semantics of spray/load
verbs by means of a diagnostic that has not been previously employed in studying them:
the readings that again produces in sentences with spray/load verbs. This use of again to
investigate the syntactic and semantic decomposition of verb phrases follows a precedent
set by Dowty (1979), von Stechow (1995, 1996), Beck & Snyder (2001), Beck & Johnson
(2004), Beck (2005), Bale (2007), Beck & Gergel (2015), Johnson (2018), and Patel-Grosz
& Beck (2019). This work has shown that again can be wielded as a powerful diagnostic of
“hidden” event structure, as I will summarize in section 2.2. In brief, again introduces to the
meaning of a sentence that a predicate of eventualities held at a time prior to the eventual-
ity described by the sentence. Specifically which eventuality held before is the eventuality
described exclusively by the phrase again attaches to (Bale 2007). It is possible to show that
sometimes this eventuality is not the eventuality described by the whole sentence. When
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this is the case, it reveals how the complex event structure described by a sentence can be
built up in syntactic and semantic layers. Again can nestle between these layers, allowing
us a clear view of how they fit together. In the case of spray/load verbs, this leads to an ap-
parent paradox, where two different and apparently mutually incompatible syntactic and
event structures are implicated. I resolve this paradox using a syntax that allows phrases to
have more than one mother—that is, a syntax that uses multidominance.
I first turn in section 2.2 to a more detailed explanation of how the again diagnostic
works in some relatively simple cases, drawing primarily on von Stechow (1995, 1996),
Beck & Johnson (2004), and Bale (2007), with small alterations. Section 2.3 presents the
application of this diagnostic to spray/load verbs, the apparent paradox that results from
its application, and the proposed resolution. Section 2.4 two topics related to the syntax
of spray/load verbs developed in this chapter: one has to do with the interpretation of mul-
tidominated indefinites, and the other discusses away of using the diagnostics presented in
this chapter to distinguish different kinds of verbs that occur in the theme-object structure.
2.2 The Semantics and Syntax of Again
Again is an adverb that attaches to predicates of eventualities, which comprise events
and states (Bach 1981). It is an identity function that carries a presupposition that a distinct
eventuality meeting the description of the predicate it combines with held at a prior time.1
(1) a. Context: Brendan kicked the soccer ball towards the net, but it didn’t quite
make it. So ...
Anne kicked the ball again. (Bale 2007, (30a–b))
b. JAnne kicked the ball again.K =
λ𝑒.kick(𝑒 , the ball) ∧ AGENT(𝑒 ,Anne) = 1
presupposition: ∃𝑒′[𝜏(𝑒′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒) ∧ kick(𝑒′, the ball)] = 1 ≈
“Anne kicked the ball, and the ball was kicked before.”
c. JagainK = λ𝑃.λ𝑒 : ∃𝑒′[𝜏(𝑒′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒) ∧ 𝑃(𝑒′)] = 1.𝑃(𝑒) = 1
1I have not directly encoded the requirement that the prior eventuality not overlap with the eventuality
described in the asserted content. This is not difficult to do, but it would make the formulae more complicated
with little pay-off. The reader may imagine that this requirement is there but simply not typed.
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In (1b), we see that again can attach to a constituent that describes an event of kicking the
ball. The result has an identical meaning, but with a presupposition that an event of kicking
the ball occurred before as well. Note that this prior event may sometimes have a different
agent, as shown by Bale (2005, 2007), as demonstrated in the examples above; I refer the
interested reader to Bale’s work for further examples and analysis. We can factor out the
contribution of again proper as in (1c), where “𝜏” is a function from an event to its runtime,
and “≺” is a relation that chronologically orders events from earlier to later given their
runtimes. I present the eventuality that is presupposed to have held before as existentially
bound rather than as a free variable or as anaphoric, following Patel-Grosz & Beck (2019),
though this choice does not affect my analysis.
Because again has the particular semantics it does, we can analyze the readings that sen-
tences with again receive to diagnose non-surface-apparent event structure. In sentences
like (1b), we can see that the sentence contains a predicate of eventualities that contains
the verb and its object, but not the subject. In other sentences, different readings are possi-
ble. Each truth-conditionally distinct reading corresponds to a different attachment site for
again, as the semantics in (1c) will result in different readings depending on the predicate
of eventualities it modifies. Traditionally, two kinds of readings are accorded special labels,
depending onwhether the eventuality that occurred beforewas a state or an event. In case it
was a state that held before, the reading is referred to as a restitutive reading. In case it was
an event that occurred before, the reading is referred to as a repetitive reading (Bale 2005,
2007; Beck 2005; Beck & Gergel 2015; Beck & Johnson 2004; Beck & Snyder 2001; Dowty
1979; Patel-Grosz & Beck 2019; von Stechow 1995, 1996).2
(2) John opened the door again.
a. John opened the door, and the door had opened before. (repetitive)
b. John opened the door, and the door had been open before. (restitutive)
Note that “restitutive” and “repetitive” are merely terminological shortcuts to pick out
whether the eventuality associated with again’s presupposition is eventive or stative. Other
2An important point is that, as Beck & Gergel (2015) argue, the repetitive reading found in (modern day)
English cannot be explained as a counter-directional reading. This is important because it makes it easier to
use again to precisely diagnose event structure in English.
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divisions are also relevant to diagnosing the syntactic and semantic decomposition of event
structure (including subjectless vs. subject-containing repetitive readings). Other readings
have also been discussed (see Bale 2005, 2007 and Patel-Grosz & Beck 2019 for examples),
but these distinctions while important are not crucial here.
Given the hypothesis that again has a single semantics (the one in (1c)), how can we
explain the ambiguity in (2)? One answer, that adopted by von Stechow (1995, 1996) and
much subsequent work, is that the ambiguity reflects structure that is not surface apparent.
In particular, the restitutive reading shows us that there is a part of the sentence that corre-
sponds to a predicate of states of the door being open. If there were no part of the sentence
with this denotation, it would not be possible to modify it independently, as again does in













If J√openK = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.open(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1, where the semantic relation open is true of eventualities
𝑒 that are states of 𝑥 being open, themeaning of again in (1c) applied to APwill produce the
restitutive reading in (2b) (Beck & Johnson 2004; Kratzer 2005; von Stechow 1995, 1996).
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(4) JvPK =
λ𝑒.AGENT(𝑒 , John) ∧





λ𝑒.∃𝑒′[∃𝑒′′[BECOME(𝑒′, open(𝑒′′, the door))] ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1
JCAUSEK =
λ𝑃.λ𝑒.∃𝑒′[𝑃(𝑒′) ∧
CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1
JBECOMEPK =
λ𝑒′.∃𝑒′′[BECOME(𝑒′, open(𝑒′′, the door))] = 1
JBECOMEK =
λ𝑄.λ𝑒′.∃𝑒′′[BECOME(𝑒′, 𝑄(𝑒′′))] = 1
JAPK =
λ𝑒′′.open(𝑒′′, the door) = 1
JAPK =







presupposition: ∃𝑒′′′[𝜏(𝑒′′′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒′′) ∧ open(𝑒′′′, the door)] = 1
The repetitive reading will arise if again attaches to a predicate of events; in this case, if














Semantic composition proceeds as indicated in (6).
(6) JvPK =
λ𝑒.AGENT(𝑒 , John) ∧





λ𝑒.∃𝑒′[∃𝑒′′[BECOME(𝑒′, open(𝑒′′, the door))] ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1
CAUSE JBECOMEPK =
λ𝑒′.∃𝑒′′[BECOME(𝑒′, open(𝑒′′, the door))] = 1
JBECOMEPK =








presupposition: ∃𝑒′′′[𝜏(𝑒′′′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒′) ∧ ∃𝑒′′[BECOME(𝑒′′′, open(𝑒′′, the door))] = 1
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Note that in the repetitive reading, again attaches to CAUSEP rather than vP. The presuppo-
sition of again thus does not include the agent John, similarly to (1b) (several additional
examples of this reading can be found in Bale 2007).3
However, we must treat the repetitive reading with some caution: we must ensure that
it is actually distinct from the restitutive reading. This can be difficult because any case in
which the repetitive reading is true is also a case in which the restitutive reading is true.
If there was an event of opening the door before, it follows that the door was open before.
What we need is an environment in which the presupposition can only be satisfied if there
was an event of opening the door before, but not merely if the door had been open before.
This can be achieved if we introduce an additional adverb, which will interact with again.
(7) a. Context: Bill slowly opened the door, and then closed it. Frustrated with
Bill’s plodding, ...
John opened the door again quickly. (repetitive)
b. Context: The door in John’s new apartment was installed open, creating a
nice breeze. When the breeze blew it shut, ...
John opened the door again quickly. (restitutive)
(8) a. Context: Bill opened the door quickly, and then closed it. To prove he
could do it just as fast as Bill, ...
John opened the door quickly again. (repetitive)
b. Context: The door in John’s new apartment was installed open, creating a
nice breeze. When the breeze blew it shut, ...
# John opened the door quickly again.
When again occurs before quickly, we see that both a repetitive and a restitutive reading are
possible. This is expected if quickly can attach to BECOMEP above where again occurs in (4)
3 Note that structureswith v, CAUSE, and BECOME create a tripartite division of the verb phrase,which has been
explored heavily in Ramchand (2008) and subsequentwork. However, as an anonymous reviewer for Linguistic
Inquiry has pointed out to me, again is typically understood to fail to distinguish between CAUSEP and BECOMEP.
One may wonder if this constitutes an argument against such a tripartite division in favor of a bipartite one,
where a single head combines the semantics attributed to CAUSE and BECOME. While this would be an interesting
avenue to explore, the argument goes beyond the scope of the dissertation. Interestingly, one might consider
Bale (2007)’s evidence for a distinction between subject-ful repetitive readings, subjectless repetitive readings,
and restitutive readings to exemplify again’s ability to diagnose a tripartite VP. This evidence is reviewed below.
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However, when again occurs to the right of quickly, only a repetitive reading is possible,
with a purely restitutive reading being excluded. This is because quickly can only attach to
predicates of events like JBECOMEPK, since it is a manner adverb that cannot be felicitously
used to modify states, like those AP describes. In order for again to occur to the right of











In (8b), the surface position of again is only compatible with a reading in which it modifies
BECOMEP and includes the contribution of quickly in its presupposition. In order for again to
modify AP, it would have to occur below quickly. This would result in it appearing to the
left of quickly, as in (7).
Examples like (7–8) are not the only ones that show us that again’s presupposition is
crucially related to its syntactic position. For instance, consider the readings that again gives
rise to when it occurs after VP compared to the reading it produces when it occurs before
the verb.
(11) a. Context: John opened the door, and then closed it. But then ...
John opened the door again. (subject-ful repetitive)
b. Context: Bill opened the door, and then closed it. Then ...
John opened the door again. (subjectless repetitive)
c. Context: The door was installed open, and had never been closed. Then
someone shut it. So ...
John opened the door again. (restitutive)
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(12) a. Context: John opened the door, and then closed it. But then ...
John again opened the door. (subject-ful repetitive)
b. Context: Bill opened the door, and then closed it. Then ...
# John again opened the door.
c. Context: The door was installed open, and had never been closed. Then
someone shut it. So ...
# John again opened the door.
We see that when again occurs at the end of the sentence, as in (11), its presupposition
is compatible with contexts supporting at least three kinds of readings: (i) a subject-ful
repetitive reading, where the agent of the prior event is the same as the agent of the new
event; (ii) a subjectless repetitive reading, where the agent of the prior event differs from
the agent of the new event; and (iii) a restitutive reading, where the event described by
the sentence is not part of again’s presupposition (and correspondingly, nor is that event’s
agent). The restitutive and subjectless readings can be derived as shown previously, in (4)
and (6), respectively. The subject-ful repetitive reading can be derived if again attaches to
vP, and so includes the subject in its scope.4
What the facts in (12) allow us to do is distinguish the subject-ful repetitive reading
from the other two readings, because the word order in the sentences in (12) is only com-
patible with the subject-ful repetitive reading—though just as before, we must take care to
distinguish these readings if wewish to claim they are in fact different. A readingwhere the
presupposition of again does not explicitly include the agent of the prior event is of course
compatible with a context where the agents of the prior and new events happen to be the
same individual. But since we can see in (12) that a subject-ful reading is forcedwhen again
occurs before open, we know that when again occurs in this surface position, it must take
scope over vP. The reason the subject surfaces in front of again is because it moves past again
to Spec,TP to receive case and satisfy the EPP.
4There is a small technical issue here that we cannot show conclusively that the subjectless and subject-ful
repetitive readings really exist as separate readings when again immediately follows the verb in (11). Diagnos-
ing these readings requires the introduction of additional modifiers and changing the position of again. They
cannot be shown conclusively to exist when these modifiers are not present, and when again occurs immedi-

















This syntax will produce the correct word order, and allow for the subject-ful repetitive
presupposition. (I will not show the steps of semantic composition here, as they are only
trivially different from what is shown above in (6) and (4).)
However, we still need to say somethingmore here.Why can’t again left-adjoin to CAUSEP
orAP? If√open is pronouncedwhere it is shown in (13), it should be possible to adjoin again





















I will assume that what this shows us is that √open is not pronounced where it is shown
in (13). Instead, it is prounounced in v. We can model this using the operation of head-
movement: √open head-moves through BECOME and CAUSE to v. The verb pronounced as


















If open is pronounced in the position of v, it would explain why again’s presupposition
must include the subject when again precedes the verb.5 Thus, we see in a different way
how again’s presupposition is uniquely determined by its syntactic complement, provided
we adopt this idea about where verbs are pronounced.
As Bale (2007) points out, facts like those in (7–8) and (11–12) (among others) make it
difficult to maintain an analysis of restitutive againwhere its presupposition is not uniquely
determined by the predicate of eventualities it combines with (as in, e.g., Dowty 1979; Egg
1999; Jäger & Blutner 2003; Williams 2015). Such analyses posit that there is some semantic
5Note that (15) might seem to predict that again could produce a subjectless repetitive or restitutive reading
if it followed the verb but preceded the object. However, attempting to place again (or any adverb, for that
matter) in a position that linearly intervenes between the verb and the object results in ungrammaticality.
(i) ★ John opened again the door.
There are two ways we might think about this. The first is that there may simply be a requirement on lineariza-
tion in English that requires adjacency between verbs and their objects. The second possibility is that the object
moves above its base position to a position associated with accusative case assignment (though this would re-
quire additional assumptions about the reconstruction of indefinite objects, which can scope below restitutive
again). The choice is not crucial for my argument, so I remain agnostic.
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operator within restitutive again’s presupposition or some pragmatic process that can iden-
tify the result state component of a complex eventuality, and presuppose the prior existence
of a result state meeting the same description. However, if such an operator were in prin-
ciple available, the lack of a restitutive reading for (8) would not be explained, nor would
the lack of subjectless repetitive and restitutive readings for (12). Instead, one would have
to say that the again with the state-identifying operator could only occur in particular syn-
tactic positions, which in English would be post-VP, below eventive adverbs—precisely the
position where such an operator would not be required to derive the correct readings. This
would make the syntax of restitutive again restricted in an apparently ad hocway. Instead, if
one supposes that there is a single again that produces repetitive and restitutive readings,
this pattern is explained as a result of the fact that again’s presupposition necessarily con-
tains everything in its complement, if we adopt the idea that verbs are pronounced in the
position of v.
The upshot of this section is that again receives different readings depending on the se-
mantics of the constituent it modifies, which is determined bywhere it occurs syntactically.
Two readings of again receive special labels: a presupposition involving a prior event iswhat
we call a repetitive reading, while a presupposition involving a prior state is what we call
a restitutive reading. However, finer-grained distinctions are relevant as well (including,
e.g., the subjectless repetitive reading, which reveals an event-denoting constituent that ex-
cludes v/the subject). If we see that a sentence with again receives a repetitive reading, we
conclude that again is attached to and semantically modifies a syntactic constituent that is a
predicate of events (in this case, CAUSEP, since the presupposition does not include the sub-
ject). If we see that a sentence with again receives a restitutive reading, we conclude that
again is attached to and semantically modifies a syntactic constituent that is a predicate of
states (in this case, AP).
2.3 Again with Spray/load Verbs
In this section, I show that again also receives different readings depending on its po-
sition when it occurs in sentences with spray/load verbs. When it occurs following the VP,
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it is ambiguous between a repetitive reading and a restitutive reading targeting the PP,
much like what happens with double object verbs, as discussed in Beck & Johnson (2004)
and Johnson (2018). When again occurs immediately following the object, a low repetitive
reading is possible that includes the verb and object but excludes the PP. This leads to an
apparent paradox: how can the object form a constituent with the PP that excludes the
verb (shown by the restitutive reading), while simultaneously forming a constituent with
the verb that excludes the PP (shown by the low repetitive reading)? I resolve this para-
dox using an approach to syntax that allows phrases to have more than one mother (i.e.,
an approach that allows multidominance) (Citko 2005; Engdahl 1980; Gärtner 1997, 1999;
Hiraiwa & Bodomo 2008; Johnson 2012, 2018; Nunes 2001; Starke 2001, a.m.o.).
2.3.1 The Restitutive Reading
First, let’s look at what happens when again occurs following the VP in a sentence with
a spray/load verb.
(16) a. Context: Someone had previously sprayed the door with the forest green
paint, but over time the paint began to flake off. So, ...
John sprayed the door with the paint again. (repetitive)
b. Context: The door was made of boards that had been coated with the for-
est green paint. Over time, the paint flaked off. So, ...
John sprayed the door with the paint again. (restitutive)
We see that much like with open, again with spray is ambiguous between a repetitive and a
restitutive reading. The repetitive reading here doesn’t tell us much except that again can
occur high, above the event-introducing V.6 On the other hand, the restitutive reading tells
us that there is a constituent in the sentence that again can attach to that describes states of
the door being with the paint (≈ the door having the paint on it). The constituent that is
a description of such states is the one that again attaches to when it receives the restitutive
reading in (16). This is shown in (17), which has a small clause structure:
6And we can verify its independence from the restitutive reading in a similar manner as we did with open.


















If the phrase headed by with is a predicate of states in which the door is “with” the paint,
the position that again occurs in will produce the restitutive reading in (16b).7
The restitutive reading that again can receivewith spray is not exclusive to the goal-object
structure. A similar reading is possible with the theme-object structure.8
7This reading of again leads us to a structure for spray/load verbs that is inmanyways parallel to the structure
for double object verbs developed in Beck & Johnson (2004). The difference is that the head of the small clause
is pronounced independently in the case of spray/load verbs, while it is pronounced as part of the verb in double
object sentences.
8An interesting issue raised by examples like (19b) is that the predicate of eventualities that again takes as
its argument does not seem to include the path component of the prepositions into and onto. In other words,
the reading produced is what is expected if againwere modifying a PP headed by on. Though I will not attempt
an account of this fact here, it is my hope that the explanation might lie in a theory of PPs that splits path and
place into separate P heads (see Cinque & Rizzi 2010; Fábregas 2007; Gehrke 2008; Kracht 2002; Radkevich
2010; Roy & Svenonius 2009; Svenonius 2007, 2010). I will tentatively suggest here that a PathP may be of the
wrong semantic type for again to compose with, since it does not describe eventualities, but trajectories, and
those latter end in the states that again can compose with. At any rate, the issue is not restricted to spray/load
verbs, since it also occurs in cases like the following, which uses the non-spray/load verb walk:
(i) Context: The scientists finally finished building the robot at the lab. To test its capabilities, they
programmed a route for it to follow, and started it up. The robot stood up and walked out of the
room. Then, it turned around, and ...
It walked into the room again. (restitutive)
Here, what is restored is the state of the robot being in the room, which does not include the path component
of into. This shows that the reading where again just modifies the place component of a path+place preposition
is not something unique to spray/load verbs. I assume that whatever analysis explains (i) will also account for
these readings with spray/load verbs.
An alternative might suppose that the meaning contributed by to is actually present in the spray/load verb
itself, and that the overt addition of to to the locative preposition could be treated as a kind of agreement or
phonological reflex of this. Some evidence supporting this is that when to is omitted in a theme-object spray/
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(19) a. Context: Someone had previously sprayed the forest green paint onto the
door, but over time it began to flake off. So, ...
John sprayed the paint onto the door again. (repetitive)
b. Context: The door was made of boards that had been coated with the for-
est green paint. Over time, the paint flaked off. So, ...
John sprayed the paint onto the door again. (restitutive)
This means that the theme-object structure is essentially the same as the goal-object struc-
ture. The only difference is that in one case, the P that heads the small clause is with, and in
the other case, the P that heads the small clause is a locative preposition—in this case, onto.
Before moving on, there is one more piece of syntactic and semantic glue to add to this
structure. We must explain how J√sprayK composes with the predicate of states that the
PP denotes. The semantic link here seems to be one of causation: the spraying event causes
the state described by the PP. We could implement this idea using either a special rule of
semantic composition (Beck & Johnson 2004; von Stechow 1995, 1996), or else by a silent
syntactic head whose denotation, when composed with its complement and its specifier,
achieves the same result as this semantic rule (Beck & Johnson 2004; Johnson 2018; Kratzer
2005). I will take the latter approach, but this choice is not crucial. The syntactic head is
called CAUSE,9 and its denotation is λ𝑃.λ𝑄.λ𝑒.𝑄(𝑒) ∧ ∃𝑒′[𝑃(𝑒′) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1 (“true iff
𝑄 holds of 𝑒, and there exists an event 𝑒′ described by 𝑃 such that 𝑒 causes 𝑒′”) (cf. Kratzer
2005; Pylkkänen 2002, 2008).10
load sentence, the meaning does not seem to be affected (provided, of course, that the PP is not interpreted as
an adjunct describing the location of the entire event), while in other sentences it clearly is.
(18) a. John sprayed the paint on the wall. ↔ John sprayed the paint onto the wall.
(under the relevant readings)
b. John walked in the room. ↮ John walked into the room.
However, I do not pursue this idea further, and it is not a feature of my final analysis. Whether this idea could
be integrated with what I propose is a topic I leave for future research.
9Sometimes typeset variously as [cause] or CAUS, among other possibilities.
10Note that the meaning CAUSE is given here is slightly different from the one in (4) and (6), which combines
with a predicate of eventualities to form a predicate of eventualities, in contrast to this CAUSE, which takes two
predicates of eventualities to form a predicate of eventualities. One could take two approaches. The first is to
assume that both these variants of CAUSE exist. The second (and more preferable in my opinion) is to assume
that the structures in (4) and (6) are slightly more complex than presented here, with the two predicate CAUSE
combining first with BECOMEP, and thenwith a null light verb that contributes very little lexical semantic content
and is interpreted something like “do,” producing a semantics that could be paraphrased as “John’s doing
something (directly) caused the door to become open.”
32
In order for this to work, we must also specify the nature of the semantic relation CAUSE.
I will follow Kratzer (2005) and assume that it is true of two events that are linked by
counterfactual, direct causation. That is, 𝑒 causes 𝑒′ only if 𝑒′ occurs only when 𝑒 does.
Furthermore, CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′) is true only if the end of 𝑒 overlaps with the beginning of 𝑒′ (in
other words, there are no intervening eventualities). This rules out using CAUSE to felici-
tously describe butterfly effect scenarios. More details can be found in Kratzer (2005) and
subsequent work.

















This structure is entirely parallel to the intransitive structure proposed for resultatives in
Kratzer (2005) and followingwork, with the only difference being that the resultative pred-
icate is a PP rather than an adjective. It will produce the semantics in (21).12
11The reader will note that I have not included the BECOME head in this structure, unlike what I did for the
examples with open. One might include it below CAUSE in (20) and all subsequent structures I propose for
sentences with spray/load verbs without changing the substance of the analysis. I omit it for presentational
reasons, as it would make the structures and semantics that are yet to come overly complicated in a way that
would not affect my conclusions or arguments.
12It is worth noting that the semantics in (21) would not require the paint to be the theme of the spraying
event. I will argue in chapter 4 that this prediction is correct. Conversely, the semantics for the theme-object
structure corresponding to (21) (which I have not shown) would also not require the paint to be the theme
of the spraying, since they would simply encode that a spraying event causes a state of the paint being on the
door. I will later argue that this prediction is incorrect. I implement a stop-gap to address this false prediction
later in this chapter, but provide a full solution in chapter 3.
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(21) λ𝑒.AGENT(𝑒 , John)∧ spray(𝑒)∧∃𝑒′[with(𝑒′, the door, the paint)∧CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1
Having dealt with these syntactic and semantic niceties, we can remind ourselves of
the main point of this section: again can receive a restitutive reading when it occurs post-
VP with spray/load verbs. This reading shows us that there is a predicate of states (i.e.,
“the door with the paint”: λ𝑒.with(𝑒 , the door, the paint) = 1 or “the paint onto the door”:
λ𝑒.onto(𝑒 , the paint, the door) = 1), which is syntactically realized as a PP [the door with
the paint] or [the paint onto the door]. We thus have evidence from this reading of again
that spray/load verbs have a small clause syntax (similar to a structure posited for double
object verbs in previous work (Beck & Johnson 2004; Harley 2002; Johnson 2018)).13
13A reviewer for Linguistic Inquiry wonders whether with is the head of a small clause, or the head of a
low adjunct. However, given the restitutive reading discussed in this section, it is unclear where exactly a low
adjunct headed by with could adjoin. It would have to adjoin below the verb root, since otherwise when again’s
presupposition contains the with phrase, it would also have to include the verb root, which is not what occurs.













However, this is problematic because post-VP again would scope over at least CAUSE the door √spray with the
paint. Another possibility would involve the PP being a lower adjunct to AP. Restitutive againwould then scope
over √spray the door with the paint. Presumably, the prior state would then have to be a “sprayed” state. This
prediction is clearly false, as shown in (19b).
The reviewer alternatively suggests that this lower stative predicatemight be a null predicate that contributes
a meaning of total affectedness, related to the holistic effect discussed in the preceding chapter (Mulder 1992).
However, thiswould predict a veryweak restitutive (rather than repetitive) readingwhen again occurs between
the object and with, which would only require the object to have been totally affected before.
(ii) Context: Bill poured water all over the towel. Then, ...
# John sprayed the towel again with paint.
As the next section shows, the (eventive) verb root is crucially part of the presupposition created when again
occurs following the object, which is what rules out (ii). If again could attach to a constituent with the meaning
of the towel totally affected, (ii) should be felicitous.
One verb for which an analysis more like (i) may be correct is fill; when it occurs with restitutive again, the
prior state must be a state of fullness:
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2.3.2 The Repetitive− Reading
Again can receive a different reading with spray/load verbs when it occurs immediately
following the object.14
(22) Context: Thewoodendoor hadnever hadpaint on it, but Johndecidedhewanted
to paint it with the forest green paint. In order to do this, it was necessary to clean
it off first. So first, Bill sprayed the door with water to clean it, and then ...
John sprayed the door again (this time) with the paint. (repetitive−with)
When again occurs after the object, as in (22), the sentence can receive a reading inwhich the
event that occurred before is a spraying of the door—a repetitive reading. However, unlike
(iii) a. Context: The lake was full of water, but it all evaporated. So, ...
The parks department filled the lake with water again.
b. Context: The poor excuse for a well had only ever had a small puddle of water in it. Even that
evaporated eventually. But one day, taking a hose, ...
# John filled the well with water again.
If the prior state could just be one of the well having some water in it, then (iii-b) should be felicitous, but it
is not. Ultimately, a structure that combines the multidominance structures to come and (i) may be correct for
fill, with the lower state corresponding to full. However, it is clear that the verb root is not part of the presuppo-
sition of a restitutive again in other cases, while it is equally clear that a low predicate meaning simply “totally
affected” would produce too weak a reading for repetitive again. Thus, the semantics leads us to a parse where
with is the head of a small clause.
14There seems to be another reading available for the string in (22) when the parethetical (this time) is omit-
ted, which is one in which againmodifies just with the paint. This reading is easiest to get if again is prosodically
stressed and has a short pause before it (Bale 2007).
(i) Context: One day, Bill sprayed the door with the forest green paint. The next day, ...
John sprayed the wall, AGAIN with the paint.
However, it should be noted that the meaning of with in this reading, and the meaning of with in the reading
in (22) may be quite different. In particular, the reading in (i) seems to require that the with-phrase’s DP be
interpreted as the instrument, rather than as a theme. This may be hard to intuit given the context in (i), which
invites an inference that the door ended up with the paint on it, as a result of the spraying event in which the
paint was the instrument. However, the difference becomes clearer if we devise a context where thewith-phrase
is not most naturally interpreted as an instrument.
(ii) Context: Bill and John bought some forest green paint. To take it home, Bill loaded the truck with
the paint. After they had arrived, ...
# John sprayed the door, AGAIN with the paint.
If again could modify just the phrase with the paint, this sentence should be felicitous. In particular, there was
a prior state in which something was with the paint (when the truck was loaded with it). However, such a
reading is not possible. It is only possible to get a felicitous reading if the paint was used as an instrument to
aid in the loading of the truck in some way, where the contents of the truck may be different from the paint.
It is hard to come up with such a context for the loading event described in (ii). Thus, I will assume that the
reading in (i) shows that in addition to the low with-phrases that involve a theme that occur within VP (and
which may remain implicit), spray/load verbs can occur with higher instrumental with-phrases that adjoin to
vP. This is unsurprising as instrumental with-phrases are generally available with agentive verbs; there is no
reason to expect they should not be available for spray/load verbs.
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the repetitive reading we previously discussed, this one excludes the with-phrase from the
event again modifies. I will variously refer to this reading as the “repetitive−with” reading
(read as “repetitive minus with”), the repetitive− reading, or the low repetitive reading.15
If we place aside the conclusion we reached in the last section for the time being, we can
ask what we learn about the structure of spray’s VP from this reading of again. This reading
tells us that there is a predicate of events of spraying the door, which do not contain the

















If J√sprayK = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1, with the semantic relation spray being true of events 𝑒
that are sprayings of 𝑥, this structure will produce a reading compatible with the context
of (22).16
15As suggested by the use of appositive this time in (22), the repetitive− reading is easiest to get when there is
a strong prosodic boundary after again. While in my judgment this strong prosodic boundary is not required to
get this reading, others have reported some variation,with them reporting it is required.Wemight thuswonder
about the importance of the prosody here. It is my belief that the multidominance analysis I propose in section
2.3.4 will predict the existence of this prosodic boundary naturally, following Selkirk (2011)’s influential Match
Theory of the syntax-prosody interface. However, it must be noted that adjustments toMatch Theory will need
to be made to make it compatible with multidominance structures, since these allow one phrase to belong
to more than one constituent. The same issue, of course, needs to be overcome in order to properly linearize
structures with multidominance. I speculate that the prosodic status of multidominated nodes will be resolved
in the same way for linearization and for prosodic purposes, but details remain to be worked out. I am focused
on the syntax-semantics interface in this dissertation and not the syntax-prosody interface, and will say no
more about this issue, though it may be important.
16Nie (2019) independently motivates a structure like (23) based on the reading that the verbal prefix re-
produces.
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Similarly to before, the equivalent reading is available in the theme-object structure.
(24) Context: Bill and John were hired to paint the door. Bill arrived early, but spent
the whole day spraying the paint into the air, with not a single drop hitting the
door. John arrived late, and noticed that the door had not been painted. So, ...
John sprayed the paint again onto the door. (repetitive−onto)
2.3.3 The Puzzle
At this point, the puzzle at issue here might be obvious: if we examine the reading that
again receives when it occurs post-VP with spray, we see that [the door with the paint] is a
constituent that excludes √spray, as in (20). On the other hand, if we examine the reading
that again receives when it occurs immediately following the object, we see that [spray the
door] is a constituent that excludes with the paint, as in (23). In a traditional syntax, these
structures are incompatible: if the door forms a constituent with with the paint that excludes
spray, it cannot also form a constituent with spray that excludes with paint. The same para-
doxical pattern occurs in the theme-object structure as well. If we were to adopt either the
small clause structure or the transitive + PP structure, we would be left with unexplained
and unexplainable residual data.
One way to account for this behavior would be to say that spray is actually the pronun-
ciation of two distinct verbs that happen to share a pronunciation and similar meanings.
One spray takes a small clause complement, and the other takes first an object and then a PP
(which may or may not be an argument). However, there is evidence that weighs against
this approach. In particular, the post-verbal DP of spray/load verbs must be interpreted as
the object of the verb, even when that very object is the subject of a resultative predicate.
The reason this matters has to do with how resultative predicates can be interpreted with
non-spray/load verbs.
In many cases, it appears that the restriction that I just noted (that the subject of the
resultative predicate is interpreted as the object of the verb) holds for resultatives with
non-spray/load verbs.
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(25) John hammered the metal flat.
= “John hammered the metal, with the result that the metal became flat.”
However, Kratzer (2005) argues that this correlation is spurious, and that the verb in resul-
tative structures is actually intransitive, with the apparent object actually serving only as
the subject of the resultative predicate. Consider her example:
(26) John drank the teapot empty.
≠ “John drank the teapot, with the result that the teapot became empty.”
= “John drank, with the result that the teapot became empty.”
The meaning of (26) is not that John drank the teapot with the result that the teapot was
empty, but that the teapot was empty as the result of John’s drinking. In other words, the
verb is intransitive. Thismakes sense because one does not drink teapots, but their contents.
Kratzer (2005) argues that all resultatives are formed from intransitives in this way. The fre-
quent appearance of a direct object interpretation is for her a common but non-obligatory
semantic inference imposed by the strict kind of causation that links the event described by
the verb to the predicate describing the result state. The direct causation relation between
the event described by the verb and the resulting state permits no event to intervene be-
tween the eventuality the verb describes and the one the resultative predicate describes.
This will ensure that the subject of the resultative predicate is preferentially interpreted as
the object of the verb if it can be (as in (25)). But it doesn’t always have to be interpreted
that way if such an inference produces an odd meaning, and this occurs in (26).
However, this does not appear to be the case with resultatives formed with spray/load
verbs. In these cases, the object must be the direct object of the verb’s action, and not merely
inferred to be. Consider the following example, which is parallel to (26):
(27) John sprayed the bucket dry.
= “John sprayed the bucket, with the result that the bucket became dry.”
≠ “John sprayed, with the result that the bucket became dry.”
This sentence can be true if the bucket is the goal of the spraying event; for instance, if
there was something in the bucket, and John dried the bucket by spraying something into
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it. However, it cannot receive a reading where the bucket became dry as the result of John
spraying its contents from it (via a hose or something of that sort). For instance, imagine
that the bucket contains paint, and John attaches a hose to a nozzle on the bucket. Then, John
sprays every last drop of the paint from the bucket onto something else, which results in the
bucket being dry. This is exactly like the scenario described by the teapot sentence, where
John’s drinking the contents of the teapot result in the teapot’s being empty. Nevertheless,
such a reading is not possible for spray. Only the reading where the bucket is interpreted
as a direct object of spray—which is most natural if it is the goal rather than the theme—is
possible. Thus, despite its occurrence with a resultative secondary predicate, spray still be-
haves as obligatorily transitive in contrast to drink.17 The impossible reading in (27) should
be possible if intransitive uses of √spray were allowed. Such uses would look like the one
in (20), and would be predicted under the lexical ambiguity account of the again facts.
The same pattern holds for other spray/load verbs.
(28) a. Context: John squeezed the tube of icing over the cake, thereby drizzling
icing onto the cake while emptying the tube of icing.
# John drizzled the tube empty.
b. Context: John poured the contents of the glass into a bowl, thereby emp-
tying the glass while filling the bowl.
# John filled the glass empty.
c. Context: John took the contents of the truck and loaded them into ship-
ping containers, thereby leaving the truck bare.
# John loaded the truck bare.
In each of these cases, we have scenarios which plausibly describe events of causing a par-
ticular result. The spraying of the contents of the bucket is an event of the bucket becoming
dry. The drizzling of the icing onto the cake is an event of emptying the tube containing
it. The filling of the bowl is an event of emptying the glass. The loading of the shipping
containers is an event of the truck becoming bare.18 In each case, however, the sentences
17In chapter 3 I propose a semantics for spray/load verbs that analyzes them as of type ⟨𝑠, 𝑡⟩ (though this
chapter ends up treating them as type ⟨𝑒 , 𝑠𝑡⟩ as a stop-gap). Thus, the status of spray/load verbs as obligatorily
transitive must be a syntactic fact in my analysis that cannot be derived from the semantics.
18Example (28c) is perhaps harder to conceive of as invoking direct causation, but it is no worse, I believe,
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cannot receive the readings that they should be able to if the resultatives occurred with in-
transitive verbs. This constitutes evidence against an account of the restitutive reading that
permits the intransitive structure in (20).
It might be possible to object that the restriction of direct causation is violated in the
contexts in (28). One might be able to claim, for instance, that in (28a), the tube is not
really a participant in the drizzling eventuality—the participants in that eventuality might
include only the agent, the icing, and the cake. Similar objections could apply to the other
cases. However, this cannot be the reason these sentences are ruled out if something like
Kratzer (2005)’s small clause analysis of sentences like John drank the teapot empty is on the
right track. The reason for this is that John drank the teapot empty is posited to invoke direct
causation: John’s drinking can be an event of causing the state of the emptiness of the teapot.
But the teapot is not be a participant in the minimal drinking eventuality: the drinking
eventuality itself would seem to have as participants only John and what he drank, which
is the contents of the teapot and not the teapot itself. Insofar as John drank the teapot empty is
acceptable, then, we have evidence that entities that are not participants of the eventuality
the verb describes (drinking eventualities, in this case, which don’t include the teapot as a
participant) can be participants of a result state directly caused by those eventualities (the
empty state, whose participant is the teapot). If the teapot’s participation in the result state
despite its lack of participation in the drinking eventuality does not falsify the relation of
direct causation, then it is implausible to claim that the tube’s alleged lack of participation
in the drizzling eventuality would do so. Arguments of an identical shape apply to the
other examples.
Furthermore, this evidence from thedifference between resultatives and spray/loadverbs
is not the only kind of evidence that weighs against the structural ambiguity approach. In
particular, it is possible to construct sentences with two agains, one that occurs after the ob-
ject, and another that occurs after the entire VP. Though the judgments are difficult, these
sentences are felicitous in contexts that support a repetitive− and a restitutive reading, but
not a high repetitive reading that includes the event and the result state.19
than thinking of an act of drinking the contents of the teapot as an event of the teapot becoming empty.
19It is possible to construct similar examples with the prefix re-: John resprayed the paint onto the fence again,
and so on. The addition of re- also makes it possible to observe behavior similar to what I have described for
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(29) Context: John decided to make a small fence for his garden. He brushed some
boardswith a green-colored paint he really liked, and put them together tomake
the fence. Over time, the paint flaked off and left the boards bare. John wanted
to restore the fence’s color. Luckily he still had most of the original paint left.
But now he had a fancy machine that could spray paint onto the boards, so he
wouldn’t have to use a brush.
a. cont.: He hooked up the sprayer to the spigot on the paint bucket, and then
asked Bill to spray the paint onto a piece of cardboard to test that it was
working with no air bubbles or mechanical issues (John wasn’t confident
he’d do it right himself). Once John was satisfied Bill had properly tested
it, he took the nozzle outside, and ...
John sprayed the paint again onto the fence again.
b. cont.: Before using the sprayer, the dirt and remainingflecks of paint needed
to be cleared off the fence. So John asked Bill to use the power washer to
spray the fence with water and clean it off (John was worried he’d hurt
himself with it). Once everything was clean, he hooked up the sprayer to
the spigot on the paint bucket. Without stopping to test the machine, ...
John sprayed the fence again with the paint again.
Let us consider what presuppositions are supported in these contexts. A subject-ful repet-
itive presupposition that includes John isn’t satisfied in either scenario, since John never
sprayed anything before in either case—Bill did. But a subjectless repetitive presupposi-
tion that includes the spraying event and the resulting state wouldn’t be satisfied either. In
neither case is there a prior eventuality that is a spraying that results in the paint being on
the fence/the fence being with the paint. The paint got on the fence by virtue of its being
built out of painted boards, not by being sprayed.
So what presuppositions are satisified? In fact, the presuppositions that are satisfied,
spray/load verbs with certain classes of resultatives; e.g., John rehammered the metal flat again. Not all resultatives
allow this: cf. John (★ re)sneezed the tissue soggy, based on an example from Carrier & Randall (1992). While
a detailed study of resultatives is outside the scope of this dissertation, I believe this behavior suggests that
at least some resultatives are amenable to the multidominance analysis I advocate in (2.3.4). In addition, the
syntax of re- is more complicated than the syntax of again, making the argument ultimately stronger but more
subtle (Keyser & Roeper 1992; Tom Roeper, p.c.).
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andwhichmake (29) felicitous are those that we discussed before: the restitutive and repet-
itive− presuppositions. The restitutive presupposition is satisfied because in both contexts,
the paint was on the fence before (or, equivalently for present purposes, the fence was
with the paint before), by virtue of the fence being built of painted boards. The repetitive−
presuppositions are satisfied by Bill spraying the paint and Bill spraying the fence (with
water). But note that these presuppositions exclude the PP. In (29a), Bill sprayed the paint
onto a piece of cardboard—not onto the fence. In (29b), Bill sprayed the fence with water—
not with paint. We can thus see the bracketing paradox can arise in a single sentence: the
first again can modify spray the paint or spray the fence, while the second again can modify the
paint onto the fence or the fence with the paint. We cannot attribute the side-by-side existence of
restitutive and repetitive− presuppositions with spray/load verbs to there being two struc-
tures these verbs can occur in, each of which is compatible with one of these possibilities.
Instead, we must propose a single structure that can accommodate both readings at once.
Finally, a conceptual reason to disfavor the lexical ambiguity account is that the read-
ings that lead us to the bracketing paradox occur quite generally with spray/load verbs. If
we were to explain this as due to a lexical ambiguity, we would be required to posit phono-
logically identical and semantically similar (in terms of lexical semantics) verbs for, as far
as I can tell, every spray/load verb. These verbs would differ primarily only in their syntax,
with small compositional semantic differences, but largely similar lexical semantics. While
ruling out systematic and arbitrary homophony of this sort is impossible to support empir-
ically, it is based on a desire for the simplest possible theory of lexical meanings; we should
avoid positing lexical doublets to solve these sorts of problems unless there is independent
evidence to support such an approach.
2.3.4 Towards a Solution
One possible resolution to our bracketing paradox would combine the intransitive and
resultative structures into one. We could assume that √spray always combines with an ob-
ject and then a small clause PP whose subject is interpreted as identical to the object. How-
ever, sincewe don’t pronounce the phrase that denotes the object twice, one of these phrases
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would actually be a phonologically null pronoun that is obligatorily coindexed with the
non-phonologically null phrase. Presumably the null pronoun would go in Spec,PP, since
when again modifies the phrase consisting of [√spray the door], the door occurs to the left



















However, (30) predicts that a quantificational object should only be able to scope above
restitutive again. This is because PRO is bound by the object, which occurs outside the PP that
again attaches to when it produces a restitutive reading. In other words, the subject of the
previous result statewould have to be identical to the subject of the result state described by
the sentence in order to satisfy again’s presupposition, since it is coindexed with or bound
by it. This prediction is clearly false.
(31) Context: The door was made with painted boards. Over time, the paint flaked
off. So, ...
John sprayed paint onto the door again. (restitutive)
Consider the truth conditions thatwould be associatedwith (31) under the analysis in (30).
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(32) J(31)K = λ𝑒.∃𝑥[paint(𝑥)∧spray(𝑒 , 𝑥)∧AGENT(𝑒 , John)∧∃𝑒′[with(𝑒′, the door, 𝑥)∧
CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1
presupposition: ∃𝑒′′[𝜏(𝑒′′) ≺ 𝜏𝑒′ ∧with(𝑒′′, the door, 𝑥)]] = 1
The quantifier that binds 𝑥 scopes over the presupposition of restitutive again, since it oc-
curs outside of again. Thus, the structure in (30) would predict that in order for (31) to be
felicitous, the paint that John sprayed onto the door would have to be the very same paint
(or the very same kind of paint, under a kind reading) that was on it before. Of course, this
is not the most natural reading of this sentence; the most natural reading is that John used
different paint. This shows the empirical inadequacy of the PRO account of the again facts.20
(I revisit the scope of indefinites relative to again in section 2.4.1. There, I provide additional
examples showing that indefinites can be bound within restitutive again’s presupposition.)
In addition to this empirical shortcoming, there are a number of theory-internal oddities
in this structure that the presence of PRO raises. First, the identity of PRO is unclear. Given that
we are dealing with English data at present, it is presumably not pro. But this does not also
seem like a canonical control context that would invoke a PRO. It is also unclear how PRO
could receive case. While PROwas classically held to not receive case (Chomsky 1981), this
viewhas been challengedmore recently (Sigurðsson 1991). Presumably, the subject receives
case by moving to Spec,TP, the object receives case from v, and the object of with receives
case from P. But this leaves no way for PRO to receive case, if one endorses Sigurðsson’s
argument. Another question that arises is why the object of √spray and the subject of the
small clause cannot differ, as in the following:
(33) ★ John sprayed the house the door with paint.
Intended reading: “John sprayed the house, which resulted in the door having
paint on it.”
Despite being of the same categorical type, a full DP cannot appear where PRO does in (30).
Presumably, the reason for this is the same problem identified for PRO just above: the DP
in Spec,PP has nowhere it can get case. While the distribution of PRO is not identical to
20See also Johnson (2018), who makes a similar point regarding the inadequacy of a PRO-based account
compared to a multidominance-based account of English dative verbs.
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the distribution of full DPs (since PRO can usually only appear in non-finite contexts), this
is not a non-finite context. This fact might actually lead us to expect that a full DP could
appear in Spec,PP, while PRO could not. However, given the analysis in (30), we would see
the opposite pattern—a curious reversal of what we might otherwise expect. In sum, there
are both empirical and theoretical shortcomings when adopting the PRO-based account.
Another approach21 would treat spray/load verbs as being of type ⟨𝑒 , ⟨⟨𝑒 , 𝑠𝑡⟩, 𝑠𝑡⟩⟩. They
would combine with an object, and then take a PP with an unsaturated entity argument,











b. JPPK = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.with(𝑒 , 𝑥, the paint) = 1
c. JVK = λ𝑥.λ𝑃⟨𝑒 ,𝑠𝑡⟩ .λ𝑒.∃𝑒′[spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′) ∧ 𝑃(𝑒′, 𝑥)] = 1
d. JVP1K = λ𝑃.λ𝑒.∃𝑒′[spray(𝑒 , the door) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′) ∧ 𝑃(𝑒′, the door)] = 1
e. JVP2K =
λ𝑒.∃𝑒′[spray(𝑒 , the door) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′) ∧with(𝑒′, the door, the paint)] = 1
While this produces the correct semantics for the asserted content, it faces certain challenges
in accounting for the presuppositions produced by again. With regards to the restitutive
reading, no constituent exists that denotes a state of the door with the paint. With regards
to the low repetitive reading, a constituent that approximately denotes a prior event of
spraying the door exists (VP1), but it is not of the right type to combine with an again that
is a predicate of eventualities. Futhermore, the unsaturated 𝑃 argument would need to be
excluded from again’s presupposition in order to achieve the right reading.
The reviewer suggests that one couldmodify the denotation of again to account for these
facts, which is in principle possible. However, Bale (2007) has demonstrated that again only
21Suggested by an anonymous Linguistic Inquiry reviewer.
22This is similar to an account of resultatives discussed in Williams (2015).
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attaches to predicates of eventualities, and that the prior eventuality it presupposes is iden-
tical in kind to the one its sister denotes. An argument of this sort was presented above
in discussing examples like (7–8) and (11–12); if we decouple again’s presupposition from
its syntax, we lose clear explanations of the behavior those examples showed. The view
that again is a predicate of eventualities whose presuppositional content is exclusively de-
termined by the constituent it attaches to is also assumed or argued for in much other work
(e.g., Beck 2005; Beck & Gergel 2015; Beck & Johnson 2004; Beck & Snyder 2001; Johnson
2018; Patel-Grosz & Beck 2019; von Stechow 1995, 1996). Further, it is clear that at least one
again that can combine with simple predicates of events exists. Consider an example like
the following, where again outscopes the raising verb seem, which heads a phrase denoting
a predicate of events.
(35) There again seemed to be a problem (though in neither case was there actually
a problem). (again > seem)
Any again with a different denotation would have to coexist next to the again that is a pred-
icate of events.23
Regardless, it is worth noting here that there seems to be a relatively simple adjustment
we couldmake to the meaning of again that would correctly produce the restitutive reading
we are after given the structural analysis in (34a). We could posit that in addition to the
again that is a function from predicates of eventualities to predicates of eventualities (type
⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑡⟩), there is an again that is a function from functions of entities to predicates of eventu-
alities, to a function from entities to predicates of eventualities (type ⟨⟨𝑒 , 𝑠𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒 , 𝑠𝑡⟩⟩). The
denotation of this again would be the following.
(36) Jagain2K = λ𝑃⟨𝑒 ,𝑠𝑡⟩ .λ𝑥.λ𝑒 : ∃𝑒′[𝜏(𝑒′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒) ∧ 𝑃(𝑒′, 𝑥)].𝑃(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1
Again2 could adjoin to PP in (34a). The result of this would have a presupposition that
23One might argue that we should nevertheless question whether Bale (2007)’s evidence for this view of
again could be explained in another way. In my opinion, this would not be so easy to achieve. Working out
the details of these agains leads to complexities in including and excluding the right parts of the semantics in
again’s denotation, with the end result being seemingly unavoidably ad hoc in many ways.
One could always posit multiple agains, each associated with its own particular syntactic restrictions and
slightly different semantics, but such an approach would run the risk of being unfalsifiable. It would also fail
to be explanatory. This is, to me, a steep price to pay simply to avoid positing multidominance—an approach
to syntax that has been independently motivated.
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includes a variable that is bound by the lambda operator. When VP1 combines with the
PP, it would saturate this open entity argument in the presupposition and in the asserted
content. This would produce the correct restitutive reading, as shown.
(37) a. JPP againK =
λ𝑥.λ𝑒 : ∃𝑒′[𝜏(𝑒′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒) ∧with(𝑒′, 𝑥, the paint)] = 1.with(𝑒 , 𝑥, the paint) = 1
b. JVP1K = λ𝑃.λ𝑒.∃𝑒′[spray(𝑒 , the door) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′) ∧ 𝑃(𝑒′, the door)] = 1
c. JVP2K =
λ𝑒.∃𝑒′[spray(𝑒 , the door) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′) ∧with(𝑒′, the door, the paint)] = 1
presupposition: ∃𝑒′′[𝜏(𝑒′′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒′) ∧with(𝑒′, the door, the paint)] = 1
The presupposition of again is satisfied whenever there was some prior eventuality of the
door being with the paint, which is the restitutive presupposition we sought.
Furthermore, positing the existence of again2 does not make any incorrect predictions
regarding the link between again’s position and the possible readings it can receive, as far as
I can tell. The one case we have discussed where this might be relevant is the fact that again
can only receive a readingwhere it includes the subject when it occurs preverbally.24 Under
the analysis that again denotes only a predicate of eventualities, I argued that the possible
readings of again in pre-subject position showed that it attached to the highest projection of
vP, and that the verb is pronounced in v. The relevant discussion and examples start around
(12). However, if we allow an again of a different type, wemust askwhether the explanation
of this pattern would be lost. In fact, the existence of again2 would not make any incorrect
predictions here, and would show us precisely the same thing that type ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑡⟩ again did:
that the verb is pronounced in v.
24The existence of again2 does not, as far as I can tell, have any implications for the sentences comparing the
















As shown in (38), the only difference is that again2 would left-adjoin below the base position
of the subject, rather than above it as in (15). Otherwise, nothing would be different.
Thus, positing again2 would predict the correct restitutive reading in (34a), and does
not make any incorrect predictions in other cases as far as I can tell (even considering ones
I have not discussed here). Positing this again, then, seems to require us only to accept that
there are two homophonous agains, one that is a predicate of eventualities (to account for
caseswhere again2’s typewould prevent semantic composition but again is licit), and again2.
Of course, while this is somewhat ad hoc, since it does not make any incorrect predictions
and allows us some hope of resolving the bracketing paradox, we might be willing to make
this move. It could simply be that spray/load verbs are the proving grounds that show us
the existence of again2, which is otherwise similar enough to again that a difference would
be difficult to detect.
But this move has only resolved half of the problem: the restitutive reading in (34a).
We would need to posit yet another again to account for the low repetitive reading in (34a),
since again2 would not be of the right type to compose with VP1. Call this again again3. The
48
denotation of again3 would have to allow it to compose with functions of type ⟨𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑡⟩,
making it type ⟨⟨𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝑠𝑡⟩⟩.
However, once we attempt to go past identifying the type of again3, we run into a sig-
nificant problem. A crucial difference between again3 and again2 is that again3 would neces-
sarily have to meddle in the semantics of its sister to a greater extent. In particular, again2’s
denotation merely takes a phrase with an unsaturated entity argument, which defines its
presupposition. Put another way, the lambda-bound entity argument in the sister of again2
is also bound by the same lambda-operator in again2’s presupposition. Thus, in some sense,
again2 allows us to maintain the generalization established clearly in Bale (2007) (and im-
plicitly adopted in much other work) that the prior eventuality invoked in again’s presup-
position is semantically identical in all but running time to the one described by its sister.
This generalization is, in my view, quite solid.
The problem that arises then, is that the denotation of again3 would have to explicitly
exclude themeaning of the ⟨𝑒 , 𝑠𝑡⟩ function in the denotation of VP1 from its presupposition
in order to account for the repetitive− reading. Consider the presupposition that would
result if this function were not excluded. It would be bound in again3’s presupposition in
the same way that the entity argument of again2 was. The resulting presupposition would
behave as scoping over VP2, including both the spraying event and the resulting state.
(39) a. Jagain3K =
λ𝑄⟨𝑒𝑠𝑡,𝑠𝑡⟩ .λ𝑅⟨𝑒 ,𝑠𝑡⟩ .λ𝑒 : ∃𝑒′[𝜏(𝑒′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒) ∧𝑄(𝑅(𝑒′))] = 1.𝑄(𝑅(𝑒)) = 1
b. JVP1 again3K =
λ𝑅⟨𝑒 ,𝑠𝑡⟩ .λ𝑒 : ∃𝑒′[𝜏(𝑒′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒) ∧ ∃𝑒′′[spray(𝑒′, the door) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒′, 𝑒′′) ∧
𝑅(𝑒′′, the door)]].∃𝑒′′′[spray(𝑒 , the door)∧CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′′′)∧𝑅(𝑒′′′, the door)]
c. JVP2K =
λ𝑒.∃𝑒′′′[spray(𝑒 , the door) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′′′) ∧with(𝑒′′′, the door, the paint)]
presupposition: ∃𝑒′[𝜏(𝑒′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒) ∧ ∃𝑒′′[spray(𝑒′, the door) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒′, 𝑒′′)∧
with(𝑒′′, the door, the paint)]]
Of course, this result is precisely what we are hoping to avoid: the repetitive− presupposi-
tion explicitly excludes the resulting state. We want the presupposition of again3 to include
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just the spraying eventuality and the object, and nothing more.
The only way that it would be feasible to do this would be to existentially bind 𝑅 specif-
ically within again3’s presupposition.
(40) a. Jagain3K = λ𝑄⟨𝑒𝑠𝑡,𝑠𝑡⟩ .λ𝑅⟨𝑒 ,𝑠𝑡⟩ .λ𝑒 : ∃𝑒′[𝜏(𝑒′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒)∧∃𝑅′[𝑄(𝑅′(𝑒′)]].𝑄(𝑅(𝑒))]
b. JVP1 again3K = λ𝑅⟨𝑒 ,𝑠𝑡⟩ .λ𝑒 : ∃𝑒′[𝜏(𝑒′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒)∧∃𝑅′[∃𝑒′′[spray(𝑒′, the door)∧
CAUSE(𝑒′, 𝑒′′) ∧ 𝑅′(𝑒′′, the door)]]].∃𝑒′′′[spray(𝑒 , the door) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′′′) ∧
𝑅(𝑒′′′, the door)]
c. JVP2K = λ𝑒.∃𝑒′′′[spray(𝑒 , the door) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′′′) ∧ 𝑅(𝑒′′′, the door)]
presupposition: ∃𝑒′[𝜏(𝑒′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒) ∧ ∃𝑅′[∃𝑒′′[spray(𝑒′, the door)∧
CAUSE(𝑒′, 𝑒′′) ∧ 𝑅′(𝑒′′, the door)]]]
The resulting presupposition would only be satisfied if there were some prior result state,
𝑅′ that the previous spraying of the door resulted in.
However, there are two objections to the analysis in (40). One is that it makes an empir-
ical prediction which is arguably false. This prediction is that there must have been some
prior state holding of the door that the prior spraying resulted in. The following sort of
example shows that this prediction is probably false.
(41) Context: The door had a lot of dried mud caked on it. John intended to wash
the door with a pressure washer. But he had never used a pressure washer be-
fore, and didn’t know what it looked like. Instead, he accidentally took the air
compressor. He sprayed the door with compressed air, which did nothing to the
caked-on mud. Realizing his mistake, John went and found the actual pressure
washer. And so, ...
John sprayed the door again with water.
Here, the presupposition of again seems to be satisfied by the prior eventuality of John spray-
ing the door with compressed air. In the context given, this spraying eventuality produced
no clear effect on the door. This leads me to believe that the repetitive− presupposition
should not include an existential binder over result states holding of the object that came
from the prior spraying event. However, it should be noted that one could argue that the
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result state of the door’s being sprayed with compressed air is a resultant state, in the sense
of Kratzer (2000). This kind of state is one that every eventuality that culminates can be
associated with; for instance, if Mary ate lunch, then the associated resultant state is the
state of Mary’s having eaten lunch. If the existentially bound relation in again3’s presuppo-
sition can be satisfied by resultant states, then the prediction we just examined may be true
(though difficult or perhaps impossible to falsify).
The second objection is more general. It has to do with the evidence I presented earlier
that the eventuality invoked in again’s presupposition is identical in shape to the one its sis-
ter describes. I provided two kinds of arguments for this: one from the interaction of again
with other adverbs, and one from the contrast between post-VP and pre-verb again. Both
of these arguments showed that again’s presupposition was unable to exclude anything
contained in the denotation of its sister. Bale (2007)—from whom I have adapted the ar-
guments presented above—provides several additional kinds of evidence supporting this
view of again. Of course, the existence of again3 would not pose any direct problems for
those pieces of evidence—it is of the wrong type to occur in those examples, and so would
not make any wrong predictions in such cases. But the general objection is that we have
good evidence that all other uses of again do not tamper with the internals of the denota-
tion of its sister. In contrast, again3, in order to produce the correct result, would necessarily
have to existentially bind part of its sister’s denotation in its presupposition. Thus, positing
again3 would make it impossible to maintain the view that again’s presupposition invokes
an eventuality that matches the description of the eventuality its sister describes. This move
would afford again’s presupposition too much leeway, letting it meddle with the predicate
of eventualities denoted by its sister. This proposal, and its pursuant proliferation of too-
powerful agains commands too great a cost. We should therefore seek an alternative to the
analysis proposed in (34a) that allows us to maintain a maximally simple theory of again.
In that spirit, I would like to propose a solution that resolves the oddities associated
with the PRO-based account, while maintaining an analysis of again as a predicate of even-
tualities whose presupposition invokes an eventuality that contains nothing beyond the
denotation of its sister. That solution involves multidominance. This solution is similar to
the one developed by Hiraiwa & Bodomo (2008) to explain object sharing in serial verb
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constructions in Dàgáárè, with the core difference being that rather than the object being
dominated by two VPs, it is dominated by a VP and PP. It is also similar to an account of
ditransitive possession verbs developed in Johnson (2018), with two primary differences:
(i) the head of the small clause is pronounced independently in the case of spray/load verbs
instead of as part of the verb, and (ii) the multidominated phrase is the specifier of the re-
sultative predicate rather than its complement. If the object is multidominated by VP and
PP, it can occur in both positions, will lead to the right readings, and will avoid the issues
the mysterious PRO raised. It will also allow us to treat again as a predicate of eventualities,
in line with previous work. The single stipulation we are left with is that the object must be
pronounced linearly adjacent to the verb, but something like this restrictionmay be needed
for English objects anyway.25,26
25If we assume (as is often assumed in transformational syntax) that the object moves to a position above VP
for case marking, wemay be able to dispense with this stipulation given an appropriate theory of linearization.
26The semantics these structures imply would seem to require that the object of a spray/load verb be inter-

























When again adjoins to the lower VP, it will result in the lower, repetitive− reading. When it
is adjoined to the right, it will be ambiguous between a low attachment to the PP, giving
rise to the restitutive reading; and a high attachment site above VP, giving rise to a high
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repetitive reading.27,28
The multidominance approach easily extends to less canonical cases, where an AP oc-
27A reviewer for Linguistic Inquiry suggests that perhaps the verb root occurs higher in the theme-object
structure than in the goal-object structure. However, given that again appears to produce largely similar pre-
suppositions in both theme-object and goal-object structureswhen it occurs in similar positions, I do not believe
that again provides any direct evidence to support this proposed difference (though it may not rule it out, given
a structure that will still account for the associations between again’s position and its possible readings).
Another reviewer for Linguistic Inquiry asks if the multidominance analysis makes additional predictions,
besides providing an account of the bracketing paradox. There are two things to note here. The first is that
multidominance has been independentlymotivated in a variety of empirical domains (see Citko 2005; Engdahl
1980; Gärtner 1997, 1999; Hiraiwa & Bodomo 2008; Johnson 2012, 2018; Nunes 2001; Starke 2001, a.m.o.). Thus,
it is not a sui generis solution to the particular puzzle highlighted here. Second is that despite this prior work, I
amnot aware of any particular predictionsmultidominancemakes besides the existence of apparent bracketing
paradoxes of the sort presented in this paper (thework cited above invokesmultidominance precisely to resolve
such paradoxes in other domains). Other than predicting the existence of complex constituent structures of this
sort, a syntax with multidominance appears to be identical (or nearly so) to a syntax without it. No predictions
are expected beyond the existence of structures that in other theories would constitute bracketing paradoxes.
28These structures raise the question of why again cannot surface immediately following the object by left-















The reading this structure would produce does indeed not seem to be available with immediately post-object
again.
(ii) Context: The door was made of boards that had been coated with forest green paint. Over time, the
paint flaked off. So, ...
# John sprayed the paint again onto the door.
The same behavior occurs in the goal-object structure (though I don’t give the full example here).
While I do not have an explanation for the lack of this reading, I will note that while there is clear evidence
that again can left-adjoin to adjunct PPs (Bale 2007), there may be evidence that again cannot left-adjoin to
small clauses:
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curs after the object.29
(43) a. John poured the glass full with/of water.
b. John loaded the truck full with/of hay.
This possibility is entirely consistentwith the analysis developed here, and even expected.30
Nothing requires that the small clause of a spray/load verb be a PP. In fact, under the mul-
tidominance analysis I just proposed, this would be what is going on in (27), discussed
above. In the same way, I suggest that what is going on in (43) is that the head of the small
clause is the adjective full, which takes a PP complement describing the contents of the full
state, and whose subject is multidominated by AP and VP (i.e., it is simultaneously the
(iii) Context: John and Bill both enjoy going to the park. Bill walked his dog in the park on Tuesday, and
the next week, ...
John went jogging, again in the park on Tuesday. (adjunct PPs)
(iv) Context: When I put little booties on the cat, I couldn’t stop laughing. Later, my wife called me into
the room after having the same idea herself, and ...
a. The cat in booties again was just as funny the second time!
(small clause right-adjoined again)
b. # Again the cat in booties was just as funny the second time! (small clause left-adjoined again)
Note that in (iv-b), there would be no multidominance structure that would be expected to produce the word
order where Spec,PP precedes again (i.e., The cat again in booties...), in contrast to the structure in (i). Thus,
whether this constitutes valid evidence that again cannot left-adjoin to small clauses in general, or just in cases
where it would linearly precede the specifier of the small clause, is unclear.
However, more generally, the non-existence of a reading that my structure might predict does not compro-
mise my argument. In particular, the non-existence of the reading that an again left-adjoined to the small clause
would produce does not constitute an argument against the existence of the restitutive and repetitive− mean-
ings that I have established. It is the existence of these readings that is sufficient to motivate my approach, with
the non-existence of other readings presumably requiring a different sort of explanation.
29These cases were brought to my attention by an anonymous reviewer for Linguistic Inquiry.
30Seth Cable (p.c.) has pointed out to me that there is for him an interesting contrast between the following
examples with regards to the behavior of again.
(i) a. John loaded the truck again, full of hay.
b. ?? John poured the glass again, full of water.
This suggests that while the truck can be the object of load, the glass cannot really be the internal argument of
pour. This raises some questions for my full analysis, which I revisit briefly in chapter 5, footnote 49.
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Finally, Iwill prefigure that themultidominance analysis fares better thanD’Elia (2016)’s
31Note that full with in isolation is somewhat degraded (though to my ears, not fully ungrammatical) com-
pared to both full of and full with in the context of load.
(i) a. The truck was full of hay.
b. ?? The truck was full with hay.
c. John loaded the truck full of hay.
d. ? John loaded the truck full with hay.
I will note that if one controls for the availability of an instrumental with parse of (i-d) by adding a separate
instrumental with-phrase, the use of full with sounds considerably more degraded to my ears.
(ii) a. John loaded the truck full of hay with a pitchfork.
b. ?? John loaded the truck full with hay with a pitchfork.
This suggests that (i-d) is less degraded than (i-b) because of the existence of an instrumental with parse that
isn’t available for the latter. In such a parse, full would not take a PP complement, and the with-phrase would
adjoin to vP. However, it should be noted that these judgments are gradient and subtle, and may not be shared
by everyone. As a case in point, Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.) reports that he feels both (i-b) and (i-d) are somewhat
acceptable, but (i-b) sounds rather old-fashioned and (i-d) is somewhat improved, which I interpret as essen-
tially in agreement with my judgments reported above. However, he reports that (ii-b) is fine for him, while it
is clearly marginal for me.
32It is worth noting that not every adjective can be used as a resultative with spray/load verbs.
(i) a. ★ Dave sprayed the door colorful.
b. ★ Dave loaded the boxes (stacked) upright. (Seth Cable, p.c.)
An important question is thus what rules out such cases, if full is indeed being used as an adjective in (44). I
do not have an answer, but it is well known that similar restrictions exist with other resultatives.
(ii) a. John scrubbed the pot shiny /★ shined. (Carrier & Randall 1992, (25a))
b. John hammered the metal flat /★worthless.
I suggest that what is responsible for explaining these sorts of patterns will explain the impossibility of (i).
Encouraging in this regard are the examples in (27–28), which are grammatical and interpretable, beingmerely
infelicitous in the contexts given.
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analysis onmany of the diagnostics that prove problematic for him, to be discussed in chap-
ter 5, section 5.2.3.3.2. D’Elia (2016) argues that goal-objects occur in the specifier of a small
clause, and are not actually objects of the verb. However, many of his diagnostics seem to
indicate the opposite, that goal-objects are actual objects of the verb. This is indeed the case
in the multidominance analysis, since the goal is both an object and the subject of a small
clause. As such, it is expected to have the properties of any typical object, as well as the
properties of the subject of a small clause—with caveats to be discussed in chapter 3.
2.3.5 Semantic Composition in Structures with Multidominance
In order to be sure that the structure in (42) will solve our problem, it is necessary to
say something about how phrases with two mothers are interpreted semantically. Luckily,
there is nothing that special to say here: a multidominated phrase is interpreted accord-
ing to standard rules of semantic composition by combining with both of its sister phrases
separately (Johnson 2012).33 How this works is shown in the following example:
(45) JVPK =
λ𝑒.spray(𝑒 , the door) ∧
∃𝑒′[with(𝑒′, the door, the paint) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1
JVPK =
λ𝑒.spray(𝑒 , the door) = 1
JCAUSEPK =
λ𝑄.λ𝑒.𝑄(𝑒) ∧
∃𝑒′[with(𝑒′, the door, the paint) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1
CAUSE JPPK =
λ𝑒′.with(𝑒′, the door, the paint) = 1
JPPK =







λ𝑥.λ𝑒.spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1
DP
the door
33Note, however, that Johnson (2012) argues that it is possible in certain circumstances for a phrase to seman-
tically compose with only one of its sisters. However, in standard cases, semantic composition will proceed as
shown in (45).
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It is worth flagging here that this semantics requires the entity argument of a spray/load
verb to be interpretable as either a theme or a goal. That is, “spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) would have to be
true of an eventuality 𝑒 and an entity 𝑥 in case 𝑒 is a spraying eventuality, and 𝑥 is the theme
or the goal of that eventuality. I will note here that this undesirable move is a intended as
nomore than an expository stop-gap; I return to this issue and ultimately do awaywith the
need to posit this sort of semantics for spray/load verbs in 3 in a way that does not adversely
affect the conclusions of this chapter.
Quantificational objects will undergo QR to a position higher than VP, and be inter-
preted as a bound variable.
(46) JVPK =
λ𝑒.∀𝑥[door(𝑥) → spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) ∧
∃𝑒′[with(𝑒′, 𝑥, the paint) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)]] = 1
QP VP
λ1 JVPK =
λ𝑒.spray(𝑒 , 𝑔(1)) ∧
∃𝑒′[with(𝑒′, 𝑔(1), the paint) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1
JVPK =
λ𝑒.spray(𝑒 , 𝑔(1)) = 1
CAUSEP
CAUSE JPPK =









Since its lambda binder is high, the variable will be bound by the same quantifier along
both paths, which will ensure that the object of the verb is the same as the subject of the
resultative predicate, as shown in (27–28).34
34The structure in (46) may appear somewhat odd given that my account uses multidominance. Typically,
movement in a theorywithmultidominance is treated as Remerge, as I discuss in section 2.3.6. In such theories,
a moved item will not behave as in (46), where movement results in the original position of the item being
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2.3.6 Syntactic Derivation of Structures with Multidominance
A common way of implementing multidominance (e.g., Johnson 2012) arises from the
treatment of movement as Remerge (equivalently called internal Merge). Merge, of course,
is a (possibly the) now standard syntactic operation that takes two elements of a numer-
ation and creates a set that bears the label of one of those elements (Chomsky 1995). Re-
merge describes a way of modeling what happens when Merge applies to an element in
a numeration that has already been merged before: the remerged element occurs in two
structural positions at once (Chomsky 2004; Citko 2005; Epstein et al. 1998; Gärtner 1999;
Starke 2001). This represents a simplification of the copy theory of movement, which mod-
els Merge applying to an already merged element as involving the copying of that element,
the merger of the copy of the original element, and then special restrictions on linearization
to ensure that only the highest copy (in most cases) gets spoken (Chomsky 1993, 1995).
Consider the following by way of illustration. I will show how Remerge could apply
in the derivation of the simple declarative sentence John hit Bill. Prior to applying Merge
to an element that has already been merged, we have the following structure. (I ignore











treated as a trace. The combination of a copy/trace-based theory of QR with the multidominance syntax of
spray/load verbs’ VPs is thus an intentional simplification. The correct result is also reached with a theory
of QR that is more consistent with the tenets of a multidominance approach to movement, such as the one
presented by Johnson (2012).However, re-presenting a full theory ofQR that plays nicelywithmultidominance
is beyond the scope of this dissertation, which is focused on the argument structure of spray/load verbs. I refer
the interested reader to Johnson’s article for a detailed account of just such a theory thatwill produce the correct
results for structures like the one in (45), but which models movement as Remerge.
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This structure can be built by the following applications of Merge.
(48) a. Merge({Bill}DP, {√hit}V) = {{Bill}DP, {√hit}V}VP
b. Merge({· · ·}VP, {v}v) = {{{Bill}DP, {√hit}V}VP, {v}v}vP
c. Merge({· · ·}vP, {John}DP) = {{{{Bill}DP, {√hit}V}VP, {v}v}vP, {John}DP}vP
d. Merge({· · ·}vP, {T}T)= {{{{{Bill}DP, {√hit}V}VP, {v}v}vP, {John}DP}vP, {T}T}TP
The next (and, for us, final) step in the derivation consists of moving the subject to Spec,TP,
to satisfy the EPP and so that it receives nominative Case. This will also be accomplished
by Merge, but in this instance, Merge applies to an element that has already been merged:
he DP John. As a result, John is structurally in both Spec,TP and Spec,vP.












Note that up to this point, I have intentionally simplified the presentation of movement
to avoid showing multidominance that is not crucial to my central claims. All these move-
ments could be replaced with structures that use multidominance with no consequence—
except in the case of QR, which crucially replaces the moved item with a trace of type 𝑒.
I refer the reader to Johnson (2012) for details about the analysis of QR in a system that
makes use of multidominance.
Remerge takes an element andmerges it with a node that dominates it. This will capture
the same set of facts that the restriction that a moved item must c-command its trace or
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copy does. However, this means that Remerge cannot produce the structures I presented in
(42). This is because the two positions of the multidominated DP are not in a c-command
relation. The way in which these structures are derived, then, cannot be via Remerge.
The solution comes fromCitko (2005), who argues that the definition ofMerge not only
permits Remerge (or internal Merge), but also what she dubs parallel Merge. We might
equivalently just think of this as Merge that creates parallel structures, where parallel struc-
tures are those that do not contain a single node that dominates all others. The advantage of
thinking this way is that it makes it clear that parallel Merge is not distinct fromMerge, but
instead describes a special case when Merge applies and the kind of structure that results.
Remerge applies to an element that has already been merged and results in a representa-
tion where the remerged node c-commands itself (or, equivalently, a representation with a
single node that dominates all others), as in (49). In contrast, parallel uses ofMerge create a
(possibly intermediate) representation where the parallel merged element does not c-com-
mand itself (or, equivalently, a representation where there is no single node that dominates
all others).
(50) a. Merge({α}α, {γ}γ) = {{α}α, {γ}γ}α
b. Merge({γ}γ, {β}β) =
α β
γ βα
This is the application of Merge that is required to derive the structures that spray/load
verbs occur in according to my analysis. As an illustration, consider the following partial
derivation of (42a).35 I have not shown the derivation of the PP, which is accomplished by
a standard application of Merge applying to onto and the door, and is unremarkable.
35Note that whether the object merges first with the PP or the verb does not matter; either order will produce











































































This, then, is how I proposemultidominance arises in the structures of sentenceswith spray/
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load verbs: via parallel Merge.36 I return to the question of why parallel Merge is required
in chapter 6, section 6.3.2.1.
2.4 Additional Issues in the Syntax of Spray/load Verbs
The discussion in the preceding section suggests a novel conception of what character-
izes the class of possible spray/load verbs. In particular, the present analysis treats the set of
possible spray/load verbs as precisely those that have lexical semantics compatiblewith goal
and theme arguments. In addition, these verbs are obligatorily transitive—if this were not
the case, resultatives in which the secondary predicate held of something other than the
verb’s object should be possible, contrary to the facts presented in (27–28). Finally, they
must be compatible with a resultative structure. Put together, these facts will lead to the
behavior shown by the alternation. However, there are more issues related to the syntax of
these verbs that merit investigation, which I now turn to.
For instance, consider the question of how to treat uses of spray/load verbs that lack a
PP following the object.37
(52) a. John sprayed the door.
b. John sprayed the paint.
I see two possibilities: one is to simply posit that CAUSEP is absent in these structures. That
is, they do not involve multidominance, and are syntactically just like standardmonotransi-
tive verbs. Another possibility is that they involve an implicit CAUSEP, which is syntactically
present but left unspoken. The correct analysis hinges on exactly how implicit arguments
(like the putative implicit CAUSEP) are to be represented. However, note that when again
occurs to the right of the object in a sentence lacking the post-object PP, a low repetitive
reading is possible, but not a restitutive reading. This favors the analysis without an im-
plicit CAUSEP.
36I modify this analysis in chapter 3 in ways that do not affect the point here. All that is different is that V
merges with a functional head to form a complex head, and that is what merges with the object rather than
the verb root itself. Parallel Merge will apply in the same way it does here to derive that only slightly different
structure.
37This issue was raised by an anonymous reviewer for Linguistic Inquiry.
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(53) a. Context: Bill sprayed the door, but didn’t quite hit all of it. So, ...
John sprayed the door again. (repetitive)
b. Context: Bill sprayed the paint, but didn’t cover the target. So, ...
John sprayed the paint again. (repetitive)
(54) Context: The doorwasmade of boards coatedwith forest green paint. Over time,
the paint flaked off. So, ...
a. # John sprayed the door again. (restitutive)
b. # John sprayed the paint again. (restitutive)
If a hidden CAUSEP with the meaning of the door with the paint or the paint onto the door (or
something more vague that denoted a result state) were available for again to modify in
(54a–b), both might be expected to be acceptable, contrary to fact. This leads me to favor










The holistic effect that has been widely noted (Beavers 2017) is no less explained in
the present account than in many others. Any approach that assigns a privileged role to
the object in measuring out the contours of the event described by the verb, such as Tenny
(1994), should apply no less to the current analysis, since the argument that bears this
privilege is the object (aswell as the specifier of the result-denoting PP). Thus, it is expected
to bear the properties that any object would have, and should be responsible for measuring
out the event in the same way as other objects. However, the gentle reader will recall that
a full explanation of why exactly only objects can measure out events in this way is still
required, and it is not provided here. Instead, I turn to this question in chapter 4. Ultimately,
I reject the Measuring Out constraint and similar ideas as accurately describing the holistic
effect, arguing that it arises in different ways in theme-object and goal-object structures.
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Another question is why multidominance is required in my analysis when a resultative
structure is present. What would prevent there from being one DP in the object position,
and a different DP in Spec,PP, as in (56)?38
(56) Context: Dave has a mixture of water and paint. He sprays it all over the door.
As a result, the entire door gets paint on it, including the knob.
a. ★ Dave sprayed the door the knob with paint.
b. ★ Dave sprayed the water/paint mixture paint onto the door.
Nothing would seem to go wrong here semantically, since it would indeed by accurate to
say that Dave’s spraying the door directly caused the state of the knob being with paint
(or that Daves’ spraying the water/paint mixture directly caused the state of paint being
on the door). But in fact, I have already explained why such cases are ruled out, when I
addressed the inadequacies of the PRO-based account earlier. The issue is syntactic, not
semantic, as I proposed in the discussion of (33). What goes wrong in these structures is
that the DP in Spec,PP cannot receive Case: the subject and object would receive Case in the
usual ways structural Case is assigned, while the DP in Comp,PP would receive Case from
the preposition. But this leaves no Case assigner for the DP in Spec,PP, leading to a violation
of the Case filter. This rules out one possibility for a non-multidominance structure (when
the PP is present).
Another possibility is best addressed later, as it is only raised by a revision to the analy-
sis I will make in chapter 3. There, I will ultimately propose that the denotation of spray/load
verb roots is not of type ⟨𝑒 , 𝑠𝑡⟩, but of type ⟨𝑠, 𝑡⟩. This move helps resolve an asymmetry
in the status of theme objects and goal objects that I provide evidence for there. This raises
the question of why it is not possible to use spray/load verbs intransitively with a small
clause result state, which would predict that the examples in (27–28) could be felicitous,
contrary to fact. In the end, I propose that what rules out the intransitive small clause syn-
tax, which would not involve multidominance, is syntactic rather than semantic. Spray/load
verbs are syntactically obligatorily transitive even though this fact cannot be derived from
their semantics, much like the contrast between the optionally transitive eat and the similar
38I thank Seth Cable (p.c.) for these examples.
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in meaning but obligatorily transitive devour.
In addition, there is a puzzle involving the relative scope of again and indefinite ob-
jects, which reveals certain difficulties associated with computing the scope of indefinites
in frameworks that feature multidominance more generally. While a full resolution to this
question is outside the scope of this dissertation, I sketch a partial solution below, with
the goal of convincing the reader that further inroads are possible, even if several details
remain yet to be worked out.
2.4.1 Multidominance and the Scope of Indefinites
Two facts in combination present a puzzle regarding the interpretation of multidomi-
nated indefinite objects in my account. To preview the rest of this section, I will first show
that an indefinite must be bound by a single quantifier in the asserted content, as revealed
by the fact that the object must be identical to the subject of the resultative predicate (cf.
(27–28)). Second, I will show that an indefinite may nevertheless scope below a restitutive
or low repetitive again, which would seem to require it to be bound bymultiple quantifiers.
Providing a full analysis of this pattern is outside the scope of this dissertation, but I will
argue below that the solution is likely to reside in a fuller understanding of how indefinites
are interpreted, and does not point to any problems specific to my account.
For presentational purposes, I will adopt an analysis of indefinites rooted in Heim
(1982)’s and Diesing (1992)’s work, whereby indefinites are analyzed as introducing free
variables of type 𝑒, which are existentially bound by an operator ∃. Where this operator
appears in a syntactic tree signals where the indefinite takes scope. (If one assumes a QR-
based approach to the interpretation of indefinite objects, then the position of ∃ in the fol-
lowing structures can be taken to signal the landing site(s) of QR, though some additional
complications may arise involving trace conversion.)
The first fact is that in asserted content, the object must be identical to the subject of the
resultative predicate. This was shown before in (27–28) for definite objects, and it is also
true of indefinite objects.39
39I concentrate here on theme-object examples. This is because it is easier to come up with naturalistic con-
texts involving indefinite themes and definite goals than vice versa (and see Brinkmann 1995 for additional
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(57) a. Context: John took a large sheet of canvas and laid it on the floor of his
workspace. Then, he took a bucket of paint and hooked up a hose to it.
Using the hose, ...
John sprayed paint onto the canvas.
b. Context: John is a modern artist who uses innovative techniques. For his
latest work, he took a large sheet of canvas and laid it on the floor of his
workspace. Then, he took a piece of plywood larger than the canvas and
coated it evenly in forest green paint. He placed the plywood with the
paint side down just above the canvas, so that wherever pressure was ap-
plied on the reverse side, the forest green paint would come into contact
with and stick to the canvas. Then, he took a hose hooked up to a bucket
of cheap red paint, and ...
# John sprayed paint onto the canvas.
(57a) is felicitous in the context given because the paint John sprays is the paint that ends
up on the canvas. In contrast, (57b) is infelicitous because that is not the case: John sprays
the cheap red paint through the hose onto the plywood, which causes the forest green
paint coating the opposite side of the plywood to go onto the canvas. This shows us that
the indefinite can only be associated with a single existential binder. In other words, (58a)
below is a possible structure, which corresponds to (57a); while (58b) is not a possible
structure, which would correspond to (57b).
discussion related to this point), and the relevant issues have to do with the interpretation of indefinite objects.
The same pattern of facts holds for goal-object structures. I avoid presenting the relevant parallel examples



























If the single indefinite could be associated with multiple existential quantifiers as in (58b),
(57b) should be felicitous in the scenario described. The semantics would have two existen-
tial quantifiers, and would be the following.
(59) J(58b)K = λ𝑒.∃𝑥[paint(𝑥)∧spray(𝑒 , 𝑥)]∧∃𝑒′[∃𝑥[paint(𝑥)∧onto(𝑒′, the canvas, 𝑥)]∧
CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1
This semantics describes eventualities that are sprayings of paint, which cause eventualities
of paint being on the canvas. This describeswhat happens in (57b): John sprays (red) paint,
which causes (green) paint to be on the canvas. Thus, if (58b) were a possible representa-
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tion for (57b), it would be felicitous. Because (57b) is in fact not felicitous, we conclude that
(58b) is not a possible representation, leaving only (58a), corresponding to (57a).40
One could object that the semantics in (59) violates the restrictions imposed by direct
causation. It seems possible and even plausible that John’s spraying of red paint does not
directly cause the state of the green paint being on the canvas. There might be an interven-
ing event, which consists of the event of the board moving and causing the green paint
to come into contact with the canvas. However, there seems to be evidence that weighs
against explaining away the problem in this way. Other resultatives, which would involve
direct causation no less than (57b), do allow this sort of mediated contact to count for the
purposes of direct causation.
40Additional suggestive evidence supporting this point comes fromHiraiwa&Bodomo (2008), who provide


























They show based on possible predicate cleft structures that the object nέnè ‘meat’ is parallel merged with each
verb separately (with subsequent movement of the first verb above the focus marker). What is relevant to the
present discussion is that their translation uses a coreferential pronoun rather than a second indefinite. This
suggests that the indefinite is bound only once, which would have to occur above where the branches rejoin
(at AspP, in their analysis). If it could be bound lower, a more appropriate translation would be “He roasted
meat and ate meat.” However, this remains speculative, since I have not been able to consult a native speaker
of Dàgáárè to verify whether such a reading is impossible.
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(61) Context: John wanted to make the lumpy sheet of metal flat by hammering it.
But he wasn’t confident that he could get it to an even flatness entirely by hand.
He got a large piece of wood and laid it over the metal, so that it would evenly
distribute the force of his hammering across the surface of the metal. Then, John
finally picked up the hammer, and ...
John hammered the metal flat.
In this case, John is not directly hammering the metal, causing the metal to be flat. Instead,
he is hammering the wood on top of the metal, which then transfers the force of the blows
through to the metal, making the metal flat. Yet this sentence is felicitous in the context,
despite the mediated contact being identical to the sort of mediated contact in (57b). I con-
clude that direct causation is satisfied in both cases, meaning the explanation for why (57b)
is infelicitous must lie elsewhere.
Now, we turn to the second fact, which is that an indefinite can scope below a restitutive
or repetitive− again.41
(62) a. Context: John’s teeth lost all their enamel. Luckly, his dentist had a fancy
machine that could spray enamel onto teeth, though he’d never actually
used it before. John showed up for his appointment, and ...
The dentist sprayed enamel onto John’s teeth again. (restitutive)
b. Context: John’s teeth lost all their enamel. Luckly, his dentist had a fancy
machine that could spray enamel onto teeth. Since this was a new treat-
ment, itwas quite popular, and the dentist had been busily spraying enamel
onto people’s teeth all day. Just before John’s turn, the dentist decided to
take a break, and put his aide in charge of continuing the treatments. Then
it was John’s turn, and ...
The dentist’s aide sprayed enamel again onto John’s teeth.
(repetitive−onto)
41The examples in this section do not directly control for the possibility of a high scope kind reading of
the indefinite. It is possible to construct examples that would control for this (imagine there are at least two
kinds of enamel distinguished by their concentration or other properties), but this would greatly complicate
the contexts and sacrifices the naturalness of these cases, with no obvious change in the discussion to come.
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Note that in (62a), only a restitutive presupposition is supported: while enamel had been
on John’s teeth before, it was not sprayed onto John’s teeth. Similarly, in (62b), only a sub-
jectless, repetitive− reading is supported by the context. The dentist’s aide had not sprayed
enamel before, and the presupposition excludes onto John’s teeth, since enamel was never
sprayed onto John’s teeth before.
Furthermore, it is clear that in themost natural readings of these scenarios, the indefinite
scopes below again. In (62b), presumably the enamel that the dentist’s aide sprays is not the
very same enamel that the dentist sprayed before. Likewise, in (62a), it is not the enamel
that used to be on John’s teeth that is restored to them, but different enamel. Thus, in each
case, we get a reading where the indefinite most naturally scopes below again. Finally, we
can combine both readings of again in a single example, as we did before with definites in
(29) (though the judgment becomes more difficult presumably due to the multiplicity of
agains just as before, it is shared by the native English speakers I have consulted).
(63) Context: John’s teeth lost all their enamel. Luckly, his dentist had a fancymachine
that could spray enamel onto teeth. Since this was a new treatment, it was quite
popular, and the dentist had been busily spraying enamel onto people’s teeth all
day. Just before John’s turn, the dentist decided to take a break, and put his aide
in charge of continuing the treatments. Then it was John’s turn, and ...
The dentist’s aide sprayed enamel again onto John’s teeth again.
Note that this context supports repetitive− and restitutive presuppositions, but does not
support a reading where either again scopes over the combined VP (i.e., there was no prior
eventuality of spraying enamel onto John’s teeth, merely prior eventualities of spraying
enamel and enamel being on John’s teeth). This is just as we should expect given the mul-
tidominance analysis. What this example tells us is that the indefinite can scope below each
again independently. The most natural reading is one in which the indefinite scopes below
each again: the enamel sprayed before is presumably different from the enamel the dentist’s
aide sprays, and that is not the same as the enamel that used to be on John’s teeth.
Thus, we see that an indefinite object can scope below either a repetitive− again as in
(62b) or a restitutive again as in (62a) (or both simultaneously, for those who are able to
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accept (63)). In otherwordswe seem to have evidence that something like (58b) is possible,
at leastwith regards to the scope of the indefinite relative to again’s presupposition—despite
the fact that the asserted content does not allow the reading this structure would produce.
Further, we can verify that even when the indefinite scopes below again’s presupposition,
it must nevertheless scope above the highest VP in the asserted content, as shown by the
required identity of the object and the subject of the resultative predicate.
(64) Context: John’s teeth lost all their enamel. Luckily, his dentist had a fancy ma-
chine that could spray enamel onto teeth. However, when John showed up for
his appointment, it turned out his dentist was nearly blind, and could not aim the
spray gun correctly at John’s mouth. Fortunately, there was a small hole in the
tube attached to the spray gun. Whenever, John’s dentist held down the spray
gun’s trigger, some enamel would spray out of the gun into the air, while some
enamel would drip from the hole and onto John’s teeth, coating them with the
enamel. So, in the end, ...
# The dentist sprayed enamel onto John’s teeth again.
If (58b) were a possible structure, this sentence should be felicitous. In particular, the se-
mantics it gives rise to are similar to those in (59), which describe the scenario above: there
is an event of spraying enamel is an event of causing enamel to be on John’s teeth. How-
ever, the enamel sprayed is not the enamel that ends up on John’s teeth. The enamel sprayed
ends up in the air because the dentist cannot see well enough to aim the nozzle at John’s
teeth, while the enamel on John’s teeth is the enamel that drips from the hole in the tube.
In sum, what we see is that the asserted content of sentences where spray/load verbs take
an indefinite object is the semantics compatible with (58a), while the presupposition asso-
ciated with the different readings of again in such sentences may correspond to what (58b)
would produce—a curious semantic paradox.
It seems that for a sentence like (62a), we have just the following semantics and presup-
position (mutatis mutandis for the parallel example in (62b)):
(65) λ𝑒.∃𝑥[enamel(𝑥) ∧ spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) ∧ ∃𝑒′[onto(𝑒′, John’s teeth, 𝑥) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)]] = 1
presupposition: ∃𝑒′′[𝜏(𝑒′′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒′)∧∃𝑥[enamel(𝑥)∧onto(𝑒′, John’s teeth, 𝑥)]] = 1
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The asserted content requires the enamel sprayed to be the same as the enamel that ends
up on John’s teeth, while the presupposition allows the enamel in the prior eventuality to
differ from the enamel in the eventuality described by the asserted content. The challenge
lies not in describing the semantics, but in deriving this result compositionally.
This puzzle is not unique to my analysis of spray/load verbs. It is a puzzle shared by
other analyses that allow an indefinite to be multidominated, including most clearly Hi-
raiwa & Bodomo (2008) and Johnson (2018). In fact, Johnson briefly discusses this very
puzzle, suggesting a solution that he notes would allow the indefinite to be bound twice
in the asserted content, which I have shown above is incorrect for spray/load verbs.42 If we
adopt a syntax with multidominance, there should probably be some constraint on the syn-
tax/semantics interface that requires a single QP to be associated with a single semantic
quantifier. Otherwise, we could predict that an indefinite could be bound multiple times
in structures involving movement, if this is modeled as Remerge (as is typical in many
theories with multidominance). This would mean that a potentially unbounded number
of existential quantifiers could be associated with a single QP, probably an undesirable re-
sult. The constraint I’ve described will require that the asserted content has only a single
existential quantifier associated with the QP. In the multidominance analysis of spray/load
verbs, this will ensure that the existential quantifier scopes above VP.43
But again’s presupposition might have certain requirements associated with it as well.
Heim (1982)’s and Diesing (1992)’s idea is that indefinites represent free variables that
must be existentially closed. We might suppose that one context where these variables can
or must be closed is in the presupposition of again, leading to an existential binder to be
insertedwithin again’s presuppositionwithout affecting the asserted content. Alternatively,
it might be possible to insert an existential binder below again in the asserted content, but
overwrite this quantifier when the branches rejoin and the violation of the single-QP-to-
single-quantifier constraint becomes apparent. The general solution involves figuring out
42I think it likely that Johnson (2018)’s proposed solution is incorrect for ditransitive verbs as well. The
relevant examples would be largely similar to the ones in this section, though making the argument is outside
the purview of this dissertation.
43This constraint may need to carve out an exception to allowmultiple existential quantifiers to be associated
with a single QP if Kaden Holladay’s multidominance analysis of right-node raising is correct (Rajesh Bhatt,
p.c.).
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how the grammarmanages the balance between the constraint on the interpretation of QPs
with the need for free variables to get bound in particular places, and that solution will
explain not only how spray/load verbs work, but double object and serial verb constructions
as well.
A piece of evidence that favors treating these facts as reflecting something particular
to indefinites is that universal quantifiers do not seem to be able to scope low in again’s
presupposition in sentences with spray/load verbs.
(66) Context: The factorymanager had everyonepaint the boardswith brushes. There
were a lot of them, and all the paint in the factorywas used up. Then, the painted
boards were assembled into a fence. Over time, the paint flaked off. John was
put in charge of repainting the fence, so he went out and bought many buckets
of paint. He didn’t want to go through the tedium of using a brush, so he got a
spray nozzle. Then, ...
# John sprayed all the paint onto the fence again.44
44One might object that the use of the definite determiner the in combination with universal quantifier all
in this example might be responsible for the unavailability of the low scope reading, since definites behave
as though outscoping all other quantifiers. However, the unacceptability of the low scope reading of all given
the context cannot be credited to the use of the definite determiner in all the paint. In particular, Bale (2007)
provides an example of a universal quantifier scoping below again evenwhen a definite determiner is included,
his (72).
(i) Context: When Seymour moved into his first apartment, all the windows were open creating a nice
breeze. He liked it so much he kept the windows open. In fact, when he moved into his next apart-
ment, ...
He opened all the windows again.
The set of windows in the presupposition and the asserted content are different, showing that the universal
quantifier takes scope below again. (Bale (2007) attributes this behavior to the propositional complexity of
resultative VPs (recall the earlier discussion that analyzed open as a resultative), which provide a landing site
for QR below repetitive again.) What is important for present purposes is that the use of the following all does
not require strict identity between the sets of windows in (i). This means that (66)’s unacceptability cannot be
attributed to the definite determiner requiring strict identity of the paint involved in the asserted content and
the paint involved in the presupposition. Instead, the definite here seems to serve as a contextual restrictor.
Note the difference in the readings of all paint (which means “all paint that exists”) and all the paint (which
means “all the paint in the context”). Using all paint in place of all the paint in (66) would therefore similarly
result in infelicitousness, but for a very different reason—it is silly to assert that John sprayed all paint (that
exists) onto the fence.
A question that one might have is why a low scope reading is not possible in a sentence like the following, a
fact which Bale (2007) does not explicitly address.
(ii) a. Context: When Seymour moved into his first apartment, all the windows were automatic,
and when open when anyone passed by. However, it turned out that when Seymour moved
in, theywere stuck open, which created a nice breeze. Eventually, Seymour’s landlord decided
to fix the automatic windows, and left them closed afterward. So, later that day, ...
As Seymour walked into the apartment, all the windows opened again. (restitutive)
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This behavior is expected in the Heim-Diesing approach because universal quantifiers do
not introduce free variables like indefinites do. They are thus not subject to constraints regu-
lating the existential closure of free variables. Instead, universal quantifiers are interpreted
via QR in the usual way (e.g., as in (46), or as in Johnson (2012)’s theory of QR). They
would have to scope above again in order to satisfy the proposed syntax/semantics con-
straint on the interpretation of QPs, and could not be closed within again’s presupposition.
2.4.2 Distinguishing Verb Classes: Put vs. Dump
Definitionally, spray/load verbs can occur in theme-object and goal-object structures.
However, some verbs only occur in one or the other of these structures.
(67) Theme-object only:
a. John put the glass on the table.
b. ★ John put the table with the glass. (under the relevant reading)
c. John dumped the water in the well.
d. ★ John dumped the well with the water.
(68) Goal-object only:
a. ★ John coated paint on the wall.
b. John coated the wall with paint.
c. ★ John plugged putty into the hole.
d. John plugged the hole with putty.
b. Context: When Seymour moved into his first apartment, all the windows were open creating
a nice breeze. He liked it so much he kept the windows open. When it came time for him
to move, his next apartment turned out to be pretty spiffy, since it had windows that would
automatically open when you passed by. In fact, ...
#As Seymour walked into the apartment, all the windows opened again.
(ii-a) shows that a restitutive reading of post-VP again is possible with an unaccusative use of open, while (ii-
b) shows that this is only the case if the universal quantifier scopes above again’s presupposition. Given the
hypothesis that unaccusative open is propositionally complex and consists of an event that causes an open state,
why couldn’t the quantifier be bound low in this case? I suggest that it has to dowith the fact that the quantifier
in moves to Spec,TP in such cases, which is above restitutive again. A natural result of this is that it must be
interpreted as scoping over again’s presupposition. Of course, what remains is explaining why reconstruction
is not a possibility (see Boeckx (2001) for a relevant proposal).
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I will return to the status of cases like (68) in chapter 4, section 4.3. For now, I will focus on
howwe can distinguish two different kinds of verbs that occur in (67) using the diagnostics
developed in this chapter.
Levin (1993) and Beavers (2017) both note that there are verbs that only occur in the
theme-object structure, which they categorize as non-alternating theme-object verbs. How-
ever, I propose that this categorization is misleading, as verbs like put and dump behave
differently with respect to the possible readings of again they support. While both support
restitutive readings of again, only verbs like dump support repetitive− readings.
(69) a. Context: John built the box in the garage. While reorganizing, he had to
move it out on the driveway, but when he finished ...
John put the box into the garage again. (restitutive)
b. Context: John put the box in the basement. While reorganizing, he had to
move it somewhere else, so ...
# John put the box again into the garage.45 (repetitive−into)
(70) a. Context: John went to the lake. He dipped a glass into the water, and
pulled it out full. Then, ...
John dumped the water into the lake again. (restitutive)
b. Context: John filled the cup with water, and then dumped in into the pan
on the stove. He then realized that he was supposed to wait until the pan
had gotten hotter, so he picked up the pan, and ...
John dumped the water again into a bowl. (repetitive−into)
This contrast shows us that non-alternating theme-object verbs like dump pattern like alter-
nating spray/load verbs in terms of the readings of again they support. Since those readings
form the core of the argument for themultidominance analysis, I conclude these verbs have
the syntax of spray/load verbs, but do not alternate (for reasons I explore in chapter 3).
45This sentence can receive a reading when again is interpreted as restitutive, which is easiest if it is prosod-
ically marked. I assume this is possible because into the garage can right-shift past restitutive again. Another
possibility is that this is an instance of left-adjoining again; see Bale (2007) for additional information and ex-
amples. However, I do not see how this could be a case of again left-adjoining to into the garage if one adopts
an analysis where put takes a small clause complement, which is supported by the possibility of a restitutive
reading in (69a).
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On the other hand, the only (relevant) reading of again that is possible with verbs like
put is a restitutive reading. Thismeans thatwe have evidence for a small clause PP syntax, as
laid out in section 2.3.1. However, we have no evidence that from again that put is transitive.
For this reason, I conclude that the small clause syntax in (17) is right for put (with with
replaced with a locative preposition).
In short, then, the readings that again produces with different theme-object verbs sup-
port splitting them into two groups. In one group are verbs that seem to involve multidom-
inance in their syntax, just like spray/load verbs, such as dump. We could call these non-al-
ternating theme-object spray/load verbs. In the other group are verbs like put, which do not
seem to have the multidominant syntax of spray/load verbs. This distinction is useful: it al-
lows us to distinguish verbs that are relevant to understanding the distribution of the spray/
load alternation from verbs that are not. An account of the spray/load alternation will need
to account for why dump cannot occur in the goal-object structure. It will not necessarily
need to account for why put cannot do this.46 The readings of again discussed in this chap-
ter thus help us understand what an analysis of the spray/load alternation should account
for, and what it need not necessarily account for.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter argues for a particular view of the syntax of spray/load verbs and the alter-
nation that is characteristic of them. Using again as a diagnostic of their event structure, I
argued that the object forms a constituent with the verb that excludes the PP, while simul-
taneously forming a constituent with the PP that excludes the verb. I presented an analysis
in terms of multidominance that permits such structures, and discussed some implications
this analysis has for our understanding of spray/load verbs and the alternation they display.
I also discussed an additional puzzle relating to spray/load verbs. This puzzle has to do
46Ultimately, the account I adopt in chapter 4 for the semantics ofwithwill explain this, however. In particular,
there is a reading of John put the table with the glass, where the table is moved into a position where it is with the
glass. The reason that a reading where the glass is what is moved is impossible is because with’s complement
in no case encodes a theme of the verb, but instead contributes a separate directly caused eventuality. In the
case of spray/load verbs, the reading where the object of with is what is moved comes about because of how
goal-objects are introduced, in combination with world knowledge and general reasoning, as I will argue in
chapter 4.
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with the interpretation of indefinites in structures with multidominance, which is easy to
observe in the context of spray/load verbs, but is an area needing investigation in multidom-
inance frameworks more generally. The solution to this puzzle is likely to reside in a fuller
understanding of how indefinites are interpreted, rather than in a revision to the syntactic
analysis proposed here for spray/load verbs, as it arises with non-spray/load verbs as well.
Taking a look at the bigger picture, we can see that multidominance allows argument
structures that would otherwise be impossible. One of those is a transitive resultative struc-
ture, and I have argued that spray/load verbs realize this structure. Johnson (2018) has ar-
gued that some ditransitive verbs invoke this same structure, but with the multidominated
object being the complement rather than the specifier of the result state. In previous work,
Hiraiwa & Bodomo (2008) present an analysis of a bracketing paradox that arises in serial
verb constructions in Dàgáárè as revealing another otherwise impossible structure, where
two verbs share a single object in a dual transitive structure. A syntax that allowsmultidom-
inance predicts that argument structures like these should exist barring any constraints that
would rule them out for independent reasons. We raise these possibilities when we allow
phrases to have multiple mothers, so the fact that they seem to be realized is a welcome
result.
What remains an open question is how we can constrain multidominance in the area of
argument structure.What rules out a phrase being the complement of V and the specifier of
vP, for instance? Such general questions must be addressed in order to develop a theory of





Now that we have a model for the syntactic structures that spray/load verbs find them-
selves in, we can begin our investigation of the spray/load alternation itself. What is inter-
esting about spray/load verbs is, of course, not only the structures they occur in, but the
relations between those structures, which I identified as related to a core topic of linguistic
theory in chapter 1. More bluntly, the previous chapter models the syntax that surrounds
these verbs in both the theme-object and goal-object structures, but it does not model the
relationship between those structures. We have an intuition that there is some relationship
between these two ways that spray/load verbs have of expressing their arguments. Empiri-
cal evidence, discussed briefly in chapter 1, bolsters this intuition: the spray/load alternation
is productive, meaning that children may use a spray/load verb they have heard in only one
structure in the other, and that it can extend to novel verbs.
And yet, this productivity is limited. Some cases of this sort were discussed in the previ-
ous chapter, where productively using one form or another is possible but often somewhat
degraded.
(1) a. John filled the zucchini with the mixture.
b. % John filled the mixture into the zucchini.1
1This example comes from an anonymous reviewer for Linguistic Inquiry.
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(2) a. John poured water into the glass.
b. % John poured the glass (full) with water.
The analysis in this chapter will suggest a way of thinking about why productivity is pos-
sible but limited in such cases.
In other cases, sentences which on the surface appear identical to spray/load verbs and
permit the same readings of again in the same positions nevertheless categorically fail to
alternate.
(3) a. Context: John dipped a bucket into the well and pulled up some water.
Finding it unsatisfactory, ...
John dumped the water into the well again. (restitutive)
b. Context: John was trying to fill up the well to retrieve a toy boat that had
fallen inside. He needed to add more water so the boat would float to the
topwhere he could reach it. He filled up a large glass with water, and then
decided he’d rather use a bowl, so he dumped the water into the bowl.
Upon arriving at the well ...
John dumped the water again into the well. (repetitive−into)
c. John dumped the water into the well.
d. # John dumped the well with the water.
(4) a. Context: The bookshelf was made from pieces of varnished wood. When
the varnish began to come off ...
John coated the bookshelf with varnish again. (restitutive)
b. Context: The bookshelf was coated with paint. Then, John decided to var-
nish it, so ...
John coated the bookshelf again with varnish. (repetitive−with)
c. John coated the bookshelf with varnish.
d. # John coated varnish onto the bookshelf.
We need stronger restrictions to explain these cases, it would seem. There appears to be a
syntactic difference here that cannot be overridden by context, at least not without effec-
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tively making these into novel verbs that share a pronunciation with their existing English
counterparts.
This chapter deals with these restrictions and the modeling of the relation between the
two structures that comprise the spray/load alternation. However, evidence that the theme-
object and goal-object structures differ is not provided by the behavior of again; as we saw
in the last chapter, each structure behaves identically with regards to the again diagnostic,
making them appear syntactically identical—the only difference is the lexical identity of the
preposition. However, looking at a broader range of contexts in which these verbs appear
shows us that there is a true syntactic difference between the theme-object and goal-object
structures.
The syntactic asymmetries between these variants become apparent when considering
unaccusative and nominal uses of spray/load verbs. As I will show in section 3.2, only the
theme-object variant permits unaccusative and nominal uses, while the goal-object variant
does not. I propose that this pattern is derived by P-conflation: the goal-object structure
involves the conflation of a phonologically null prepositionwith the verb. The asymmetries
then reduce to the syntax of prepositions and null affixes.
Since there does not seem to be a better place to introduce what conflation means, I will
do so briefly here. Conflation is defined in opposition to incorporation,which are bothways
in which complex headsmay be formed. Conflation describes what occurs when a complex
head is formed by external Merge, while incorporation describes what occurs when a com-
plex head is formed by internal Merge (or, equivalently, Remerge; see the discussion in
chapter 2, section 2.3.6) (Folli & Harley 2005, 2020; Hale & Keyser 1993a; Harley 2005;
















In (5a), we can say that β incorporates into α, while in (5b), α and β have conflated (in
this case, α is shown as projecting). What ends up being useful about the distinction is that
while incorporation requires the projection of a phrase headed by β, conflation does not.
Thus P-conflation can occur even if the conflated preposition is never the head of a PP. This
is an important distinction between my account and Damonte (2005)’s (to be discussed
in chapter 5, section 5.2.3.2), since it allows me to derive the spray/load alternation non-
transformationally.
With conflation defined, I will now outline the remainder of this chapter. Section 3.2
presents data that establishes the syntactic differences between theme-object and goal-ob-
ject spray/load verbs. Next, section 3.3 presents data relating to the German verbal prefix be-,
which is implicated in the German equivalent of the spray/load alternation in some cases,
which will motivate positing an analogous (though not completely equivalent) null prefix
in English. Some details relating to the syntax and semantics of this analysis are discussed
in section 3.4. Section 3.5 shows that under the P-conflation analysis, the syntactic behav-
ior of English spray/load verbs conforms to existing and well-established generalizations
regarding the syntax of prepositions and the meanings of nominalizations. It also suggests
a way of thinking about these existing patterns that approaches an explanation, though
rejecting this explanation would not entail rejecting the P-conflation analysis.
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3.2 Non-agentive Uses and Nominalizations of Spray/load Verbs
If a spray/load verb can occur in a non-agentive use, it seems that only the theme can be
the subject (Levin 1993, sec. 9.7; D’Elia 2016, (263–265)), with six exceptions.2 Similarly,
their nominalizations can only refer to the theme, as first noted in Fraser (1971) (see also
Levin 1993, sec. 9.7). (Some spray/load verbs do not allow non-agentive uses and/or nomi-
nalizations in English, presumably for independent reasons.3)
(6) a. Paint sprayed onto the wall.
b. ★ The wall sprayed with paint.
c. the spray (= the paint/≠ the wall)
(7) a. Rain sprinkled onto the ground.
b. ★ The ground sprinkled with rain.
c. the sprinkling (= the rain/≠ the ground)
2The exceptions occur with fill, clog, flood, interlace, interleave, and stop up in sentences like The room filled with
water (though the standard pattern, Water filled the room, is also grammatical for all of these to some extent).
What is exceptional is that unlike other spray/load verbs, the goal can become the subject. However, note that
unlike other spray/load verbs, an overt preposition is not easily possible with any of these: ★Water filled into
the room. All of these exceptions are in fact listed as non-alternating goal-object verbs in Levin (1993). I have
not found any other verbs that belong to the spray/load/fill class that allow this. I believe modeling them as
deadjectival might provide a way of accounting for the exception, but I have not worked out the details. I will
not attempt an analysis of their syntax/semantics in what follows.
In addition, note that some spray/load verbs may have alternate lives as members of the swarm class of verbs,
which can occur with either theme or location subjects (Dowty 2001).
(i) a. Bees swarmed in the garden.
b. The garden swarmed with bees.
(ii) a. John drizzled icing onto the cake.
b. John drizzled the cake with icing.
c. Icing drizzled onto the cake.
d. ★ The cake drizzled with icing. (on goal-subject reading)
e. Icing drizzled on the cake. (locative meaning possible)
f. ? The cake drizzled with icing. (on location-subject reading)
I leave aside these complications. One could state that the proper generalization is that goal subjects of spray/
load verbs are not possible, with location subjects being possible for some verbs. Certainly, the relationship
between the spray/load alternation and the swarm alternation is worth exploring. But, as Dowty (2001) points
out, there are a number of differences between these alternations that make it hard to reduce one to the other.
3A full list of spray/load verbs from Levin (1993) that summarizes their behavior in unaccusative and nom-
inal uses appears in the appendix to this chapter.
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(8) a. Icing drizzled onto the cake.
b. ★ The cake drizzled with icing.
c. the drizzle (= the icing/≠ the cake)
(9) a. ★ Books loaded into the truck.
b. ★ The truck loaded with books.
c. the load (= the book/≠ the truck)
These cases might pose a problem for the multidominance analysis presented in the pre-
vious chapter. In particular, that analysis treats goal objects and theme objects as being of
equal status, in that they occur in the same structural positions. Thus, there is no obvious
source for any asymmetry regarding which promotes to a subject position or what the no-
minalization of a spray/load verb can refer to.4 Chapter 2 tells us that this difference cannot
be tied to whether the relevant argument is an object of the verb, since the post-verbal DP
is an object of the verb in both structures as revealed by repetitive− readings of again. The
task of this chapter is thus to identify the source of the asymmetry, and to show how it can
be integrated with the multidominance analysis.5
A first attempt to address this might be to say that the non-agentive uses do not rep-
resent cases of an object being promoted. Note that the non-agentive uses that are possi-
ble often require (or simply sound better) with prepositions introducing the goal. This is
important because sentences with spray/load verbs might also take instrumental adjuncts.
Instruments are often able to become subjects, in sentences like The knife cut the bread, for
instance; and the themes of spray/load verbs, but not the goals, are precisely those that I
suggested may have a parallel life in instrumental with-phrases.
What speaks against treating these as instrumental subjects is the fact that prepositions
seem to often be obligatory for non-agentive uses of spray/load verbs. If these were instru-
4This concern was pointed out to me by an anonymous reviewer for Linguistic Inquiry. However, I believe it
is worth noting that this problem applies to other existing analyses of the spray/load alternation, many of which
also treat theme and goal objects as having the same syntactic status. The problem is not entirely new to my
account, even if its significance has not always been appreciated in prior work.
5However, it is worth noting that most of what is said in this chapter is independent from the multidomi-
nance analysis. Adopting the basic proposals of this chapter does not rely on endorsing the multidominance
analysis, though of course I present these proposals in a way that integrates them with it. Alternative imple-
mentations are surely possible, though I would posit they would run into problems when accounting for the
facts in chapter 2.
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mental subjects, the sentences should be derived from structures using instrumental with-
phrases, which would lack the locative preposition. Including an instrumental with-phrase
in a sentence that also includes the locative preposition that does not take an object are very
degraded or ungrammatical, yet these sentences (minus the agent) would be the basis for
the sentences in (6–8) that take locative prepositions following the verb.
(10) a. ★ John sprayed onto the wall with paint.
b. ★ John sprinkled onto the ground with water.
c. ★ John drizzled onto the cake with icing.
Thus, (6–8) seem to represent cases where an internal argument is promoted to a subject
position,much like in unaccusatives or passives; rather than cases of the instrument-subject
alternation. In addition, treating these non-agentive subjects as instrumental subjectswould
fail to straightforwardly explain the similar restriction observed in their nominalizations,
where the theme also appears to be the privileged argument.
Finally, note that despite the asymmetry in unaccusative uses of spray/load verbs, no
asymmetry exists with regards to passivization. Both theme-object and goal-object variants
can passivize.
(11) a. Paint was sprayed onto the wall.
b. The wall was sprayed with paint.
(12) a. Water was sprinkled onto the plants.
b. The plants were sprinkled with water.
(13) a. Icing was drizzled onto the cake.
b. The cake was drizzled with icing.
(14) a. Books were loaded into the truck.
b. The truck was loaded with books.
Thus, whatever explains the asymmetry in unaccusative uses must not apply to passives.
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3.3 Be- and the Spritzen/luden Alternation
In this section, I examine the German verbal prefix be-, which is implicated in the Ger-
man spray/load alternation and many other valency operations. What unites all uses of be-
is that it stands in complementary distribution to an overt preposition. Be-’s distribution is
both somewhat too widespread and too restricted to be exactly equivalent to what drives
the English spray/load alternation. However, the detour will be useful as it will establish
the existence of valency changing prefixes that have a prepositional meaning. On this ba-
sis, I will propose that the English spray/load alternation (and some cases of the German
equivalent) are derived by the conflation of a null prepositional affix with the verb.
3.3.1 Be-: The Basics
The German prefix be- can occur with a wide range of verb types. In every case, its
presence clearly or arguably correlates with the absence of an overt preposition. Unless








































“Peter climbed the mountain.”
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“The vandals sprayed the car with paint.”
Similar patterns are found for spray/load verbs in Hungarian and Russian (Ackerman 1992;
Iwata 2008; Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1998).






















































“The peasant loaded the wagon (with hay).”




















“The peasants loaded the cart with hay.”
In these cases, the spray/load alternation is morphologically marked, suggesting there is a
generalization that could be made here regarding the relationship between morphology
and the spray/load alternation.6
6Note that theHungarian data presented above is somewhat problematic for the generalization that a prepo-
sitional affix is related to the goal-object structure. In particular, the overt prepositional prefix ra- ‘onto’ is as-
sociated with the theme-object structure in Hungarian, while the goal-object structure is associated with a
perfective affix. (Levin & Rappaport Hovav (1998) do not provide informative glosses for Russian na- and za-
87
In German, the alternation between a preposition and be- is clear in the case of intran-
sitive and spray/load verbs. It is less obvious in the case of transitive verbs. However, the
meaning of the be-prefixed variant of a transitive suggests that the proper comparison is not
with the transitive, but with an intransitive. In particular, the interpretation of (15a) is that
the speaker depicts their cat in a painting. In contrast, the interpretation of (15b) carries
no such entailment—rather, it entails that the speaker applied paint to or on their cat. We
might thus think of bemale ‘BE-paint’ as corresponding to ‘paint on,’ rather than a prefixed
bare male ‘paint.’
In all cases above, it seems plausible then that be- should be analyzed as a verbal af-
fix that carries a prepositional meaning. The combination of the verb and be- will form a
predicate that takes an entity argument, as demonstrated most clearly in (16) by the fact
that stieg is intransitive, while bestieg is transitive. This entity argument is interpreted as the
(physical) goal of the eventuality the verb describes. In the case of spray/load verbs, there
remains one additional puzzle, which has to do with why the theme, formerly the verb’s
object, is now expressed as the complement ofwith. I will return to this question later on, in
chapter 4, section 4.2. For now, the discussion is focused on how to derive the alternation
between a theme-object and a goal-object.
If be-were implicated in every goal-object use of spray/load verbs inGerman, the analysis
would be quite simple: we could simply posit that English has an unpronounced version
.) However, given some of the data to come, it seems clear that be- is associated with a prepositional function in
German. In addition, as Beavers (2017) reports (though he does not provide the data), the perfective prefixmay
actually appear with either structure in Hungarian, making the data presented above from Iwata (2008), who
cites them from Ackerman (1992), perhaps somewhat misleading in isolation. In this regard, it is instructive
to compare the data in (18) with the data from Moravcsik (1978) that is reported in Levin & Rappaport Hovav
(1998), who provide examples that are more congenial to my approach.
























“John smeared the wall with paint.”
Note that in (i-b), the goal-object structure is compatible in Hungarian with a prefixed preposition, in contrast
to what is shown in (18).
However, I will suggest here that while the affixation of a preposition might be one way to derive the spray/
load alternation, it may not be the only way—other types of derivational morphology and even non-morpho-
logical ways of deriving it may be possible. See alsoMateu (2000, 2017) and the discussion in chapter 5, section
5.2.3.4.
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of be-. In fact, the utility of doing this would extend beyond the spray/load alternation, as
English also contains many other verbs that alternate between intransitive and transitive
variants with no overt prefix, while the same verbs may be prefixedwith be- in German. For
instance, climb in English can be both intransitive and transitive, with no overt prefixation.
(20) a. John climbed up the ladder.
b. John climbed the ladder.
If transitive climbwere actually derived by the affixation of an unpronounced English equiv-
alent of German be-, we would unite the spray/load alternation with such cases. Many other
verbs behave this way, too: wander, roam, leap, jump, etc. If these all involve a null preposi-
tional affix that corresponds toGerman be-,we could explainwhy these intransitive/transitive
alternations all seem to have a prepositional meaning.
While I believe that the affixation of a null Pmight indeed explain such cases, identifying
this null prefix with German be- is not actually so easy as all that. For one thing, not every











































































































































“She stuffed the bag with the T-shirts.”
In particular, note that the goal-object use of spritzen and schmieren require be- prefixation,
laden and füllen may be prefixed or not, and stopfen rejects prefixation.
Brinkmann (1995) further notes that in the cases where be- prefixation is optional, it cor-
relateswith an interpretational difference.Within the class of spray/load verbs (but notwith
the other cases discussed above), be- prefixation prevents the goal from being understood
as the interior of an object. When a verb takes a goal-object without be-, the interpretation is
that the theme moves to the interior of the goal; when it does so with be-, the interpretation































































“When leaving for the ski vacation, theMillers pack their car(’s interior) as





































“When leaving for the ski vacation, the Millers pack their car(’s trunk and
roof) as if they will be away for half a year.”
This interpretational difference makes sense of the ungrammaticality of be- prefixation in
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(25b); the lexical semantics of stopfen ‘stuff’ requires that the theme bemoved to the interior
of the goal. This is incompatible with be-’s requirement that the goal be an exterior surface,
so the combination will always result in a contradiction.
The facts above support an analysis where be- prefixation derives goal-object spray/load
verbs only for cases when the goal is interpreted as the exterior surface of some object. The
derivation of non-be-prefixed goal-object spray/load verbs must be accomplished without
be-. We could suppose that be- is a prefix whose meaning is the same as onto’s, and that
there is a null prefix that means into or whose meaning includes both into and onto, with
the into reading being derived via implicature.
However, while this statement of be-’s meaning works well enough in the context of
spray/load verbs, it does not extend to its uses with intransitive verbs. With intransitive








































“She climbs into the car.”
In particular, note that intransitive stiegen ‘climb’ can occur with both auf ‘onto’ and in
‘into’ PPs. Both of these can alternate with transitive bestiegen. This is a clear contrast to
English, where transitive climb can only mean that the subject ascended the exterior of the
object. If there were a null be- prefix in English that were responsible for both the spray/
load alternation and other P/transitive alternations, it would have to behave in exactly the
opposite way from the German be- in the range of interpretations in could get in different
structures. With spray/load verbs, the English null be- would have to be interpretable as into
or onto, while for intransitive verbs, it could not mean into (at least with climb).7
7Brinkmann (1995) also says that be- prefixation is impossible in non-agentive contexts:
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3.3.2 Be- Prefixation Is Freer in German
We have already seen some differences between the behavior of German be- and its
putative null English counterpart. The range of possible interpretations associated with
these affixes appear to be exact mirrors of each other in the contexts of spray/load verbs and
intransitives. But in addition to these differences, there are more. German be- prefixation
is available with a much wider range of verb types than its null counterpart would be in
English.More specifically, the alternation inGerman betweenVPP and be-VDP has awider
distribution than the alternation between V PP and V DP does in English (though there is
some overlap). The following examples show both the overlap in the distribution of these
alternations, as well as their differences.


































“The blind company directory felt the new Mazda.”
c. ? The blind man felt around on the car.






































This suggests that the contrast in (i) may be unrelated to the non-agentive context, and may have to do with
more general properties of causativizable verbs.
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“The sculptor worked the marble.”
c. The sculptor worked at the marble.
d. The sculptor worked the marble.




























“They talked about smoking in the office.”
c. They talked about smoking in the office.
d. ★ They talked smoking in the office.8
























“She marveled at the sawn-apart chain.”
c. She marveled at the sawn-apart chain.





























“Andreas gifts his landlady red roses.”
c. Andreas gifts his landlady red roses.
d. ★ Andreas gifts his landlady with red roses.
































“Oscar cooked Nasi Goreng for the family.”
c. Oscar cooked Nasi Goreng for the family.







































“He robbed the woman.”
c. He robbed the woman of her purse.
d. He robbed the woman.
In particular, while both German V PP/be-V DP and English V PP/V DP alternations are
possible for verbs of active perception and verbs of material manipulation, in English the
V PP/V DP alternation is impossible for verbs of speech, verbs of emotion, datives, and
benefactives. In addition, English allows expressing the theme argument of privatives as a
PP, while German does not.
These differences between the greater freedom of German be- prefixation compared
to the English intransitive-transitive alternation, in addition to the interpretational differ-
ences within the realm of the spray/load alternation, make it hard to identify the spray/load
alternation with the result of null be- prefixation in English. If this were what gave rise to
goal-object forms, wewould expect that other German alternations this prefix is involved in
should be possible with no overt prefix in English. However, this is not the case. In addition,
the fact that the spray/load alternation is possible in German without overt be- prefixation,
provided the goal is a surface and not an interior, supports a view where the spray/load
alternation is not dependent on be- prefixation.
Further issues are raised in Dewell (2004) and Iwata (2008), who show that be- prefixa-
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tion is correlated with additional interpretational differences. In particular, be- prefixation
results in an event description that does not specify an endpoint.






























































“He has already be-loaded the truck, and now he is loading something else
onto the truck.” (Dewell 2004, (34))
Iwata (2008) suggests that it is this property of be- that prevents it fromoccurringwith verbs
like stopfen ‘stuff’ in (25), as its lexical semantics describe the filling of an enclosed space,
and so are associated with an intrinsic endpoint.9 If a hidden be- derived the goal-object
structure, then, we might expect it to be associated with an anti-holistic reading, contrary
to fact.
However, these issues do not truly constitute evidence against an analysis where the
spray/load alternation is derived by prepositional affix. They simply constitute evidence
against German be- being identical to whatever null affix is responsible for the alternation
in English, and against the view that the only semantic contribution of be- is prepositional in
nature. Instead, be-’s meaning might be both aspectual and prepositional. And we already
saw evidence that the distribution of be- goes well beyond spray/load verbs in German in
(30–36), including cases where alternating between an overt preposition and a null affix is
impossible in English.
Furthermore, we could suppose that be- competes with a similarly prepositional but
phonologically null affix in German to derive the differing interpretations of be-prefixed
spray/load verbs and non-be-prefixed spray/load verbs. Suppose that when be- is prefixed
9While I cannot speak directly to this point as regards German stopfen, Iwata (2008)’s reasoning certainly
does not apply in the case of English stuff, which we might also suppose specifies an endpoint. It is possible to
form an analog of (37a) using stuff in English.
(i) He has already stuffed the suitcase with his clothes, and now he’s stuffing it with his souvenirs.
While one could claim that German stopfen differs from English stuff in that it specifies that the container ends
up completely full, I am skeptical.
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to a spray/load verb, it produces an onto+asp reading. A similar but phonologically null
affix, PLOC∅ would occur in the into reading. We could suppose that this phonologically null
affix is in fact the same one implicated in the English spray/load alternation. However, in
English this prefixmust alternatewith both into and onto.We could suppose that the prefix’s
meaning is underspecified. In German, the contrast between the onto+asp reading of be-
and the into reading of the null PLOC∅ would be due to pragmatic reasoning. Be-’s semantics
produce an onto(+asp) reading. If the speaker doesn’t use be-, the semantics would, in some
cases, be compatible with either an into or an onto reading. But a hearer can reason in a
Gricean way that if the more specific onto reading were supported, the speaker would have
used be-. Since they didn’t do this, they can’t have meant to communicate the onto reading.
As a result, the hearer will interpret the null prefix as supporting an into reading, just as
described above. In other cases, the lexical semantics of the verbwill require an into reading,
making be- prefixation impossible. This is what happens, for instance, in (25), where the
lexical semantics of stopfen ‘stuff’ require a goal that is an interior and not a surface.10 In
English, there is no overt prefix that competes with PLOC∅ , so the interpretation will depend
both on the lexical semantics of the verb (e.g., with stuff) and contextual factors (as with
load).
I will follow Brinkmann (1995) and Wunderlich (1997)’s lead, then, and suppose that
this is the right sort of explanation for the spray/load alternation at least in German and in
English. In German, both be- prefixation and PLOC∅ affixation can derive goal-object spray/
load verbs, with the differing interpretations associated with each of these options arising
from the semantics of be- and general pragmatic reasoning. In contrast, English does not
have an equivalent to be-, even a phonologically null one; it has only PLOC∅ .
However, Brinkmann (1995) and Wunderlich (1997) propose that the alternation is es-
sentially lexical, with the affixation of be- signaling a change in the lexical semantics of the
verb that occurs prior to its insertion into a syntactic context. This change can be accom-
plished even in the absence of be-, of course, since in some cases German spray/load verbs
can alternate without be- prefixed, as we have just seen. The end result of this is that the
10Note that more complications arise when considering that be- can produce meanings other than onto with
non-spray/load verbs, as in (29b). Somehow, its meaning is contextually restricted with spray/load verbs so as
to only allow onto readings, as Brinkmann (1995) describes.
96
alternation is not a syntactic one; there is no P (besides with of course) in the goal-object
structure.
I will instead pursue a syntactic implementation, which I describe in the next section.
3.4 P-conflation: Syntax and Semantics
I suggested that the differences between theme-object and goal-object variants of the
spray/load alternation can be derived by assuming that the goal-object structure is derived
by the conflation of a null preposition into the verb. This followspreviouswork byBrinkmann
(1995), Wunderlich (1997), and Damonte (2005). That is, the theme-object and goal-object

















I have not included with in the goal-object structure, instead including an overt PLOC in the
place where it might be expected to go. The reason for this will become apparent in the
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course of the discussion, where I will show that locative prepositions are licit in goal-object
structures (example (45) and the surroundingdiscussion). In addition, in chapter 4, section
4.2, I will argue that thewith that often travels with the goal-object structure is in fact a kind
of locative preposition, following Rapoport (2014). For now, the reading could comfortably
ignore this and replace PLOC (the overt PLOC, that is) in (38b) with with until the relevant
points in the discussion are reached.
The ways that Brinkmann (1995), Wunderlich (1997), and Damonte (2005) implement
this idea differ from my approach, as I will discuss in chapter 5, sections 5.2.1.2 and 5.2.3.2.
Brinkmann (1995) andWunderlich (1997) essentially posit that P-conflation takes the form
of a lexical redundancy rule that creates a goal-object verb from a theme-object verb if the
verb takes a theme and a prepositional argument, while in my approach, the conflation is
crucially syntactic, as will become apparent.
In contrast, Damonte (2005) pursues a syntactic approach. But my account differs from
his in two (related) respects. First, Damonte’s approach relies on P-incorporation, rather
than P-conflation. Second, Damonte’s approach relates the theme-object structure to the
goal-object structure transformationally, with the theme-object structure being the basic
one. My approach involves P-conflation, where PLOC∅ is first-merged with the verb root.
Thus, in my approach, the theme-object and goal-object structures are not transformation-
ally related. Instead, they are related because they contain partially overlapping sets of roots
and functional heads that differ in their syntactic arrangement.11 The next section shows
that my analysis makes the right predictions about the impossibility of forming unaccusa-
tives from goal-object verbs and the possible readings of spray/load verb nominalizations,
in a way that other analyses do not.
In English, the precise identity and interpretation of PLOC∅ in the goal-object structure
depends on the particular verb it combines with (cf. D’Elia 2016, p. 130). For instance, goal-
object load supports either an into or an onto interpretation (equivalent to using either of
these overt prepositions in the theme-object structure), while goal-object spray only sup-
ports on onto interpretation.
11More details of Damonte’s approach and a full critique are presented in chapter 5, section 5.2.3.2.
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(39) a. John loaded the box with the books.
≈ John loaded the books into the box.
b. John loaded the table with the books.
≈ John loaded the books onto the table.
(40) a. John sprayed the wall with the paint.
≈ John sprayed the paint onto the wall.
b. ?? John sprayed the air with the paint.
≠ John sprayed the paint into the air.
As we will see later, none of the paraphrases above are quite right, as they don’t capture
the holistic effect.12 The point here is that load with supports readings where the goal of the
loading is either something’s surface (onto) or interior (into). In contrast, spray with only
supports a reading where the goal of the spraying is a surface (onto).
In addition, we have the more general question of the semantic interpretation of P-con-
flation. In chapter 2, I made the assumption that Vwas a function from entities to predicates
of eventualities (e.g., λ𝑥.λ𝑒.spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1). The meaning of the semantic relation that re-
lates the entity and the eventuality covered cases in which the relation is one we might
describe as “theme,” and also cases where the relation is one we might describe as “goal.”
However, in the structure in (38b), presumably it is PLOC∅ that is responsible for binding
the goal argument, not V.
A first approach would be to assume that V indeed denotes a function from entities
to predicates of eventualities, as stated above, with the semantic relation it invokes broad
enough to cover cases in which its entity argument is the theme or the goal of the eventual-
ity. PLOC∅ could combinewith this function and place additional restrictions on the resulting
function such that only a goal interpretation would be possible. For instance:
12I return to this question in section 4.2, where I endorse Rapoport (2014)’s account of the meaning of with,
who proposes a meaning for it that accounts for the holistic effect in the goal-object structure. The holistic effect
in the theme-object structure would have to have a different source, however.
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(41) a. J√sprayK = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1
where spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1 iff 𝑒 is a spraying eventuality and 𝑥 is a theme or a
goal of 𝑒
b. JPLOC∅K = λ𝑃.λ𝑥.λ𝑒.𝑃(𝑒 , 𝑥) ∧ GOAL(𝑒 , on(𝑥)) = 1
c. J√spray PLOC∅K = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) ∧ GOAL(𝑒 , on(𝑥)) = 1
The semantics for PLOC∅ in (41b) correspond to the onto reading it receives with spray. To
account for its into readings with some verbs, we could suppose that there is a separate
PLOC∅ with this semantics, or else that its meaning is determined via contextual allosemy.
Alternatively, we could suppose that there is a relation 𝑅 defined as follows.
(42) 𝑃(𝑒 , 𝑅(𝑥), ...) = 1 iff 𝑃(𝑒 , on(𝑥), ...) = 1 or 𝑃(𝑒 , in(𝑥), ...) = 1
We could replace the relation on in (41b) with 𝑅. Then, in order to account for the fact that,
e.g., spray only permits an onto reading of its goal-object, we could say that the semantic
relation spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) is true iff 𝑒 is a spraying eventuality and 𝑥 is a theme or a surface onto
which something is sprayed. Building this into the denotation of the semantic relation the
verb spray invokes aligns with our intuition that the particular meaning that PLOC∅ supports
is idiosyncratically determined by the verb.
However, there are some reasons to disfavor building the particular resolution of PLOC∅
as surface or interior into the semantics of the verb directly. If the meaning of the verb root
required either only interior or only surface goals, we would have no way of explaining
why cases like the following are felicitous.
(43) a. The rocket sprayed fuel into outer space.
b. John spritzed water into the air.
c. John piled stones into the crevice. (cf. # John piled the crevicewith stones.)
For instance, the data in (40) show us that in goal-object uses, the goal of the spraying
event must be understood as a surface. But (43a) shows us that this requirement is not due
to properties of spraying events generally, since it is perfectly felicitous to use the same root
spray to describe events whose goals are volumes/interiors. Thus, the restriction observed
in (40) cannot be attributed to a restriction on what kinds of events are sprayings.
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In addition, the presupposition of a repetitive− again in the theme-object structure does
not rely on the prior eventuality having a goal characterized in the same way as in the
previous event. That is, such a sentence can be felicitous if the current goal is a surface,
even if the previous goal was an interior, and vice versa.
(44) a. Context: John sprayed paint into the air to test the hose. Then, he took aim
and...
He sprayed paint again onto the wall.
b. Context: John loaded clothes onto the table. Then, ...
He loaded the clothes again into a box.
This makes it difficult to support the idea that the particular locative relation that holds of
the goal in the goal-object structure comes from the verb. If it did, we would have to claim
there are two verb roots here: one that specifies whether its goal is a surface or an interior,
and one that does not. This does not seem like the best approach.
Additional problems arise, too; a prediction the underspecification approach in (42)
makes is that it might be possible to get a goal-object reading even when PLOC∅ does not
conflate with the verb. This is because one could construct a context in which resolving
an object as a goal rather than a theme would be more plausible, and thus this interpre-
tation could be reached even without P-conflation. One could consider examples like the
following as evidence:
(45) Context: John set up the doors like dominos. He turned on the hose and ...
He sprayed the first door onto the second one.
This looks like a theme-object structure, in that we have an overt locative preposition. One
could take this as evidence that if the object is most compatible with a goal interpretation,
that is how spray’s (underspecified) relation between its entity and event arguments will
be resolved, even in the absence of P-conflation.
However, it is not clear that this case doesn’t involve P-conflation. In fact, there is ev-
idence that it does. The only reason we might think that it doesn’t is because we have a
locative preposition low, rather than with. But nothing I have said would require that the
overt preposition in a goal-object structure be with. Certainly, having with would give us a
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different interpretation. But the interpretation of (45) is one with two goals: the spraying
of the first door (which is the goal of the event) causes the state of the first door on the sec-
ond door. This is what we expect if the overt onto is contributing its own goal argument to
the caused eventuality. In other words, this sentence has two goals, associated with differ-
ent (sub)eventualities: the first door is the goal of the spraying eventuality, and the second
door is the goal of the eventuality described by the first door onto the second door, which is
related to the first one via CAUSE. Note that no unaccusative counterpart of this sentence
exists:
(46) ★ The first door sprayed onto the second one.
(under a reading where the first door is a goal)
Nor can the first door bewhat a nominal use of spray refers to in such a scenario. This behavior
is diagnostic of goal objects and, as I will argue, follows from the presence of a preposition
conflatedwith the verb. I conclude that (45) is a goal-object structure, but simply onewhere
with is substituted for another preposition.
There is, of course, a more generous way of formulating the constraint, which is in fact
more in line with what (42) proposes. The way that (42) formulates the restriction is such
that it should only apply to goal-object sentences. This would mean that we cannot use
theme-object sentences like the ones I have just used to argue against it. However, while this
move is possible, it does not seem desirable tome. Simple concerns of parsimony leadme to
propose that the semantics of the particular locative function should come from PLOC∅ , and
not from the verb. This is because the facts discussed above show us that the verb root itself
need not be associated with a particular locative function in theme-object uses, meaning
that the statement of the restriction would still need to be stipulated to hold only for goal-
object uses. In addition, generally speaking, if there is a locative meaning, we might think
that it should come from a preposition, which are typically associated with spatiotemporal
functions of the relevant sort, rather than the verb, which typically encode event descrip-
tions rather than locative functions.
Thus, I propose that there is no underspecification. If there is a goal-object reading, it
must involve P-conflation, and if there is a theme-object reading, it must not. This seems to
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me to be the most straightforward and attractive view, even if there might be some way to
preserve the underspecification approach. But if we avoid underspecification, then we are
back where we started, with determining how to semantically compose V and PLOC∅ . There
are a few alternative possibilities here, and I see no clear way to decide between them. It is
possible they work out to be equivalent.
The first possibility is to suppose that [V+PLOC∅] constitutes a small idiom. It has a non-
compositionalmeaning. Equivalently, we could say that there is contextual allosemy, where
the meaning of either V or PLOC∅ (or both) depends on the meaning of its sister. In other
words, the meaning of √spray when it does not conflate with PLOC∅ would be as in (47a),
while the meaning of [√spray+PLOC∅] would be as in (47b).
(47) a. J√sprayK = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1
where spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1 iff 𝑒 is a spraying event and 𝑥 is the theme of 𝑒
b. J√spray PLOC∅K = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.spray(𝑒) ∧ GOAL(𝑒 , on(𝑥)) = 1
where spray(𝑒) = 1 iff 𝑒 is a spraying event, GOAL(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1 iff 𝑥 is the goal
of 𝑒, and on(𝑥) is the surface of 𝑥
Thus, the first possibility is to do away to some extent with the compositionality of V and
PLOC∅ . This is not so bad as it might sound—after all, we know from (39–40) that the mean-
ing of the goal-object structure depends on the identity of V, sowemust confront the specter
of idiomaticity in some way. The question is simply where precisely we wish to locate that
idiomaticity.
In this spirit, I will present an alternative which localizes the idiomaticity of the goal-
object structure to the contextual allosemy of PLOC∅ . I do not believe this approach is any
more principled than the one in (47) in light of what we have discussed so far. However,
we will see in section 4.3 that doing this will help us account for non-agentive transitive
uses of spray/load verbs and their kin. The basic idea is that we separate not only the goal
argument from the verb as I proposed for the goal-object structure, but also separate the
theme from the verb in the theme-object structure. This follows ideas from Borer (2005a,b,
2013) and Huang (2018). Borer and Huang extend Kratzer (1996)’s idea that external ar-
guments are not present in the denotation of verbs to the idea that internal arguments are
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not in verbs’ denotations either. Instead, internal arguments are introduced by a functional
head or heads, leading to a fully neo-Davidsonian syntax.13 In the case of the theme-object
structure, this head would presumably introduce a theme argument, as shown below. I
have chosen a particular denotation for THEME which would lead to it composing with the









As indicated, the denotation ofVwould be a simple predicate of eventualities (e.g., λ𝑒.spray(𝑒) =
1). The denotation of THEME would be a function from predicates of eventualities to func-
tions from entities to predicates of eventualities.14
(49) JTHEMEK = λ𝑃⟨𝑠𝑡⟩ .λ𝑥.λ𝑒.𝑃(𝑒) ∧ THEME(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1
We should be cautious: Kratzer (2003) presents evidence against this kind of approach.
She argues convincingly that the notion of theme that gets invoked in many theories of
argument structure has little purchase when we consider the kinds of relations it would
have to be true of, following work by Gropen (1989); Pinker (1989); Rappaport & Levin
(1988); Rappaport et al. (1993, a.m.o.).15 However, this criticism does not seem to apply
here. In particular, while it is indeed difficult to identify similarities between the internal
arguments of verbs as diverse as, e.g., dig, plant, and buy, as she notes, it is not that hard to
13See Davidson (1967, 1969), Higginbotham (1985, 2000, 2009), and Parsons (1990, 2000) for foundational
works of (neo-)Davidsonian event semantics. Maienborn (2011) provides an overview of the historical devel-
opment of this research program.
14One could imagine an alternative where THEME has a denotation that combines with V via Event Identifi-
cation (Kratzer 1996) rather than Function Application:
(i) JTHEMEK = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.THEME(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1
The reason for this choice will become apparent in section 4.3.
15It may also be non-cumulative, in contrast to most (if not all) semantic relations, though this argument is
somewhat more delicate.
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do so in the case of spray/load verbs. For spray/load verbs, the relation I have been calling
theme always involves movement of some substance or material. I have been calling this
relation THEME, but this does not mean it is intended to cover all relations that term has
been used to describe. I might have called it GO, SUBSTANCE, MATERIAL, or something else.
The important thing is that there does appear to be some commonality across the objects of
non-goal-object uses of spray/load verbs, and I have labeled that commonality “THEME.”16
However, we must bite the bullet and posit that PLOC∅ ’s meaning is non-compositional
to an extent. It will always introduce a goal, but whether that goal can be interpreted as a
surface or an interior depends on the particular verb it combines with. We might consider
this lexically governed aspect of its meaning to be part of what forces it to first-merge with
the verb, but this is nomore than a suggestion. It is my hope that this could be derived from
themeaning of the semantic relation the verb invokes, but I do not see how to do this, given
that, e.g., spray’s goal-object use only supports an onto reading, but it is not conceptually
incongruent to conceive of one spraying paint into a bucket, into the air, etc. It’s just that
such readings are not available in the goal-object structure.
Thus equipped, we can fill in the semantics of (38) as (50) once we have specified a
verb (in this case, spray).
16One might well wonder why the existence of THEME in the same position as PLOC∅ would not give rise to
the behavior I have attributed to the presence of PLOC∅ . Put another way, why is PLOC∅ a preposition, but THEME
is not? I discuss this in section 3.4.2.
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(50) a. Theme-object structure:
JVPK =
λ𝑒.spray(𝑒) ∧ THEME(𝑒 , the paint)∧
∃𝑒′[onto(𝑒′, the paint, the door) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1
JVPK =
λ𝑒.spray(𝑒) ∧ THEME(𝑒 , the paint) = 1
JCAUSEPK =
λ𝑄.λ𝑒.𝑄(𝑒)∧















λ𝑃.λ𝑥.λ𝑒.𝑃(𝑒) ∧ THEME(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1
b. Goal-object structure:
JVPK =
λ𝑒.spray(𝑒) ∧ GOAL(𝑒 , on(the door))∧
∃𝑒′[with(𝑒′, the door, the paint) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1
JVPK =
λ𝑒.spray(𝑒) ∧ GOAL(𝑒 , on(the door)) = 1
JCAUSEPK =
λ𝑄.λ𝑒.𝑄(𝑒)∧













3.4.1 Choosing a Preposition
A minor but interesting point here has to do with the selection of the preposition that
heads the small clause in each of these structures. In most cases, the theme-object struc-
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ture has a small clause headed by a locative preposition (e.g., into, onto, etc.), while the
goal-object structure has a small clause headed by with. In the structures in (50), it is not
immediately clear what would lead to this pattern. I propose that this is no more than a
pragmatic effect that has to do with the semantics of THEME, PLOC∅ , and with.
First, consider the goal-object structure, which is typically associated with (in English)
the preposition with. I presented evidence in the form of example (45) (and the ensuing
discussion) that goal-object structures may involve prepositions other than with. The ev-
idence was that even when the sentence contains a locative preposition, when the object
is interpreted as a goal, it has the syntactic status of a goal. Thus, goal-object structures
with prepositions other than with are possible. This nevertheless leaves us with the task
of figuring out why most goal-object sentences use with. The answer, I believe, resides in
the semantics of with, which I present a detailed semantics for in chapter 4, section 4.2. For
now, an approximation will have to suffice: with encodes physical possession as spatial ac-
companiment, with the argument in its specifier in control of the location of the argument
in its complement (Rapoport 2014). Thus, the meaning of the small clause the door with
the paint could be loosely stated as a predicate of states where the door has paint stuck to
it, such that wherever the door is, the paint is. The question we are asking then becomes
why these kinds of physical accompaniment relations are so naturally expressed as result
states of sprayings of goals. I suggest that this is pragmatic in nature: a common reason for
spraying things is to coat them evenly with a substance, and is thus a semantic head that is
appropriate for expressing this meaning is likely to be chosen with goal-object structures.
The semantics ofwith (again, to be discussed inmore detail in chapter 4, section 4.2) is well-
suited to this purpose. However, it should be noted that even if this suggestion turns out to
be on the wrong track, the empirical evidence shows clearly that goal-object structures that
do not use with as the preposition are possible. Since these are syntactically and semanti-
cally possible, the common choice of with would seem to only be able to have a pragmatic
source, whatever the proper account of that source may be.
Second, consider the theme-object structure, which is typically associated with a loca-
tive preposition (e.g., into, onto, etc.). The explanation of this trend is fairly easy to see, since
the semantics of locative prepositions are somewhat more transparent than the more com-
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plex semantics of with. In theme-object structures, THEME encodes motion of some entity. A
natural result state to predicate of an entity inmotion is one that describeswhere it ends up.
This is precisely what a locative preposition does. Once again, the explanation is pragmatic
in nature.
However, a small concern is why we could not use with in a theme-object structure,
given the semantics I (informally) described for it above. The resulting meaning would be
one where the object is described as moving (i.e., as a theme), and as a result, comes to
control the location of some other entity. Here are two attempts to elicit this reading. One
is only marginally successful in my judgment, while the other is entirely unsuccessful.
(51) a. Scenario: John hooked up the end of a tube used to spray paint to a hose
filled with water. He then sprayed the paint through the hose, thereby
mixing it with the water.
?# John sprayed the paint with the water.
b. Scenario: John suspended a piece of paper from a string. He then sprayed
paint from a tube onto the paper. The stream of paint was strong enough
that the string broke, resulting in the spray of paint pushing the paper
through the air.
# John sprayed the paint with the paper.
Given the semantics I sketched for with, I think these might be predicted to be possible, but
this prediction does not seem correct. If these were possible theme-object structures, (51a)
should be a felicitous description of the corresponding scenario, because the paint moves,
with the result that the paint is with the water. Of course, a possible concern here is that it
is difficult to say in what sense the location of the paint would “control” the location of the
water in this case, since they would presumably be equally mixed. But the same criticism
might be leveled at the door controlling the location of the paint.
At any rate, the same issue occurs in (51b), which would describe sprayings whose
theme is the paint, which result in a state of the paint being with the paper. In this scenario,
the paint would control the location of the paper by virtue of the fact that the location of
the end of the stream of paint is what pushes the paper through the air.
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One thought is that the notion of control has to do with figure and ground, with the
ground being the entity that controls the location of the other. It might be easy to think of
the door as the ground and the paint as the figure, while it could be harder to do this with
the paint and the water or the paper. Perhaps it is impossible: suppose that the semantics of
being the ground of a figure/ground relation, as with might impose on its specifier, entail
that the ground is a reference point. This might require that the ground not be described
as in motion, since otherwise it could not serve as a constant point of reference to which
the figure could be compared.17 The semantics of THEME would of course entail that the
ground of with would be in motion, and thus that it could not serve as a unchanging point
of reference.
Another thought is that the restriction could be described syntactically (perhaps in addi-
tion to the semantic and/or pragmatic approaches discussed above). In this case, wewould
have to say that PLOC∅ somehow dictates what kinds of resultative predicates it can combine
with syntactically, and these are only those headed bywith.18 Howexactly this should be im-
plemented is unclear to me, but there is some precedent for thinking this way. For instance,
consider the following contrasts.
(52) a. Bill shot John dead.
b. ★ Bill shot John deceased.
c. ★ Bill shot John angry.
(53) a. John wiped the table clean.
b. ★ John wiped the table dirty.
(54) a. John painted the table red.
b. ★ John painted the table clean.
Note that shoot can combine with dead as a resultative predicate, but not the semantically
equivalent deceased. Nor can it take the semantically reasonable angry as a resultative pred-
17Of course, wewould have tomake reasonable exceptions here, sincewe can say things like the man in the car,
where the car may well be in motion. The relevant notion may be relative to a perspective. However, given that
the theme relation describes the theme as in motion, it may not be possible to come up with the appropriate
perspective, which could thus require conceiving of the theme as simultaneously in motion and not in motion
in the same context of utterance—presumably a contradiction.
18And in some cases with non-alternating goal-object verbs, a special use of in; see chapter 4, appendix.
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icate either. Similarly, wipe can combine with clean but not dirty, while paint can combine
with red but not clean. Thus, even particular verbs may be choosy about which resultative
predicates they license, sincewipe allows clean but paint does not. The source of these differ-
ences is unlikely to reside in the semantics, since all of the ungrammatical sentences would
have quite clear and sensiblemeanings. Instead, theremust be some syntacticway of enforc-
ing a selectional restriction between a verb and a resultative predicate that combines with
it. A similar mechanism might be what is needed to capture the fact that THEME cannot li-
censewith as the head of a resultative small clause,19 if the semantic/pragmatic suggestions
above do not pan out.
3.4.2 The Difference between THEME and PLOC∅
In the structures in (50), I presented PLOC∅ and THEME as belonging to two different cate-
gories. But they are otherwise quite similar, since they occur in identical syntactic positions,
and seem to have similar semantics, apart from the inclusion in the meaning of PLOC∅ of a
locative function that applies to its entity argument. The reason for choosing these labels
is clear: goal objects behave like objects of prepositions, while theme objects do not. This
constitutes the empirical evidence for proposing a different syntactic status for the head
responsible for introducing themes and the head responsible for introducing goals.
However, it is prudent to ask why things must be this way. What, for instance, would
rule out treating PLOC∅ and THEME as belonging to the same syntactic category? If I did this,
the explanation of the asymmetry of theme-objects and goal-objects would be lost. I do not
have a full answer to this question, though I revisit it in chapter 6. For now, I will suggest
that the difference has to do with Case assignment: by assumption, PLOC∅ assigns Case to
the object while THEME does not. If we assumed THEME assigned Case to its object, we would
run the risk of greatly weakening the link between external theta-roles and accusative Case
(Burzio 1986) (though of course this link is already known to not be absolute). More de-
tailed thoughts, including thoughts on how this might relate to the proposal about labeling
that I present later in this chapter, are presented in chapter 6. I leave the fuller discussion
19Note that the restriction would have to be associated with THEME and not with the verb root, since in goal-
object uses the same verb root is compatible with a resultative small clause that is headed by with.
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until then due to small revisions to the analysis I make later in this chapter and in chapter
4, making a full discussion at this point less useful.
3.5 P-stranding and Nominalization
Having examined the syntax and semantics of the P-conflation approach, I will now
explore its advantages. In particular, the P-conflation analysis can explain the asymmetries
regarding which object can promote to subject position and what nominalizations of these
verbs can refer to, as under this approach the behavior conforms to independent patterns
related to the possibility of P-stranding under A-movement and nominalization.
3.5.1 Passives, Unaccusatives, and P-stranding
This section compares two kinds of argument structure configurations with regards to
how they behave regarding P-stranding: passives and unaccusatives. Both configurations
involve A-movement of an internal argument to Spec,TP, but they differ in two respects: (i)
in passives, an external argument is semantically always present, while this is never true
in unaccusatives; and (ii) in passives, the external argument may be optionally expressed
as the complement of the preposition by. Passive sentences are (almost) always related to a
corresponding active sentence;20 this is also true in many cases for unaccusative sentences,
though not every active sentence is associatedwith a corresponding unaccusative sentence.
(55) a. John devoured the spaghetti. (active)
b. The spaghetti was devoured (by John). (passive)
c. ★ The spaghetti devoured (by John). (unaccusative)
(56) a. John bounced the ball. (active)
b. The ball was bounced (by John). (passive)
c. The ball bounced (★by John). (unaccusative)
20A very limited number of verbs in English seem to have only passive uses; Levin (1993, sec. 8.1) lists rein-
carnate, rumor, and repute (though I disagree with the inclusion of reincarnate and repute, which have active uses
for me). We could imagine that something blocks these roots from surfacing in an active context. Alternatively,
we might suppose that (for speakers who agree with Levin (1993)’s reported judgments), these are not verbs
that occur in only the passive, but instead adjectives that look like passive participles. The (non-)existence of
passive-only verbs does not affect any of the arguments made here, at any rate. See also chapter 5, footnote 22.
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The evidence for the semantic presence of the external argument in passives even in the
absence of a by-phrase are many; these are not strictly relevant here, so I refer the interested
reader to Roeper (1987) and Baker et al. (1989) for evidence (though many other sources
also discuss this).



































Why exactly the presence of Pass results in the non-projection of the external argument or
its demotion to a by-phrase has been explained syntactically in many ways (Baker et al.
1989; Bruening 2011, 2014; Collins 2005, a.m.o.). For now though, all that matters is the
descriptive fact that it does.
What distinguishes the passive and unaccusative structures above is that in the passive,
v projects, and thus the semantics of the passive entails the existence of an external argu-
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ment. In contrast, in unaccusatives, v does not project, and no such entailment arises.21
Interestingly, in certain circumstances, the movement of a phrase to a subject position in
a passive can leave behind a preposition that governs it. Such cases are called pseudo-pas-
sives. In the following examples, I have represented the original position of the subject with
a trace that is coindexed with it, but this should be understood as a notational convenience
rather than a theoretical commitment.
(58) a. The wild partyi was talked about ti for many weeks afterward.
b. The bedi was rarely slept in ti.
c. The problemi was quickly dealt with ti.
There are some semantic/pragmatic restrictions on pseudo-passives. For instance, the fol-
lowing would-be pseudo-passive does not seem as well-formed as those in (58).
(59) ?? New York Cityi was slept in ti.
One way of thinking about this has to do with a notion of affectedness—pseudo-passives
sound best when their subject is interpreted as affected in some pragmatically well-defined
way. That’s why (59) sounds bad, but the similar (58b) is okay: sleeping in New York City
does not affect the city much, but sleeping in a bed might affect the bed’s appearance. We
would have to extend this notion to something being talked about, which wouldn’t usually
seem to affect the topic of discussion itself, in order to account for the well-formedness of
(58a).
At any rate, pseudo-passives are possible, at least in some cases. This means that the
movement that is shown in (57b) seems to be able to strand a preposition, speaking de-
scriptively. But interestingly, the same is not true for the superficially similar movement in
(57c). It turns out that even though the source and destination of the movements in (57b)
and (57c) are structurally identical, only in the former case can the movement target a DP
and leave behind a preposition containing it. This is shown by the following data, which
21Sometimes a distinction is made between unaccusatives and inchoatives. Inchoatives are a subclass of un-
accusatives, so called because their semantics seems to involve events that can be characterized as becomings.
But while many unaccusatives are inchoatives, not all are. For instance, verbs of motion like go are sometimes
considered unaccusative, as are verbs like exist. But in neither of these cases (especially the latter) does it nec-
essarily make sense to talk of these as describing inchoative events. While the examples I use of unaccusatives
are often inchoatives, this is simply due to their prevalence. There are no crucial syntactic differences for my
purposes between non-inchoative unaccusatives and inchoative unaccusatives.
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establish that a particular verb root can occur in active (transitive), passive, and unaccu-
sative contexts (a–c); and that when the same verb root occurs with a preposition, it can
occur in active and passive contexts, but not unaccusative contexts (d–f). This shows that P-
stranding is possible in passive A-movement, but not unaccusative A-movement—in other
words, pseudo-passives are possible, butwhatwemight refer to as “pseudo-unaccusatives”
are not, even when the verb root can otherwise occur in unaccusative contexts.22
(60) a. John broke the vase. (transitive)
b. The vase was broken (by John). (passive)
c. The vase broke. (unaccusative)
d. John broke into the house. (P-object)
e. The house was broken into (by John). (pseudo-passive)
f. ★ The house broke into. (pseudo-unaccusative)
(61) a. John moved the platform.
b. The platform was moved (by John).
c. The platform moved.
d. John moved into the new house.
e. The new house was moved into (by John).
f. ★ The new house moved into.
(62) a. John blew the whistle at five.
b. The whistle was blown at five (by John).
c. The whistle blew at five.
d. John blew onto the soup (to cool it down).
e. The soup was blown onto (by John) (to cool it down).
f. ★ The soup blew onto.
22Though note that, unsurprisingly, it is possible to “strand” a particle in an unaccusative:
(i) The vase broke apart.
However, particles differ syntactically from prepositions, so this fact is not relevant to the P-conflation analysis.
The prepositions in (60–64) do not have a double-life as particles (unlike many other English prepositions like
on, up, etc.), and so represent the appropriate test case.
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(63) a. John turned the wheel.
b. The wheel was turned (by John).
c. The wheel turned.
d. John turned onto the driveway.
e. ? The driveway was turned onto (by John).
f. ★ The driveway turned onto.
(64) a. John hung the picture on the wall.
b. The picture was hung on the wall (by John).
c. The picture hung on the wall.
d. John hung onto the trapeze (for dear life).
e. The trapeze was hung onto (for dear life) (by John).
f. ★ The trapeze hung onto.
A first attempt to explain this pattern might be to assume that the verb that occurs in (d–f)
is different from the verb that occurs in (a–c). The phonological and semantic similarities
between the transitive, object-taking verbs in (a–c) and the verbs occurring with PPs in (d–
f) would be due to happenstance. However, in three of these cases (break, blow, and hang),
we are able to firmly reject this possibility. This is because these verbs have irregular inflec-
tional paradigms, which characteristically identify roots (e.g., Borer 2013). We would have
to claim that these verbs are accidental doublets that also happen to be irregular in exactly
the sameways—a far more tenuous position to take. In the cases of the irregularly inflected
hang and blow, it is also difficult to see any clear semantic differences between their transi-
tive and PP uses that would make us favor such a move. In addition, taking this approach
would fail to state the generalization: we would have to claim that all these doublets inde-
pendently stipulate that they cannot occur in unaccusative contexts. That would seem to be
missing an important generalization exemplified across all the verbs above. I will thus as-
sume that the same verbs occur in (a–c) and (d–f) above, and that whatever is responsible
for the possibility of pseudo-passives and the impossibility of pseudo-unaccusatives must
not be related to particular lexical items.
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In addition, note that this restriction appears to only apply to A-movement. A preposi-
tion can be stranded in an unaccusative under A-movement.
(65) a. Whati did John fall onto ti?
b. Which train stationi did Bill arrive at ti?
c. Which shelfi did the vase break on ti?
Regardless, the differences between P-stranding in A- and A-movement are well estab-
lished. For instance, while there are particular semantic/pragmatic conditions on the forma-
tion of pseudo-passives, as in (59), no such constraints seem to govern, e.g.,wh-movement.
(66) Which cityi did John sleep in ti?
I will not propose an explanation for this contrast.23
While I amnot aware of an existingworking analysis of data like the above,24 the pattern
seems robust: descriptively, P-stranding is possible in passives but not in unaccusatives. If
we suppose that the incorporated null PLOC∅ in the goal-object variant of spray/load verbs is
subject to this restriction, the fact that only themes can become subjects follows: only they
can occur in unaccusative structures without stranding a preposition. In contrast, passives
of goal-object spray/load verbs are possible, but they would be analyzed like pseudo-pas-
sives, as shown in (67).
23In light of what is to come, we could suppose that P-stranding A-movement requires [V+P] to form a
constituent, while this is not required in A-movement. However, this does not explain the difference; it just
formalizes the statement of it in a particular way.
24Keyser & Roeper (1984) and Fagan (1988) discuss data like these in a different context, with only Fagan
(1988) providing some sort of analysis. In particular, Fagan argues that a lexical feature [+causative] deter-
mines the availability of unaccusativization, with non-causatives unable to form unaccusatives. She notes that
break is causative, while break into is not, which explains why it cannot form an unaccusative. However, it is hard
to adopt Fagan’s analysis is a system where unaccusativity is derived in the syntax rather than the lexicon, as
is currently popular. I discuss Fagan’s proposal and alternatives more in section 3.5.2.
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What would distinguish the structures in (67) from their unaccusative counterparts in that
in the latter, no PassP or vP would be projected. Instead, T would merge with VP. As we
have just discussed, in structures like those, no P-stranding is possible. Thus, under the
P-conflation analysis, the generalization that goal-object unaccusatives are impossible re-
duces to the generalization that P-stranding is never possible in unaccusatives.
The claim that goal-object passives are pseudo-passives could be seen as making a pre-
diction that languages that have the spray/load alternation but disallow pseudo-passives
should disallow goal-object passives.25 On the surface this seems incorrect, but as I will ex-
25Treating goal-object passives as equivalent to pseudo-passives is also not inconsistent with the notion of
affectedness that may play a role in licensing pseudo-passives, as shown earlier in (59). However, there are
important caveats (presented in the discussion surrounding that example) that we probably do not have a very
good understanding of these constraints (cf. the talked about example, which does not seem to clearly involve
affectedness). Ultimately, I will claim that it is not the goal-object structure itself (nor PLOC∅) that encodes
the affectedness of the goal, but the preposition with, since the holistic effect seems to go away in goal-object
structures that use locative prepositions (see this chapter, example (45); and chapter 4, section 4.2). Thus, the
apparent (and poorly understood) link between the relevance of affectedness to both structures is not actually
captured in my account, if indeed the link is real and not better explained in some other way (as I suspect).
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plain, I do not believe itmeans the P-conflation analysis iswrong. Instead, the patternmight
relate to what restricts P-stranding in languages that disallow pseudo-passives. First, here




















































“José is counted on by everyone.” (Campos 1991, (2b))
(68) establishes that the Spanish verb rociar ‘spray/sprinkle’ participates in the locative
alternation, as it can take a theme argument and a locative PP headed by sobre ‘over,’ or a
goal argument and a con ‘with’ PP. (69a) shows that the goal-object variant of rociar can
passivize, while (69b) shows that pseudo-passives are not generally possible in Spanish.
If the goal-object use of rociar is derived via P-conflation, and if the difference in the P-
stranding possibility of passives and unaccusatives in English explained why goal-subject
unaccusatives were impossible, the grammaticality of (69a) is unexpected.
However, there may be other reasons for this. Mateu (2000, 2017) has suggested that
different languages may achieve the spray/load alternation in different ways,27 related to
Talmy (1991, 2000)’s distinction between verb-framed languages (like Spanish) and satel-
lite-framed languages (like English). But even if the spray/load alternation is derived in
similar ways in Spanish and in English, there are additional differences that may be rele-
vant. In particular, P-stranding is more restricted in Spanish than in English. In English,
A-movement is able to strand prepositions; in Spanish, this is impossible.
(70) Whati are you talking about ti?
26https://www.facebook.com/Telemundo52/posts/un-oficial-fue-rociado-con-combustible-y-pren-
dido-en-fuego-una-protesta-por-la-m/10158311463819431/
27It should be noted, though, that Mateu (2000, 2017) adopts a uniform small clause syntax for spray/load





















“What are you talking about?”
This difference suggests that the impossibility of P-stranding in Spanish might have a dif-
ferent source. In particular, we could characterize it as a phonological constraint: in Span-
ish, prepositions require their complement to be phonologically overt and adjacent. Pre-
sumably, these phonological requirements might be lifted if the preposition itself is either
phonologically null or part of another word, which is precisely what happens in passives
of goal-object structures in Spanish.
There might be some evidence that supports this way of characterizing the restrictions
on Spanish P-stranding. In particular, productive verbal prepositional affixes exist in Span-
ish, and verbs formed with these affixes can passivize. For instance, the preposition sobre
‘over’ (which has an independent life as a fully normal preposition as seen in (68a)) can























“This comet was flown over by the space probe Deep Impact ...”28
This shows that when a preposition is affixed to a verb, the restrictions on P-stranding are
deactivated in Spanish.
To summarize, the general impossibility of P-stranding in Spanishmight have a different
source from the specific impossibility of P-stranding in English unaccusatives. I suggested
that this might be because the ungrammaticality of P-stranding in Spanish is related to
phonological constraints.29 If we put a preposition in a syntactic configuration where it
would make sense for those phonological constraints to be relaxed (e.g., if the preposition
itself is null or is affixed to a verb), those constraints apparently can be relaxed. I propose
28https://es.thefreedictionary.com/sobrevolado
29Another piece of evidence that might be relevant to this characterization of the constraints on P-stranding
in Spanish as phonological is that pro cannot be the complement of a preposition in Italian, even though it
is licensed in object position (Kyle Johnson, p.c.). Null direct objects are also possible in certain varieties of
Spanish, though they are subject to certain semantic restrictions (Clements 2006).
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that this is what is going on in cases like (69a). As a result, we cannot use the fact that
goal-object structures can passivize in Spanish as direct evidence against the P-conflation
analysis. There is a more general ban on P-stranding in Spanish that gets in the way of this,
and this general ban might not apply in the case of goal-object passives.30
In contrast, the ban on P-stranding in unaccusatives might have a different source. A
way of characterizing it is that in order to form a head consisting of [V+P], v must project.
This generalization accounts for the fact that both active and passive uses of spray/load verbs
are possible, and for the general possibility of pseudo-passives, while correctly disallowing
the existence of pseudo-unaccusatives.
I will suggest that a possible explanation for this generalizationmight relate to labeling.
After two items in a numerationmerge, they are labeledwith one of the labels of the daugh-
ter nodes. Consider the status of the label when the daughter nodes are heads labeled V
and P. What label should be assigned to their mother node? How could the labeling algo-
rithm choose V or P? Let us suppose that it cannot do so right away, but that labels might
be assigned later on depending on where [V+P] ends up. A standard assumption is that
30This account might predict that if a language allows P-stranding but disallows pseudo-passives, passives
and unaccusatives of goal-object spray/load verbs should be impossible. The reason for this is that even in lan-
guageswhere P-stranding is generally possible like English, it is not possible in unaccusatives. Thus, goal-object
unaccusatives are always predicted to be impossible. In contrast, passives of goal-object spray/load verbs are
predicted to be possible if pseudo-passives are allowed. In a language like Spanish, the more general ban on
P-stranding makes it difficult to evaluate why pseudo-passives are disallowed, and the proper statement of the
conditions regulating the ban on P-stranding in Spanish might subvert this in the case of affixed verbs, which
I just showed. However, in a language that generally allows P-stranding, this more general ban on P-stranding
would not exist, and so would make it difficult to consider it a phonological constraint. As such, the predic-
tion would be that both unaccusative and passive uses of goal-object spray/load verbs would be impossible,
while these would be possible for theme-object spray/load verbs. Kyle Johnson (p.c.) has suggested to me that
Icelandic has the relevant properties of permitting P-stranding but disallowing pseudo-passives, and so might
provide the relevant test case. My expectation is that the prediction is wrong, and that passives but not unac-
cusatives of goal-object spray/load verbs will be possible, though of course this requires empirical evidence I
do not have at present.
However, whether this in fact constitutes a prediction of my account is perhaps a bit trickier than that. I
just showed evidence from Spanish that passives of verbs that are formed by P-conflation (i.e., sobrevolar ‘fly
over’ in (72)) can passivize, even though pseudo-passives are impossible. This could mean that passives of
goal-object structures are not really pseudo-passives—the comparison might just be a useful analogy. It could
be that if goal-object passives are possible in Icelandic, the reason could be related to the difference between
incorporation (which is responsible for licensing pseudo-passives) and conflation (which is responsible for
goal-object spray/load verbs and (probably) verbs with prepositional affixes). One could suppose that Icelandic
disallows pseudo-passives because P-incorporation is disallowed, while P-conflation is allowed. Alternatively,
one could suppose that, if passives of verbs with prepositional prefixes are possible in Icelandic (as they are
in Spanish), that this is because incorporation in Icelandic (and Spanish) requires realizing the preposition
as an affix rather than as an independent phonological word as is possible in English. This would, as far as I
can tell, make identical predictions to the proposal that P-incorporation is impossible in such languages, while
P-conflation is permitted. Thus, while the predictionmight seem clear at first glance, there are some issues that
must be clarified in determining which data are truly relevant to evaluating it.
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it will end up pronounced in v, since this makes sense of certain facts regarding the rela-
tionship between the possible readings of again and its syntactic position (as discussed in
chapter 2) (Bale 2007; Beck & Johnson 2004; von Stechow 1996).
This means that like other verbs, goal-object spray/load verbs formed as [V+PLOC∅] will
move to v, where they are pronounced. There is direct evidence for this, so in fact this is not
really an assumption; again must receive a subject-ful repetitive reading when it precedes
goal-object spray/load verbs, too.
(73) a. John again sprayed the wall with paint. (subject-ful repetitive only)
b. John again drizzled the cake with icing. (subject-ful repetitive only)
c. John again loaded the truck with books. (subject-ful repetitive only)
Let us suppose that because v is in the extended projection of V, movement of [V+P] to v
is able to resolve the labeling conundrum, in favor of V rather than P.
Now, consider that passives also contain v like actives do, but unaccusatives do not. This
is established by Roeper (1987), who shows that the implicit agent in a passive can control
the PRO subject of a purpose clause, but that no such thing is possible in an unaccusative.
It is also established in Baker et al. (1989) via the existence of disjoint reference effects:
the implicit external argument in a passive cannot be interpreted as coreferential with the
subject.
(74) a. The ship was sunk to collect the insurance. (passive)
“The ship was sunk so that the sinker could collect the insurance.”
b. ★ The ship sunk to collect the insurance. (unaccusative)
(cf. Roeper 1987, (3a,b))
(75) The men were killed. ≠ The men committed suicide.
(cf. Baker et al. 1989, (10a,11a))
We conclude, following not only these facts but many other analyses (e.g., Collins 2005;
Legate 2017, 2014, 2021; Legate et al. 2020), that v projects in passives. Accordingly, the
labeling conflict can be resolved in passives in the same way it is in actives: [V+P] can
move to v, which will provide a resolution to the labeling conflict.
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The idea that [V+PLOC∅] must head-move to v in passives of goal-object spray/load verbs
receives independent support from the behavior of pseudo-passives, since in these cases
the verb and stranded preposition must be adjacent.
(76) a. The committee talked about the problem forever.
b. The committee talked forever about the problem.
(77) a. The problem was talked about forever.
b. ★ The problem was talked forever about.
If a pseudo-passive requires the verb and preposition to be part of the same head (cf. Horn-
stein & Weinberg 1981), then we might expect to run into the same labeling problem. But
it could be resolved in the way I suggested if [V+P] moves to v. That would explain why
the preposition must be adjacent to the verb in pseudo-passives: it is part of the head that
is pronounced in the position of v. To summarize the idea, pseudo-passives require the
preposition to be part of a head with the verb. This leads to a labeling conflict. The head
containing V and P can head-move to v, which resolves the conflict. This means that P (and,
naturally, V) will precede everything else in VP. This prevents an adjective from coming
between V and P.
Unaccusatives, in contrast, do not contain v, which means there is no way to resolve the
labeling conflict that [V+P] represents. As a result, pseudo-unaccusatives are impossible.
3.5.2 Middles and P-stranding
Actives and passives both allow P-stranding, but unaccusatives do not. I have related
this not to properties of P-stranding, but instead to properties of v. A-movement that strands
a P requires there to be a v. I proposed a mechanism to derive this that relied on a labeling
conflict, but even if that explanation turns out to be wrong, the generalization linking P-
stranding A-movement to v seems to hold.
A question now arises regarding the possibility of P-stranding in middles. Middles
might involve the projection of a vMiddle, so if what I proposed above is right, P-strand-
ing in middles should be possible, and so should goal-subject middles of spray/load verbs.
Are these predictions correct?
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As it turns out, there is no small amount of controversy regarding whether middles
allow P-stranding. Keyser & Roeper (1984) claim that it is possible, which would fit with
the generalization I proposed above.
(78) a. ★ The room broke into (because it was poorly secured).
(pseudo-unaccusative)
b. ? The room breaks into easily (because it is poorly secured).
(pseudo-middle)
However, Fagan (1988) claims that pseudo-middles like (78b) are ungrammatical. She
attributes the noticeable contrast in (78a) and (78b) to the middle being ill-formed merely
syntactically, while the unaccusative is ill-formed semantically as well. In particular, she
proposes that unaccusatives can only be formed from predicates that are lexically marked
as [+causative]. As she says, because break is causative, but break into is not, the unaccusa-
tive is ill-formed semantically. The P-stranding merely adds a syntactic violation on top of
this semantic violation. In contrast, middles can be formed by causative and non-causative
predicates alike, so the middle only incurs a syntactic violation, making it ungrammatical
but relatively better than the pseudo-unaccusative.
There are a number of problems with this proposed explanation. For one thing, it is not
clear why a syntactic violation alone would not suffice to produce total ungrammaticality.
Violations of the coordinate structure constraint involve only a single illicit movement, but
they are strongly and unequivocally ungrammatical.
(79) ★ What did you eat strawberries and?
Thus, the claim that a single syntactic violation should not result in total ungrammaticality
is dubious at best.
Another problem is the idea that the violation related to decausativization is semantic
in nature. If [+causative] is a feature that is implicated in a syntactic process, then it is
presumably visible to the syntax, and perforce a syntactic feature, not a purely semantic
feature. However, we could say that there are two syntactic violations in (78a), and only
one in (78b); ultimately what matters for Fagan (1988)’s approach here is the existence of
two violations compared to one violation, regardless of what kinds of violations they are.
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However, it is unclear that this is the right approach for pairs like break/break into and
blow/blow onto. The reason for this is that the verbs in these pairs share identical irregular in-
flectional paradigms; e.g., the past tense of break—whether followed by into or not—is broke,
not ★ breaked. This constitutes evidence that the same root is implicated in the transitive and
P-object uses of these verbs, since phonological information like this is what characterizes
roots (Borer 2013). If these are the same roots,wemight expect that the same featureswould
be present with each, and decausativization should be possible. Of course, this is not out of
logical necessity; wemight suppose that different uses of the same root comewith different
features. This is the case for features like [+topic] and [+focus]. Perhaps [+causative] could
be a feature like these, and it would only be associatedwith verbs that do not take a preposi-
tional object—though the correlation between the semantics associated with [+causative]
and the syntactic fact that verbs bearing it do not take prepositional objects would remain
mysterious.
More worringly, if we follow Fagan’s approach and say that what rules out deriving
an unaccusative from break into is the lack of a causative feature, we run the risk of mak-
ing [+causative] mean nothing beyond “can occur as an unaccusative,” begging the ques-
tion. Fagan (1988) does not provide independent evidence that would allow us to estab-
lish whether the [+causative] feature is present, beyond the asymmetry to be explained
(though admittedly that is not the main point of her paper). Thus, the proposal as stated
becomes hard to falsify. I conclude that we should not appeal to causativity in explaining
the contrast between (78a) and (78b).
Amore general criticism of Fagan (1988)’s appeal to causativity has to do with architec-
ture of grammar that I assume. My system is one that does not contain a generative lexicon.
There is no operation that could take a verb with a [+causative] feature that would syntac-
tically project an internal and an external argument, and remove both that feature and the
external argument. There is no way of stating such an operation in my system, since gen-
erative power is exclusively relegated to syntax. The corresponding way decausativization
would have to work in a system like mine would involve projecting a verb, and if that verb
bore a [+causative] feature, a higher functional head could existentially close the external
argument. Of course, this would make decausativization the same as passivization, which
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is clearly not the right approach. Instead, in my system, one can project the external ar-
gument (by merging v) or not, and it is this choice that determines unaccusativity. Some
verbal roots will have to combine with v (e.g., destroy, which cannot occur as an unaccu-
sative). But clearly, the verbal roots in (60–64) are not such roots, since the same roots
can occur in unaccusatives when there is no P-stranding. Thus, I propose that there is no
decausativization operation. The difference between (78a) and (78b) would have to do a
different source, since one cannot violate the parameters of an operation that does not exist.
Newman (2020a) discusses additional examples of pseudo-middles, reporting contrasts
between different predicates.
(80) a. ★ Gromit doesn’t lie to easily.
b. ★ WW2 doesn’t talk about easily.
(81) a. ? vP’s don’t extract from easily.
b. ? That shower doesn’t walk into easily.
I share these judgments. Additional data supporting the idea that pseudo-middles are pos-
sible but often degraded for some reason comes from the following contrast Newman re-
ports (I have supplied the transitive controls in (82c) and (82d)):
(82) a. ? vP’s don’t extract from easily.
b. ★ vP’s don’t extract easily from.
c. Wh-movement extracted that phrase from the vP easily.
d. Wh-movement extracted that phrase easily from the vP.
In (otherwise acceptable) pseudo-middles, just as in pseudo-passives, nothing can inter-
vene between the verb and the preposition. If pseudo-middles involve the formation of a
[V+P] head that moves to vMiddle, then this identical pattern is entirely expected. What
remains unexpected is why pseudo-middles often seem worse that pseudo-passives. How-
ever, middles already occupy an odd place in acceptability judgments, with some middles
of many garden-variety transitive verbs sounding odd to begin with.
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(83) a. ? This music hears easily because it’s so loud.
b. ? This TV watches easily because it’s so bright.
c. ? This topic studies easily because it’s so simple.
d. ? This topic teaches easily because it’s so simple.
These all seem to be of the same status as (78b) in my estimation. They are not crashingly
bad like (78a), but they are not so good either. It is likely that the conditions on the fe-
licitous use of middles involve subtle semantic and pragmatic factors that go beyond the
mere syntactic possibility of their existence. That might explain why (78b) is somewhat
odd, without having to posit that the degradedness is to due to P-stranding. Nevertheless,
what seems to be consistent is that while perfectly acceptable middles exist, most to all
pseudo-middles sound somewhat degraded. I have attempted to come up with a couple of
examples that do not sound so bad to my ears, though.
(84) a. This loose soil digs into easily, making this a great place to gather it.
b. This soft bread cuts into easily, making it great for sandwiches.
I suspect the relevant facts here have to do with affectedness. Middles seem best when the
promoted object is interpreted as affected in someway. Thiswould explainwhy themiddles
in (83) sound odd: none of these cases invoke affectedness (hearing music, watching TV,
and studying/teaching a topic do not affect the music, the TV, or the topic, respectively).
In contrast, middles that are clearly acceptable involve affected arguments (e.g., Politicians
bribe easily), and the pseudo-middles that are acceptable in (84) fit this pattern as well.
It is unclear why pseudo-middles should be degraded so often. But returning to the
larger picture, we are asking if middles provide any support for the P-conflation analysis
of goal-object uses of spray/load verbs, and for the proposed explanation of the impossibility
of pseudo-unaccusatives in terms of labeling. If the latter is correct, then pseudo-middles
should be possible if middles are assumed to include a v like passives Alexiadou & Doron
(cf. 2012); Keyser & Roeper (cf. 1984).31 In some cases, pseudo-middles do appear possible,
31It should be noted that this is not universally assumed; see Rapoport (1999) and Newman (2020b) for
representative analyses where middles lack v (qua agent-introducing Voice). However, something must distin-
guish middles from unaccusatives—otherwise, they would be identical and that is clearly incorrect. Even if the
standard agentive v does not appear in middles, it is possible that some other kind of v does (perhaps with a
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consistent with the proposed explanation under this assumption. The prediction is then
that (pseudo-)middles of goal-object spray/load verbs should be possible. In addition, we
might predict that such middles would often be somewhat degraded in the same way as
many other pseudo-middles, especially compared to middles of theme-object spray/load
verbs, which do not involve P-stranding. These predictions seem to be borne out.32
(85) a. This paint sprays easily (once you’ve thinned it out). (theme middle)
b. ? This wall sprays easily (with paint) (once you’ve coated it with primer).
(goal pseudo-middle)
c. This icing drizzles easily (because there are no lumps). (theme middle)
d. ? This cake drizzles easily (with icing) (because of its shape).
(goal pseudo-middle)
e. These books load easily (because they’re so light). (theme middle)
f. This truck loads easily (because it’s low to the ground).
(goal pseudo-middle)
Note that while all of the goal middles involve affectedness, the one that describes the most
intuitively plausible scenario (Which truck should I rent? The one that loads most easily.) is the
most acceptable. This suggests to me that the felicitousness of (pseudo-)middles is related
to pragmatics, even if the suggestion above about affectedness turns out to be inadequate
(which is likely).
Indirect evidence supporting the judgments in (85) comes fromGoogle searches.While
middles are generally uncommon to beginwith, there is a clear difference in the thememid-
dles and goal pseudo-middles. A search for the theme middle "paint sprays easily" re-
turned 424 results, while searches for the goal middles "wall sprays easily", "fence
sprays easily", and "patio sprays easily" all returned 0 results.33 While such evi-
modal meaning), and this would be what makes them more similar to actives than to unaccusatives (see, e.g.,
Alexiadou et al. 2015).
32Though note that it is well-established that goal objects of spray/load verbs are interpreted as affected,
meaning that any oddness associated with middles of this sort would have to be for other reasons unrelated to
affectedness.
33The double quotationmarks ensure that Google searches for only literal matches of the entire string. When
searching for "patio sprays easily", Google found no results for the literal string, but insisted on its sug-
gestion of removing the quotation marks, allowing for results that included the keywords that did not occur
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dence is never conclusive in the modeling of linguistic competence, the conspicuous ab-
sence of goal pseudo-middles of spray/load verbs is suggestive.
To summarize, we have the following picture about the status of middles of goal-ob-
ject spray/load verbs and the proposed explanation linking P-stranding A-movement to the
projection of v. Pseudo-middles are possible but often degraded. This is probably because
of semantic and/or pragmatic factors, and not because of syntax. However, prepositions
might carry with them particular semantic properties that run afoul of these semantic and
pragmatic constraints on the felicitous use of middles, so pseudo-middles being somewhat
degraded might be what results. spray/load verbs seem to fit into this general pattern, with
their goal pseudo-middles being generally worse that their thememiddles, but not always.
In the end, the behavior of goal-object spray/load verbs is not inconsistent with the P-confla-
tion analysis. However, the independent complexities surrounding pseudo-middles mean
that this behavior should not be seen as strong evidence for the P-conflation analysis.
3.5.3 Nominalizations
Under the P-conflation analysis, the fact that nominalizations of spray/load verbs can
refer to themes and not goals is part of a more general pattern that objects of prepositions
are never referents of nominals derived by productive affixes.
What zero-derived nominal uses of roots that have verbal uses can refer to is somewhat
idiosyncratic, and depends on the verb. Sometimes, they refer to eventualities, other times
to what we might call “reified eventualities,”34 and other times to their internal argument.
Often, they are ambiguous between these, though sometimes certain usages do not seem
to be available.
in the specified order. This suggested search of patio sprays easily returned 22,000,000 results. I am not
sure why Google did not insist on something similar for the other 0-result searches. In addition, an attempted
search for truck loads easily was complicated by the inclusion of mostly irrelevant results like There were
four truck loads easily and (how to) secure truck loads easily.
34Kyle Johnson (p.c.) suggested this term to me.
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(86) a. Did you see that dance just now? (eventuality nominal)
b. The school dance begins at 7 PM. (reified eventuality nominal)
c. The report lasted four hours. (eventuality nominal)
d. John submitted his report. (reified eventuality nominal)
e. The fisherman’s catch weighed 55 lbs. (internal argument nominal)
The usage of the terms “eventuality nominal” and “internal argument nominal” should be
fairly obvious; the former refers to nominalizations that denote eventualities, while the lat-
ter refers to nominalizations that denote entities that receive the same interpretation as the
internal argument of the nominalized predicate. What is meant by “reified eventuality” is
a bit more complex. For instance, consider that the report can refer to a physical object as
opposed to an event. But this physical object need not be something created as the result of
a reporting event—one can type up a report without ever having actually reported its con-
tents to anyone. So a report cannot necessarily be something that is the internal argument
of a reporting event. There is an interesting question about how to relate these nominals to
the events they invoke, but the details are not particularly relevant here.
However, what is interesting is that most nominals seemingly cannot refer to objects of
prepositions. That is, they cannot refer to subjects of pseudo-passives or objects of preposi-
tions. They can only refer to eventualities, reified eventualities, and internal arguments.
(87) a. the sleep (= event/≠ the bed)
b. the break (= event/= reified event/≠ the shelf)
c. the invite (= reified event)
d. the change (= event)
e. the construction (= event/= internal argument/≠ the job site)
f. the building (= event/= internal argument/≠ the job site)
There are a variety of other nominalizing suffixes in English, including -al, -(a)tion, -ment,
and -∅ (a null affix), which show the same pattern.
There are a few exceptional suffixes which produce different readings. One is -er, which
is compatible with a very wide variety of readings, though its agent-denoting use is the
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most canonical. It can also more generally produce instrument and internal argument read-
ings.35
(88) a. The restaurant needed someone to broil chickens, and so hired a broiler.
(agent nominal)
b. The machine used to broil chickens broke, so they bought a new broiler.
(instrument nominal)
c. They were out of chicken, so they bought some more broilers.
(internal argument nominal)
d. The door opener stood at the ready. (agent nominal)
e. The automatic door opener worked via radio waves.
(instrument nominal)
f. This fun house has a lot of fake doors in it that don’t open, but that one
over there is an actual opener. (internal argument nominal)
In at least one case, -er can refer to a location. In another case, it can refer to the object of
about.
(89) a. I love eating at that diner. (location nominal)
b. That’s a thinker. (a conundrum; something one must think about)36
However, it is worth noting that these uses of -er do not seem to be productive. To wit:
35Tom Roeper (p.c.) brought the productivity of examples like these to my attention.
36One could come up with a semantics that would not seem to model thinker as involving a preposition:
(i) JthinkerK = λ𝑥.𝑥 makes one think
This semantics might imply thinker to instead be the result of binding the external argument of a causative use
of think. This is somewhat appealing because it would identify this use of -er with its most typical use, where
it binds an external argument (most often an agent, but also non-agent causers). However, something would
have to be said about why this proposed causative use of think cannot surface as a verb.
(ii) ★ That puzzle really thought me! (under the reading “That puzzle really made me think!”)
While this does not seem insurmountable, it is an obstacle to taking this approach. One could posit that it is -er
itself that adds the external argument semantically, rather than its binding an external argument introduced
by some other functional head. However, the fact that other verbs that are semantically similar to think (e.g.,
understand) that also lack causative uses disallow -er suffixation make this move dubious.
(iii) a. ★ That example really understood me!
(under the reading “That example really made me understand!”)
b. ★ That’s an understander. (≠ a helpful example; something that helps one understand)
Perhaps the contrast is related to the fact that think is intransitive, while understand is transitive:
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(90) a. an eater (≠ a restaurant)
b. a buyer (≠ a store)
c. a reader (≠ a library)
d. a builder (≠ a job site)
e. an arriver (≠ a train station)
f. a talker (≠ a thing to talk about)
I have also found a single exceptional use each of -ence and -ant.
(91) a. the residence (location nominal)
b. the confidant (one who is confided in)
Confidant is not really a location nominal, but its meaning is related to the prepositional
object of confide in.
Even though it is difficult to clearly delimit the possible meanings of nominalizations,
I do believe that a generalization holds regarding those derived via zero-affixation and
-ing. These nominals can never refer to prepositional objects, while nouns derived via other
affixes sometimes can, but apparently only in rare, probably idiosyncratic cases like those
discussed above.37 While the full range of possible meanings of nominalizations resists pre-
cise characterization given these facts, there is still a clear general trend towards the pattern
shown in (87). The fact that nominalizations of spray/load verbs cannot refer to goals aligns
with this more general pattern under the P-conflation analysis. Whenever nominalizations
of spray/load verbs are derived via one of these affixes (most commonly -∅ or -ing(s)), they
cannot refer to their goals, as shown in (6–9). This is consistent with the patterns discussed
(iv) a. John thought ★ (about) the problem.
b. John understood (★ about) the problem.
But given the general pattern that it is arguments of transitive verbs that allow -er suffixation, this is actually
the opposite of what wewould expect, as it would link the existence of thinker under the “conundrum” reading
to the fact that think takes a prepositional object. This leads us neatly back to the view presented in the text that
thinker is exceptional (though it raises the question of why understander under the “helpful example” reading
is impossible, if transitive understand is not synchronically analyzed as [V+P]).
37Apparent exceptions might exist, if we consider examples like box, bag, bottle, lodge, house, etc. Such words
can occur as either nouns or verbs, and would seem to refer to the prepositional objects of their verbal uses,
rather than their direct object (consider John bagged the groceries in a sack, where the bag does not refer to the
groceries). However, it is unclear in these cases that the noun is actually derived from the verb—if anything, it
is probably the other way around (cf. Hale & Keyser 2002).
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above if the object of goal-object uses of spray/load verbs is introduced by a preposition. Oth-
erwise, if the object of a goal-object use of spray/load verbs were a true internal argument,
it would be unclear why goal nominals were impossible.
To explain why only theme nominalizations are possible requires saying one of two
things. What is presented here of course will remain tentative, given the fuzzy borders of
nominalization we have just surveyed. Nevertheless, I believe it is worth making an explicit
suggestion in the service of defining the problem more concretely.
First, we could adopt the contextual allosemy approach to spray/load verbs presented
in (47). This would mean that whenever √spray appears outside the context of PLOC∅ , the
verb takes a theme argument. Thus, when a nominalizer attaches directly to it, it can bind
the theme argument (the spray ≈ the theme of some (salient) spraying event), as follows.
(92) a. JNMLZK = λ𝑃⟨𝑒 ,𝑠𝑡⟩ .λ𝑥.∃𝑒[𝑃(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1]
b. J√sprayK = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1
c. J√spray+NMLZK = λ𝑥.∃𝑒[spray(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1]
The result of saturating JNMLZK’s argument is a predicate of entities that describes objects
of spraying events. Because this entity is the one introduced by the root, it is interpreted as
the theme.
The other possibility would be to reject the contextual allosemy approach, and instead
adopt the one in (50), where √spray always denotes a predicate of eventualities, with the
theme argument coming from a separate thematic head. If this were the case, presumably
in order to derive a nominal referring to a theme, the THEME head would have to be present
in whatever structure gets nominalized: [√spray+THEME]+NMLZ.
In contrast, consider what would happen with a goal-object spray/load verb. I assume
that [V+PLOC∅] does not introduce a theme, since when againmodifies a constituent consist-
ing of the verb and a goal-object, no implications regarding the theme seem to arise (see
chapter 2).38
38Of course, the existence of a theme is still entailed by [V+PLOC∅]. I assume that this is not because [V+PLOC∅]
contains the semantic relation THEME, but instead arises because of the meaning of GOAL, which specifies the
endpoint of a path of motion. As such, there must be something that moves along that path, which would
satisfy the semantic relation THEME. Alternatively, one could add to the denotation of PLOC∅ that it existentially
binds the entity argument of a theme relation; though I cannot foresee all the consequences of this move, I do
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(93) J√spray+PLOC∅K = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.spray(𝑒) ∧ GOAL(𝑒 , on(𝑥)) = 1
Note that the goal object of [√spray+PLOC∅] must be a surface, as shown in (40). Thus, the
locative part of PLOC∅ here is represented with on.Now, nothing would go wrong semanti-
cally if NMLZ were attached to [V+PLOC∅], as it is of the right semantic type. If this occurred,
the resulting nominal would be a predicate of goals of spraying events (that are surfaces).
However, as I showed in (6–9), this is not a possible reading of nominalized spray. We
can now propose some idea about why this is that fits with the general patterns seen with
nominalizations: NMLZ (the phonologically null nominalizer) cannot include a preposition
within it (cf. Myers 1984; Pesetsky 1995). This would account for why location nominaliza-
tions are generally ruled out (though of course, it remains a bit unclear how to account for
the limited exceptions).
3.6 An Alternative to Prepositions?
An alternative characterization of the facts I have presented in this chapter would not re-
late the ungrammaticality of pseudo-unaccusatives, themarginal status of pseudo-middles,
and the impossibility of goal nominals to the syntax of prepositions. Instead, one might re-
cast the constraint as one on processes that target themes (perhaps in the broader sense
of “direct internal argument” that I earlier rejected). Perhaps only themes can become sub-
jects of unaccusatives and middles, and the referents of zero-derived nominalizations. A
possible semantic source for this generalization might be if themes are arguments of roots
(Kratzer 2003), in contrast to what I’ve proposed here. The proposed constraint on nomina-
lizations would also bear some similarity to Roeper & Siegel (1978)’s First Sister Principle
(though the First Sister Principle was proposed to account for compounds and not bare no-
minalizations). Provided we could find a way of linking the semantic properties of themes
to these syntactic processes, we might have an alternative way of describing the behaviors
seen.
Of course, this characterization of the facts would be most satisfying if there were some
principled syntactic explanation of why these processes targeted themes and not other
not see any immediately obvious problems that would arise.
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kinds of arguments. But I suggest that that explanation is precisely what I have proposed
in this chapter. Suppose themes are not introduced by prepositions, but all other thematic
relations are. Then my approach would constitute a closer step to an explanation of this
alternative description of the facts in terms of themes rather than in terms of the syntax
of prepositions. In the end, I suggest that this potentially viable alternative way of describ-
ing the facts is not incompatible with my proposal, and that my proposal might provide a
deeper explanation of the link between syntax and semantics that it identifies. More work
is needed, of course, to determine whether the analysis thus suggested is feasible, but at
first glance it appears to hold some promise.
136
CHAPTER 4
THE THEME IN GOAL-OBJECT STRUCTURES
4.1 Introduction
Grappling with the issue of two intersecting alternations and nominalizations in the
previous chapter led us to an account of the spray/load alternation that made use of P-
conflation. This chapter continues investigating the P-conflation proposal by examining the
status of the theme in two goal-object structures: agentive transitive goal-object structures,
and non-agentive transitive goal-object structures, shown here.
(1) a. John sprayed the wall with the paint. (agentive transitive goal-object)
b. The paint sprayed the wall. (non-agentive transitive goal-object)
The P-conflation analysis, which took the form it did partially due to the evidence from
again, makes the claim that the theme is not a semantic argument of the verb in goal-object
structures. However, prior literature on spray/load verbs has often assumed that it is. It is
thus worth examining the status of the theme in goal-object structures. Ultimately, this
examination reveals two things: the differing source of the holistic effect in theme-object
and goal-object structures, which resides in the semantics of with; and the success of the
P-conflation analysis in accounting for non-agentive transitive uses and non-alternating
goal-object verbs, which can be accounted for with no unnecessary additional syntactic or
semantic machinery.
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4.2 The Holistic Effect and With
In this section, I investigate the status of the theme in (1a) by examining the semantics
of with, the preposition that composes with it. More precisely, I examine the meaning of
the semantic relation with that relates two entities to a state. The meaning of this relation is
important to understanding the status of the theme in, and some of the semantic properties
of, the goal-object structure. Two things are relevant: one is the holistic effect that results
in the object being interpreted as completely affected in the way specified by the verb root
(e.g., completely covered with sprayed paint, completely loaded with books, etc.). Many
analyses link the holistic effect to the relevant argument occurring in an object position
(or vice versa, with linking rules placing affected arguments in object positions) (Gropen
1989; Gropen et al. 1991a,b; Pinker 1989; Rappaport & Levin 1988; Tenny 1992, 1994, a.m.o.).
I will instead follow Rapoport (2014), who proposes that the affectedness interpretation is
not related to a particular semantics associated with the object position, but instead to the
meaning of with.1 With details to come, preliminary evidence for this is that the holistic
effect seems diminished when using a goal-object structure that only contains the object,
or when using a dual goal structure, as in example (45) from chapter 3 (repeated as (2b)).
(2) a. John sprayed the door.
(↛ the door is covered with an even coating of the omitted theme)
b. Context: John set up the doors like dominos. He turned on the hose and ...
He sprayed the first door onto the second one.
(↛ the first door is covered with an even coating of the sprayed theme)
These facts lead me to follow Rapoport (2014) in believing that the origin of the holistic
effect resides in the denotation of with. As for why with is used so often in the goal-object
structure as opposed to other prepositions, that would probably have to dowith facts about
usage, and what kinds of situations it is useful to describe with goal-object structures.
1However, note that even if one were to reject Rapoport (2014)’s account and my adoption of it, many ex-
planations of the holistic effect would be compatible with the structures I posit. Indeed, explanations that posit
an association between being in object position and the holistic effect are highly compatible with my account,
since the verb takes an object. In contrast, accounts that posit a small clause syntax must find a different expla-
nation. Thus, while I do favor an explanation that doesn’t relate affectedness to object position as a primitive,
other accounts are forced to that conclusion, while my account is more flexible, being more compatible with
alternative approaches. I believe this flexibility is a strength of my approach.
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In addition to with telling us how the goal is to be interpreted, its meaning is crucial
to telling us about the status of the theme argument in goal-object structures. I suggested
above that [V+PLOC∅] is associated with a single meaning that picks out a goal argument.
None of what I presented assumed that there was a theme argument present semantically
in the goal-object structure. If the theme is not present in the semantics of the goal-object
structure, why do we seem to interpret with’s argument as the theme of the causing even-
tuality? Here, I will continue to follow Rapoport (2014), and suppose that this DP is not
a theme of the verb. Instead, it is the argument of with alone. My suggestion is that the in-
ference that with’s complement is the theme of the causing eventuality has to do with how
the meaning of with relates to the meaning of the verb. This makes an empirical prediction
that we will see appears to be borne out.
Rapoport (2014)’s idea is that there is a particular use of with that is associated with a
meaning of central coincidence; that is the with that seems to be relevant here. Rapoport
contrasts central coincidence with terminal coincidence, a distinction she credits to Hale
(1986). Terminal coincidence has to do with a changing relationship between a figure and
a ground,while central coincidence has to dowith unchanging relationships between these.
(3) a. The person ran to the hill. (terminal coincidence)
b. The person stood on the hill. (central coincidence)
(Rapoport 2014, (1))
It is important not to identify terminal and central coincidence with events and states, re-
spectively. While stative relations always invoke central coincidence, the entailment is uni-
directional, with some cases of central coincidence occurring with eventive predicates.
(4) a. The horse ran along the river.2 (event, central coincidence)
b. Reeds grow along the river. (state, central coincidence)
(Rapoport 2014, (2))
2Though Rapoport (2014) herself does not break down what central coincidence means in more detail for
this example, we can imagine the sentence as saying that all points in the path of the horse’s running are
included in the path defined by the river (which, because of the semantics of along and possibly pragmatic
factors, will include nearby points on land that run parallel to the river’s course).
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In (4a), the predicate run is interpreted as a description of events, but this does not mean
that the relationship between the horse and the river is one of terminal coincidence. The
relationship between the horse’s trajectory and the location of the river remains constant,
making this a relation of central coincidence, even though the sentence is a description of
events. Of course, the coincidence is not literally “central” in (4a)—the horse is not running
down the center of the river. The notion of what counts as central coincidence is pragmati-
cally tempered; as Rapoport (2014) puts it, “the location of the figure, that is, its trajectory
[(4a)] or its linear arrangement [(4b)], corresponds throughout to (and to the extent prac-
tical, coincides ‘centrally’ with) the place.”
Rapoport (2014) argues, following Hale & Keyser (2005), that the preposition with
(among others) encodes central coincidence. She notes that there are many kinds of mean-
ing associated with with, but that they all to some extent involve a type of constant relation
between two things—definitional of central coincidence.
(5) a. accompaniment or proximity:
the child you were with, a steak with a bottle of wine
b. having or possession: a shirt with a white collar, the man with a red moustache
c. instrument or means or material: cut it with a knife, fill the bowl with water
d. manner or circumstances: the children shouted with joy
e. proportion, relation or simultaneousness: the pressure varies with the depth
(Rapoport 2014, p. 160)
Rapoport (2014) proposes that these are all the samewith, and that they are underspecified
as the nature of the accompaniment, which gets filled out pragmatically.
If that is the case, we can see that the semantics of thiswithmust relate two entities to an
eventuality. Intuitively, thismakes sense because central coincidence definitionally involves
an unchanging relation between two entities. We can verify this intuition using sentences
where with serves as the main predicate.
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(6) a. Are you with or without luggage?
b. I am with a car today, so I don’t need a lift.
c. My friend is with a jacket, but not a tie.
d. Today, I am with my child.
e. If he is with a gun, then it’s not Jesus.
f. He is with a hat and a red shirt.
g. If he is without a tie and jacket or suit, he is generally attired in a Polo
sweater.
h. A lot of people don’t understand why he is with an umbrella all the time.
(Rapoport 2014, (6))
If we make the standard assumption that every argument must receive an interpretation,
then it seems clear that with delivers that interpretation for both arguments.
Rapoport (2014) summarizes her proposal as follows: with relates two arguments via
central coincidence, which is a constant locative relationship. The second entity with com-
bines with, the with-subject, controls this relationship. In other words, the location of the
with-object depends on the location of the with-subject, and not the other way around. For
instance, in (6h), it is the person referred to with he that determines the location of the
umbrella, and not the umbrella that determines the location of the person. This notion of
control is however, a bit subtle—if the relationship is constant, how can we consider one
of the entities in it to be in control of the location of the other? Rapoport (2014) offers the
following by way of explanation.
(7) a. I am with a car now.
b. # I am with a table now.
(Rapoport 2014, (9))
The contrast in (7) can be attributed to the notion of locative control. In (7a), a car can
accompany the speaker wherever she goes. However, tables do not usually have this prop-
erty. For instance, (7b) cannot be used in a crowed café to announce to one’s friends that
one has found a table. A table does not typically follow a person wherever she goes, and
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with is infelicitous. Note that if one constructs a different context, (7b) might be possible:
consider someone who is setting up an event space using tables that can be rolled around
on wheels. In this context, (7b) sounds fine as a way of describing what the speaker is
currently on her way to set up.3
Rapoport (2014) notes that this definition is similar to definitions of possession (as dis-
tinguished from ownership), and proposes that the relation with imposes is a species of
possession that we might refer to as “physical possession.” Note the following contrast.
(8) a. John has an umbrella, but he left it at home today.
b. ?# John is with an umbrella, but he left it at home today.
Ifwith encoded possession qua ownership, this would be unexpected. But if it encodes phys-
ical possession, this makes sense: physical possession would require that John have the
umbrella on his person, not merely that he own it. This idea allows her to further condense
the interpretation of with: “with defines as (locative) accompaniment a central coincidence
relation of physical possession” (Rapoport 2014, (10)).
In the context of spray/load verbs, Rapoport (2014) proposes that under this way of
thinking, it is with that is responsible for the holistic effect discussed in chapter 1.4 The idea
is that in a sentence like John sprayed the wall with paint, the wall is interpreted as holistically
affected not because it is in the object position of the sentence, but because it is the with-
subject. The semantics of with that Rapoport proposes derives this because of the notion of
locative control: it is the wall that controls the location of the paint, and not the other way
around. For this to be true, Rapoport says that “the possessor [in Spec,PP is] the location
that controls the location of thewith-object, the possessee: wherever the wall is, the paint is,
3However, consider the following pair of sentences:
(i) a. John is with the car today.
b. The car is with John today.
Both of these sound equally felicitous tome. If thewith-subject is always the controller of possession, it is unclear
how the carwould be controlling John’s location. Tomy intuition, it seems like in these cases, the control relation
is reversed: (i-a) describes situations where John is accompanying the car (for instance, if the car is parked in
a lot and John is guarding it), while the (i-b) describes situations where the car is accompanying John (e.g.,
he has rented it for the day). This aside, the judgments in (7) also seem right to me. There is probably more
to be said about how exactly the control relationship is defined in these cases. But for spray/load verbs, what
Rapoport (2014) applies correctly.
4Rapoport (2014) assumes the small clause syntax discussed and rejected in chapter 2, but nothing crucial
hinges on this.
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as it were. Put differently, in order for paint to be considered to accompany the possessor the
wall as required bywith’s interpretation, the paintmust be associatedwith thewall along the
wall’s spatial extent” (Rapoport 2014, p. 166). For Rapoport (2014), this is whywe interpret
the wall as being totally or holistically affected by the paint: because of the particular notion
of central coincidence as physical possession associated with with. In the case of interior
readings of spray/load verbs, like with stuff, the relevant notion would presumably be the
volume defined by the boundaries of the container, which would be asserted to centrally
coincide with whatever is stuffed inside.
Additional evidence for the identification of the holistic effect with the semantics of
with comes from goal-object sentences that use a preposition other than with. I discussed
one example from English in (2b), in a double-goal structure. Other examples come from
Italian andHebrew, which also allow the use of prepositions that do not correspond towith
in goal-object structures.











“I smeared the wall in (a little) paint.” (lit.)













“I have loaded the truck of sand.” (lit.)
Both Rapoport (2014) (Hebrew) and Damonte (2005) (Italian) report that these sentences
do not entail a holistic effect, while Damonte (2005) reports that the corresponding Ital-
ian sentence with con ‘with’ instead of di ‘of’ does display the holistic effect (see also the
discussion in chapter 5, section 5.2.3.2).
A possible prediction of this analysis is that if the quantity of thewith-object is specified
to be a small amount, a holistic reading of the goal should not be required. While Rapoport
(2014) presents the holistic effect as entailed in her account, it is not clear that this is correct.
This is because a small amount of something being centrally coincident with a surface or
container should not necessarily require the surface container to be completely covered/
full, as long as the with-object is centrally coincident with it (cf. (6c), where the use of with
certainly does not entail that thewearer of the jacket is not wearing any other clothing). The
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notion of physical possession wouldn’t seem to require the wall with the paint to necessarily
describe states where the wall is covered with the paint, but could describe states where
the wall controls the location of the paint simply by virtue of the paint being stuck to the
wall, regardless of how much of the wall is covered. That is, the holistic effect should arise
pragmatically, and most naturally when the quantity is left unspecified (as with the mass
nouns commonly used in spray/load alternation sentences in the literature (Beavers 2006,
2017; Brinkmann 1995)). This prediction seems to be borne out for both alternating verbs
like load and traditionally non-alternating verbs like fill.
(11) a. John loaded the truck with the hay, # but left some space for the grain.
b. John loaded the truck with a little bit of hay, leaving plenty of space for
the grain. (cf. chapter 1, (20))
(12) a. John filled the bottle with water.
→ The bottle is full of water.
b. John filled the bottle with a little bit of water.
↛ The bottle is full of a little bit of water.
There seem to be two possible interpretations in these cases: one is that the container (the
truck or the bottle) is very small and can only hold a little bit. Under this interpretation, the
truck or the bottle might well be at capacity. But the more natural interpretation seems to
me to be one in which the truck and bottle are normal-sized, and simply haven’t been com-
pletely filled. Interestingly, while under this reading it is inaccurate to say, e.g., the bottle is
full of a little bit of water, it is perfectly acceptable to say the bottle is with a little bit of water,
with with used as the main predicate as in (6). While I have not checked these judgments
with others, they seem fairly easy to get to me. If they are right, then it speaks to the advan-
tages of location the holistic effect in the semantics ofwith, rather than in a relation between
being a direct object and being interpreted as holistically affected.5
Note that under this analysis, the source of the holistic effect would have to be different
in goal-object and theme-object structures, given that it occurs in both (Beavers 2017). How-
ever, given the analysis of theme-object structures I have proposed, there is a likely source
5But see Beavers (2006, pp. 51 ff.) for potentially important qualifications.
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for it there already: the meaning of vTHEME. We might suppose that the semantic relation
THEME that it invokes relates a theme to an eventuality incrementally, in the sense of Krifka
(1998), or Borer (2005a, 2013) and Kiparsky (1998). Alternatively, we might derive this in
a more general way, relating to the way in which movement of the theme takes place. Con-
sider push a cart (preferentially atelic) and spray a gallon of paint (preferentially telic). When
one pushes a cart, the cart is not “used up” by the pushing—pushing is simply a manner in
which it can bemoved. But if a context is provided in which the cart is pushed along a path,
the cart’s motion along the path can define the boundaries of the predicate, and result in
it being telic. We might suppose that this is what distinguishes push a cart (preferentially
atelic) from push a button (preferentially telic).
Similarly, when one sprays paint, world knowledge dictates that the paint is gradually
used up and made unavailable for further spraying. It is not generally possible to gather
sprayed paint together again in a liquid form that would render it amenable for immediate
further spraying. Similar factsmight plausibly hold for other spray/loadpredicates. Support-
ing this idea, I note that if one does come up with a context whether continuous spraying
of the same theme is possible, the theme-object predicate can be interpreted as atelic even
if the theme is quantized, à la push a cart.
(13) a. Context: To prevent the water in the small pond from becoming stagnant,
it had to be continuously pumped. In order to accomplish this, a fountain
was installed. Once it was turned on, a small inlet at the bottom of the
pond took in the water from the pond, and ...
The fountain continuously sprayed the water into the pond.
Note that the use of continuously is degraded with telic predicates: ??John continuously ate
an apple. Thus, (13a) might provide evidence that the holistic effect in the theme-object
structure is based on the interaction of contextual and grammatical factors.
Returning to with, Rapoport (2014) extends her analysis to a class of predicates that
differs from spray/load verbs that occur with with: the swarm class of verbs (Dowty 2001),
and the black with class of predicates.6
6Rapoport (2014) notes that black with should be distinguished from black from (e.g., His face was black from
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(14) a. Bees swarmed in the garden.
b. The garden swarmed with bees.
c. Fireflies glowed in the field.
d. The field glowed with fireflies. (Rapoport 2014, (19–20))
e. Fish abound in the pond.
f. The pond abounds with fish. (Dowty 2001, (1))
(15) a. The floor was black with ants.
b. The hills were white with snow.
c. The cave was red with paint.
d. The ceiling was black with soot.
e. The rocks were green with moss.
f. Her cheeks were wet with tears. (Rapoport 2014, (22))
The verbal predicates in (14) are interestingly different from spray/load verbs inmanyways,
despite the superficial similarities (i.e., the alternation between a structure with a locative
preposition and a “flipped” structure with with). However, this alternation differs from
the spray/load alternation in many ways, and should not be identified with it (e.g., Dowty
2001; Hoeksema 2009). One immediately relevant fact is that in the goal-object structure,
the location can be become the subject (even for predicates that do not alternate, like the ad-
jectives in (15)). This contrasts with the behavior of the goal-object use of spray/load verbs,
which do not allow location subjects. Note that this does not call into question the gener-
alization regarding the impossibility of unaccusative uses of goal-object spray/load verbs:
with spray/load verbs, the location argument is interpreted as a goal (that is, as the endpoint
of a path); with swarm verbs, the location argument is interpreted as a mere location not
associated with a path. We might expect that this semantic difference would correlate with
a syntactic difference, though I will not pursue a full analysis here.
What is relevant for us is how Rapoport (2014)’s proposal regarding with could relate
to the interpretation of spray/load verbs. I will (slightly) formalize her proposal below not
soot. Black with relates to the discourse situation, while black from indicates causation (cf. Her hair was grey with
dust/#with worry, Rapoport 2014, fn. 19, (iii-b)).
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with regards to the preposition with, but with regards to the semantic relation with:
(16) Let 𝑅 and 𝑅′ be contextually specified functions of entities that pick out some
spatial property of their argument. Then, with(𝑒 , 𝑅(𝑦), 𝑅′(𝑥)) = 1 iff 𝑒 is an even-
tuality and ...
a. 𝑅′(𝑥) and 𝑅(𝑦) are spatially related via accompaniment
b. 𝑅′(𝑥) and 𝑅(𝑦) are centrally coincident (as far as context permits)
c. 𝑅′(𝑦)has control over𝑅(𝑥)’s location (i.e.,𝑅′(𝑦)physically possesses𝑅(𝑥))7
This is essentially Rapoport (2014)’s definition of with. What I have added is the functions
of entities 𝑅 and 𝑅′, which return some space defined in relation to their argument. I will
illustrate now how this small addition can account for particular properties of spray/load
verbs. In particular, it provides a way of understanding how context “fills in” the notion of
central coincidence in a specificway (16b). This helps us solve some problems I will present
that relate to the kinds of restitutive readings that again can get with spray/load verbs, and
how these relate to the restrictions on the kinds of relations that can hold between the goal
and the theme in goal-object uses, shown previously in (39–40). I repeat these examples
here as (17–18).
(17) a. John loaded the box with the books.
≈ John loaded the books into the box.
b. John loaded the table with the books.
≈ John loaded the books onto the table.
(18) a. John sprayed the wall with the paint.
≈ John sprayed the paint onto the wall.
b. ?? John sprayed the air with the paint.
≠ John sprayed the paint into the air.
Informally and intuitively, with load, the goal-object structure can describe the movement
of the theme to the surface or the interior of the goal. In contrast, with spray, the goal-object
7Interestingly, this means that with essentially reverses the usual semantics of prepositions, which tend to
take the ground as their complement and the figure as their specifier: cf. the bookfigure on the tableground, the
tableground with the bookfigure.
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structure can only describe the movement of the theme to the surface of the goal, never its
interior. That is, (19) can only be paraphrased as (19a) and never as (19b).
(19) I sprayed the box with paint.
a. “I sprayed the surface of the box with paint.”
b. “I filled the interior of the box with paint by spraying paint.”
In some cases, an interior reading for spraymight seempossible, but I believe this is illusory.
For instance, in (19a), the surface that is described could include the interior walls of the
box—nothing rules that out. But what is ruled out in (19) is a reading where the goal of
the spraying event is the volume delimited by the sides of the box—that is, a reading where
the box was filled by spraying paint into it. Such a reading is not incompatible with the root
√spray in general, as it is perfectly fine to say (20).
(20) I sprayed paint into the box (and filled it up).
Thus, the root √spray can be used to describe events where the destination of the spraying
is a volume. However, this reading is never associated with the goal-object structure. In
contrast, such a reading is possible with the goal-object structure of load, contingent on the
context and the physical properties of the goal (i.e., whether the goalmost naturally defines
an enclosed space or a surface, and contextual information).
(21) I loaded the box with books.
a. “I put books on top of the box by loading them.”
(if an already full box is being used as a platform)
b. “I filled the box with books by loading them.”
(if the box is being used as a container)
Ideally, we would be able to derive this difference, since the same pattern seems implicit
in the use of be- in German, shown in (21) and (23). But I do not see precisely how to do
that, given (20). For now, I will treat this as something that must be modeled as a reflecting
lexical idiosyncracy.
Now, I have talked about this before as reflecting something about the contextual al-
losemy of PLOC∅ : in the context of
√spray, PLOC∅ will be interpreted something like on/surface,
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while in the context of √load, PLOC∅ will be either underspecified, or have its meaning filled
in by context.
Now, consider 𝑅 and 𝑅′ in the denotation ofwith I proposed. These relations encode the
idea that the specific way that with’s central coincidence relation is determined is not un-
derspecified, but is resolved contextually. Evidence for this claim comes from the particular
readings that restitutive again can and cannot give rise to. In particular, when a restitutive
again occurs with a goal-object structure, it can only presuppose the existence of a state that
can be described by a goal-object structure with an identical sort of locative relation. This
statement may sound a bit complex now, but the following discussion should clarify it.
First, we can establish a baseline for several spray/load verbs. These examples show us
what kind of locative relations are associated with the goal-object uses of slather, spray, stuff,
and pack.
(22) John slathered the box with paint.
a. ≈ John slathered paint onto the box.
b. ≠ John slathered paint into the box.
(23) John sprayed the box with paint.
a. ≈ John sprayed paint onto the box.
b. ≠ John sprayed paint into the box.
(24) John stuffed the box with (cans of) paint.
a. ≠ John stuffed paint onto the box.
b. ≈ John stuffed paint into the box.
(25) John packed the box with (cans of) paint.
a. ≠ John packed paint onto the box.
b. ≈ John packed paint into the box.
These examples establish that goal-object uses of slather and spray are compatible only with
an on/surface reading of PLOC∅ , while goal-object uses of stuff and pack are compatible only
with an in/interior reading of PLOC∅ .
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Next, the following examples combine goal-object uses of these cases with restitutive
again.What they show is that a prior eventuality of slathering/spraying that results in the box
with paint can satisfy again’s presupposition when it occurs in a sentence with the opposite
predicate of eventualities. The same is true for stuff/pack. In contrast, a prior slathering
or spraying that results in the box with paint cannot satisfy again’s presupposition when it
occurs with load/stuff, nor vice versa.
(26) Both PLOC∅ ≈ onto:
a. Context: John slathered the wall with paint, and then removed it. Then, ...
He sprayed the wall with paint again. (restitutive)
b. Context: John sprayed the wall with paint, and then removed it. Then, ...
He slathered the wall with paint again. (restitutive)
(27) Both PLOC∅ ≈ into:
a. Context: John stuffed the suitcase with clothes, and then removed them.
Then, ...
He packed the suitcase with clothes again. (restitutive)
b. Context: John packed the suitcase with clothes, and then removed them.
Then, ...
He stuffed the suitcase with clothes again. (restitutive)
(28) Prior into, current onto:
a. Context: John stuffed/packed the box with silly string, and then removed
it. Then, he mashed the silly string together in his hand, and ...
# John slathered the box with silly string again. (restitutive)
b. Context: John stuffed/packed the box with silly string, and then removed
it. Then, he hooked up a hose that could spray silly string, and ...
# John sprayed the box with silly string again. (restitutive)
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(29) Prior onto, current into:
a. Context: John slathered/sprayed the suitcase with a lot of silly string, and
then he gathered it all up. Then, ...
# John stuffed the suitcase with silly string again. (restitutive)
b. Context: John slathered/sprayed the suitcase with a lot of silly string, and
then he gathered it all up. Then, ...
# John packed the suitcase with silly string again. (restitutive)
In (26–27), we see the presupposition of again is satisfied by an eventuality that can be
described with a goal-object sentence that has an identical reading of PLOC∅ to its interpre-
tation in the asserted content. In contrast, in (28–29), we see that when the presupposition
is described by a goal-object sentence where PLOC∅ receives a contrasting reading from the
one it receives in the sentence again attaches within, the result is infelicitous.8
In (26–27), again’s presupposition does not include the verb, because the prior eventu-
alities are described by different verbs from the present ones. A spraying is not necessarily
a slathering, nor is a packing a stuffing (one can pack a suitcase without stuffing it, and vice
versa, provided a proper packing does not simply involve cramming things into a suitcase
willy-nilly). For this reason, I conclude that again must attach to a syntactic phrase whose
denotation is a predicate of eventualities that is at least no higher than PP.9 (Note that given
8Note that these diagnostics weigh in favor of saying that the reading PLOC∅ receives with load is not unspec-
ified, but always corresponds to in, at least in English:
(i) a. Context: John sprayed the box with silly string, and then took it all out. Then, ...
#He loaded the box with silly string again. (restitutive)
b. Context: John stuffed the box with silly string, and then took it all out. Then, ...
He loaded the box with silly string again. (restitutive)
When again’s presupposition has an onto goal, load with is infelictious. In contrast, when it contains an into goal,
load with is felicitous. This would be most compatible if PLOC∅ always receives an into reading with load. Intu-
itively, we could think of this as reflecting the fact that even if the goal of the loading could be characterized as
a surface, that is not what defines the loading—what defines the loading is a volume defined by the boundaries
of (the edges of) a surface or an enclosed space. If one loads the table, whatmatters is that there is a volume that
one can define by projecting the space defined by the table’s surface upward. However, this picture would not
necessarily explain why it is possible to nevertheless use be- with laden ‘load’ in German only when it receives
an onto reading, as Brinkmann (1995) reports.
9An astute reader will note that the contexts described in (26–29) do not necessarily force a restitutive read-
ing for again—in particular, there were prior events where the suitcase came to have things in/on it. However,
all that is important here is that the reading of again excludes the verb root, which is clear. Even if again could
attach to CAUSEP to receive a repetitive reading, this would not affect the point here. I show it attached to the
PP because the semantic type I have assumed for CAUSEP would lead to a type mismatch if againwere to attach
to it.
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the preceding discussion regarding the meaning of with, it no longer seems appropriate to












If again attached to VP2, for instance, its presupposition would necessarily ensure that the
prior eventuality could be described by the same verb as in the asserted content. But that is
not the case in (26) or (27): a slathering is not a spraying, nor is a stuffing a packing. This
means that again’s presupposition cannot include slather, spray, stuff, or pack.
As a result, whatever again’s presupposition includes is described by just the PP:
[DPGOAL with DP]. But this leaves us with a conundrum: if this is all that is included in
again’s presupposition, then (29) and (28) should be felicitous if the reading ofwith is iden-
tical across slather, spray, stuff, and pack. Since we know again need not scope over the verb
root because its presupposition can be satisfied in examples like (26–27), we cannot ascribe
(29–28)’s infelicitousness to again’s presupposition necessarily including the verb root.
Instead, the source of the infelicitousness seems to come from the differing interpreta-
tions forced on PLOC∅ with slather and spray, on the one hand; and stuff and pack, on the other.
But if again occurs where it does in (30), then it should not include the meaning of PLOC∅
in its presupposition either, since that is adjoined to the verb and likewise not in again’s
scope. This is where 𝑅 and 𝑅′ become relevant: they allow the context of utterance to do
some work in resolving this issue. Suppose that what with does is pick out the locations
of both of its arguments and relate them in the way described in (16). Because 𝑅 and 𝑅′
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are resolved according the context of the utterance in this way, they could be resolved to
any number of locative functions (including potentially ad hoc ones that are pragmatically
constructable). We might think that is what is going on in cases like the following:
(31) The horse was running with the river. (cf. (4a))
Here, 𝑅(the river) would be resolved in context to pick out an area defined as an exten-
sion of the river’s edge onto land, and this would be identified as centrally coincident with
𝑅′(the horse), where 𝑅 could pick out the trajectory of the horse.
Nowconsiderwhatwould happen in a goal-object spray/load sentence. In this case, PLOC∅
will already specify the function that picks out the correct part of the goal by virtue of the
particular verb it combines with; that is, for√spray, PLOC∅ would identify the goal as the sur-
face of the object. We could consider that because PLOC∅ has already specified the function
that picks out the surface of the goal, this is the most likely function (or alternatively, the
only function) that could stand in for 𝑅′. That is, a goal-object VP with a spray/load verb
would have the following structure and semantics.
(32) JVPK =
λ𝑒.spray(𝑒) ∧ GOAL(𝑒 , on(the wall))∧
∃𝑒′[with(𝑒′, 𝑅′(the wall), 𝑅(the paint)) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1
JVPK =
λ𝑒.spray(𝑒)∧
GOAL(𝑒 , on(the wall)) = 1
JCAUSEPK =
λ𝑄.λ𝑒.𝑄(𝑒)∧
∃𝑒′[with(𝑒′, 𝑅′(the wall), 𝑅(the paint)) ∧ CAUSE(𝑒 , 𝑒′)] = 1
CAUSE PP
JPPK =
















presupposition: ∃𝑒′′[𝜏(𝑒′′) ≺ 𝜏(𝑒′) ∧with(𝑒′′, 𝑅′(the wall), 𝑅(the paint))] = 1
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Since the goal of the spraying event is identified as the surface of the wall, and this event
causes the eventuality of the wall being with the paint, we could imagine that the interpre-
tation is that 𝑅′ corresponds to on. To do otherwisewould require that the result of spraying
the surface of the wall with the paint be interpreted as directly causing some other part of
the location of the wall to be with paint—presumably an incoherent notion.10 Thus, the se-
mantics of direct causation will require the accomodation of a context where 𝑅′ is identical
to the locative function present in the denotation of PLOC∅ . And because 𝑅′ is specified in
the context, it will necessarily be resolved identically to how it is in the asserted content in
again’s presupposition, under the standard assumption that sentences are evaluated with
respect to only a single context.11 The pattern in (26–29) is thus derived via indirectly: the
verb specifies the specific locative function in PLOC∅ , the semantics of direct causation re-
quire this to be identified with the contextually specified function 𝑅′ in the denotation of
with, and the fact that sentences are evaluated relative to a single context of utterance en-
sures that 𝑅′ in the presupposition of again is identical to the 𝑅′ in the asserted content. This
explains the complex behavior in (26–29) that shows the verb root is not included in again’s
presupposition, but the locative function in PLOC∅ ’s denotation is, despite the fact that PLOC∅
is not present in the small clause.
10Another suggestion about how to force the locative function 𝑅′ to be interpreted in the same as the locative
function that PLOC∅ invokes is related to the exhaustivitity of thematic roles (see Williams 2015, ch. 8.2). The
idea is that if a participant in an event is specified as bearing some relation to that event, then that relation is
borne only by that participant. However, for this to work here, the implication would have to be reversed: we
would have to say that because the goal of the eventuality is the surface of the wall, only the surface of the
wall can be the goal. But this reversal is empirically inadequate. One and the same entity may bear multiple
relations to an event, even if they exhaust each.
(i) John shaved (himself). (λ𝑒.AGENT(𝑒 , John) ∧ shave(𝑒 , John) = 1)
Exhaustivity of thematic relations says that (i) specifies that the only agent of 𝑒 is John, and that the only shavee
of 𝑒 is John. But exhaustivity clearly does not require that the role John play in 𝑒 be only the agent or else only
the shavee. Otherwise, the use of reflexives should be impossible. In other words, just because the surface of
the wall is the only goal of 𝑒 in (32), it should not entail that the only locative function that could apply to
the wall in 𝑒 is the function that returns its surface. Double-goal sentences like (45) also speak against this.
Exhaustivity of thematic relations will not quite do the job here, then.
11Barring special circumstances that are probably not met in these circumstances; see Deal (2020) for an
overview.
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4.2.1 Interpreting Themes in Goal-object Structures
This section has been animated by the question of what the meaning ofwith contributes
to the meaning of the goal-object structure. I have just proposed that it is with that is re-
sponsible for the holistic effect that holds of the goal, following Rapoport (2014). The other
question we began with was related to the interpretation of with’s complement, and what
happens to the theme argument in the goal-object structure. If what I have argued about
with is on the right track, then the goal-object structure has no theme argument. Neverthe-
less, we arrive at the inference that the complement of with is the theme of the event. For
instance, if one says John sprayed the wall with paint, we understand that the theme of the
spraying event was the paint. It is what moved to result in the state described by the wall
with paint. We cannot use this sentence to describe scenarios where the wall ended up with
paint as a result of some other substance being sprayed.
While the present analysis does not encode this inference directly, I believe it does so
indirectly. In particular, consider that the semantics of the goal-object structure entail that,
e.g., (the surface of) the wall is the goal of the spraying event. As the goal of this event, it
defines the endpoint of a path that the spraying event follows. This spraying event causes a
state described as some location related to thewall beingwith paint, which context requires
us to resolve to the surface of the wall being with paint. In addition, the semantics of with
mean that it will control the central coincidence relationship that holds between it and the
location of with’s complement: it is the wall that determines the location of the paint, and
not the other way around. Now, the inference that the other argument of the with state is
what moves arises naturally. The spraying that proceeds along a trajectory to the surface of
the wall causes the surface of the wall to be with paint. Since the surface of the wall is the
endpoint of this trajectory, and the controller of the central coincidence relation that results,
it does not traverse this trajectory. Thus, in order to be true, something else must traverse
the trajectory to the wall.
Because this “something else” isn’t entailed to be the paint, we could imagine that the
wall ends up with paint as the result of something else traversing that trajectory—for in-
stance, John could spray the wall with paint by virtue of spraying water towards the wall
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and knocking over a bucket of paint that spills all over it. But then again, this would not
be a spraying event whose goal is the surface of the wall: it would be an event whose goal
is the surface of the bucket. Correspondingly, using the sentence John sprayed the wall with
paint to describe this scenario would be false: not because the paint is not the theme of the
spraying event, but because the surface of the wall is not its goal. It seems quite clear that
in order for the wall to end up with paint as a result of a spraying event whose goal is the
surface of the wall, the only possible thing that can be sprayed is the paint. This will lead
to 𝑅 being resolved in such a way that it picks out the trajectory of the paint. This results in
us interpreting it as the theme of the spraying event, even though the THEME relation is not
directly encoded in the semantics of that sentence under my analysis.
Seth Cable (p.c.) has pointed out to me that there is empirical evidence that bears on
this claim. This evidence not only supports what I have just argued—that the interpreta-
tion of the object of with in goal-object sentences as the theme is an inference rather than
an entailment—but in doing so makes it difficult to maintain analyses where the object of
with bears the same thematic relation in the theme-object structure as in the goal-object
structure. The latter proposal is a common feature of some of the most popular existing ac-
counts of the spray/load alternation (Brinkmann 1995; Rappaport & Levin 1988;Wunderlich
1997), which I will discuss in chapter 5. This evidence also makes it difficult to maintain a
small clause analysis of the syntax of theme-object structures, which is common in previous
syntactic approaches (Damonte 2005; Larson 1990, 2014; Mateu 2000, 2017).
The relevant evidence comes from examples like the following.
(33) Scenario: You’ve (unknowingly) put a bunch of people with COVID-19 onto the
bus that you’re about to drive. Somehow, I find out about this, and Iwant towarn
you that it’s not safe to drive the bus.
a. (You idiot!) You’ve loaded the bus with COVID-19!
b. # (You idiot!) You’ve loaded COVID-19 onto the bus!
(Seth Cable, p.c.)
Note that in the scenario given, the goal-object sentence is felicitous, but the theme-object
sentence is not. This contrast follows straightforwardly inmy account but is not predicted in
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other accounts. In the scenario above, presumably COVID-19 is not the direct theme of any
loading event. Instead, the people are the direct theme of the loading event—they are who
was directly loaded onto the bus. But the event of loading the people onto the bus directly
causes the state of the bus beingwithCOVID-19. That explainswhy the goal-object sentence
is felicitous, but the theme-object sentence is not—because the theme-object sentence entails
that COVID-19 is the direct theme of a loading event, which is not the case in the scenario
given.
An alternative explanation for this contrast might relate it to a different explanation of
the holistic effect than the one I have proposed. In the scenario in (33), the bus is holisti-
cally affected since it is full of people with COVID-19. This could lead to a preference for
using the goal-object structure, which encodes the goal being holistically affected. But this
explanation fails to explain the following modification to the scenario does not improve
(33b).
(34) Scenario: You’ve (unknowingly) put one person with COVID-19 onto the bus
that you’re about to drive.
a. # You’ve loaded COVID-19 onto the bus!
(Seth Cable, p.c.)
In this scenario, the bus is no longer holistically affected by the loading, meaning there
should be no pressure from the holistic effect to use the goal-object structure (and this also
makes (33a) infelicitous in the scenario in (34)). But this new lack of pressure to use the
goal-object structure does not mean that (34a) is felicitous. Instead, a better explanation of
the contrast in (33) is the one my account gives, which says that COVID-19 is the theme in
(33b), but only a participant in a caused eventuality in (33a).
The examples in (33) and (34) are also difficult to accomodate in many previous ac-
counts of the spray/load alternation. In particular, any account in which COVID-19 bears
the same thematic role in the theme-object and goal-object structures would fail to predict
the contrast in (33), given the data in (34). This is because these accounts claim that the
object of with in the goal-object structure bears the same thematic relation to the event as
it does in the theme-object structure. However, these data show that this is not the case,
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and that the difference is unlikely to be due to the holistic effect. Furthermore, these data
also make it difficult to maintain small clause analyses of the theme-object structure. This is
because in those analyses, the most natural semantics would treat the theme in the theme-
object structure as also just a participant in a caused eventuality, as shown below.
(35) JVPK =












The semantics here describe loading events that cause states of COVID-19 being on the bus
(keeping in mind the caveat about prepositions I observed in chapter 2). But this semantics
accurately describes the scenarios in (33) and (34): in both cases, the loading event directly
causes COVID-19 to be on the bus. Yet as we just observed, theme-object sentences cannot
be used to felicitously describe these scenarios. My account explains why not, since the
semantics I propose require COVID-19 to be interpreted as the theme of the loading event,
which is not satisfied in these scenarios. These data thus show that the theme must be
interpreted as the theme of the loading event in the theme-object structure, and that it must
not be so interpreted in the goal-object structure. Previous accounts that say differentlywith
regards to either of these points would run into difficulty accounting for the contrasts in
(33–34), while my account of the differing semantic status of the theme in theme-object
and goal-object structures handles them correctly.
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4.3 Non-alternating Goal-object Verbs and Non-agentive Transitive Uses
In addition to spray/load verbs, which alternate between theme-object and goal-object
uses, there is a class of verbs in English that have very similar meanings to spray/load verbs,
but which nevertheless occur only (or with very few exceptions) in the goal-object struc-
ture.12 These are the cover/fill verbs (Levin 1993).
(36) a. John covered the screen with the blanket.
b. ★ John covered the blanket over/onto the screen.
(37) a. John filled the glass with water.
b. ?★ John filled water into the glass.
(38) a. The crew blocked the street with cones.
b. ★ The crew blocked cones into/onto the street.
(39) a. The priest anointed the child with oil.
b. ★ The priest anointed oil onto the child.
For some of these verbs,with can alternate with in (but never into) (Levin 1993, sec. 9.8).
This sounds most natural to me if the theme is non-quantized (that is, if it is a bare plural
or a mass noun).
(40) a. ?? John covered the screen in a blanket.
b. The storm covered the mountains in snow.
c. ★ John filled the glass in water.
d. ★ The crew blocked the street in cones.
e. ? The priest anointed the child in oil.
Whether this is possible seems to be somewhat idiosyncratic, but a regularity is that it is
only possible if the goal is specified as a surface, and never when it is specified as in interior
(see the appendix for a list).
12There are also many verbs that occur in only the theme-object structure, such as put, place, etc. However,
the relation of these verbs to spray/load verbs seems less clear in many cases. While some are likely to be non-al-
ternating theme-object spray/load verbs, others behave quite differently (see the discussion in chapter 2, section
2.4.2 for details). Including them would thus introduce additional complications.
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In some ways, these restrictions bear certain similarities to restrictions on the use of
di to introduce themes with spray/load verbs in Italian (Damonte 2005), suggesting some
underlying commonality. In some cases, in can be used with alternating spray/load verbs,
though this seems rarer in English than in Italian.
(41) a. ★ John loaded the truck in hay.
b. ★ John sprayed the wall in paint.
c. ★ The chef drizzled the cake in icing.
d. The monk wrapped the Pharaoh’s body in bandages.
I will ignore this complication, while noting that the restrictions are worth exploring, even
if they will be somewhat idiosyncratic.13
Wemight take two approaches to these verbs. The first would be to suppose that despite
the superficial syntactic and semantic similarities they bear to goal-object spray/load verbs,
they are unrelated. Their basic use is a goal-object use, and does not involve P-conflation.
Another approach we could take would be the one I suggested in the previous section:
these verbs are non-alternating spray/load verbs either because their roots can only surface
when P-conflation applies, or else because they are so strongly associated with a result
interpretation that themanner interpretation imposed by the theme-object structure is hard
to achieve.
I believe there is evidence that supports the second kind of approach. The cover/fill verbs
require (or strongly favor) the P-conflation syntax due to either a syntactic requirement or a
semantic preference. The evidence for this is that, with five exceptions, they pattern exactly
like spray/load verbs in disallowing theme subjects, and their nominalizations can only refer
to their themes, never their goals. This is especially interesting because they never surface in
theme-object structures. (Of course, as with spray/load verbs, some of these verbs disallow
non-agentive uses and/or nominal uses for presumably independent reasons.)
13In particular, Damonte (2005)’s examples show that the Italian equivalent of load, caricare, can occur with
di (provided semantic conditions are met), while English load cannot occur with in.
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(42) a. The blanket covered the screen.
b. ★ The screen covered with the blanket.
c. the cover (= the blanket/≠ the screen)
(43) a. Traffic cones blocked the road.
b. ★ The road blocked with traffic cones.
c. the blockage (= the traffic cones/≠ the road)
(44) a. Curlicues embellished the invitations.
b. ★ The invitations embellished with curlicues.
c. the embellishment (= the curlicues/≠ the invitations)
(45) a. Thick molasses coated the countertop.
b. ★ The countertop coated with thick molasses.
c. the coat(ing) (= the molasses/≠ the countertop)
If the verbal use of these roots requires P-conflation, the patterns reported in (42–45)would
be explained in the same way they are for spray/load verbs.
However, there are some additional complications to address. First of all, the non-agen-
tive uses of these verbs do not appear to correspond precisely to the ones discussed above.
In particular, there is no overt preposition introducing the theme as there is for unaccusa-
tive uses of spray/load verbs.
(46) Spray/load verbs:
a. Paint sprayed onto the wall.
b. Icing drizzled onto the cake.
c. Rain sprinkled onto the ground.
(47) Cover/fill verbs:
a. The blanket covered (★onto) the screen.
b. Traffic cones blocked (★onto) the road.
c. Thick molasses coated (★onto) the countertop.
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This is an important difference. I have supposed that the theme-object unaccusatives are


















In contrast, goal-object unaccusatives are ruled out because prepositions, even ones that
might form a unit with the verb, cannot be stranded in unaccusatives. I suggested that this
is because stranding a preposition under A-movement requires [V+P] to form a head, and
that doing this requires the projection of v, but whether that is the right explanation is
currently beside the point. What is important for now is that the derivation in (48) will
result in an overt locative preposition being spoken after the verb, as in (46).
In contrast, there is no locative preposition pronounced after the verb in (47). If such
cases were derived in a way parallel to (48), we would expect this to be possible. Of course,
it is fairly clear why this doesn’t happen: the locative prepositions possible in unaccusative
uses of spray/load verbs are precisely those that occur in their theme-object uses. But the
verbs in (47) do not have theme-object uses with a locative preposition. They only have
goal-object uses, with with.
The question is thus not why a locative preposition is impossible in (47). Instead, the
question is whether these are unaccusative uses at all, since they are transitive at least on
14I am again not treating movement as Remerge as I might have, for simplicity’s sake.
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the surface. A related question is where with has gone in such uses, if they are indeed unac-
cusative; this question applies to non-agentive transitive uses of alternating verbs as well.
Before that, though, there is an additional contrast between (46) and (47)worth noting:
unaccusative uses of spray/load verbs appear to describe events. In contrast, non-agentive
uses of cover/fill verbs can describe states or events. We can see this clearly because adverbs
that are only compatible with events can occur with non-agentive uses of both classes of
verbs, while adverbs that modify states can only occur with non-agentive cover/fill.
For instance, the adverbs gradually, quickly, and slowly are only compatible with eventive
predicates.
(49) Eventive:
a. The hurricane gradually drifted out to sea.
b. The manager quickly dispatched a memo.
c. The diver slowly entered the cave.
(50) Stative:
a. ?★ The employee gradually resented his boss.
b. ?★ The flour quickly weighed five pounds.
c. ?★ The problem slowly appeared intractable.
Note that the stative examples can be rescued by coercion, which is generally possible. But
in such cases, the only reading is one where, e.g., resent means “come to resent”—an even-
tive predicate.
In contrast, the adverbs completely, totally, and entirely in non-intensifier uses are only
compatible with predicates of gradable states. In those uses, they modify not the causing
event, but only the resulting gradable state.15
15Some verbs seem to include both an event and a result state (e.g., flatten). In these cases, adverbs like
completely, totally, and entirely can modify the result state, even when they occur before the verb: John completely
flattened the metal. I have no explanation for why this is possible, assuming that flatten is pronounced in v, and
given the apparent contrast between these cases and those in (52), where the position of the adverb before the
stative predicate is crucial.
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(51) Eventive:
a. ?★ The runner completely ran.
b. ?★ John totally ate dinner.
c. ?★ John entirely discovered the answer.
(52) Stative:
a. The metal became completely flat.
(cf. ?★The metal completely became flat.)
b. His cheeks turned totally red.
c. The car looked entirely new.
We can see that event-modifying adverbs can occur with unaccusative uses of spray/
load verbs and non-agentive transitive uses of cover/fill verbs. In contrast, state-modifying
adverbs cannot occur with unaccusative uses of spray/load verbs, though they can occur
with non-agentive transitive cover/fill verbs.
(53) a. Paint gradually sprayed onto the wall.
b. Icing quickly drizzled onto the cake.
c. Rain slowly sprinkled onto the ground.
(54) a. ?★ Paint completely sprayed onto the wall.
b. ?★ Icing totally drizzled onto the cake.
c. ?★ Rain entirely sprinkled onto the ground.
(55) a. The blanket gradually covered the screen.
b. ? Traffic cones quickly blocked the road.
c. Thick molasses slowly coated the countertop.
(56) a. The blanket completely covered the screen.
b. Traffic cones totally blocked the road.
c. Thick molasses entirely coated the countertop.
This suggests that non-agentive cover/fill verbs must be derived in a different way from
unaccusative uses of spray/load verbs, beyond the quirk of the locative preposition being
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absent. If the absence of the locative preposition were unimportant, we would not expect
such differences.
In addition, some spray/load verbs allow non-agentive uses that similarly lack a locative
preposition (though judgments on these examples vary from speaker to speaker in my
experience, and once more, some verbs simply disallow these for possibly idiosyncratic
reasons).
(57) a. ? Paint sprayed the wall.
b. ? Boxes loaded the truck.
c. ? Rain sprinkled the ground.
Interestingly, in cases like these, the use of stative adverbs does not sound quite as bad as
in (54).16
(58) a. ? The paint completely sprayed the wall.
b. ? The boxes totally loaded the truck.
c. ?? The rain entirely sprinkled the ground.
Furthermore, with spray/load verbs, we can observe that the locative function applied to
the goal-object in non-agentive transitive uses must be the same as the one expressed in the
agentive goal-object structure.
(59) a. John sprayed paint onto the wall. ≈
John sprayed the wall with paint.
b. John sprayed paint into the air. ≠
?? John sprayed the air with paint.
(60) a. Paint sprayed onto the wall. ≈
Paint sprayed the wall.
b. Paint sprayed into the air. ≠
?? Paint sprayed the air.
16The judgments reported here are mine—others have reported theirs differ. I will reiterate that I indeed find
these not so good, as the question marks indicate, but they do seem improved related to (54).
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And finally, we can see that non-alternating theme-object verbs can never occur in non-
agentive transitive uses.
(61) a. Water poured into the glass.
b. ★ Water poured the glass.
c. The oar dipped into the water.
d. ★ The oar dipped the water.
e. The ball dropped onto the ground.
f. ★ The ball dropped the ground.
These facts suggest that the non-agentive transitive sentences without locative prepo-
sitions are derived in an importantly different way from the non-agentive unaccusative
sentences with locative prepositions. (60) shows that the locative function applied to the
goal object in non-agentive transitive uses must match the one invoked by PLOC∅ in agentive
goal-object structures. In addition, only when a verb can occur in agentive goal-object struc-
tures can it support a non-agentive transitive structure, as verified in (61). Taken together,
this strongly suggests that non-agentive transitive uses of spray/load and cover/fill verbs are
related to the goal-object structure rather than to the theme-object structure—despite the
fact that in both cases, the theme is the subject. Thus, my proposal is that the sentences
with locative prepositions are derived from theme-object structures, while the sentences
without locative prepositions are derived in a different way.
In the P-conflation analysis, what would naturally unite non-agentive transitive struc-
tures with goal-object structures is P-conflation: verbs that support P-conflation could oc-
cur in both structures (barring idiosyncratic restrictions). In this case, it is clear why non-
agentive transitive structures license goal-objects: because they are goal-object structures.
However, the difference between agentive and non-agentive transitive structures remains
somewhat elusive. In addition, while the presence of PLOC∅ would explain the presence of
the object argument, it would not on its own explain how the subject is related to the even-











To confront the puzzle related to the identity of ?P, I begin by examining the read-
ings that again can receive in structures like (46) and (57). When a locative preposition
is present, the readings again can receive are precisely those that it can receive in a tran-
sitive theme-object sentence in the same positions, modulo the movement of the internal
argument to Spec,TP. In other words, when again occurs after the verb, it receives a repeti-
tive reading that includes the (promoted) internal argument and the verb; when it occurs
at the end of the VP, it can receive a restitutive reading that includes the promoted subject
and the rest of the PP, but excludes the verb.
(63) a. Context: The paint-spraying machine was set up to face the door. After a
while, it broke down. The workers managed to fix it and set it up to face a
wall instead of a door. So, when they turned it on, ...
Paint sprayed again (this time) onto the wall. (repetitive−onto)
b. Context: The door was made of painted boards of wood. Over time, the
paint flaked off. Theworkers set up the paint-sprayingmachine to face the
door, and turned it on. So, ...
Paint sprayed onto the door again. (restitutive)
As noted in chapter 2, getting the repetitive− reading is facilitated by the use of the par-
enthetical this time, but it is not required. These readings are entirely expected given the
analysis presented in the previous chapter, and show that it easily extends to unaccusative
uses.
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Now, let us consider what readings again can get in cases like (42–45) and (57). Because
the non-agentive sentences without locative prepositions are already somewhat odd for
spray/load verbs, I will present data representative of the pattern with spray/load verbs and
cover/fill verbs. In these cases, again cannot occur between the verb and the object. It can
occur after the object, or before the verb. However, unlike in other cases, the reading it
receives seems to be identical in either case. Whether the reading is best characterized as
repetitive or restitutive seems to depend on the particular verb.
(64) a. Context: The workers had the spraying machine set up to spray paint on
the door. It broke down, so they fixed it. So, when they turned it on, ...
Paint sprayed the door again. (repetitive)
Paint again sprayed the door. (repetitive)
b. Context: The house was made with insulation in the walls. However, dur-
ing the strong earthquake, the walls split open and most of the insulation
came out. During the repairs, the workers put more insulation back into
the walls, so that ...
Insulation packed the walls again. (restitutive)
Insulation again packed the walls. (restitutive)
c. Context: John’s new glasses were made with a special protective coating.
Over time, this coating wore off and needed to be reapplied. After John’s
optometrist applied the coating to the glasses, ...
A protective layer coated the glasses again. (restitutive)
A protective layer again coated the glasses. (restitutive)
Crucially, neither a subjectless repetitive nor a subjectless restitutive reading is available.
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(65) a. Context: The broken fire hydrant kept spraying the wall with water. Even-
tually, it washed off all the paint. So the workers set up the paint-spraying
machine in front of the wall and turned it on, so ...
# Paint sprayed the wall again. (subjectless repetitive)
# Paint again sprayed the wall. (subjectless repetitive)
b. Context: The door was made of painted boards of wood. Over time, the
paint flaked off. Theworkers set up the paint-sprayingmachine to face the
door, and turned it on. So, ...
# Paint sprayed the door again. (restitutive)
# Paint again sprayed the door. (restitutive)
(66) Context: The house was built with foam insulation in the walls. However, the
owners decided they wanted to replace it with fiberglass. So they removed all
the foam, and put fiberglass, so that ...
# Fiberglass packed the walls again. (subjectless restitutive)
# Fiberglass again packed the walls. (subjectless restitutive)
(67) Context: John’s new glasses were made with a layer of coating that protected
against UV exposure. When that wore off, John decided he no longer wanted it,
but that he did want a layer of coating that filtered out blue light. He took his
glasses to the optometrist, and within the hour, ...
#A layer of blue light coating coated the glasses again. (subjectless restitutive)
#A layer of blue light coating again coated the glasses. (subjectless restitutive)
The fact that a subjectless restitutive reading is unavailable is not so surprising, given that
Bale (2007) has shown such readings are generally unavailable.17 It is a bit surprising that
the subjectless repetitive reading for verbs like spray does not exist, though, since this goes
17An interesting wrinkle arises due to the behavior of cover in the following sentences. Unlike coat (and
the behavior of most other verbs like coat), cover might allow a subjectless restitutive reading. The following
examples are from Seth Cable (p.c.).
(i) Context: A towel was partially covering the screen earlier, but then it fell off. We couldn’t find the
towel, so we tried to fix this with a blanket. After we got it in place...
A blanket partially covered the screen again. (subjectless restitutive)
Interestingly, a subjectless reading only seems to be possible for the (apparently) stative reading of cover. When
the sentence forces an eventive reading, a subjectless repetitive reading is impossible:
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against the general pattern identified in Bale (2007). That alone should be enough to clue us
in that something interesting is going on in these cases. In addition, these readings provide
evidence that while non-agentive transitive uses are related to goal-object structures, they
are not identical to them. If they were derived from a goal-object structure, there should
be a phrase somewhere that corresponds to the wall with paint that describes a state of the
wall being with paint. Without additional stipulations, we would expect that again could
attach to such a phrase and receive a restitutive reading, even for eventive verbs like spray.
However, a restitutive reading is not possible for this use of spray.
Like Bale (2007), I will take this to indicate that in the non-agentive uses of spray/load
verbs and cover/fill verbs that lack a locative preposition, there is no predicate of eventuali-
ties that includes the verb and object that excludes the subject or the verb root. There is only
one phrase that denotes a predicate of eventualities, and that includes the subject, the verb,
and the object. Thus, the structure in (62) will have to be revised, since its VP is a predicate
(ii) Context: A towel was quickly thrown over the screen, covering it. But it fell off. So, we tossed a
blanket over the screen, and ...
#A blanket quickly covered the screen again.
These judgments seem right to me, and they are interesting in two ways. The first way is that the judgment for
(i) differs from the judgment reported in (67) for post-VP again. Both judgments seem relatively clear to me,
and the source of the difference is unclear. I am tempted to attribute the behavior to the adverb partially, though
I admittedly have no real reason to do so. This raises the possibility that the structural analysis of non-agentive
cover would differ from the structural analysis I propose for other non-agentive transitive goal-object verbs, or
that I have not characterized the facts in (67) correctly. Ultimately, this would require only a small adjustment
to my analysis, which would be that (to preview) instead of THEME merging inside the verb, it would merge
with VP. This would in fact simplify the semantics to be presented. The source of the asymmetry in “stative”
and eventive uses would remain mysterious though.
The second way that these facts are interesting is that even outside my analysis this behavior is mysterious.
Bale (2007) examines the possible readings of again with different kinds of verbs, and identifies the following
pattern: subjectless repetitive readings are possible with eventive transitive verbs (e.g., hit), but not with stative
transitive verbs (e.g., hate).
(iii) a. Context: After Seymour’s TV went all fuzzy, the repairwoman corrected the situation by hit-
ting it quickly. after a while it started to return to its fuzzy state. Seymour saw how the repair-
woman had fixed it, so ...
Seymour hit it again. (Bale 2007, (35a,b))
b. Context: Seymour’smother loved Frank, although shewas the only onewhodid. After awhile
she no longer cared for Frank. However, Seymour became attached to theman, and developed
strong feelings for him after his mother’s love subsided. So ...
# Seymour loved Frank again. (Bale 2007, (47a,b))
Bale (2007) shows that the lack of a subjectless restitutive reading is not restricted to psych-verbs, as the same
pattern occurs with own and owe. In this light, the behavior of cover in (i) and (ii) is quite surprising: it displays
precisely the opposite pattern from what we might expect given (iii). While (iii) shows that (in most cases),
subjectless presuppositions are only possible with eventive transitive verbs, (i) and (ii) show that stative tran-
sitive cover does support a subjectless presupposition, while eventive transitive cover does not. While I do not
have an analysis here that would derive this, the topic seems ripe for further investigation.
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of eventualities that excludes the subject.
One way tomodel this fact would be to say that there are separate verbs that directly en-
code relationships between the subject and object, and that these are the verbs that produce
such structures. Denotations for these verbs would look like the following.
(68) a. J√sprayK = λ𝑥.λ𝑦.λ𝑒.spray(𝑒) ∧ onto(𝑒 , 𝑦, 𝑥) = 1
b. J√packK = λ𝑥.λ𝑦.λ𝑒.pack(𝑒) ∧ in(𝑒 , 𝑦, 𝑥) = 1
c. J√coatK = λ𝑥.λ𝑦.λ𝑒.coat(𝑒) ∧ on(𝑒 , 𝑦, 𝑥) = 1
This is certainly a possible analysis. However, this runs the risk of making any similarities
between the spray that occurs in agentive and unaccusative contexts, on the one hand, and
the spray that occurs in non-agentive contexts, on the other hand, entirely coincidental. It
would also eliminate our explanation of how non-agentive transitive uses and goal-object
uses are related via P-conflation. I will suggest a way of thinking that could resolve these
issues.
My suggestion is that we think of THEME as not being of the syntactic categoryΘ,which I
usedmnemonically above, but instead as being a kind of v. In the sameway that there is a v
that introduces an agent argument, there would be a v that introduces a theme argument.18
What relates the eventuality described by the verb to its object is PLOC∅ , and what relates the
verb to the eventuality described by the subject of these transitive non-agentive uses is v.19
However, the theme-introducing v cannot be where it is shown in (62). If it did occur
there, it should be possible to adjoin again to a phrase that does not contain its meaning
or argument. The result would be that again’s reading could exclude the subject of a non-
agentive transitive use, which I just showed is impossible in (65–67). Instead, I will suggest
that THEME merges with [V+PLOC∅], as in (69).
18I remind the reader here that my use of the term theme is restricted specifically to the object of non-goal-
object uses of spray/load verbs.
19Note that I assume that THEME, unlike vAGENT, does not assign Case to the object—vAGENT does that, in ac-
cordance with Burzio (1986), Johnson (1991), and Kratzer (1996). This would constitute a syntactic difference
between vAGENT and THEME. Such a difference within a single syntactic category is not unprecedented—there
are, after all, prepositions that assign Case to their complement (e.g., to, with, through, etc.), and prepositions













Note that in this structure, there is no phrase smaller than themaximal vP that is a predicate
of eventualities. Both heads that introduce arguments are in the complex v head, meaning
that vwill be of type ⟨𝑒 , ⟨𝑒 , 𝑠𝑡⟩⟩. Thus, when again attaches to this structure, it can attach no
lower than the highest vP, and its presupposition will necessarily include the subject, the
verb, and the object.
However, how exactly this structure will compose semantically is still to be explained.
Currently, there will be a type mismatch when THEME is to compose with [V+PLOC∅], given












In particular, we know that the highest v should be of type ⟨𝑒 , 𝑒𝑠𝑡⟩, as it will combine with
the object and then the subject to yield a predicate of eventualities. If it were instead of
type ⟨𝑒𝑠𝑡⟩, we would expect again to be able to receive subjectless readings, contrary to fact.
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However, the denotation of vMax should be a function of the denotation of its daughter
nodes, which are of type ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑒𝑠𝑡⟩ and ⟨𝑒𝑠𝑡⟩. Standard modes of composition such as Func-
tion Application and PredicateModificationwill not apply here, nor will availing ourselves
of variants of them, such as Event Identification (Kratzer 1996), do the trick.
Instead, I will follow previous work by Keine & Bhatt (2016) and Di Sciullo & Williams
(1987), and propose that vTHEME composes with [V+PLOC∅] via Function Composition, de-
fined in (71).20
(71) a. Simple Function Composition:
(𝐵 → 𝐶) ◦ (𝐴 → 𝐵) B (𝐴 → 𝐶)
b. Generalized Function Composition:
(𝐶 → 𝐷) ◦ (𝐴 → (𝐵 → 𝐶)) B (𝐴 → (𝐵 → 𝐷))
(Keine & Bhatt 2016, (29))
Keine & Bhatt (2016) illustrate Function Composition with kinship terms in Swedish. Ba-
sic terms for mother, mor, and father, far, combine in a predictable way, giving rise to
terms for more distant relations. For instance, farfar is one’s father’s father—one’s pater-
nal grandfather—while morfar is one’s mother’s father—one’s maternal grandfather. This
productivity is captured by combining the simple denotations of mor and far via Function
Composition.
(72) a. JfarK = λ𝑥. ι𝑦.father(𝑥, 𝑦)
b. JmorK = λ𝑥. ι𝑦.mother(𝑥, 𝑦)
c. JfarfarK = JfarK ◦ JfarK = λ𝑥.JfarK(JfarK(𝑥))
= λ𝑥. ι𝑦.father( ι𝑧.father(𝑥, 𝑧), 𝑦)
d. JmorfarK = JfarK ◦ JmorK = λ𝑥.JfarK(JmorK(𝑥))
= λ𝑥. ι𝑦.father( ι𝑧.mother(𝑥, 𝑧), 𝑦)
(Keine & Bhatt 2016, (30))
Keine & Bhatt (2016) extend this kind of analysis to account for possible readings of Ger-
man verb clusters, though the details of their particular implementation are not relevant
20See also Ades & Steedman (1982); Jacobson (1990, 1992); von Stechow (1992); Steedman (1985), and Gärt-
ner (2011).
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here.21 Thus, Function Compositionmust be amethod of semantic composition that is avail-
able to natural language.22
Function Composition will allow vTHEME and [V+PLOC∅] to compose, as follows. Slight
differences arise since we are composing functions of type ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑒𝑠𝑡⟩ and ⟨𝑒𝑠𝑡⟩, rather than
two functions of the same type ⟨𝑒 , 𝑒⟩, as in (72), so I present each step of the process in
(73c).
(73) a. (𝐵 → 𝐶) ◦ (𝐴 → 𝐵) B (𝐴 → 𝐶)
b. (⟨𝑠𝑡⟩ → ⟨𝑒𝑠𝑡⟩) ◦ (𝑒 → ⟨𝑠𝑡⟩) = (𝑒 → ⟨𝑒𝑠𝑡⟩)
JTHEMEK J[V+PLOC∅]K JvK
c. JvK = JTHEMEK ◦ J√coat PLOC∅K
= λ𝑥.JTHEMEK(J√coat PLOC∅K(𝑥))
= λ𝑥.JTHEMEK([λ𝑧.λ𝑒′.coat(𝑒′) ∧ GOAL(𝑒′, on(𝑧)) = 1](𝑥))
= λ𝑥.JTHEMEK(λ𝑒′.coat(𝑒′) ∧ GOAL(𝑒′, on(𝑥)) = 1)
= λ𝑥.[λ𝑃.λ𝑦.λ𝑒.𝑃(𝑒)∧THEME(𝑒 , 𝑦) = 1](λ𝑒′.coat(𝑒′)∧GOAL(𝑒′, on(𝑥)) = 1)
= λ𝑥.[λ𝑦.λ𝑒.[λ𝑒′.coat(𝑒′) ∧ GOAL(𝑒′, on(𝑥)) = 1](𝑒) ∧ THEME(𝑒 , 𝑦)] = 1
= λ𝑥.[λ𝑦.λ𝑒.coat(𝑒) ∧ GOAL(𝑒 , on(𝑥)) ∧ THEME(𝑒 , 𝑦) = 1]
= λ𝑥.λ𝑦.λ𝑒.coat(𝑒) ∧ GOAL(𝑒 , on(𝑥)) ∧ THEME(𝑒 , 𝑦) = 1
Essentially,what this does is create a new semantics from the semantics of THEME and [√coat
PLOC∅]. This occurs by means of saturating the entity argument of [
√coat PLOC∅] with a vari-
able I have labeled 𝑥. The result of doing this becomes the first argument of JTHEMEK, with
a new lambda operator added to bind the variable 𝑥 that was introduced.
Thus, we have the following structure and semantics for non-agentive transitive uses of
spray/load verbs and cover/fill verbs.23
21The differences have to do with verb movement, which will not play a role in my account.
22It is possible that this mode of composition is only available below the word level (Kyle Johnson, p.c.),
though this point does not become crucial here.
23I label the binder of the entity argument of JTHEMEK here as 𝑦 to make following derivation easier—nothing
would go wrong if 𝑥 were used instead, but this makes it harder to see how the arguments map to the right
places in the semantic representation. Note also that the semantics given here would mean that the subject of
a non-agentive transitive spray/load/cover/fill verb would have to be interpreted as the theme, in contrast to the
object of the with phrase, as discussed in section 4.2.1. While I have an intuition that this is the case, I have so
far not been able to come up with a good example to test this prediction.
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(74) JvPK =










λ𝑃.λ𝑦.λ𝑒.THEME(𝑒 , 𝑦) = 1
JVK =





λ𝑥.λ𝑒.GOAL(𝑒 , on(𝑥)) = 1
There is one difference between spray/load verbs and cover/fill verbs that is not explained
directly by these semantics, and that is the difference in the possibility of event-modifying
and state-modifying adverbs shown in (53–56). My suggestion is that this is due to a differ-
ence in the denotations of the verbs involved. In particular, I will suggest that both verbs
denote events, and not states. This requires some justification given that the most natural
way of characterizing the reading that again receives in examples like (64) is as a state-mod-
ifying, restitutive reading. Furthermore, this raises a puzzle regarding how exactly we are
to interpret the goal of a state, which may be an incoherent notion. Thus, it is important to
precisely characterize the semantic status of seemingly state-denoting verbs like cover, if I
am to argue that they involve the very same PLOC∅ that the event-denoting spray/load verbs
do. Otherwise, there might be issues of ineffability, since it is unclear that states can have
goals of the sort that PLOC∅ invokes.
However, not all states are created equal in linguistic terms. Some states instead seem
to behave syntactically more like events. We can diagnose this in English by examining
whether the most natural way of expressing a current, non-habitual situation involving
these verbs occurs in the simple present or the progressive. In English, stative verbs most
naturally occur in the simple present tense with this meaning, while eventive verbs most
naturally occur in the progressive. If stative verbs occur in the progressive, they can often
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be coerced into an eventive reading, though this is intuitively quite noticeable; for some
verbs, this coercion is difficult or impossible to support conceptually (e.g., own). In addition,
eventive verbs can occur in the simple present, but in this case they must receive a habitual
or generic reading.24
(75) Eventive, progressive:
a. John is running to the store.
b. John is painting a picture.
c. John is approaching the door.
(76) Eventive, simple present:
a. John runs to the store. (habitual only)
b. John paints a picture. (habitual only)
c. John approaches the door. (habitual only)
(77) Stative, progressive:
a. # John is owning a car.
b. # John is being tall.
c. # John is knowing the answer.
(78) Stative, simple present:
a. John owns a car.
b. John is tall.
c. John knows the answer.
Interestingly, the putative stative verbs coat, cover, and so on, actually pattern with eventive
verbs in this regard.
24There are also cases of the narrative present, which can be euphemistically referred to as the sportscaster
present tense or historical present tense, in cases like the following.
(i) a. James gets the ball, he shoots and... he scores!
b. We turn to the story of the Great Depression. It is October 24, 1929...
I leave these aside, as they are clearly irrelevant for present purposes.
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(79) a. The blanket is covering the screen.
b. The blanket covers the screen. (habitual/modal only)
c. The paint is coating the wall.
d. The paint coats the wall. (habitual/?modal only)
This is perhaps not so surprising, given that these predicates can occur with event-mod-
ifying adverbs, as I showed in (55). In this behavior, cover/fill verbs pattern like another
class of predicates, the Davidsonian states, or D-states (Maienborn 2008). These include—
perhaps unsurprisingly—verbs that describe the physical position of their subject, just as I
have proposed coat and cover do.
(80) a. The boy is standing in the room.
b. The boy stands in the room. (habitual only)
c. The diamond is gleaming on the pedestal.
d. The diamond gleams on the pedestal. (habitual only)
There are other tests we can use to distinguish true statives from these more eventive D-
statives. For instance, D-statives can occur in a small clause complement of a perception
verb, as can eventives, while true statives cannot (Maienborn 2008).
(81) a. I saw the boy stand in the room. (D-stative)
b. I saw the diamond gleam on the pedestal. (D-stative)
c. I saw John run to the store. (eventive)
d. I saw John paint a picture. (eventive)
e. I saw John approach the door. (eventive)
f. I saw the blanket cover the screen.
g. I saw the paint coat the wall.
h. ★ I saw John own a car. (stative)
i. ★ I saw John be tall. (stative)
j. ★ I saw John know the answer. (stative)
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In addition, D-statives combine with locative modifiers (already shown in (81a–81b) for
uncontroversial cases of D-statives), while true statives do not (Maienborn 2008).
(82) a. The blanket is covering the screen in Bill’s office.25
b. The paint is coating the wall near the edge of campus.
c. ★ John owns/is owning a car at his home.
d. ★ John is (being) tall in the office.
e. ★ John knows/is knowing the answer in class.
Finally, D-statives support manner adverbs (and similar expressions), while true statives
do not (though we must be careful to test the relevant cases with manner adverbs that do
not invoke agency) (Maienborn 2008).
(83) a. The boy was calmly standing. (D-stative)
b. The diamond was brilliantly gleaming. (D-stative)
c. John was carefully running. (eventive)
d. John was absent-mindedly painting a picture. (eventive)
e. John was cautiously approaching the door. (eventive)
f. The blanket was haphazardly covering the screen.
g. The paint was beautifully coating the wall.
h. ★ John frequently owns/is owning a car. (stative)
i. ★ John awkwardly is (being) tall.26 (stative)
j. ★ John carefully knows/is knowing the answer. (stative)
In sum, verbs that receive stative readings in the cover/fill class seem to pattern more like
D-statives than like true statives. D-statives, as we have just seen, are treated semantically
more like eventives than like true statives, as shown by their ability to occur in the particular
semantic environments outlined above. We might assume that this semantic similarity to
25I do not know of a way to rule out an alternative parse for this string where in Bill’s office is a DP-inter-
nal modifier. Preposing the PP might work, but requires a particular context. It is my hope that the relevant
difference between coat/cover and true statives is still fairly easy to intuit.
26Note that John is awkwardly tall has a different reading, where awkwardly refers to a degree of tallness, rather
than to the manner in which John is tall.
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eventive predicates leads to their ability to take goal and theme arguments as well, despite
seeming on the surface like they are predicates of states rather than predicates of events.27
This could resolve the remaining semantic puzzle I noted, as it would provide us a way
of thinking about how these apparent states can combinewith a preposition that introduces
a goal argument: they are not descriptions of states, but descriptions of events of active
maintenance of states. What I mean by this is the same sort of thing that is described in a
sentence like John held the door shut (by going limp against it); at an intuitive level, this could be
thought of as a description of an event (described by holding) that is actively maintaining
the state of the door being shut. We could think of verbs like cover in the same way, as
describing the active maintenance of particular kinds of states.28
A syntactic puzzle arises when we attempt to determine why such a structure could not
lead to an agentive use. I will make a suggestion, butmore needs to be said. That suggestion
has to do with an idea related to accusative Case assignment. First, I present the structure
that would result from making (69) a complement to vAGENT.
27Note that nothing would rule out verbs like cover having some sort of stative substructure. We might sup-
pose that the verb root denotes a predicate of states, which combines with a functional head that introduces
an event. All that is relevant here is that there be an event at the point when PLOC∅ combines with the verb, so
that a goal can be specified coherently.
28This might suggest a decompositional analysis of these verbs, where they combine an event part and a
stative part. This seems potentially promising to me, but unifying it with the analysis I have proposed would

















There might be two possible strings that could result from this initial structure, depending
on whether the lower v head-moves to vAGENT. Both are, of course, ungrammatical.
(85) a. ★ John coated the paint the wall. (with head-movement)
b. ★ John the paint coated the wall. (without head-movement)
Let us suppose that there is a requirement that v be pronounced as part of the main verb of
its clause, and that a means the syntax has to achieve this is head-movement. This would
derive the behavior discussed in chapter 2 regarding the difference in the possible readings
of again when it occurs before and after the verb, which I suggested showed that the verb
root moved to v. This requirement would immediately rule out the possibility in (85b),
since vAGENT would not be pronounced as part of the verb.
Thus, movement of the lower v to the higher vAGENT would be required.29
29I represent movement here in a traditional way that does not use multidominance. However, in this case
the choicemay be important. Under a copy theory approach, wewould say that only the higher head can assign
Case; under themultidominance approach, wewould say something similar but slightly different, that where a
head can assignCase depends on its highest dominating node. Thisway, the result is the same regardless of how
movement is modeled. The Remerge/multidominance approaches raises additional questions: for instance,
what would happen if a head did not have a “highest” position (for instance, if a head were multidominated
by two nodes, where one node did not asymmetrically c-command the other)? The answer to this question is



















However, I suggest that a problem might arise in this structure as well. First, movement of
PLOC∅ might mean that it cannot assign Case to the wall, because there is a closer target for
Case assignment: the paint. Alternatively, we could suppose that something special occurs
when twoCase assigners are part of a complex head. In this instance, the twoCase assigners
would be vAGENT and PLOC∅ . What we might imagine happens is that the Case assigning abil-
ity of these two heads merge, so that only a single Case can be assigned. Perhaps there is a
grammatical constraint that ensure a single head—regardless of its inner complexity—can
only Case-license a single DP. Then, with only one Case assignment possible, there would
be a problem since one DP would not have a source for Case, most likely the wall.30 While
tentative, thismight be able to rule out the other illicit structure, in (85a). This could account
for why (69) cannot form part of an agentive sentence. However, similarities between the
structure in (86) and proposals about the double-object structure in the dative alternation
would need to be addressed—in particular, Larson (1988), Pesetsky (1995), Harley (2002),
Beck & Johnson (2004), and Johnson (2018) have proposed that the double-object struc-
ture involves a lower element that assigns Case to the second object moving into a higher
position. Yet this does not remove its ability to assign Case to the lower object. If this is the
right way of thinking about the double-object structure, then something else would have
30In the multidominance approach, the issue would be more general, since it would not rely on the idea that
Case can only be assigned from the highest position of a head, just that a single head can only assign Case to
one DP. In addition, note that this might affect the analysis of pseudo-passives above.
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to rule out (86).
There is another puzzle that we run into: why couldn’t PLOC∅ and THEME merge in the
opposite order, producing a sentence where the interpretations of the subject and object
flip?
(87) The wall coated the paint.
meaning: The paint coated the wall.
Nothing would rule this out semantically in my analysis. I will not resolve this puzzle fully,
but I will make a suggestion. Before this, it is worth noting that one way to fix this hole
would be to say that the denotation of PLOC∅ is of type ⟨𝑒 , 𝑠𝑡⟩ and combines with V by Event
Identification (Kratzer 1996), rather than Function Application (see the denotation of PLOC∅
in (41b)).31 If this occurred, the denotation of [V+THEME] would be of type ⟨𝑒 , 𝑠𝑡⟩, as would
the denotation of PLOC∅ , which would merge with them. This would result in them combin-
ing by some form of conjunction, identifying their arguments.
(88) a. JV+THEMEK = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.V(𝑒) ∧ THEME(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1
b. JPLOC∅K = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.GOAL(𝑒 , on(𝑥)) = 1
c. J[V+THEME]+PLOC∅K = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.V(𝑒) ∧ THEME(𝑒 , 𝑥) ∧ GOAL(𝑒 , on(𝑥)) = 1
This would mean that the verb would combine with only a single argument, which would
have to be interpreted as both the theme and the goal of the same eventuality. We could
imagine that theme and goal are semantically incompatible notions: a goal is the endpoint
of a path that constitutes a reference point, while a theme undergoes movement. Maybe it
is contradictory to assert that one and the same entity is the theme and the goal of the same
eventuality—or that it is syntactically illicit to do so without using a reflexive pronoun to
signal this (e.g., Reinhart & Reuland 1993).
However, I’m not sure this constitutes a real solution. It is perfectly possible to write
a reasonable denotation for PLOC∅ that is a function from a predicate of eventualities to a
31To clarify this point, throughout most of the presentation of this analysis, I have been focusing on the
denotation of the complex head [V+PLOC∅], which is of type ⟨𝑒 , 𝑠𝑡⟩. However, I have considered PLOC∅ itself
to be of type ⟨⟨𝑠𝑡⟩, ⟨𝑒𝑠𝑡⟩⟩, as in (41b). I have avoided showing the composition of V with PLOC∅ in my graphs
as it makes them become quite visually cluttered and harder to follow, instead focusing on the denotation of
[V+PLOC∅].
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function from entities to predicates of eventualities (⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑒𝑠𝑡⟩). Explaining the impossibility
of (87) in this way could amount to little more than playing with the formalism.
Another suggestion is less detailed, but might also resolve the problem. We know that
the interpretation of PLOC∅ depends on the particular V it combines with, while we have no
evidence that this is the case for the denotation of THEME. Suppose that whatever allows V
to fill in the choice of in or on as the appropriate function in PLOC∅ ’s denotation is a relation
that only holds between a head and its first sister. That is, it has to do with the domain over
which PLOC∅ ’s idiosyncratic meaning can be defined. In this case, merging THEME first would
entail that V would not be PLOC∅ ’s sister. As such, PLOC∅ ’s denotation could not be properly
filled in, and semantic composition would have no way of proceeding. Furthermore, this
might lead to syntactic ill-formedness, too, under the common assumption that all syntactic
heads must have at least some phonological and/or semantic content. If PLOC∅ ’s denotation
could not be properly retrieved, it would leave it semantically and phonologically empty,
and this requirement would remain unmet.
Looking at the more general picture, a crucial part of accounting for the again facts in
(64–67) in this analysis was the idea that vTHEME could combine directly with the verb (or,
more specifically, with [V+PLOC∅]).32 This might be a possibility for agentive v as well, if
we assume that again cannot attach to a head. Consider Bale (2007)’s data that again cannot
produce a subjectless reading with unergative verbs.33
32There is evidence that this might be possible more generally for v. As I mentioned before, Bale (2007)
shows that stative transitive structures do not support subjectless readings of again.
(i) Context: Seymour’s sister hated George. But she seemed to be the only one who did. After a while
George worked his charm on her and the hatred subsided. After a few months, Seymour realized
that George’s charm was all an act. Underneath, he was pure evil. So ... (Bale 2007, (46a–b))
# Seymour hated George again.
This pattern is not restricted to subject experiencer psych-verbs like hate, but is a general pattern that occurs
with all transitive stative verbs. Nevertheless, in such cases we have no reason to think that these verbs take
two internal arguments. They pass tests for transitivity (in contrast to object experiencer psych-verbs, which
pattern differently—see Belletti &Rizzi 1988, Dowty 1991, Pesetsky 1995, Landau 2009, Cheung&Larson 2015).
Now, if we suppose that transitivity is correlated with the projection of a v, we could explain why such verbs
nevertheless disallow subjectless readings of again: the v that they involve is merged with the verb directly,
which means there is no phrase that has a proposition consisting of the verb and the object to the exclusion of
the subject.
33Subjectless presuppositions are also impossible with unaccusative verbs, but this is less surprising given
that unaccusative subjects are assumed to be semantic arguments of the verb rather than of v.
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(89) Context: This morning, Bob danced until he dropped from exhaustion. Mary
was inspired by his moves. So ...
#Mary danced again. (subjectless repetitive)
(Bale 2007, (56a–b))








There is a predicate of events that excludes the subject in unergative sentences under stan-
dard assumptions. That predicate corresponds to V(P) in (90). Usually, again can attach
to VPs that describe predicates of eventualities, but it apparently cannot do this in unerga-
tives. We might suppose that the reason for this is that in unergatives, v does not merge
with a phrasal projection of V to form a vP,34 but instead merges directly with V to form a







In (91), there is no (phrasal) predicate of eventualities that excludes the subject, since
v merges directly with the verb. If we suppose that again cannot merge within a head—
probably a reasonable assumption—this structure would explain why no subjectless repet-
itive reading can exist for (89). A general way of thinking about what would force this
34While V may not necessarily have a phrasal projection in (90), we could force one by the inclusion of a
modifier such as quickly. In this case, the same judgment that subjectless readings are impossible holds.
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would relate it in some way to the existence of an object: if V is transitive, v cannot merge
with it—to do so would result in a violation of Principle B of the binding theory according
to Reinhart & Reuland (1993), since it would identify V’s argument with v’s but would not
mark this semantics with a reflexive pronoun.35
(92) JvPK =




λ𝑥.λ𝑒.hit(𝑒 , 𝑥) ∧ AGENT(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1
JvK =
λ𝑥.λ𝑒.AGENT(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1
JVK =
λ𝑥.λ𝑒.hit(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1
√hit
The syntax in (92) would thus violate Principle B of the binding theory, since two argu-
ments are identified but this is not syntactically marked as required.
Alternatively, we could imagine that the problem has something to do with Case: when
v assigns Case to an internal argument, V must project separately for some yet unknown
reason. To address the issue this way would not rely on a particular view of the semantics
of v.36 However, this would make it mysterious how stative v assigns Case to an internal
argument. I will leave this puzzle unresolved.
4.4 Conclusion
The preceding discussion took us into a lot of complex syntactic and semantic issues
related to spray/load verbs. To reestablish its conclusions, I present here an inventory of
the final structures proposed for agentive and unaccusative theme-object uses of spray/
load verbs, goal-object uses of spray/load verbs, and non-agentive transitive uses of spray/
load verbs, illustrated with specific examples. These structures combine the insights of this
chapter with those of chapter 2.
35We would, of course, have to make some modifications to Reinhart & Reuland (1993) to deal with the
fallout caused by introducing the external argument with a separate head. I assume such modifications are
possible without entirely compromising their approach.
36In particular, note that if vAGENT were instead of type ⟨𝑠𝑡, 𝑒𝑠𝑡⟩, it could semantically combine with a verb of
type ⟨𝑒𝑠𝑡⟩ via Function Composition, as previously discussed.
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By definition, spray/load verbs are those verbs that can occur in either structure in (93a–
93b). Non-alternating goal-object verbs are those that require conflation with PLOC∅ , while
(some) non-alternating theme-object verbs are those that disallow such conflation (n.b.
chapter 2, section 2.4.2). Some theme-object verbs can occur in (93a) without v projecting,
which results in unaccusative uses. Some verbs that allow P-conflation (alternating spray/
load verbs and non-alternating goal-object verbs) can occur in in (93c); verbs that disallow
P-conflation (non-alternating theme-object verbs) never occur in non-agentive transitive
structures, as they disallow P-conflation.
4.4.1 Unresolved Issues
There are some open issues in this analysis that I will briefly discuss before concluding.
First, the analysis in this chapter posited one way of thinking about the denotations
of verbs like spray: they are simple predicates of eventualities, with the theme argument
coming from a separate functional head, vTHEME (at one point categorized as Θ). Of course,
an advantage in the last chapter of treating spray/load verbs as functions from entities to
predicates of eventualities was that it provided a semantic explanation for their apparent
transitivity requirement: they must combine with an entity argument. This would account
38An important question I do not address is why this structure seems to be available only for vTHEME, and
not vAGENT. The difference may have to do with a better understanding of what distinguishes external thematic
roles like AGENT from internal thematic roles like THEME.
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for why an intransitive small clause parse is impossible. But now, if these are just predicates
of eventualities, we have lost an explanation for why they must be transitive. One possibil-
ity would be to reject the vTHEME approach, and return to the contextual allosemy approach
in (47). In this case, the denotation of these verbs when they do not merge with PLOC∅ is a
function from entities to predicates of eventualities, and when they do, they are a different
function from entities to predicates of eventualities. However, for this to work, we must
suppose that there are two semantic relations corresponding to spray. The first would be in
spray’s denotationwhen it occurswithout PLOC∅ , and be true of an eventuality 𝑒 and an entity
𝑥 if 𝑒 is a spraying of 𝑥. In contrast, the secondwould be in the denotation of [√spray+PLOC∅],
and would be true of an eventuality 𝑒 if it is a spraying. However, this would leave us with-
out an idea of how the subject argument gets introduced in non-agentive transitive uses.
Regardless, we are left with either a need to stipulate either the transitivity of spray/load
verbs, or else to stipulate the existence of two semantic relations. I don’t see any particular
reason to favor one approach over the other, and so I have assumed that we can simply stip-
ulate that spray/load verbs are transitive, similarly to obligatorily transitive causative verbs
like destroy (see Folli & Harley 2005).
Next, I have analyzed the structure of non-agentive transitive uses of spray/load and re-
lated verbs as involving both P-conflation and vTHEME. However, the data I presented showed
only a clear relationship between the possibility of agentive goal-object uses and non-agen-
tive transitive uses. Agentive goal-object uses do not implicate vTHEME. As such, while the
inclusion of PLOC∅ in non-agentive transitive structures is well-motivated, the inclusion of
vTHEME is somewhat more tenuous: we do not always have independent evidence that verbs
that allow non-agentive transitive uses can occur with vTHEME. For instance, verbs like cover
allow goal-object uses and non-agentive transitive uses, but not theme-object uses.
(94) a. John covered the screen with the blanket.
b. ★ John covered the blanket onto the screen.
c. The blanket covered the screen.
A thought about this is that such verbs must be merged with PLOC∅ . If they then merge
with vTHEME, a non-agentive structure is all that can result, since adding vAGENT would lead to
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an impossible derivation (perhaps as suggested in the discussion about (86)). If they do
not merge with vTHEME, an agentive structure would be possible. However, independent evi-
dence of the compatibility of these verbs with vTHEME would constitute more direct evidence
for the analysis in (93c).
In addition, I alluded earlier to some exceptions to the generalizations regarding goal-
object unaccusative uses of cover/fill verbs: fill, flood, clog, stop up, interweave, interlace.39
(95) a. Water filled the room. (theme unaccusative)
b. The room filled with water. (goal unaccusative)
(96) a. Water flooded the room.
b. The room flooded with water.
(97) a. Gunk clogged the drain.
b. The drain clogged (up) with gunk.
(98) a. Gunk stopped up the drain.
b. ? The drain stopped up with gunk.
(99) a. ?? Blue threads interwove red threads in the tapestry.
b. Red threads interwove with blue threads in the tapestry.
(100) a. ?? Blue threads interlaced red threads in the tapestry.
b. Red threads interlaced with blue threads in the tapestry.
Unlike the putative exceptions that swarm verbs and black with predicates constitute (see
(14–15)), these do not uniformly have location subjects. In (95–98), for instance, the subject
39Interestingly, the goal-subject sentences these sentences display seem to pattern differently when using a
theme that can subvert the holistic effect (see (11–12)). While the theme-subject sentences clearly require the
goal to be read as completely affected, the goal-subject sentences do not. I illustrate with fill, but the pattern
seems to me to hold more generally.
(i) a. A little bit of water filled the bottle.
→ The bottle was full of a little bit of water. (small bottle only)
b. The bottle filled with a little bit of water.
↛ ??The bottle was full of a little bit of water. (normal-sized & small bottle possible)
In (i-b), the reading where the bottle is normal-sized seemsmost natural, but this reading is impossible in (i-a)
(given an appropriate contextual specification of a little bit). Interestingly, the fact that there does not appear
to be a holistic effect in (94b) is precisely what we would not expect if this were derived as the unaccusative
form of the goal-object structure, since that is associated with a holistic reading of the goal.
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is indeed interpreted as a goal of an event, not merely a location. In (99–100), the subject
could be interpreted as a location, but the verbs interweave and interlace do not seem to prop-
erly belong with the class of swarm verbs, as the meaning in this case is quite distinct. These
do seem to constitute true exceptions to the generalization that goal-subject unaccusative
uses of cover/fill verbs are impossible. However, these verbs do still display the pattern of
nominal readings where a nominal can only refer to the theme and never the goal (some-
times with additional restrictions on the particular kind of theme).
(101) a. the filling (= the apples/≠ the pie)
b. the flood (= the water/≠ the town)
c. the clog (= the gunk/≠ the drain)
d. ? the interweaving (= the threads/≠ the shirt)
e. ? the interlacing (= the threads/≠ the shirt)
Whatever makes these cases exceptional seems restricted to their verbal uses, then. Inter-
estingly, no truly clear exceptions to these generalizations exist for alternating spray/load
verbs (see the appendix to this chapter).
There are, however, four different exceptions to the generalization regarding nominal
uses, though these exceptions again occur only with non-alternating verbs—in this case,
with non-alternating theme-object verbs. These exceptions are place, position, dip, and dump.
Of these, place and position do not have unaccusative uses, while dip and dump allow only
the theme to become an unaccusative subject.
(102) a. ★ The books placed onto the table. (theme unaccusative)
b. ★ The table placed with the books. (goal unaccusative)
c. the place (≠ the books/=the table)
(103) a. ★ The books positioned on the table.
b. ★ The table positioned with the books.
c. the position (≠ the books/=the table)
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(104) a. The oar dipped into the water.
b. ★ The water dipped with the oar.
c. the dip (≠ the chip/= the salsa)40
(105) a. The water dumped into the reservoir.
b. ★ The reservoir dumped with water.
c. the dump (≠ the trash/= the place where one dumps trash)
I have no account for these exceptions or the previous ones at present, andmust leave them
as exceptions here. What is interesting is that the exceptions with non-alternating goal-ob-
ject verbs all occur in unaccusative uses, while the exceptions with non-alternating theme-
object verbs all occur in nominal uses. It is not clear to me what would derive this, but
given the limited number of exceptions to begin with, it could be accidental. Interestingly,
however, none of these exceptions occurs with alternating spray/load verbs. This might tell
us that there is some underlying structural difference between those verbs that alternate
and those that do not that goes beyond the kinds of morphological idiosyncrasy I have
discussed here (i.e., whether a verb may, must, or must not combine with PLOC∅).
Finally, it is well-known that particular spray/load verbs are choosy about which argu-
ments may be optional and which may be obligatory, as well as about which kinds of argu-
ments can alternate.
(106) Theme optional, goal optional:
a. John loaded the hay (onto the wagon).
b. John loaded the wagon (with the hay).
(107) Theme optional, goal obligatory:
a. John stuffed the feathers ★ (into the pillow).
b. John stuffed the pillow (with the feathers).
(108) Theme obligatory, goal optional:
a. John piled the stones (onto the deck).
b. John piled the deck ★ (with the stones).
40Cf. John dipped the chip into the salsa, ★ John dipped the chip with salsa.
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(109) Theme obligatory, goal obligatory:
a. John slathered the plaster ★ (onto the walls).
b. John slathered the walls ★ (with the plaster).
(Beavers 2017, (59–62))
(110) a. John spread glue on the paper.
b. John spread the paper with glue.
c. John spread a map on the bed.
d. # John spread the bed with a map.
(Iwata 2008, ch. 3, (30,32))
Like many other analyses, my analysis does not provide an explanation for these facts. Of
course, one can always appeal to lexical idiosyncrasy as is common in confronting these is-
sues, but this is not an explanation. Pinker (1989)’s account in terms of lexical subclasses (or
conflation classes) attempts an explanation of these patterns. However, as Beavers (2017)
notes, it fails in particular ways; see Beavers (2017, section 6) for discussion.
4.4.2 The General Picture
My goal at the outset of this chapter was an account of the spray/load alternation; in
particular, an account ofwhat relates the theme-object structure to the goal-object structure.
In addition, I raised the question of how these structures relate to non-agentive transitive
structures, which are usually not dealt with explicitly. In light of the structures in (93), I
am now in a position to provide some answer to these questions.
What relates the theme-object and goal-object structures in (93a–93b) is the presence of
overlapping sets of lexical and functional heads, which get deployed in different syntactic
ways. The inventory of (relevant) heads common to these particular theme-object and goal-
object structures consists just of √spray, CAUSE, and a locative preposition (either overt or
null). The semantics of these heads will account for the near-paraphrase relationship that
holds between the theme-object and goal-object structures, the first desiderata of an account
of the spray/load alternation identified in (Rappaport et al. 1993). What distinguishes these
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structures can be boiled down to whether √spray combines first with a thematic relation
(vTHEME), or a locative preposition (PLOC∅). If it combines with a locative preposition, its ob-
ject will be interpreted as a goal and not a theme. If it then combineswith a resultative small
clause, the subject of the result state will be identified as the goal of the spraying under the
multidominance analysis. In many cases, this is natural if the result state is described using
with, but this need not always be the case (cf. (45)).
If, on the other hand, √spray combines with vTHEME first, the object will be interpreted
as the theme of the spraying event, with this relation entailing some sort of movement. If
it then combines with a resultative small clause, the theme will be identified as the subject
of the result state under the multidominance analysis, with its destination specified by the
choice of locative preposition.Essentially, then, the alternation is ultimately reducible to
whether a spray/load verb merges with PLOC∅ or vTHEME.
Next, we can ask what relates the structures in (93a–93b) to the one in (93c). In fact,
there are relations between it and both of the others. Non-agentive transitive uses of spray/
load verbs involve the verb, vTHEME, and PLOC∅ . In this way, they represent a sort of hybrid
structure. What distinguishes them from agentive uses is the absence of a small clause
introduced by CAUSE, which explains why these do not have resultative readings. This is
unexpected on accounts where goal-object uses of spray/load verbs denote a result state,
since these are goal-object uses and yet do not necessarily denote a result state. In my anal-
ysis, this difference is expected. What distinguishes these structures, then, boils down to
whether [V+PLOC∅] merges with vTHEME or not. In agentive structures, this does not occur,
while in non-agentive structures, these merge to form a complex head. What distinguishes
agentive structures from non-agentive structures, then, is both the inventory and configu-
ration of the heads they implicate.
Themore general picture we reach, then, is one where what is responsible for argument
structure alternations is not transformational in nature. Instead, argument structure alter-
nations are defined by different syntactic arrangements of overlapping sets of lexical and
functional heads. This is in line withmuch current thinking on such alternations, especially
the dative alternation (see, e.g., Beck & Johnson 2004; Harley 2002; Johnson 2018; Peset-
sky 1995). It is also true of the active/passive alternation, even though these are still often
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thought of as transformationally related. In most current analyses, passives are essentially
the same as actives, modulo the addition of a single functional head that has little (or no)
semantic effect41 (e.g., Baker et al. 1989; Bruening 2011, 2013, 2014; Collins 2005). Because
the inventory of heads in active and passive sentences is nearly (or exactly) identical, the
active/passive alternation is not associated with a difference in meaning like other alterna-
tions are. The causative/inchoative alternation is also thought to work this way, with the
difference being the absence of v in inchoatives. This means no agent is semantically repre-
sented in inchoatives, with their meaning being otherwise identical to the meaning of the
causative.42
Other alternations exist (we have also seen the swarm alternation, but there are many
others besides), but the general picture is clear. Alternations, and the relations between sen-
tences that result, are due to a certain amount of (sometimes idiosyncratically) restricted
lexical and syntactic flexibility. Some verbs require the parts of their meanings to be de-
ployed in very specific ways, which means these verbs show few alternations. Other verbs
may have few parts to their meanings (e.g., simple transitive verbs like eat), and so occur in
a limited number of syntactic contexts. But as the inventory of parts of meanings associated
with verbs increases, so too might their syntactic complexity. The more elements co-occur
with a verb, themore ways these elements could in principle be arranged, simply as amath-
ematical fact. Though the grammar will place constraints on which of the logically possible
ways of arranging these elements are actually possible, we expect the correlation to hold in
general.
This idea could explainwhy verbs associatedwithmore complex event structural mean-
ings tend to occur in more syntactic frames. A non-alternating unaccusative verb with a
41Though there are some semantic (possibly pragmatic) effects associated with passivization.
(i) a. Londoners inhabit London.
b. London is inhabited by Londoners.
c. Sherlock Holmes inhabits London.
d. ??# London is inhabited by Sherlock Holmes.
Something about the fact that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character who nevertheless lives in (a version of) a
real citymakes the passive in (i-d) odd. (These examples are poorly recalled versions of better counterparts that
Barbara Partee came up with in a question to an invited speaker at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.)
42I am not sure exactly who to credit with this modern version of the causative/inchoative alternation, but
it seems to be what is generally assumed. The general idea that what sets apart unaccusatives is the lack of an
agent/external argument could be traced back to Perlmutter & Postal (1984).
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very simple logical meaning like existmight occur very few distinct event structural config-
urations (possibly only one) because it is associated with a single head, √exist. In contrast,
verbs like spray/load verbs, barring idiosyncratic morphological and syntactic restrictions,
can occur in a much wider variety of contexts, including agentive transitive theme-object
and goal-object structures, unaccusative theme-object structures, and non-agentive transi-
tive goal-object structures. In the way of thinking I have suggested, this is because these
verbs are associated with other parts of meaning: v, CAUSE, PLOC (null or overt), and (in
some goal-object structures) with/vwith. This increased flexibility arises naturally due to
the larger inventory of syntactic components that go into constructing the complex event
structures they are associated with.
Appendix: Tables of Non-agentive and Nominal Uses of Spray/load Verbs
This appendix lists each of the spray/load verbs, cover/fill verbs, and put/place verbs iden-
tified in Levin (1993), along with some facts about what kinds of syntactic environments
they can occur in. In her terms, these groups are alternating theme/goal-object verbs, non-
alternating goal-object verbs, and non-alternating theme-object verbs, respectively.
Table 4.1 shows properties of alternating spray/load verbs.43 It indicates whether they
occur in unaccusative theme-subject and/or goal-subject uses, aswell aswhat their nominal
uses can refer to. Finally, I indicate what I take to be the meaning of PLOC∅ in the goal-object
structure. In some cases, a theme nominal is zero-derived, while in other cases particular
suffixes may be optional or required; this is not indicated below. A dash in a cell indicates
that neither a theme nor a goal usage is possible (though other presently irrelevant uses
might be possible). A question mark preceding an entry indicates that I find the judgment
hard to make with certainty. I suspect there is a lot of variation that is not captured here or
in the following tables. This appendix is intended as a starting point for future work, rather
than as a definitive reference.
43Levin (1993) also lists prick and wash as marginally alternating, and stick as alternating. I do not have an
alternating use of these, so I have omitted them here.
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Table 4.1: Summary of some properties of spray/load verbs
Verb Unaccusative subject(s) Nominal referent(s) PLOC∅ meaning
brush ?theme theme onto
cram theme – into
crowd theme theme into
cultivate – – ?into
dab – theme onto
daub – theme onto
drape theme ?theme onto
drizzle theme theme onto
dust ?theme theme onto
hang theme theme onto
heap – theme onto
inject – theme into
jam theme – into
load ?theme theme into44
mound – theme onto
pack ?theme/goal45 into
pile theme theme onto
plant – theme ?into
plaster – theme onto
pump theme – into
rub – theme onto
scatter theme theme ?into
seed – ?theme46 ?into
settle theme – ?into
sew – – ?into
shower theme theme onto
44See discussion in section 4.2, fn. 8.
45There are at least two potentially relevant nominal uses of this verb: pack (i.e., backpack, knapsack, etc.)
and package. Pack could be argued to be a goal nominal, but its usage is restricted in particular ways. Packing
the car does not mean the car is a pack, for example. Package is hard to identify as clearly theme or goal, given
that the verb pack entails arranging the theme in a particular way.
46Arguably, the noun seed is not derived from the verb, so this may not be true nominal use of the verb.
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Table 4.1: Summary of some properties of spray/load verbs
slather ?theme theme onto
smear ?theme theme onto
smudge – theme onto
sow – ?theme ?into
spatter theme theme onto
spray theme theme onto
spread theme theme onto
sprinkle theme theme onto
spritz ?theme theme onto
squirt theme theme onto
stack – theme onto
stock – theme ?into
strew – – ?onto
string – – onto
stuff ?theme theme into
swab – ?theme onto
vest – theme onto
wrap theme theme onto
Table 4.2 summarizes some properties of Levin (1993)’s non-alternating goal-object
verbs.47 The patterns found with non-agentive subjects and nominal references with al-
ternating verbs extend to these cases as well, with the limited exceptions of non-agentive
uses of clog, fill, flood, interlace, interleave, and stop up (though note that even these excep-
tions are completely regular with regards to their nominal uses). The meaning of with for
these exceptions is universally into, which might be significant in some way that I do not
yet understand.
Even though these verbs can only surface in agentive uses with goal objects, in the ma-
jority of cases goal subjects and nominals are not generally possible. Note that I list these
here as “non-agentive” rather than “unaccusative,” since the non-agentive uses of these
verbs do not introduce their theme arguments with prepositions (except for the exceptions
47Note that some people may marginally accept these in alternating uses: cf. chapter 1, example (17a):
%The chef filled the mixture into the zucchini.
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noted above, which in goal-subject uses introduce the “theme” argument using with), in
contrast to the standard behavior of non-agentive uses of spray/load verbs. Levin (1993)
also lists face, but I do not have a use of this verb with with. She also lists interlard and lard,
which are not present in my speech.
Table 4.2 also shows whether these verbs allow in to alternate with with in the agentive
goal-object structure. Regarding the readings ofwith they allow, a few of these verbs do not
seem to have an into or onto reading, but a rare around reading.Note that no verbwith an into
meaning for with allows with to alternate with in in goal-object structures (though not all
verbswith an ontomeaning forwith allow this). I have no explanation for this generalization,
but it seems robust.
Table 4.2: Summary of some properties of non-alternating goal-object verbs
Verb Non-agentive subject(s) Nominal referent(s) PLOC∅ meaning 3[with = in]
adorn theme theme onto 3
anoint theme – onto 3
bandage theme theme onto 3
bathe48 theme theme ?into/onto 3
bestrew49 – – ?onto ?3
bind theme theme onto 3
blanket theme theme onto 3
block theme theme into/onto 7
blot theme theme onto 7
bombard theme theme onto 7
carpet theme theme onto 3
choke theme – ?into ?3
cloak theme theme onto 3
clog theme/goal theme into 7
clutter theme theme ?into/onto 7
coat theme theme onto 3
48I believe this is the The sun bathed the room with light sense of the verb, rather than the personal grooming
sense.
49Note that this non-alternating verb involves an overt be- prefix, in contrast to the alternating verb strew.
Interestingly, the overtly prefixed verb does not allow non-agentive or nominal uses, even with a theme subject
or referent.
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Table 4.2: Summary of some properties of non-alternating goal-object verbs
contaminate theme theme ?into/?onto 7
cover theme theme onto 3
dam theme theme into 7
dapple – – onto 7
deck theme – onto 3
decorate theme theme onto 3
deluge – theme ?onto ?3
dirty ?theme – onto 7
douse theme theme onto 3
dot theme theme onto ?3
drench theme theme onto 3
edge ?theme theme/goal50 onto 7
embellish theme theme onto 7
emblazon theme theme onto 7
encircle theme theme around 7
encrust theme theme ?onto 7
endow – theme into 7
enrich theme theme into 7
entangle theme theme around 7
festoon theme theme onto ?3
fill theme/goal theme into 7
fleck ?theme theme onto 7
flood theme/goal theme into 7
frame ?theme theme around 7
garland theme theme onto 7
garnish theme theme onto ?3
imbue theme theme into 7
impregnate theme theme into 7
infect theme theme into 7
inlay ?theme theme into 7
interlace ?theme/goal theme into 7
50The nominal edge/edging is similar to pack/packing. See fn. 45.
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Table 4.2: Summary of some properties of non-alternating goal-object verbs
interleave ?theme/goal theme into 7
intersperse – theme into 7
interweave – theme into 7
inundate – theme into 7
lash theme theme onto 7
line theme theme onto 7
litter theme theme onto 7
mask theme theme onto 7
mottle – – onto 7
ornament theme theme onto 7
pad theme theme onto 7
pave theme theme onto 3
plate theme theme onto 3
plug theme theme into 7
pollute theme theme ?into 7
replenish ?theme theme into 7
repopulate ?theme – ?into 7
riddle ?theme – into 7
ring – – around 7
ripple – – ?onto 7
robe – theme onto 3
saturate theme theme into 7
season theme theme onto 7
shroud theme theme onto 3
smother – theme onto 3
soak theme – into 7
soil ?theme theme onto ?7
speckle ?theme theme onto 7
splotch ?theme theme onto 7
spot – theme onto 7
staff theme theme ?into 7
stain theme theme onto 3
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Table 4.2: Summary of some properties of non-alternating goal-object verbs
stipple – theme onto ?3
stop up theme/goal – into 7
stud theme theme onto 7
suffuse theme theme into 7
surround theme theme51 around 3
swaddle ?theme theme around 3
swathe – theme ?onto ?3
taint theme theme onto 7
tile – theme onto ?3
trim – theme onto ?3
veil theme theme onto 3
vein theme theme into 7
wreathe theme theme around 3
Finally, table 4.3 summarizes the behavior of Levin (1993)’s non-alternating theme-ob-
ject verbs. As discussed in chapter 2, section 2.4.2, some of these are likely very different
from spray/load verbs, such as put; these are nevertheless included here in the interest of
completeness. Note that since these do not occur with PLOC∅ , no meaning for it is provided.
Four exceptions to the generalization regarding nominals exist in this list: place, position, dip,
and dump seem to refer to goals of the events they describe, rather than themes.
Table 4.3: Summary of some properties of non-alternating theme-object verbs





































54Note that the unaccusative use of this verb is lie.
55Here is the relevant paradigm:
(i) a. John dipped the chip into the hummus.
b. ★ John dipped the hummus with the chip.
c. The chip (was) dipped into the hummus.
d. ★ The hummus (was) dipped with the chip.
e. the dip (≠ the chip/= the hummus)
Note that the uses of dip are restricted to a thick viscous semi-liquid, usually food, though the verb can be
used in any context involving a dippingmanner. For instance, we can say John dipped his toe into the water, though
we would usually not refer to the water as the dip in such a scenario.
56Note that the nominal use of dump is restricted to a particular institutionalized place where one dumps
trash. It cannot refer to any place that is the goal of a dumping event; e.g., in John dumped water into the sink, the
dump cannot refer to the sink.
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57The unaccusative use of this verb is rise.
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COMPARISON TO PRIOR WORK ON THE
SPRAY/LOAD ALTERNATION
5.1 Overview of This Chapter
With the end of chapter 4, my analysis of the syntax and semantics of the spray/load
alternation has been presented in full. This chapter thus takes a step back to compare my
approach to prior work. To do this, I present a detailed critical evaluation of relevant prior
analyses of the spray/load alternation, with an eye to evaluating their performance with re-
gards to the desiderata outlined in chapter 1: acquisition/productivity, near-paraphrasabil-
ity, linking, and affectedness. I discuss these separately for each analysis, since they dif-
fer considerably in how they address them. Following this, I briefly summarize how all
previous analyses fail to account for the readings of again examined in chapter 2, and the
asymmetries between theme-objects and goal-objects discussed in chapters 3–4. This can
be done together, since these analyses fail to extend to these data in similar ways.
Following this, I discuss how my analysis might be extended to account for the four
desiderata, which it was (for the most part) not explicitly designed to do. The fact that my
analysis can be naturally extended in ways to account for phenomena that were not explic-
itly considered during its construction provides strong suggestive evidence of its promise.
I now turn to the review of specific prior proposals about the spray/load alternation. I
will present the lexicalist approach of Rappaport & Levin (1988), and a construction gram-
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mar approach fromGoldberg (1995). These approaches currently enjoy themost popularity
among those who work on the spray/load alternation.
However, there have been analyses that take a syntactic approach, including Larson
(1990, 2014), Damonte (2005), D’Elia (2016), and Mateu (2000, 2017). A common feature
of Larson (1990, 2014)’s and D’Elia (2016)’s approaches is the reduction of the spray/load
alternation to the dative alternation (also suggested in Speas (1990), who adopts Rappa-
port & Levin (1988)’s lexicalist approach). However, as D’Elia (2016) notes, this approach
leaves differences in the behavior of goal-object and ditransitive structures mysterious and
unexplained. Damonte (2005)’s analysis is somewhat different as he proposes that the goal-
object structure is transformationally related to the theme-object structure, with the differ-
ences between them coming down to whether the locative preposition is phonologically
overt or not. Finally, Mateu (2000, 2017)’s approach is focused on cross-linguistic differ-
ences, with languages varying in whether they achieve the alternation via Manner-confla-
tion, Result-incorporation, or possibly both.1
One way of classifying these analyses that is useful for present purposes is by whether
they analyze the object and PP as a small clause, or as a transitive verbwith a PP argument/
adjunct. The contrast is sketched here with spray, though particular implementations vary
in ways to be discussed.
1It is worth noting that throughout the discussion, I have made and will make reference to Beavers (2017).
The reader might be therefore curious why I do not discuss his approach. This is because Beavers (2017) pro-
vides a overview of the spray/load alternation for a handbook; he does not present an original account. Similarly,
I do not discuss Beavers (2006) lexicalist approach in detail because it is couched in a larger systematic analysis
of verbs as encoding various kinds of scalar change, and is otherwise similar to Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s
analysis in ways that are relevant for the ensuing discussion here. Finally, I have also failed to cover many other
analyses; the literature on the spray/load alternation is vast, and I have striven to provide in this chapter depth
more so than breadth, focusing on the analyses that have seemed to me to enjoy relatively greater popularity,
and which are more straightforwardly compared to my own.
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Of the analyses I have mentioned, the lexicalist analyses of Rappaport & Levin (1988) and
Brinkmann (1995) and Wunderlich (1997), along with the construction grammar analy-
sis of Goldberg (1995), imply a transitive approach, while most of the syntactic analyses
converge on something like the small clause approach, though implementations vary con-
siderably.
First, I will discuss Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s lexicalist analysis, which has enjoyed no
smallmeasure of popularity, being endorsed and refined in various forms by Pinker (1989),
Gropen (1989), Gropen et al. (1991a,b), Speas (1990), and Rappaport et al. (1993). Second,
I will discuss an alternative lexicalist approach proposed by Brinkmann (1995) and Wun-
derlich (1997). This analysis makes use of the idea of P-incorporation/conflation, which I
implemented in my analysis in quite a different way in chapter 3. Next, I discuss Goldberg
(1995)’s and Iwata (2008)’s construction grammar approach. Finally, I will turn to the vari-
ous syntactic analyses; as I have also taken a syntactic approach, I will discuss the analyses
of Larson (1990, 2014), Damonte (2005) (who implements P-incorporation syntactically),
D’Elia (2016), and Mateu (2000, 2017) in somewhat more detail, highlighting what they
208
have in common and where they differ as appropriate.
5.2 Prior Approaches
5.2.1 Lexicalist Approaches
5.2.1.1 Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s Lexicalist Approach
The task Rappaport & Levin (1988) set for themselves is to understand how lexical se-
mantics influences syntax. Prior work at this time had largely converged on the idea that
predicates (most relevantly, verbs) come with a list that indicates the quantity and gram-
matically relevant part of the interpretation of their arguments. These “grammatically rel-
evant parts of interpretation” are termed “theta-roles,”2 and the list of theta-roles that a
word comes with is its “theta-grid.” The following is a sample theta-grid for the word put.
(3) put: ⟨Agent, Theme, Location⟩
This theta-grid encodes the fact that put combines with three arguments, and that those
arguments are interpreted as the agent, theme, and location of the event it describes.
(4) JohnAgent put the booksTheme on the shelfLocation.
One thought about the utility of such theta-grids and their theta-roles is that linking
rules could ensure that particular theta-roleswould endup in particular syntactic positions.
This would account for long-noted regularities in how the syntactic positions of various
arguments relates to their interpretation. For instance, Agents (possibly uniformly) map
to the subject position, while themes typically though not always map to object position,
and locations (again typically but not always) map to the object of a preposition. If linking
rules like the following are part of the grammar, itwould explainwhy these similarities hold
across different predicates, if theta-roles are indeed the only parts of the interpretation of
arguments relevant to determining their underlying positions.
2Or the equivalent but typographically more seemly “θ-role,” or the more explicit “thematic role.”
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(5) Linking rules:
a. Agent is linked to Subject.
b. Theme is linked to Object, unless there is no Agent. Then, link Theme to
Subject.
c. Location is linked to Oblique, unless there is no Agent and no Theme.
Then, link Location to Subject.
Further refinements posited theta-role and grammatical function hierarchies (e.g., Perlmut-
ter 1978; Perlmutter & Postal 1984), which could reduce these rules at the cost of requiring
the hierarchies to be primitives of the grammar.
(6) a. Theta-role hierarchy:
Agent ≺ Theme ≺ Location
b. Grammatical function hierarchy:
Subject ≺ Object ≺ Oblique
c. Linking rule:
In order of their position on the theta-role hierarchy, map each argument
to the highest available grammatical function. A grammatical function
cannot have an argument mapped to it twice.
Thiswould equally account forwhy theAgent of put is its subject, its Theme is its object, and
its Location is its Oblique, provided the syntax would translate the grammatical functions
Subject, Object, and Oblique into the appropriate structural positions.
Rappaport & Levin (1988) point out several problems with this approach. One prob-
lem is that despite much work on the topic, no uniform set of theta-roles nor a universally
agreed upon hierarchy has been achieved (even since the time of their writing), a criti-
cism echoed in Dowty (1991). While this work arrived at very general patterns (Agent was
always higher than Theme, for instance), the inconsistencies were apparent. Second, and
more importantly for them, a universal set of linking rules based on theta-roles like in (5)
or (6c) failed to account for the differing linking properties of sentences that are near-para-
phrase relations of each other, such as the following.
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(7) a. We emptied water from the tank.
b. We emptied the tank of water.
(8) a. Jacob bought his birthright from Esau.
b. Esau sold his birthright to Jacob.
(Rappaport & Levin 1988, (2–3))
These sentences seem to involve the same verbs, which would presumably have identical
theta-grids associated with them.
(9) a. empty: ⟨Agent, Theme, Location⟩
b. buy: ⟨Goal, Theme, Source⟩
c. sell: ⟨Goal, Theme, Source⟩
And yet, their linking properties are clearly different in the pairs in (7–8). In (7a), the Agent
of empty is mapped as expected given standard universal linking rules, with Agentmapped
to Subject, Theme to Object, and Location to Oblique. In contrast, (7b) retains the mapping
of Agent to Subject, but instead maps Theme to Oblique, and Location to Object. Similarly,
buy in (8a) maps Goal to Subject, Theme to Object, and Source to Oblique; while sell in (8b)
maps instead Source to Subject, Theme to Object, and Goal to Oblique. To address this,
one could claim that each use of empty, or that buy and sell, invoke different theta-roles.
But then the similarities between the interpretations of their arguments are not expressed
grammatically. Given that these similarities in meaning are part of the competence of a
native English speaker, we might want to encode them in our model of grammar.
Most relevantly, Rappaport & Levin (1988) note that the same issue arises with the
spray/load alternation,3 given that the theme-object and goal-object structures are near-para-
phrases of each other.
3Rappaport & Levin (1988), as well as many others, refer to what I call the spray/load alternation as the
locative alternation. However, as Beavers (2017) points out, there are other locative alternations in English.
(i) The swarm-alternation (Dowty 2001; Hoeksema 2009; Rapoport 2014):
a. Bees swarmed in the garden.
b. The garden swarmed with bees.
(ii) The wander-alternation (Levin 1993, sec. 1.4):
a. Bears wandered (in) the woods.
b. John leapt (over) the fence.
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(10) a. Jack sprayed paint on the wall.
b. Jack sprayed the wall with paint.
c. Bill loaded cartons onto the truck.
d. Bill loaded the truck with cartons.
(Rappaport & Levin 1988, (8–9))
To refer to the arguments, they use the terms Agent (Jack in (10a)), Locatum (paint) and
Goal (the wall) (though ultimately they use these terms as helpful labels rather than gram-
matical primitives). Interestingly, there is an interpretive difference between the different
structures as well, noted first by Anderson (1971). When the Goal argument appears as the
direct object, it is understood as holistically or completely affected as a result of the action
described by the verb. Intuitively, in (10c), the truckmay ormay not be full as a result of the
loading, but it is understood as completely full (or full to a contextually defined capacity)
in (10d).
This sets up the requirements that Rappaport & Levin (1988) and Rappaport et al.
(1993) propose any account of the locative alternation should meet, presented before in
(11). As they show in detail, theories that make use of lists of theta-roles in accounting for
linking run into problems in attempting to fulfill these requirements. Theories that assume
each structure is associated with identical lists of theta-roles fail to explain why the alter-
nation is possible to begin with, and must stipulate special linking rules simply to capture
the facts, failing to predict the positions of the arguments uniquely from their theta-roles.
This approach would also require a special rule of interpretation to account for the holistic
effect. On the other hand, analyses that propose each structure invokes different theta-roles
fail to capture the near-paraphrase relationship between each structure.4
(iii) Locative inversion (Levin 1993, sec. 6.2):
a. A wizard sat in the corner.
b. In the corner sat a wizard.
Many others beside these exist as well. While there is a common temptation to reduce the swarm alternation to
the spray/load alternation, Dowty (2001) cautions against it, noting they have a different syntax and semantics.
The others are clearly unrelated to the spray/load alternation. For this reason, I have chosen to use the term
spray/load alternation to be more specific about what I will address here.
4Another issue Rappaport & Levin (1988) discuss is that the analysis of the spray/load alternation ought to
apply to similar verbs that involve removal of some substance/entity, which display a similar alternation with
different prepositions.
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Instead, they propose a linking theory that eschews theta-roles, with linking principles
stated over informal semantic representations called lexical conceptual structures (see also
Speas 1990). Lexical conceptual structures decompose complex meanings associated with
verbs into relations between arguments and more basic semantic predicates, which are in-
voked across many verbs. For example, a lexical conceptual structure for put might be the
following:
(11) put: [𝑥 cause [𝑦 to come to be at 𝑧]] (Rappaport & Levin 1988, (20))
The variables 𝑥, 𝑦, and 𝑧 stand in for put’s arguments. Square brackets delimit semantic
primitive predicates. As these structures are posited to represent the grammatically rele-
vant part of a verb’s meaning, linking rules make reference to them, mediating between the
lexical conceptual structure and the verb’s predicate argument structure, which contains
information about the syntax of a verb’s arguments.
(12) Linking rules:
a. When the lexical conceptual structure of a verb contains the substructure
... [𝑥 cause 𝑃]... (where 𝑃 is a variable over descriptions of eventualities),
link the variable represented by 𝑥 to the external argument/Subject vari-
able in the verb’s predicate argument structure.
b. When the lexical conceptual structure of a verb contains one of the fol-
lowing substructures, link the variable represented by 𝑥 in either to the
internal argument/Object variable in the verb’s predicate argument struc-
ture.
i. ...[𝑥 come to be at LOCATION]...
ii. ...[𝑥 come to be in STATE]...
(i) a. Doug cleared dishes from the table.
b. Doug cleared the table of dishes.
I do not explicitly discuss these cases, though I believe the analysis I develop in chapters 2 and 3 could easily
extend to them as well. It seems to me that the relevant patterns presented in those chapters mostly extend to
these structures as well. The only point that would require clarification is the meaning of of in (i-b), which in
my analysis would have to correspond to what is usually expressed as without. In addition, there appear only
four verbs in English that participate in this alternation: clear, clean, drain, and empty, leaving any attempt to
discover general patterns within this class in a difficult position. Something that does appear to distinguish this
class from spray/load verbs is that clear verbs allow goal subjects in unaccusative uses; as I showed in chapter
3, this is universally impossible with (alternating) spray/load verbs.
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Rappaport & Levin (1988) note that it is still useful to use terms like “Agent” and “Theme”
to refer to particular arguments, but that these are to be understood as shortcuts for refer-
ring to variables occurring in particular positions in thesemore articulated representations.
For instance “Agent” is a useful shorthand for referring to the variable 𝑥 in either [𝑥 cause
𝑃] or [𝑥 do 𝑃], and so on. But the term “Agent” as such has no theoretical status beyond
its invocation of a particular position in lexical conceptual structures.
To extend this to the spray/load alternation, Rappaport & Levin (1988) capitalize on
the holistic effect, which in their data has to do with the Goal being understood as com-
pletely affected (see (10d)). They propose that this reveals that the goal-object structure
has a more complex meaning than the theme-object structure, which they support with
judgments about entailment. The goal-object structure entails the theme-object structure,
but the opposite is not true.
(13) a. Henry loaded hay onto the wagon. ↛ Henry loaded the wagon with hay.
b. Henry loaded the wagon with hay. → Henry loaded hay on the wagon.
In order to capture both this fact and the entailment facts, they propose that the lexical con-
ceptual structure for load in the goal-object structure embeds the lexical conceptual struc-
ture of theme-object load, as follows.
(14) a. load (theme-object): [𝑥 cause [𝑦 to come to be at 𝑧]/LOAD]
b. load (goal-object): [[𝑥 cause [𝑧 to come to be in STATE]]
BY MEANS OF [𝑥 cause [𝑦 to come to be at 𝑧]]/LOAD]
The representation of the theme-object structure treats load as an event that involves some
actor causing some thing to go to some other thing’s location (by loading). In contrast,
the representation of the goal-object structure embeds this structure to derived a change
of state predicate, which describes some actor causing some thing to come to be in a state
by causing some thing to go to some other thing’s location. The shared variables in the
main and embedded parts of the lexical conceptual structure represent that the participants
involved in each subevent are understood as the same.
Given that we have added embedded lexical conceptual structures, the linking rules
must be amended to deal with them. In particular, the representation of with-structure load
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would result in contradictory mappings: by the rules in (12), both 𝑧 and 𝑦 would be linked
to the direct object. Rappaport & Levin (1988) propose that the main clause of a lexical
conceptual structure is what takes priority in this case, which would mean that 𝑧 would
be linked to the direct object. Thus, although Rappaport & Levin (1988) do not provide
an explicit structural analysis of spray/load verbs, their description of their analysis (and of
most analyses following them) is most compatible with the transitive approach in (2).
As the linking rule for 𝑥 will apply without problems, we are just left with the question
of why 𝑦 is realized as the object of with. Rappaport & Levin (1988) propose that this is
predictable, sincewith introduces so-called “displaced themes”with other alternating verbs
as well.
(15) a. The jeweler inscribed a motto on the ring.
b. The jeweler inscribed the ring with a motto.
c. The judge presented a prize to the winner.
d. The judge presented the winner with a prize.
e. Kevin hit the stick against the wall.
f. Kevin hit the wall with the stick.
We could presumably state a linking rule that would account for such cases more generally;
something along the lines of (12b), but with an alternate realization in case the direct object
already has a variable linked to it, or a linking rule thatmakes specific reference to the status
of 𝑦 as part of an embedded clause in the lexical conceptual structure. They suggest that
the reason with is used might relate to its use with instruments, as both involve arguments
that are found in embedded lexical conceptual structures that are linked to themain clauses
with the relation BY MEANS OF.
Returning to the desiderata in (11), Rappaport & Levin (1988) argue that their ap-
proach addresses all three. First, the near-paraphrase relation is captured because the lex-
ical conceptual structure of the goal-object use embeds the lexical conceptual structure of
the theme-object structure. Second, the linking of the arguments is predictable in terms of
their positions in the lexical conceptual structures using the linking rules in (12) (plus one
of those suggested above for embedded theme arguments). Finally, the affected interpre-
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tation is encoded as part of the lexical conceptual structure since it is the argument of a
change of state predicate.
This analysis has enjoyed no small amount of popularity. In particular, a series of publi-
cations by Pinker and Gropen (Gropen 1989; Gropen et al. 1991a,b; Pinker 1989) argue that
Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s analysis can be naturally extended to account for the produc-
tivity and acquisition of the spray/load alternation. What makes the alternation productive
is a regular and productive process that allows lexical conceptual structures to be combined
via embedding. A change of state predicate can embed a predicate that describes how the
change of state came about. This is possible when the lexical semantics of the verb encodes
both how a change of location comes about (= the verb’s “manner”) and a state that pre-
dictably results from such a change of location (= the verb’s “result”). New verbs that meet
these criteria will alternate, while verbs that only describe either manner or result will only
be compatible with one lexical conceptual structure.
Acquisition of the alternation consists of the child learning the meanings of particular
verbs accurately; overgeneralization errors (as in (6–7)) occur when the child has not yet
learned that a verb’smeaning is restricted to encoding eithermanner or result. For instance,
a child may misunderstand fill as encoding not the fact that a container ends up full, but
instead as meaning something more like “put into.” In contrast, a child might misunder-
stand pour as encoding not only the manner in which some thing moves (downward in a
continuous stream), but as encoding some result state as well (i.e., full, wet, etc.). Until the
child understands precisely what a verb encodes, they will overgeneralize, once they have
understood how the embedding process works. What allows them to then restrict overgen-
eralization could be the use of verbs in particular circumstances where either manner or
result is clearly not entailed (for instance, if they hear fill used to describe an event achieved
by scooping water rather than pouring it, or they hear pour used to describe an event with
no noticeable effect on the goal). This explanation would account for the U-shaped learn-
ing curve that children display with these verbs, noted first in Bowerman (1982), with
early high accuracy associated with listed idiosyncratic structures associated with partic-
ular verbs, later lower accuracy associated with the over-application of a newly-acquired
productive rule relating each structure due to imprecisely specified verbmeanings, and late
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high accuracy reflecting the final acquisition of the correct meaning for each verb.
In addition, Pinker (1989) proposes that finer-grained meanings of verbs determine
which arguments can be expressed optionally. Some spray/load verbs can omit either (in-
ternal) argument, some only one or the other, and some neither.
(16) Theme optional, goal optional:
a. John loaded the hay (onto the wagon).
b. John loaded the wagon (with the hay).
(17) Theme optional, goal obligatory:
a. John stuffed the feathers ★ (into the pillow).
b. John stuffed the pillow (with the feathers).
(18) Theme obligatory, goal optional:
a. John piled the stones (onto the deck).
b. John piled the deck ★ (with the stones).
(19) Theme obligatory, goal obligatory:
a. John slathered the plaster ★ (onto the walls).5
e. John slathered the walls ★ (with the plaster).
(Beavers 2017, (59–62))
Pinker relates this to the meanings of these verbs. Those verbs that can omit either argu-
ment might allow each structure to be derived from the other, those that require expressing
only the goal encode primarily result, those that require expressing only the theme encode
primarily manner, and those that require expressing both encode both manner and result.
Pinker (1989)’s extension of Rappaport & Levin (1988) has enjoyed popularity as well,
as it would have not only the advantages of their approach, but additional advantages re-
5Some I have spoken to dispute this judgment. Regardless, other verbs seem to show the same pattern more
clearly:
(i) a. John crammed the boxes into the storage cabinet.
b. John crammed the storage cabinet with the boxes.
c. ★ John crammed the boxes.
d. ★ John crammed the storage cabinet.
Thus, the point remains even if the judgment Beavers (2017) reports is disputable.
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lated to acquisition and finer-grained properties of spray/load verbs. The notion that verbs
encode manner or result and that these are grammatically relevant for the locative alterna-
tion is now widespread even among analyses very different from Pinker (1989)’s, such as
Mateu (2000, 2017)’s, Brinkmann (1995)’s, and Wunderlich (1997)’s, and even common
in analyses of verbal argument structure more generally (e.g., Alexiadou & Anagonos-
topoulou 2013; Beavers & Koontz-Garboden 2020; Beavers et al. 2010; Folli & Harley 2005,
2020; Husband 2011; Krifka 1999; Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1991, 1995, 2006, 2013; Mateu
& Acedo-Martellán 2012; Ramchand 2008; Rappaport Hovav & Levin 2007, 2010; Talmy
1991, 2000).
However, as Beavers (2017) points out, Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s analysis of the
spray/load alternation itself, while impressive, remains imperfect, as does Pinker (1989, et
seq.)’s extension. For one thing, it is not clear why specifying that the goal undergoes a
change of state results in a holistic interpretation—the state of a wagon changes by virtue
of having any amount of hay on it, not only if it is completely loaded. The lexical conceptual
structures themselves thus do not actually account for the holistic effect; instead it would
have to come down to the pragmatics of what counts as a state change. Furthermore, even
if the change of state were responsible for the holistic effect, it would not account for why
quantized themes are interpreted as completely affected as well (see (19)).6
A further problem has to do with the relation BY MEANS OF in (14b). Crucially, BY MEANS
OF embeds the substructure encoding causedmotionunder the substructure encoding change
of state. This is a critical part of Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s analysis, as it is what derives
the answer to the question of how arguments’ position can be predicted from their interpre-
tations. But as Beavers (2017) notes, BY MEANS OF simply encodes causation, and Rappaport
& Levin (1988)’s lexical conceptual structures already invoke a causative relation—namely,
“cause.” If causewere used to link the change of location and change of state substructures,
exactly the wrong precedence relations would be achieved. Thus, it is critical for Rappa-
port & Levin (1988) that causation is expressible with two lexical conceptual relations that
exactly reverse the relative prominence they assign to causing and caused events. More
6Recall that I have argued that the holistic effect in the goal-object structure is due to the meaning of with
(Rapoport 2014), while its origin in the theme-object structure is pragmatic and defeasible. See chapter 4,
section 4.2, and cf. Jeffries & Willis (1984).
218
bluntly, BY MEANS OF sneaks into the lexical conceptual structure in (14b) a syntactic fact
about where the goal argument surfaces—even though that is what the analysis is sup-
posed to derive.7 Other analyses that link affected arguments to object positions Dowty
(e.g., 1991); Tenny (e.g., 1992, 1994) suffer from similar problems: without some indepen-
dent reason for linking objects with holistic readings, linking affected arguments to Object
merely states the problem in a different way (Beavers 2017).
These problems aside, Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s analysis was and remains very in-
fluential. While their analysis in the end relies on some stipulations, the three-fingered
gauntlet they throw down regarding what an analysis of the spray/load alternation should
account for has remained the target for essentially all future analyses, with the addition of
Pinker (1989)’s call for addressing acquisition influential as well. In part, the contributions
of chapter 2 and 3 were to add a few more items to their list of what defines a successful
analysis of the spray/load alternation, which should also address facts about modification
with again, and uses of spray/load verb roots in unaccusative, nominal, and non-agentive
transitive contexts.
5.2.1.2 Brinkmann (1995) and Wunderlich (1997)’s Lexicalist Approach
Another lexicalist approach is developed in Brinkmann (1995) and Wunderlich (1997)
(and see also Wunderlich 1987).8 While this analysis has not become as popular or influen-
tial as Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s approach, it is worth presenting because it is the source
of the idea of that the spray/load alternation is derivedvia P-conflation/incorporation,which
I implement in my syntactic approach in chapter 3 (see also Mateu (2000, 2017) for a dif-
7Though to be fair to Rappaport & Levin (1988), the fact that the overt preposition by exists and encodes this
“flipped” causation (e.g., John cleaned the car by washing it) might lead us to believe it is not so implausible to
posit a similar operator at the level of lexical conceptual structures (see also Levin&Rapoport 1988, p. 283). But
if lexical conceptual structures are supposed to involve minimal and reusable primitive predicates, proposing
that both cause and BY MEANS OF exist as independent semantic primitives would require further justification.
8The chronology of publication of Brinkmann (1995) and Wunderlich (1997) is likely to lead to some con-
fusion, since I note that Brinkmann (1995)’s analysis draws on Wunderlich (1997)’s. Regrettably, time-travel is
not responsible. Instead, Brinkmann (1995) bases her analysis on an earlier unpublished version ofWunderlich
(1997), dating from 1992. I have cited the final published version of Wunderlich (1997)’s proposal here, which
seems to be little changed from the 1992 version based on what Brinkmann (1995) describes. Nevertheless, I
primarily cite Brinkmann (1995) because her work was the first to appear, and there may be slight differences
between what she attributes to Wunderlich (1992) and what later appeared as Wunderlich (1997) that I have
overlooked.
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ferent syntactic approach that makes use of P-conflation, which I detail in section 5.2.3.4 of
this chapter).
While Brinkmann (1995) and Wunderlich (1997)’s formalism differs from that of Rap-
paport & Levin (1988), it really contains the same sort of ingredients, though they are
named in overlappingways that canmake this fact difficult to see.What Rappaport & Levin
(1988) call “lexical conceptual structure” corresponds to Brinkmann (1995) and Wunder-
lich (1997)’s “predicate-argument structure,” and what Rappaport & Levin (1988) refer
to as “predicate-argument structure” is split into two levels, a “thematic structure” and a
“syntactic complement structure.” Of course, the incompatible uses of the term “predicate-
argument structure” hinder comparison a bit. For this reason, I will use Rappaport & Levin
(1988)’s terminology, even as I discuss Brinkmann (1995) and Wunderlich (1997)’s analy-
sis. But I will adopt Brinkmann (1995)’s formalism, since it makes certain features of their
analysis easier to grasp.
To illustrate their system, consider the lexical conceptual structure associated with tran-
sitive open.
(16) open: (CAUSE(𝑥, BECOME(OPEN, 𝑦)))(𝑒)9
Similarly to Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s lexical conceptual structures, this structure en-
codes an event description associatedwith open: it describes eventswhere 𝑥 causes a becom-
ing event, which describe 𝑦 entering an open state. We could write this using Rappaport &
Levin (1988)’s formalism as follows:
(17) open: [𝑥 cause [𝑦 to come to be at STATEOPEN]]
What is useful about Brinkmann (1995)’s formalism, however, is that her linking rulesmake
reference to how deeply embedded an argument is in a lexical conceptual structure, which
her system makes somewhat easier to visually parse.
In particular, Brinkmann (1995) makes use of Bierwisch (1988)’s hierarchy principle to
link arguments in a lexical conceptual structure to a thematic structure. However, it should
be noted that a thematic structure does not invoke theta-roles, despite its name. Instead, it
9Those who are familiar with von Stechow (1996)’s approach to again ambiguities should find this event
decomposition quite familiar.
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represents an ordering of the argument variables, as the following definition demonstrates.
(18) Hierarchy Principle (after Brinkmann 1995, ch. 3, (24)):
In the thematic structure, the hierarchy of arguments in the [lexical conceptual
structure] is preserved in the inverse order.
What this means is that the least embedded argument will be the last one to saturate its cor-
responding variable in the lexical conceptual structure, as is standard in semantic analysis.
Thus, we can derive the thematic structure of open.
(19) Thematic Structure Lexical Conceptual Structure
λ𝑦 λ𝑥 λ𝑒 (CAUSE(𝑥, BECOME(OPEN, 𝑦)))(𝑒)
Each argument is represented as bound by a lambda operator, with the order of the op-
erators determined according to the Hierarchy Principle. For example, note that the most
deeply embedded argument, 𝑦 is the first argument in the thematic structure, and the most
deeply embedded argument in the lexical conceptual structure.
The final step links the thematic structure to the syntactic complement structure, which
associates each argument with a Case.
(20) Linking rules:
a. The rightmost argument in a thematic structure is linked to nominative.
b. The leftmost argument in a thematic structure is linked to accusative.
c. Other arguments are linked to dative or oblique, depending on semantics.
(In case there is only one argument, presumably (20a) takes precedence over (20b).) Pro-
vided that the linking rules ignore the event argument—not necessarily a completely in-
nocent move, but one which Brinkmann (1995) does not explicitly address10—these rules
allow us to derive the syntactic complement structure of open as follows.
10In her text, Brinkmann (1995) presents the analysis without event arguments, and then briefly shows how
they could be included in an appendix. She does not address how to reformulate the linking rules once these
event arguments are added.
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(21) Thematic Structure Lexical Conceptual Structure
λ𝑦 λ𝑥 λ𝑒 (CAUSE(𝑥, BECOME(OPEN, 𝑦)))(𝑒)
ACC NOM
Thus equipped, we can start to understand Brinkmann (1995)’s approach to the spray/
load alternation. The basic argument structure of a spray/loadverb is represented as in (22).11
(22) spray (theme-object):
λ𝑃DIR λ𝑦 λ𝑥 λ𝑒 (CAUSE(𝑥, 𝑃DIR(𝑦)) ∧ SPRAY(𝑦))(𝑒)
ACC NOM
Here, 𝑃DIR represents a preposition that is part of the argument structure of spray. Note
that we must assume that prepositions are a special case—here the preposition is actually
less embedded than 𝑦, which would mean it should go to the right of 𝑦 in the thematic
structure by theHierarchyPrinciple. In addition,𝑃DIR is not linkedwith aCase,whichmakes
sense because prepositions cannot bear Case. This might be related to why the Hierarchy
Principle applies differently to prepositions.
The argument structure for spray in (22) does not tell us about where the goal argument
comes from in the argument structure—the reason for this is that the goal is not represented
in the argument structure of the verb itself, but in the argument structure of the preposition,
which looks like the following.
(23) onto:
λ𝑧 λ𝑦 BECOME(LOC(𝑦, on(𝑧)))
ACC
Note that despite the linking rules, 𝑦 is not linked to a Case in the argument structure of
the preposition. This is probably related to the fact that the subjects of prepositions must
receive Case from outside the PP, though Brinkmann (1995) does not explicitly address this
point.
11Note that Brinkmann (1995)’s presentation in her main text intentionally omits the event argument as a
simplification; I restore it here as she proposes in her appendix 1.
222
To saturate the prepositional argument of (22), the preposition must combine with its
leftmost argument first so that it can be of the right type to take a single argument 𝑦. This
will give us the following representation of the preposition, if its leftmost argument is the
wall.
(24) onto the wall:
λ𝑦 BECOME(LOC(𝑦, on(the wall))
ACC
We are left with a puzzle of how the preposition integrates with the rest of the sentence,
since we need to identify its argument with the next highest argument of (22). Brinkmann
(1995) does not explain precisely how thisworks, and refers her readers to Bierwisch (1988),
Higginbotham (1985), and Wunderlich (1991). We may assume that it works out correctly,
giving us the representation below.
(25) spray – onto the wall:
λ𝑦 λ𝑥 λ𝑒 (CAUSE(𝑥, BECOME(LOC(𝑦, on(the wall))) ∧ SPRAY(𝑦))(𝑒)
ACC NOM ACC
The remaining steps of composition with 𝑦 and 𝑥 should be fairly straightforward, so I
will not step through them. Something that is not fully spelled out in Brinkmann (1995)’s
approach is how exactly the arguments are associated not only with Case but also syntactic
positions, but the way she discusses things makes it seem as though the lowest argument
of the verb is associated with direct object position.
To derive the goal-object structure, Brinkmann (1995) follows Wunderlich (1997),12
whoproposes that it is derived byP-incorporation.13 What thismeans inWunderlich (1997)’s
system is that the argument structure of the P is unified with the argument structure of the
verb, before the argument of the P is saturated rather than after, which we could think
of semantically as involving Function Composition.14 However, it should be understood
12See footnote 8 for clarification on the timeline of these analyses.
13Chapter 3, section 3.3 presents the evidence from German that leads Brinkmann (1995) and Wunderlich
(1997) to the P-incorporation analysis. I do not discuss it again here, since as I explained there, it is more
suggestive than conclusive.
14See the discussion in chapter 3, section 4.3, starting around example (71).
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that “incorporation” here is not used in the same sense as in Baker (1988a), who uses it to
describe syntactic movement of one head into another; it is Baker (1988a)’s usage that is
commonly adopted today. Thus, this incorporation is crucially not syntactic, in contrast to
my approach in chapter 3 and Damonte (2005)’s approach. Instead, it takes place in the
lexicon, at the level of lexical conceptual structure.
(26) spray (goal-object):
λ𝑧 λ𝑦 λ𝑥 λ𝑒 (CAUSE(𝑥, LOC(𝑦, on(𝑧))) ∧ SPRAY(𝑦))(𝑒)
ACC with NOM
Once the argument structure of the preposition has incorporated with the argument struc-
ture of the verb, the most embedded argument is the internal argument of the relation
corresponding to the incorporated preposition, 𝑧. This means it will be the leftmost argu-
ment in the thematic structure, which means it will be linked to accusative Case. Because
of this change, 𝑦 is no longer the leftmost argument in the lexical conceptual structure, and
is linked to a semantically appropriate Case marker, which Brinkmann (1995) and Wun-
derlich (1997) identify as with. (The linking of 𝑥 to nominative is identical in both struc-
tures, though note that it is unclear why 𝑦 should count as more embedded than 𝑥 given
this lexical conceptual structure, given the unembedded status of the conjunct SPRAY(y).
Brinkmann (1995, p. 68) in fact explicitly ignores this verb-specific conjunct when present-
ing her analysis of the alternation, though its presence causes non-trivial complications for
her approach.)
An interesting effect of this approach is that the result of saturating the lexical con-
ceptual structures of the theme-object and goal-object spray/load verbs results in identical
lexical conceptual representations. What matters for Brinkmann (1995), then, is essentially
whether the preposition combines with the verb or its internal argument first. Understood
in this way, her approach bears similarities to the one I presented in chapter 3, though I in
my approach the process of combining the preposition and the verb is crucially syntactic,
as this was what accounted for certain facts related to unaccusative and nominal uses of
spray/load verbs. It is unclear to me how Brinkmann (1995)’s approach could account for
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these facts, as once the prepositional relation is incorporated, the resulting verb behaves
just like a standard verb for linking purposes, and so presumably the innermost argument
(𝑧 in (26)) would be realized as the verb’s object. However, it is difficult to make such a
prediction given the lack of a fully worked out syntax for her examples—unlike Rappaport
& Levin (1988), who propose links to grammatical functions that could plausibly be as-
sociated with particular syntactic positions, Cases are not in a one-to-one mapping with
syntactic positions, making any attempt to derive syntactic predictions from her analysis
difficult.
Since the final results of the lexical conceptual structures in theme-object and goal-object
structures are identical, Brinkmann (1995) proposes a different kind of explanation for near-
paraphrasability and the holistic effect thanRappaport&Levin (1988),which she attributes
to Wunderlich (1997). This is called the homogeneity presupposition.
(27) Homogeneity Presupposition:
If 𝑃 is directly predicated of 𝑥, assume 𝑥 to be homogeneous with respect to 𝑃.
The idea here seems to be that if a predicate directly applies to some 𝑥, we assume all parts
of 𝑥 to be equally affected in the way described by 𝑃.
The result of this applies differently in the theme-object and goal-object argument struc-
tures, because of a difference in the directness of the predication: in the theme-object struc-
ture, the verb is predicated of the theme only, and so we assume the predicate to apply
homogeneously with respect to the theme—in other words, that all parts of the theme are
equally affected by the event. In contrast, a preposition intervenes between the verb and the
goal argument, so the relationship of direct predication between the goal and the spraying
is broken, meaning that the goal is not homogeneously affected with respect to the spray-
ing. Thus, in a sentence like John loaded the hay onto the wagon, all of the hay is assumed to
have been loaded, but not all of the wagon.
In the goal-object argument structure, in contrast, the verb is directly predicated of the
goal, whichmeans that every part of the goal is interpreted as affected by the spraying.Note
that the relevant notion here is of “being equally affected”—though there are links between
this and telicity, they are not identical. When I say John pushed a cart, it can be interpreted
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as atelic, but the understanding is that every part of the cart was affected by the pushing,
satisfying the homogeneity presupposition. Thus, in a sentence like John loaded the wagon
with the hay, all of the wagon is assumed to be homogeneously affected by the loading.
However, it is also true that the verb is directly predicated of the theme in the goal-
object argument structure—yet the theme in this structure does not seem to influence the
holistic effect. To account for this, Brinkmann (1995) extends Wunderlich (1997)’s account
and proposes what she calls the Nonindividuation Hypothesis: “in order for a transitive
verb to take its goal as direct object, the quantificational properties of its theme must be
irrelevant: the verbmust allow speakers to assume that the theme is nonindividuatedwhen
it is not specified [= omitted from the sentence, MW]” (Brinkmann 1995, p. 80). In other
words, she proposes that in order for P-incorporation to take place, when the theme can
be omitted, it must be understood as having cumulative reference. More bluntly, the goal
can become the direct object of a spray/load verb only when the theme plays no role in
determining the telicity of the VP.
Correlated with the ability of an omitted object’s quantificational properties to be un-
derstood as irrelevant to determining the truth of an event is whether the verb admits of
an atelic activity reading. In order for the quantificational properties of the object to be ir-
relevant in determining the truth of the event, it must be the case that the verb denotes
a particular way of doing something (an activity) that is independent of achieving a par-
ticular result. This essentially means that Brinkmann (1995)’s approach predicts that only
manner-denoting verbs should alternate—verbs that denote result predicates rely on the
quantificational properties of their argument to define when the result is achieved. While
Brinkmann (1995) uses quite different terminology to discuss this prediction, she argues
it is borne out in German. (Though as I will discuss, the domain of facts she considers rel-
evant to the spray/load alternation is quite a bit smaller than one might hope, so there is
room for doubt.)
We might also take as evidence for the nonindividuation hypothesis a fact that Beavers
(2017) notes, which is that most examples of spray/load verbs in the literature involve bare
mass noun or bare plural DPs as themes, and definite DPs as goals. Since bare mass nouns
and bare plurals express non-quantized meanings, they would be the most natural DPs to
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use in goal-object structures.
However, it is clear that quantizedDPs can be used in goal-object structures—the nonin-
dividuation hypothesis does not rule that out. Instead, it simply says that the quantization
cannot be relevant to defining the endpoint of the event if the object is omitted. Brinkmann
(1995)’s evidence for the homogeneity presupposition and the nonindividuation hypothe-
sis comes from the fact that goal-object uses of spray/load verbs allow telic and atelic read-
ings, against the predictions of Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s approach.15
(28) a. He sprayed the lawn with water for hours / in an hour.
b. The farmer sowed his fields with cotton seeds for days / in a day.
c. She rubbed her leg with ointment for half an hour / in an hour.
(Brinkmann 1995, ch. 2, (47))
Recall that in Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s approach, the goal-object structure is associ-
ated with a lexical conceptual structure that encodes a change of state achieved by some
process—essentially an accomplishment (cf. Rothstein 2004). Accomplishments most nat-
urally receive telic interpretations, as shown by their compatibility with modifiers like for
α time (atelic) and in α time (telic).
(29) a. John built a house ??for days / in a day.
b. John dismantled the car ?for an hour / in an hour.
c. Bill drove John to the store ??for an hour / in an hour.
In contrast, the sentences in (28) do not seem to be preferentially telic, which Brinkmann
(1995) takes to show that theydonot describe changes of state.However, in these cases, both
the homogeneity presupposition and the nonindividuation hypothesis seem to hold: every
part of the lawn, fields, and leg are interpreted as affected, even if they are not understood
to change state. In addition, the quantificational properties of the theme do not seem to play
a role in determining telicity, since both telic and atelic readings are equally possible even
though in these cases the theme is non-quantized.
15Brinkmann (1995) also cites as evidence for the nonindividuation hypothesis that verbs like eat can omit
their arguments and receive activity readings only when their themes are understood as nonindividuated, but
I do not fully understand this argument.
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Brinkmann (1995) notes that implementing the nonindividuation hypothesis requires a
revision to theWunderlich (1997)’s approach. Rather than proposing that the theme is still
an argument in the goal-object argument structure, she proposes it is existentially bound,
leading to the following argument structure representation (Brinkmann 1995, appx. 1, (5)).
(30) spray (goal-object):
λ𝑧 ∃𝑦 λ𝑥 λ𝑒 (CAUSE(𝑥, BECOME(LOC(𝑦, on(𝑧)))) ∧ SPRAY(𝑦))(𝑒)
ACC NOM
As a result of existentially binding the theme, it must no longer be an argument of the verb,
so Brinkmann (1995) proposes it is an adjunct that specifies additional information about
𝑦 via its argument, which is related to the lexical conceptual structure of the verb by the
event argument.
Brinkmann (1995)’s main concern is with a prediction of the nonindividuation hypoth-
esis: it should be easier for children to acquire the goal-object structurewith verbs thatmost
naturally describe eventswith nonindividuated themes thanwith verbs thatmost naturally
do not. For instance, spraymost naturally (perhaps only) describes events where the theme
is a substance, which is easily construed as nonindividuated. On the other hand, load can
describe events with both individuated and nonindividuated themes, and is perhaps more
natural with individuated themes. As a result, children must learn how to deindividuate
themes that aremost naturally conceived of as individuated to use the goal-object argument
structure of load. A production experiment bore out these predictions, with young children
using mass-object verbs (e.g., spray) accurately more often in the goal-object structure to
describe videos than count-object verbs (e.g., load). This was true regardless of whether the
verb specified a change of state, with children’s understanding of this fact assessed through
an independent pre-test.
Under Brinkmann (1995)’s account, then, the acquisition of the alternation consists of
the acquisition of P-incorporation and the ability to understand omitted themes as nonindi-
viduated. This accounts for why children acquire verbs that most naturally occur with non-
individuated themes earlier than verbs that are less natural with nonindividuated themes.
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Overextension of the alternation to non-alternating verbs can be attributed to children not
understanding semantic restrictions on the particular preposition that incorporates. Re-
garding the near-paraphrasability of the two structures, Brinkmann (1995)’s and Wunder-
lich (1997)’s account would attribute this to the shared final lexical conceptual structure
of each structure. The reason the paraphrasability is not exact is due to the different inter-
pretations associated with each structure because of the homogeneity presupposition and
the nonindividuation hypothesis. The position of the arguments is predictable from their
locations in the lexical conceptual structure of the verb in a general way. And the holistic
effect is captured by the homogeneity principle.
However, there are shortcomings in this account. In particular, Brinkmann (1995) is
concerned with German, where the spray/load alternation is associated in some cases with
a morphological reflex, as described in chapter 3: for some verbs, the goal-object structure
is associated with the verb bearing the prefix be-.


























































“The vandals sprayed the car with paint.”
Note that for the verb spritzen ‘spray,’ the goal-object structure can only occur if the verb is
prefixed with be-. Brinkmann (1995) identifies be- with the incorporated preposition, given
its use with other verbs (see chapter 3, section 3.3 for additional data).
However, some spray/load verbs alternate without taking be-, or take be- only optionally.
When optional, be-’s presence requires that the goal be understood as a surface, rather than
the interior of something.
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“When leaving for the ski vacation, theMillers pack their car(’s interior) as





































“When leaving for the ski vacation, the Millers pack their car(’s trunk and
roof) as if they will be away for half a year.”






























“She stuffed the bag with the T-shirts.”
The verb packen ‘pack’ optionally occurs with be-, and when it does, the interpretation is
that the goal of the packing includes a surface (the car’s roof in (32b)).16 When it does not,
it describes an interior. Verbs that can be used if the goal is an interior and not a surface,
like stopfen ‘stuff,’ can only alternate without be-.
This is an issue for Brinkmann (1995)’s analysis because she explicitly assumes that
P-incorporation only accounts for alternating verbs that are prefixed with be-. While this
displays a certain prudent morphological conservatism, it means that she explicitly consid-
ers stopfen ‘stuff’ and verbs like it outside the purview of her analysis. However, it is not so
clear that these non-be-prefixed verbs should not bemodeled as exemplifying the spray/load
alternation. English verbs that correspond to non-be-prefixed German verbs alternate, for
one thing. The holistic effect applies in these cases as well. It is not clear that they should
be excluded from a model of the spray/load alternation.
16Note, however, that in Brinkmann (1995)’s description of the meaning of (32b), the trunk of the car (plau-
sibly an interior) is also included. She does not explain how this is possible given her claim that be- requires
goals that are surfaces. I have presented the data here under the assumption that her characterization of it is
correct, and that there is some explanation for why the trunk can be included as well that does not compromise
her claim. If her characterization is incorrect, it will not end up affecting my analysis in any important way.
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As a result of this exclusion, Brinkmann (1995) proposes that the theme-object form
is always the basic one, and the goal-object form is the derived one. When including only
verbs that take be-in the goal-object form, this makes sense. But given that the criteria for
inclusion in her analysis invokes morphological complexity to begin with, it is not surpris-
ing that her account is that the morphologically less marked form is the basic one. As a
result of this exclusion though, it is hard to evaluate her approach to which verbs do not
alternate, since she only considers why some verbs might appear only in the theme-object
structure. She does not attempt to explain why some verbs might occur only in the goal-ob-
ject structure. Essentially, she explains why some verbs cannot host be-, since for her that
is the spray/load alternation. But then the alternation of verbs that do not take be- and their
restrictions is left entirely unaddressed, which seems to leave a large gap in the empirical
reach of her analysis.
Additional problems are related to the application of the homogeneity principle inWun-
derlich (1997)’s account, which does not existentially bind the theme argument in the goal-
object form. In this case, it is unclear why the theme should not be understood as homo-
geneous with respect to the verb in addition to the goal, because the verb also directly
predicates of the theme.
Brinkmann (1995)’s modification involving existential binding of the theme addresses
this concern, but raises an additional problem, since it requires her to treat the with-phrase
as an optional adjunct, as it is not present in the goal-object argument structure.While there
are problems treating the with-phrase as an adjunct generally (see discussion at the end of
section 5.2.2), more specific problems are posed by treating it as an optional adjunct, given
that sometimes it cannot be omitted, at least in English (cf. (18)). Whether there are verbs
like this in German is something Brinkmann (1995) does not discuss, but a prediction of
her account is that they should not exist.
In addition, it is unclear whether the homogeneity presupposition amounts to more
than a restatement of the link between object position and the holistic effect. In particular, it
must be excluded from applying tomore deeply embedded arguments to derive the correct
readings in Wunderlich (1997)’s approach. If this is the case, then it amounts to little more
than saying that the most embedded (entity) argument of a verb is interpreted as directly
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affected—and the most embedded entity argument of a verb is the one that will be realized
with its accusative Case,making it a direct object.While the path getting us there is a bit less
direct, it is once again simply stating the fact that direct object are interpreted as holistically
affected.
The nonindividuation hypothesis is not without its problems, too. Some verbs, like
English pile, do not allow the theme to be omitted in the goal-object structure (cf. (18)).
Brinkmann (1995)’s account proves less informative for such verbs, since a prediction of
the nonindividuation hypothesis cannot be verified. In addition, we might question the
data in (28), which is supposed to show that the quantificational properties of the theme
do not matter. In particular, diagnostics of (a)telicity like in α time and for α time do not so
much reveal the existence of a particular reading as they reveal preferences for a particular
reading. Take the following:
(34) John washed the car for an hour / in an hour.
The predicatewash the car is apparently compatible with both telic and atelicmodifiers. This
should indicate that the quantificational properties of its theme are irrelevant, meaning the
verb wash has an activity/manner reading. This should make it possible to drop the object,
but that is not possible.
(35) ★ John washed for an hour / in an hour. (under a non-reflexive reading)
Instead, what seems to be going on in (34) is that the modifiers either create or force a par-
ticular kind of reading on the predicate, with an atelic modifier compatible only with what
we might call a “partitive” reading, where John washed part of the car but possibly not the
whole car. Different kinds of predicates might more naturally describe situations compat-
ible with partitive readings, or particular contexts might make them more accessible. For
this reason, the diagnostics in (28) cannot be clear evidence that goal-object structures lack
a change of state reading—instead, it may be the case that they describe scenarios that are
just easily compatible with partitive readings.
In sum, while I have shown that there are benefits to the P-incorporation analysis in
chapter 3, there are general concerns having to do with the homogeneity presupposition
and the nonindividuation hypothesis, with the former potentially reducing to a statement
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of the holistic effect, and the latter’s empirical adequacy being somewhat unclear. There is
also an unfortunate and intentional limit to the reach of the analysis, given that Brinkmann
(1995) explicitly considers verbs that alternatewithout taking the prefix be- to be outside the
scope of her analysis. However, these verbs nevertheless appear to display some alternation
that is much like the spray/load alternation, and they certainly alternate cross-linguistically.
Without a full picture of how including these verbs in Brinkmann (1995)’s system might
affect its accuracy, it is hard to evaluate her claims fully.
5.2.2 Goldberg (1995)’s Construction Grammar Approach
Goldberg (1995) models meaning in a different way from Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s,
Brinkmann (1995)’s, and Wunderlich (1997)’s lexical conceptual structures, via construc-
tions. While lexical conceptual structures are associated with individual verbs, construc-
tions represent listed mappings between form and meaning that are not associated with
verbs. The idea behind constructions as separate from verb meanings can be illustrated
with the following example.
(36) Frank found his way to New York. (Goldberg 1995, ch. 9, (2))
(36) entails that Frank traversed some path and ended up in New York. In Rappaport &
Levin (1988)’s system, the way this could be achieved is by positing a lexical conceptual
structure associated with find. But this seems somewhat dubious given that the lexical con-
ceptual structure would have to include a subpart that expresses caused motion, while find
does not seem to encode this in more canonical uses. Goldberg (1995)’s proposal is there-
fore that the meaning of caused motion does not come from some structure associated
with the verb, but an independent structure associated with a meaning of caused motion—
a construction. Verbs have independent meanings that combine with the constructions to
produce fleshed out event descriptions. Essentially, then, the difference between Rappa-
port & Levin (1988)’s approach and Goldberg (1995)’s relates to where the parts of mean-
ing relevant for argument realization reside. For Rappaport & Levin (1988), lexical con-
ceptual structures are (as the name suggests) associated with particular words. In contrast,
Goldberg (1995)’s constructions pull out the event templatic information that Rappaport &
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Levin (1988) put into the lexical conceptual structure and put it into constructions that any
compatible word can combine with, thus avoiding the need to independently posit identi-
cal or near-identical lexical conceptual structures for each verb that realizes its arguments
in similar ways.
The following will illustrate, using Goldberg (1995)’s example in (36). In this case, the
arguments and meaning of the verb find will unify with a construction called the “way-
means construction.” First, I will present the construction, following Goldberg (1995, fig.
9.1) and explain how to read the formalism. I will then show how its meaning is combined
with the meaning of the verb find to produce (36) in her system.
(37) Sem CREATE-MOVE ⟨ creator-theme createe-way path ⟩
means
PRED ⟨ ⟩
Syn V Subji Objwayi Obl
The top line, indicated by “Sem” encodes the meaning of the construction in terms of the
interpretations it links with particular arguments and its event structure. In this case, the
event described is one of created movement, and there are three theta-roles it invokes: a
creator-theme, a createe-way, and a path. Goldberg (1995) proposes treating theway-means
construction as describing the means by which some moving entity (theme) creates a way
along a path. Since the creator of the way in this construction is necessarily identical to the
theme, the role is that of a creator-theme. (Note that, e.g., it is impossible for Frank to find
Sam’s way to New York.) The second role is that of the created way, and the third role is
the path that defines the path, or trajectory, of the way. Theta-roles in boldface must be
expressed, while those in regular font weight are optional.17
The construction thus comeswith three participants. The next line down represents how
these participants are related to themeaning of the verb. A solid line indicates that that part
of the meaning of the construction is identified with an existing part of the meaning of the
verb. For instance, the CREATE-MOVE event is related to the PRED (the event described by the
17Note that regular font weight alsomeans that no bearer of the argument need be identifiable in the context.
Goldberg (1995) uses a special notation for arguments that can only be unrealized as definite null complements,
which places square brackets around a boldface theta-role: e.g, [eatee].
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verb) because the verb describes the means/manner of the CREATE-MOVE event. The theta-
roles provided by the construction unify with those provided by the verb (which are not
filled in until we put the actual verb in). A solid line indicates that the verb must have an
existing theta-role to unify with the corresponding role in the construction, while a dashed
line indicates that the construction itself can license that role even if the verb lacks one
corresponding to it.
Finally, the last two lines represent the syntax (“Syn”) associated with the construction
in terms of grammatical functions, which the arrows showing which arguments are linked
to which grammatical functions. In this case, the CREATE-MOVE event whose means are spec-
ified by PRED are expressed syntactically by the verb, while the creator-theme, createe-way,
and path are linked to Subj(ect), Obj(ect)way, and Obl(ique), respectively. The indices on
Subj and Objway indicate that the subject must bind the possessor DP of the object, while
the subscript way is a shorthand that expresses that the head of the object DP must be the
word way. The path is expressed as Oblique—a PP or a locative adverb.
The meaning of find that will enter this construction is its theta-grid, which is the fol-
lowing.
(38) find: ⟨ finder, findee ⟩
We can then represent the fusion of find with the way-means construction as in (39).
(39) Sem CREATE-MOVE ⟨ creator-theme createe-way path ⟩
means
find ⟨ finder findee ⟩
Syn V Subji Objwayi Obl
Combining find with the way-means construction thus results in a grammatical object that
describes movements created by means of finding, where the creator-theme of the move-
ment is the finder and the createe-way is the findee, with the path being added by the con-
struction itself. Thus, the meaning of a sentence like (36) could be paraphrased as “there
was movement along a path created by finding, where the finder, creator, and mover are
Frank, the createe, way, and findee are Frank’s way, and the path was to New York.”
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Of course, there are some constraints. If a verb obligatorily expresses a theta-role, it
must fuse with a theta-role available in the construction. For example, if there were a verb
that had to express two theta-roles and a construction that only contained one theta-role,
that verb could not occur in that construction. In addition, filling out a construction with a
verb is only possible if the meaning of the theta-roles in the representation of the verb are
able to be construed as particular instances of the theta-roles provided by the construction
in a natural way.
Thus equipped with an understanding of how Constructions are represented, we are
prepared to examine Goldberg (1995)’s analysis of the spray/load alternation. In fact, in
Goldberg (1995, 2002)’s view, there is no such thing as an “alternation,”whichwould imply
that it is the verb that carries particular meanings associated with different surface forms.
Instead, two distinct constructions are implicated. The first is the caused-motion construc-
tion, while the second is the change of state construction (plus a with adjunct) (Goldberg
1995, ch. 7; Goldberg 2002).
(40) a. The caused-motion construction: (Goldberg 1995, fig. 7.3 A)
Sem CAUSE-MOVE ⟨ cause path theme ⟩
R
R: instance, PRED ⟨ ⟩
means
Syn V Subj Obl Obj
b. The change-of-state (plus with adjunct) construction:
(based on D’Elia 2016, ch. 2, (155b); Goldberg 2002, (54b)
Sem CAUSE-Δ-STATE ⟨ cause patient (instrument) ⟩
R
R: instance, PRED ⟨ ⟩
means
Syn V Subj Obj Oblwith
Thus, in Goldberg (1995, 2002)’s account, there is no alternation as such. Instead, there are
two independent constructions, both of which can fuse with a (partially) overlapping set
of verbs. The idea that the spray/load alternation is not a transformational alternation, and
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is instead the result of two different ways that arguments can be expressed, is shared by
very different analyses, including those of D’Elia (2016) and Mateu (2000, 2017), as I will
describe in sections 5.2.3.3 and 5.2.3.4.
As with Rappaport & Levin (1988), Goldberg (1995, 2002) does not provide a syntactic
structure for her analysis. However, based on the grammatical functions each construction
contains,we can assume that the analysis could look like the transitive+PP adjunct analysis
in (2).18
The advantage of proposing that these two constructions are involved is that their ap-
plications go beyond the spray/load alternation. Under Goldberg (1995)’s approach, the
caused-motion construction is implicated in many other cases. For instance:
(41) a. Frank squeezed the ball. ↛ The ball moved.
b. Frank squeezed the ball through the crack. → The ball moved.
(Goldberg 1995, ch. 7, (12))
In (41a), the use of the verb squeeze does not result in the entailment that the ball moved.
In contrast, the use of the same verb in the context in (41b) does entail that the ball moves.
Goldberg (1995) attributes this to the caused-motion construction being used in (41b) but
not (41a). Other cases seem to involve the construction occurring with verbs that would
not ordinarily be able to encode caused motion.
(42) In the last Star Trek episode, there was a woman who could think people into a
different galaxy. (Goldberg 1995, ch. 7, (154))
If we were to instead take Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s approach, we would have to posit
that there is a lexical conceptual structure that think directly encodes that entails caused
motion—a somewhat dubious notion.
However, it is the change of state (plus with adjunct) construction that poses the most
severe problems for Goldberg (1995, 2002)’s analysis. In particular, as is widely noted, the
with-PPs that expressed the theme arguments of spray/load verbs do not behave like other
instruments (Brinkmann 1995; Iwata 2008; Levin & Rappaport 1988; Rappaport & Levin
18Though Goldberg herself assumes a quite different model of syntax that could mean this claim can be only
approximate.
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1988; Rissman 2010, 2011; VanValin&LaPolla 1997;Wilson 2020). For instance, it is possible
to add an instrumental adjunct to a goal-object structure. In this case, the instrument must
occur outside the displaced themewith (to borrow Rappaport & Levin 1988’s terminology)
(Levin & Rappaport 1988).
(43) a. John loaded the truck with hay with a pitchfork.
b. # John loaded the truck with a pitchfork with hay.
In addition, while (43a) shows that it is possible to adjoin both a displaced theme with PP
and an instrumental with PP in the same structure, attempting to join two with phrases of
the same type is degraded.
(44) a. # John sprayed the wall with paint with water.
b. John sprayed the wall with paint with a hose.
c. ?# John sprayed the wall with a hose with a machine.
When a VP is replaced by do so ellipsis, a displaced theme with cannot be the correlate of an
instrumental with.
(45) a. ? John loaded the truck with hay (and removed it) and Bill did so with a
crane.
b. ?? John loaded the truck with hay (and removed it) before Bill did so with
boxes.
c. John loaded the truck with a forklift and Bill did so with a crane.
(The inclusion of “and removed it” is intended to defuse the holistic effect, due to which
it would be difficult to load the truck a second time after it is already completely loaded.)
In particular, (45a) seems to only receive one of three possible readings. The most natural
reading seems to be one where both hay and a crane are interpreted as displaced themes.
Another possible reading is one where both are instruments, though it is quite odd to con-
sider hay as an instrument (one imagines that John somehow fashioned a tool out of hay
that he used to help him load the truck with something else—odd but not impossible). Fi-
nally, there is a readingwherewith hay is included in the ellipsis site, andwith a crane scopes
over it. Compare this to John ate dinner, and Bill did so with a fork, which states that Bill ate
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dinner with a fork (and implies that John ate dinner without a fork). Crucially, a reading
where hay refers to something that ends up on the truck and a crane refers to an instru-
ment seems to be impossible. Furthermore, (45b) seems quite degraded, with both withs
introducing displaced themes. If displaced themes are arguments rather than adjuncts, this
would make sense, since do so ellipsis typically must elide all arguments.19 Finally, when
both with phrases refer to instruments, stranding one is perfectly acceptable.
These arguments aside, Goldberg (2002) addresses some of these concerns. Regarding
the ordering facts in (43), she appeals to facts about scope: the outermost with phrase must
scope over the innermost. In one order, this is natural, because it is clear how a pitchfork
would facilitate the loading of the truck using hay; while in the other case it is not, because
it is unclear how hay could facilitate loading the truck using a pitchfork. This is also her
explanation of facts like those in (44). Regarding the do so test in (45), she appeals to the
notion of which roles are obligatory (profiled, in her terms) with particular verbs and the
construction. If the verb requires its instrument to be obligatorily present at a semantic level,
as she posits load does, then ellipsis might treat them differently.
That said, there is an increasingly popular line of work that attempts to reduce these
apparently disparate uses ofwith to a singlewithwith a single meaning (Jerro 2017; Koenig
et al. 2003, 2007; Rapoport 2014; Rissman 2011). Thus, the criticism that with does not in-
troduce instruments in the spray/load alternation may be defused if we instead replace the
construction in (40b) with one where the meaning of with is defined a bit differently, with-
out drastically changing the core of the analysis. The more general criticisms of Goldberg
(1995, 2002)’s approach thus have more to do with how one views her model of grammar.
More general concerns are raised by the treatment of the with phrase as an adjunct,
regardless of its particular interpretation, as noted by D’Elia (2016). In general, omitting
adjuncts does not result in an entailment regarding the existence of something filling its
role. When such an entailment does result, it is typically taken as evidence of an implicit
argument.
19However, Rissman (2010) reports that subjects in a rating study failed to distinguish between stranded
displaced theme cases like (45b) and stranded instrument cases like (45c).
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(46) a. John ate dinner. ↛ John ate dinner with someone.
b. John ate. → John ate something.
In this way, we conclude that the object of comitative use ofwith is an adjunct, since when a
sentence occurs without a comitative with, no participant corresponding to its object is en-
tailed. In contrast, while the object of the verb eat is omissible, a participant corresponding
to it is entailed, revealing it to be an argument.
In fact, spray/load verbs in goal-object structures entail that a participant corresponding
to the with object exists, even when the with phrase is expressed only optionally.
(47) a. John sprayed the wall. → John sprayed the wall with something.
b. John loaded the truck. → John loaded the truck with something.
(after D’Elia 2016, ch. 2, (190c,e))
This is consistent with the view that the with that occurs with spray/load verbs is an argu-
ment (though, as I argued in chapter 3, footnote 38, it might have a different source).
In addition, adjuncts are typically less selective than arguments. But the with phrases
that occur with spray/load verbs appear to be quite selective, as they cannot occur with a
broad range of predicates.
(48) a. John sprinkled the cake with coconut.
b. ★ Sam placed the table with shopping.
(under the reading “Sam placed shopping on the table.”)
c. ★ I broke the table with books.
d. ★ John rolled the tube with paper.
(under the reading “John rolled the paper onto the tube.”)
If the with-phrase is an adjunct, the reason that it cannot occur with verbs other than spray/
load verbs (and related but non-alternating verbs) is unclear.
How does Goldberg (1995)’s analysis fare with regards to acquisition and the desider-
ata outlined in (11)? Acquisition would likely proceed in much the same way as in Pinker
(1989)’s account, with it consisting of learning how the particular meanings of verbs could
interface with the meanings of the caused-motion and change-of-state constructions. If a
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child has not acquired quite the right meaning for a particular verb, it could lead to them
being able to fuse itwith a construction that it should not be able to fusewith, given itsmean-
ing in the adult grammar. This would lead to the same pattern of initial correctness, which
would take place prior to children acquiring the constructions and associating each verb
with idiosyncratic restrictions, overapplication once the constructions have been learned
but verb senses have not been properly nailed down, and later return to adult usage once
verb senses have been precisified. A possible prediction of Goldberg (1995)’s account is
that there should be correlations between when children acquire the spray/load alternation
and when they acquire other uses of the caused-motion and change-of-state constructions,
since these are what underlie it. But it is possible that this would make the same predic-
tions as the lexical conceptual structure approach, which could account for any correlation
by positing that it is related to when children acquire the correct linking rules.
Regarding the other desiderata, Goldberg (1995)’s analysis fares rather poorer. The
near-paraphrasability of the two structures, and the fact that the goal-object structure asym-
metrically entails the theme-object structure is entirely lost: all the constructions have in
common is that they encode causation of some event (motion or state) and a cause the-
matic role. Unfortunately, the cause argument and meaning is not what is most interesting
with regards to the near-paraphrase relation, which has to do with the interpretations of
the non-subject arguments. In this case, however, the theme of the caused-motion construc-
tion is the correlate of an instrumental adjunct in the change-of-state construction, and the
path of the caused-motion construction is the patient of the change-of-state construction.
Goldberg (2002, 2006) addresses this by claiming that the overlap in meaning between the
structures comes from the verb itself, whichwill of course profile the same theta-roleswhen
it fuses with either construction. But this requires the overlap in meaning to be specified
idiosyncraticallywith each verb—whichmust profile all three arguments for paraphrasabil-
ity to be derived. Thus, this account provides a way of stipulating the near-paraphrasibility
of the structures at the level of individual verbs, but does not derive it.
The predicatibility of which grammatical function is associated with each argument
(i.e., linking) is not addressed explicitly, but we may assume that it is not derived. The
reason for this is that constructions are posited to be non-compositional (except in special
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circumstances where two constructions may be combined). A construction is therefore a
non-decomposable mapping between structure and meaning. What this entails is that the
fact that the cause theta-role in both the caused-motion construction and the change-of-
state construction gets mapped in both cases to Subject is not derivable grammatically—
instead, if there is a general pattern, it must be derivable from pragmatics or non-linguistic
cognitive factors. Goldberg (1995) herself makes this claim, by proposing that construc-
tion-independent linking rules cannot account for all mappings. However, those taking a
lexicalist approach would be no strangers to the fact that stating universal linking prin-
ciples is a difficult task. Nevertheless, there do seem to be linking regularities that hold
across a variety of different syntactic contexts (Baker 1988a; Belletti & Rizzi 1988; Dowty
1991; Kratzer 1996, see), and these would seem to be left entirely unexplained on Goldberg
(1995)’s account.
For similar reasons, the affectedness interpretation of goal objects would be left unex-
plained under Goldberg (1995)’s account. The fact that there is a construction where the
goal is interpreted as changing state does not in fact explain this—it just builds it into the ac-
count axiomatically. In the absence of universal linking rules that link arguments of change
of state events to Object, the affectedness interpretation can only be stated, not derived. The
reasonwemay think of this fact as derived in Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s approach, in con-
trast, is because the linking rules that place the argument of a change of state event in object
position are predicted tomean something outside the particular domain of spray/load verbs.
If this prediction is borne out, wemay ask why the linking rules are this way, but we would
have evidence that they are, and then their existence constitutes the explanation we seek.
Iwata (2008) provides a different kind of Construction Grammar approach (Boas 2003,
see also), where constructions encode event structures rather than theta-roles as in Gold-
berg (1995). However, Iwata (2008)’s analysis ends up being quite similar to Rappaport
& Levin (1988)’s and Pinker (1989)’s. Iwata (2008) proposes that the core locative alterna-
tion constructions describe caused motion (following Goldberg 1995) and caused covering
or filling (as opposed to the more general construction caused change of state). However,
Iwata (2008) places a greater emphasis on lexical meaning and how it relates to a verb’s
ability to occur in particular constructions. Alternating verbs in his approach lexically en-
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code both causedmotion and caused covering/filling, and that is what allows them to occur
in both of the relevant constructions. However, once this meaning has been associated not
with constructions but with particular lexical items, it is unclear how it differs from Rap-
paport & Levin (1988) and Pinker (1989), who also posit these meanings are associated
with lexical items (Beavers 2017). At that point, what is left for the constructions to do is
simply to profile one or the other aspect of the event. But in the end, the alternation is made
possible in the same way it is in lexicalist approaches.
Iwata (2008)’s analysis does cover other ground. Certain verbs do not encode either
caused motion or caused covering/filling, but instead image-schema whose meaning is
augmented by the construction (similarly to how Goldberg (1995) proposes a construction
can unify its theta-roles with those of the verb, or contribute its own). An example is spread,
which encodes an image-schema that represents only a theme that increases gradually in
size over time. This meaning can be combined with the meaning of the caused covering/
filling construction only when the meaning of the theme is compatible with a caused cov-
ering event.
(49) a. He spread glue on the paper.
b. He spread the paper with glue.
c. He spread a map on the bed.
d. # He spread the bed with a map.
(Iwata 2008, ch. 3, (30,32))
It is important to note that although Iwata (2008) uses the term “covering” to describe the
meaning of the related construction, it might be better glossed as “coating,” given what he
says. In this way, the contrast between (49a–49b) and (49c–49d) is explained, because the
meaning of glue is compatible with viewing the spreading as a event of coating the bed,
while this is not possible with a map.20
However, as Beavers (2017) notes, this patternmust also be restricted to particular verbs
to avoid overgeneration, which could be seen as reducing this approach to the lexicalist ap-
20Though of course, if we were to literally interpret the construction as encoding covering, (49d) should be
acceptable, as the map could cover the bed. But analyzing it as encoding coating instead, as Iwata (2008) does
in practice if not in name, resolves this.
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proach from a certain point of view. For instance, load does not show the same restrictions
as spread in this regard, as it does not require its theme to coat the goal (and if we instead
said load required its theme to cover the goal, we would be back to lacking an account for
the infelicitousness of (49d))). However, as I will note later, this is probably not a valid
criticism, as every account recognizes the existence of lexical idiosyncrasy. Thus, even if
Iwata (2008)’s account requires lexically restricting the unification of verbs with particu-
lar constructions, there are still important differences between it and the kind of lexicalist
accounts proposed in Rappaport & Levin (1988) and Brinkmann (1995) and Wunderlich
(1997).
However, this criticism notwithstanding, Iwata (2008)’s approach remains flawed. As
with Goldberg (1995)’s analysis, the fact that constructions are not themselves constructed
means that paraphrasibility, linkingpredictability, and affectedness criteriawill be addressed
inadequately or idiosyncratically rather than in a general way. In addition, the same gen-
eral problems raised for Goldberg (1995, 2002)’s approach in chapters 2 and 3, which show
that the meanings associated with spray/load verbs are syntactically decomposed, apply to
Iwata (2008)’s approach as well (though as with Rappaport & Levin (1988) and Goldberg
(1995) analysis, Iwata (2008) does not make explicit claims about syntactic structure).
5.2.3 Syntactic Approaches
In this section, I discuss several syntactic approaches to the spray/load alternation. Most
of these take the small clause approach sketched in (1), though theydiffer regardingwhether
the P (locative or with), the verb, or both are the head of the small clause. (The exception
is D’Elia (2016), who combines a transitive+PP argument/adjunct approach to the theme-
object structure with a small clause approach to the goal-object structure.) A way in which
we can distinguish them is whether they characterize the relationship between the theme-
object and goal-objects structures as transformational. Larson (1990, 2014) and Damonte
(2005) posit that the goal-object structure is derived from the same underlying structure as
the theme-object structure. In contrast, D’Elia (2016) and Mateu (2000, 2017) propose that
each use is associated with a different underlying structure.
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Of these, I will go through D’Elia (2016)’s analysis in the most detail, as he provides
the greatest number of distinct kinds of syntactic evidence for the structures he proposes.
What is most relevant for me is that he also discusses in some detail several diagnostics that
are problematic for his approach. This will be useful because it turns out that the structural
analysis of spray/load verbs developed in chapter 2 performs no worse than his analysis
on the diagnostics that support his analysis, and in fact accounts for much if not all of the
behavior of spray/load verbs that is problematic for his analysis.
5.2.3.1 Larson (1990, 2014)’s Transformational Approach
Larson (1990, 2014)’s approach to the spray/load alternation is based on his (1988) VP
shell analysis of the dative alternation. This analysis was in turn inspired by certain facts
regarding asymmetries noted by Barss & Lasnik (1986) having to do with c-command rela-
tions between the internal arguments of dative verbs. In particular, a number of diagnostics
seem to show that in both the prepositional dative and double object dative structures, the
linearly first object is higher than the second. I will not review all of their data, but two
relevant examples involve Principle A binding and the licensing of Negative Polarity Items
(NPIs).
(50) Principle A binding:
a. John showed Billi to himselfi.
b. ★ John showed himselfi to Billi.
c. John showed Billi himselfi.
d. ★ John showed himselfi Billi.
(51) NPI licensing:
a. John showed nothing to anyone.
b. ★ John showed anything to no one.
c. John showed no one anything.
d. ★ John showed anyone nothing.
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Barss & Lasnik (1986) suggest that such facts might require reformulating the standard
explanations of anaphor binding and NPI licensing in terms of c-command.
Larson (1988) takes the opposite approach. He argues that we can maintain an expla-
nation of the facts in (50–51) based on c-command if we posit a structure with multiple
embedded VPs. Note that in Larson (1988), subjects were assumed to be generated inter-
nal to the VP (rather than vP). As such, the structures could be modernized to include vP













To account for the double object structure, Larson (1988) proposes that it is derived in a sim-
ilarway to the passive. However, Larson (1988) does not assume that passive is derivational
as is common today. Instead, he assumes that passivization is derived bywhat is essentially
a lexical redundancy rule that allows an argument of a predicate to be expressed as an ad-
junct. What happens in double-object structures is this very process or something much
akin to it, which allows the theme argument to be expressed as an adjunct. This will result
in the goal argument raising into the empty specifier position of VP (which Larson (1988)















Note that since a letter is assumed to be an adjunct in this structure, it does not require Case.
In responding to some criticisms of Larson (1988) by Jackendoff (1990), Larson (1990)
proposes an extension of this basic analysis to other types of alternations, including most
relevantly for present purposes the spray/load alternation. The basic idea is that derivation
of the theme-object structure is like the derivation of the prepositional dative in (52), while
the derivation of the goal-object structure is like the derivation of the double-object dative
in (53). Larson (1990)’s argument for this rests on the fact that scope-freezing occurs in
both double-object datives and goal-object spray/load structures (see also Aoun & Li 1989;
Bruening 2001).
(54) a. Bill gave a book to every student. (∃ > ∀; ∀ > ∃)
b. Bill gave a student every book. (∃ > ∀; ★∀ > ∃)
(55) a. John loaded a box onto every truck. (∃ > ∀; ∀ > ∃)
b. John loaded a truck with every box. (∃ > ∀; ★∀ > ∃)
However, given that Larson (1990) himself does not propose an explanation for this con-
trast, the argument is somewhat weak. The reason for this is the following: double-object
structures make it clear that there are at least some environments in which scope freezing is
forced. But this does not mean that what forces scope freezing in double-object datives and
goal-object spray/load structures must be the same thing. In fact, it would be quite surpris-
ing if there were only one way that scope freezing could arise if it is a resource available to
the grammar. In addition, the parallel is only clearly established between the double-object
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structure and the goal-object structure. The lack of scope freezing in both the prepositional
dative and theme-object structures is less convincing regarding their putative related sta-
tus, since a lack of scope freezing is fairly standard in English in many different syntactic
environments.
Nevertheless, it is possible to strengthen Larson (1990)’s argument, since we can show
that facts like Barss & Lasnik (1986)’s hold for both the theme-object and goal-object struc-
tures (cf. Bruening 2001). In particular, the object in both the theme-object and the goal-ob-
ject structure asymmetrically c-commands the DP inside the following PP.
(56) Principle A binding:
a. John sprayed the wateri onto itselfi.
b. ★ John sprayed itselfi onto the wateri.
c. John sprayed the wateri with itselfi.
d. ★ John sprayed itselfi with the wateri.
(57) NPI licensing:
a. John sprayed nothing onto anything.
b. ★ John sprayed anything onto nothing.
c. John sprayed nothing with anything.
d. ★ John sprayed anything with nothing.
These similarities are more convincing, as they show analogous restrictions hold for both
structures that are claimed to be parallel. In each structure, the object c-commands the PP.
Taking the facts in (56–57) as better evidence for the parallel between the dative alter-
nation and the spray/load alternation, we continue following Larson (1990), who posits the
following derivations for the spray/load alternation. These are of course entirely parallel to
the derivations he posits for dative structures in (52–53), with the exception of the extra
preposition with in the goal-object structure.
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There is a loose end here regarding the status of the preposition onto as well. In par-
ticular, the theme-object structure introduces the goal with a locative preposition, while
the goal-object structure uses no preposition to do so. In regards to this fact, as well as the
presence of with in the goal-object structure, Larson (1990) makes a suggestion that this is
a way in which the spray/load alternation differs from the dative alternation: the spray/load
alternation is essentially the dative alternation but with a locative constant “added on.” The
locative constant shows up as onto or into in the theme-object structure and as with in the
goal-object structure.
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The obligatory presence of the preposition is said to be due to a requirement that it
is recoverable. It seems that what Larson (1990) means by this is that some locative ele-
ment must be expressed overtly, but the point is made somewhat vaguely. Nevertheless,
in the theme-object structure, the locative constant is expressed by the locative preposition;
while in the goal-object structure, the passivization process by which the verb “absorbs”
this preposition would render the locative element unrecoverable were it not expressed
in some alternative way. With expresses this locative constant, satisfying the recoverability
requirement. Larson (1990) proposes that the choice of with has to do with the notion of
central coincidence, which describes situations in which the centers of two entities are iden-
tified as located in the same space (up to pragmatic restrictions) (see also Hale 1986 and
Rapoport 2014, as well as the discussion in chapter 4, section 4.2).
In this context, it is worth clarifying the reason we may consider Larson (1990)’s anal-
ysis transformational, despite the existence of two different underlying structures. This is
because the relative positions of the two arguments, modulo the presence/absence of the
prepositions that go along with them, start off the same. The theme is higher than the goal
in both structures. Thus, the differences between the structures boil down to the application
of P-absorption (roughly equivalent to passivization according to Larson (1990)’s charac-
terization) and the movement and alternate expression of the locative component of spray/
load verbs’ meanings that results.
Many of the shortcomings of Larson (1990)’s account have to do with the context in
which he proposes it, which is a defense of his (1988) analysis of the dative alternation.
As such, his concerns are not about capturing facts related to the spray/load alternation
specifically, but instead about establishing the plausibility of the VP shell approach more
generally. For this reason, he simply does not directly address the concerns that Rappaport
& Levin (1988) raise in (11). Nevertheless, we can consider how his approach might fare
according to those criteria.
Regarding acquisition, it seems clear that Larson (1990)’s approach would account for
it as the result of the rule that allows an argument to be expressed as an adjunct. Recall
that according to Larson (1990), this rule is implicated in passivization and the formation
of double-object datives and goal-object spray/load structures. Thus, we might expect chil-
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dren to begin applying this process productively in all these domains at roughly the same
time. As Larson (1990)’s concerns are not with acquisition, he simply does not provide data
relevant to this point.
Regarding productivity and its limitations, Larson (1990)’s account is simply inade-
quate. He proposes that the theme-object structure is basic, and that the goal-object struc-
ture is derived by a rule akin (if not identical) to passivization.21 However, passivization
is highly productive, while the formation of goal-object structures is less so. Passivization
can apply to essentially any verb that assigns accusative Case, while deriving a goal-object
structure from a theme-object structure seems to be restricted on semantic grounds (re-
call Pinker (1989)’s manner/ result distinction). In addition, passivization is rarely obliga-
tory,22 while many verbs occur in only goal-object structures (Levin 1993, sec. 9.8). Thus,
we would have to posit that this operation is obligatory for particular verbs more often
when it forms goal-object structures than when it forms passives.
More pressingly, there are semantic restrictions on the formation of double-object da-
tives, which require the indirect object to be a potential possessor of the theme (e.g., Beck
& Johnson 2004; Gropen et al. 1989; Harley 2002; Oehrle 1976; Pesetsky 1995, a.m.o.).
21Larson (1988) himself identifies this rule as identical to passivization. But in the interest of evaluation
the core features of his analysis, we might suppose it is not, especially given that Larson (2014) admits that
identifying this operationwith passivization became untenable in light of work following his original proposal.
22There are a few scattered examples of verbs in English that might only have passive uses; rumor is perhaps
the most common example.
(i) a. The player was rumored by fans to be out sick.
b. ★ Fans rumored the player to be out sick.
Note that this is to be distinguished fromwager-class verbs (e.g., Kayne 1984; Postal 1974), which show a similar
pattern, but whose active uses can be licensed by A-movement of the object.
(ii) a. ★ John wagered Bill to be the best.
b. Bill was wagered to be the best.
c. Who did John wager to be the best?
In contrast, active uses of rumor are not rescued by A-movement.
(iii) ★ Who did fans rumor to be out sick?
Thus, rumor appears to only be licensed in passive uses. However, regarding the main point, it is clear that
rumor is quite exceptional in this regard; very few verbs exist that allow only passive uses, while many exist
that allow only goal-object uses; see Levin (1993, secs. 8.1, 9.8).
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(59) a. John sent a package to the border.
b. John sent a package to the boarder.
c. # John sent the border a package.
d. John sent the boarder a package.
(Gropen et al. 1989, citing Joan Bresnan’s 1978 lecture notes)
However, these semantic restrictions are different from the semantic conditions on the al-
ternation of spray/load verbs, which seem to have less to do with properties of the goal,
and more to do with whether the verb receives a manner or a result reading. As such, it is
difficult to claim that the same rule is responsible for the formation of both double-object
datives and goal-object spray/load verbs.While it is possible to claim that a rule relates these
structures, it would have to be a bespoke rule,with particular semantic and syntactic effects.
This need to posit such a rule would do away with much of Larson (1990)’s motivation for
treating the spray/load alternation as a special case of the dative alternation.
Larson (1990)’s analysis intuitively accounts for the near-paraphrasability of both struc-
tures and their linking properties, as both structures are underlyingly nearly identical, with
the only difference being in which kind of locative relation they express and how they ex-
press it. However, given that it is difficult to determine what a compositional semantics for
Larson (1990)’s structures would look like, it is difficult to establish that this claim goes
beyond the intuition. In fact, Larson (1990) seems to assume that the syntax projects from
a verb’s theta-grid, with the possibility of two structures being due to the possibility of the
passive-like rule that adjusts how the projection occurs.23 However, this operation does not
affect the verb’s meaning nor its list of theta-roles—especially if we take it to be analogous
to passivization, which affects neither truth-conditional meaning nor thematic structure.
As such, there is a way of understanding Larson (1990)’s approach where each structure
is predicted to have very close to the same meanings, with the only slight difference com-
ing from the insertion of an appropriate locative preposition to satisfy the verb’s need to
project a locative constant syntactically. Note that this preposition in Larson (1990)’s ap-
proach is crucially not inserted to license Case on the theme in the goal-object structure, as
23Thus, despite Larson (1990) providing explicit syntactic structures—an advantage over Rappaport & Levin
(1988)’s and Brinkmann (1995)’s accounts—his account is in many ways a lexicalist one.
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he assumes that the theme in this structure is an adjunct and as such does not need Case
(cf. (53)).
Thus, Larson (1990) predicts that both structures should differ only in themeaning con-
tributed by the choice of locative preposition, which must project because the verb projects
a locative constant. But this is problematic, given that this locative constant does not always
need to project overtly.
(60) a. John sprayed the paint.
b. John sprayed the wall.
While there may be differences in whether the missing PP in the above examples is inter-
preted as existential or indefinite, this is not relevant to Larson (1990)’s claims, who pro-
poses that the locative constant must project or else it will be unrecoverable. However, it
is clear that this is not the case: the locative component may project covertly or not at all,
at least for some verbs. This means that even in its absence, it is recoverable. If this is the
case, we may then ask why it cannot project covertly in the goal-object structure when the
theme is overt, too, producing the following:
(61) ★ John sprayed the wall the paint.
When considered in this way, Larson (1990)’s suggestion that the difference between dou-
ble-object datives and goal-object spray/load structures reduces to the presence of an obli-
gatorily projected locative constant in the latter becomes untenable.
Larson (1990) addresses the holistic effect only indirectly, but his suggestion is essen-
tially the one I adopted in chapter 4, section 4.2 about with expressing a meaning of central
coincidence. My approach thus constitutes a development of this idea, based on further
work by Rapoport (2014).
5.2.3.2 Damonte (2005)’s Transformational Approach
Damonte (2005) takes a different kind of syntactic approach from Larson (1990, 2014),
drawing inspiration from Brinkmann (1995), Wunderlich (1997), and especially Grone-
meyer (1995).24 He does not model the structures in which spray/load verbs are found as
24Damonte (2005)’s approach basically represents a modernization of Gronemeyer (1995), who bases her
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transitive with a PP argument/adjunct, as Larson (1990, 2014) does. Instead, he posits a
small clause syntax as in (1). But like Larson (1990, 2014), Damonte (2005) posits that the
relationship between the theme-object and goal-object structures is derivational, with the












(after Damonte 2005, (4b))
FollowingBaker (1988a)’sUniformity of Theta-AssignmentHypothesis (UTAH),Damonte
(2005) posits that (62) is the only possible underlying structure that the arguments of load
(and other spray/load verbs) can project in. The UTAH states that arguments bearing iden-
tical theta-roles are linked to identical underlying structural positions. In effect, then, Da-
monte (2005) is breaking from Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s and Goldberg (1995)’s claims
that the arguments bear different theta-roles in each structure.25 Instead, he aligns himself
with Brinkmann (1995) and Wunderlich (1997), who claim that both structures predicate
the same theta-roles of their arguments.
The goal-object structure is derived from the structure in (62) by movement. However,
the surface order is one inwhich the goal precedes the theme. Under a standard viewwhere
“rightward is downward” (Kayne 1994), this leads to a problem, since the goal is lower than
the theme. Given standard assumptions about movement, a lower phrase of the same type
as a higher phrase cannot generally be targeted for movement (see, e.g., Rizzi 1990). In
analysis on Baker (1988a,b)’s approach to incorporation. The derivation of the goal-object structure inDamonte
(2005)’s approach also bears many similarities to Collins (2005)’s approach to the passive.
25Though n.b. that in Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s analysis the argument corresponding to the goal occurs in
multiple positions in the lexical conceptual structure of the goal-object structure, being both the argument of a
change of state and the goal of a motion event. Thus, while the theta-roles the goal bears in each structure are
not identical, they are overlapping, since the same argument is an argument ofmore than one lexical conceptual
predicate. This bears some similarities to my approach, where the object is an argument of the V (consisting of
the root and a functional head) and a small clause predicate (most often a PP).
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order to allow for this, Damonte (2005) proposes that load can license a small clause with










Following a proposal fromChomsky (1993), thismakes Spec,VP equally distant from either













To account for the fact that the theme surfaces in a PP headed by with, Damonte (2005)
proposes that with can be generated higher in the functional structure, and that the theme
moves to the specifier of a case projection, KP, to receive Case.





















At this point, we have not derived the correct word order; if the sentence were to be pro-
nounced as shown, it would correspond to, e.g., I with the sand the truck loaded, which is not
the right result. In regards to deriving the right word order, Damonte (2005) stops being as
detailed at this point, but I will follow what he says, even in the absence of him providing
explicit structures for each step.
First, he suggests that following movement of the theme to Spec,KP, the functional pro-
jection immediately belowKPmoves to Spec,PPwith. Since he does not specifywhether there
are functional projections betweenAgrOP andKP, I will assume that AgrOP is immediately



















Finally, the verbmoves out of the VP—Iwill assume that it moves to v, but Damonte (2005)
is not specific, saying only that it moves to “check its features” (Damonte 2005, (24ii)).27
27Damonte (2005) seems to indicate that this movement occurs before movement of the theme to Spec,KP
and thus presumably before movement of Spec,AgrOP to Spec,PPwith. However, if we understand that move-
ment expands the tree as it is created by Merge, then I do not see how this works, since the verb will have to
move to a position higher than Spec,PPwith to be pronounced in the correct position. It might not be a problem if
we assume that movement can occur between embedded parts of structures that have already been generated.



























At this point, the derivation proceeds as normal.
With the basic steps of the derivation outlined, Damonte (2005) turns his attention to
the holistic effect. Regarding this point, Damonte (2005) notes that in Italian, it is possible
to use either con ‘with’ or di ‘of,’ unlike in English. Interestingly, the choice of prepositions
has implications for the quantificational properties of the theme argument: when con ‘with’
is used,mass and bare plural themes are degraded; when di ‘of’ is used, they are acceptable.
The opposite is true for definite themes, which are only compatible with con ‘with.’
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“I have loaded the truck of the sand.” (lit.)






























“I have loaded the truck of sand / tubes.” (lit.)
Damonte (2005) proposes that in the di ‘of’ variant, the theme denotes a property and as
such incorporates into the verb (cf. Chung & Ladusaw 2004; van Geenhoven 1998). He im-











Damonte (2005) follows Baker (1988a)’s proposal that a DP from which an abstract noun
(or classifier) has incorporated does not need structural Case, and thus in this instance, the
themeDPwill notmove to Spec,KP to receiveCase. Of course, since the theme surfaceswith
the overt preposition di ‘of,’ this is somewhat mysterious—Damonte (2005) proposes that
di ‘of’ is generated internal to the DP (perhaps it heads a KP selected by CL). Thus, while the
DP from which the classifier incorporates does not need to be Case licensed, the DP inside
28I have collapsed two of Damonte (2005)’s examples here; he reports that mass nouns receive a judgment
of ‘?★ ’ in this case, while bare plurals are “evenmore” degraded, which he represents as ‘★ .’ His analysis treats
both as equally ungrammatical.
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it (sand, in this instance) could be Case-licensed by di ‘of.’ This hypothesis predicts that
di ‘of’ should have other uses in Italian that correspond to English with, which Damonte
(2005) says is borne out (though he does not provide specific examples).
Because the incorporated classifier restricts the set of possible themes, Damonte (2005)
proposes the DP that stays behind can be an empty category, explaining why the theme can
be omitted in the goal-object structure despite being an argument. (He does not provide
an example of this in Italian, but of course it is clearly possible in English: cf. John loaded the
truck).
The analysis predicts that in Italian, only the di ‘of’ variant should show the holistic
effect. The reason for this that Damonte (2005) provides is that di is only possible when the
theme is non-referential and denotes a property, as described above. As a result, it cannot
measure out the event, only the goal (which denotes an entity) can. This is what Damonte
(2005) claims leads to the holistic effect, and accounts for its absence in sentences with con
‘with.’




























“I have loaded the truck with the sand.”
(Damonte 2005, (34))
To account for the holistic effect in English, despite the fact that with is used, Damonte
(2005) proposes that the goal-object structure is ambiguous between the structure where
the thememoves to Spec,KP and the structure where the classifier incorporates. The under-
lying structure depends on whether the theme is definite or not: if it is definite, then the
structure is the one without classifier incorporation, and the holistic effect should not arise.
In contrast, if the theme is indefinite, then the structure is the classifier incorporation struc-
ture and the holistic effect should arise. He reports that this is borne out in the following
sentences from English and German, according to his consultants (though I disagree with
the English judgments, agreeing instead with the judgments reported in Beavers (2017)
that are endorsed in most work on the spray/load alternation).
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(71) a. I loaded the truck with sand.
b. I loaded the truck with the sand.




























“I loaded the truck with the sand.”
In the (a) examples, the holistic effect holds, while in the (b) examples, it does not. The
reason for this is that when the theme is a predicate, its quantity is, naturally, unspecified.
This means that only the capacity of the goal is available to define the endpoint of the event.
Furthermore, since a dropped theme can only be licensed in the classifier incorporation
structure, when the theme is dropped, the holistic effect should be present, which seems to
be true.
(73) I loaded the three-ton truck, # but only used one ton of hay.
Damonte (2005) suggests that these facts are related to Brinkmann (1995)’s nonindividu-
ation hypothesis (see section 5.2.1.2). However, rather than nonindividuation being nec-
essary to a verb taking a goal as its object, as it is for Brinkmann (1995), it is a necessary
condition for the holistic effect. Instead, the ability of a verb to take its goal as an object is
due to P-incorporation.
While Damonte (2005) motivates his approach based on linking, and spends much of
his paper addressing the holistic effect, he does not explicitly address acquisition and pro-
ductivity. We may assume that acquisition of the alternation consists of children acquiring
P-incorporation under his account. Then, presumably children’s overextension errors come
about when they assume that any verb that occurs with the underlying syntax in (62) can
license P-incorporation, when only some can. Thismakes a testable prediction that children
should acquire other uses of P-incorporation around the same time as they acquire the loca-
tive alternation in a productive way. Of course, given that Damonte (2005)’s approach is a
kind of syntactification of Brinkmann (1995) and Wunderlich (1997)’s lexicalist approach,
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the predictions in this regard are largely similar, making it hard to use them to distinguish
the two.
It is unclear how Damonte (2005)’s analysis would account for the fact that some verbs
occur in only one or the other structure, and the relation of this to manner and result that
Pinker (1989) identifies. One would have to posit that verbs that have only a manner read-
ing never license null prepositions, while verbs that have only a result reading license only
null prepositions. This is because otherwise, the underlying structures for each would be
the same. Positing a link between manner and result and overt and null prepositions that
occur in otherwise identical structures is an odd notion, which is presumably why he at-
tempts to show that the result reading is an epiphenomenon that arises due to the semantic
properties of structures that license classifier incorporation.
Given that both structures start off as underlyingly the same, Damonte (2005)’s ap-
proach clearly provides some explanation for the near-paraphrasability of the theme-object
and goal-object structures. In fact, in the goal-object structure with a definite theme, the
paraphrase should be exact, with each variant entailing the other (provided the denotation
of the overt preposition matches the denotation of the null preposition, which Damonte
(2005) seems to assume). This is because no semantic differences are implicated in the
derivation of the definite theme goal-object structure. In contrast, the paraphrase should
be only approximate only when the theme is indefinite, since in this case the structure is
derived by classifier incorporation, with the small difference in meaning being due to the
holistic effect in the way he describes.
However, despite the judgments Damonte (2005) reports from his consultants, it is not
clear that this is the case. Beavers (2006, 2017) explicitly notes the importance of control-
ling for the definiteness of the theme. But in the judgments he reports in (19–20) show, the
holistic effect is present even when the theme is definite. This is a problem for Damonte
(2005)’s proposal regarding the possible reinterpretation of Brinkmann (1995)’s nonindi-
viduation hypothesis, since it undermines his entire explanation of the holistic effect. His
explanation crucially links the holistic effect to the theme being interpreted as a predicate,
which should only be possible when it is not definite. In contrast, it does not directly under-
mine Brinkmann (1995)’s statement of the nonindividuation hypothesis, since her formu-
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lation only proposes that the quantificational properties of the theme are irrelevant when
the theme is omitted, not when the theme is overt and definite.
In addition, despite the initial motivation of his approach being a rigid approach to link-
ing rules, it is not clear that it adequately addresses the predictability of where the various
arguments arise on the surface. Underlyingly, all arguments are linked to the identical un-
derlying positions, due to Damonte (2005)’s adoption of Baker (1988a)’s UTAH as a guid-
ing principle. But this does not account for where each of those arguments surfaces, which
is what Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s criterion describes. Instead, much of his approach is
posited in an ad hoc way to ensure that the correct word order can be achieved in the goal-
object structure, with only the theme-object structure having predictable linking. What is,
for instance, the independent motivation for the existence of KP, for the position of with
above it, and for the movement of (at least) AgrOP to with’s specifier? These functional
projections would require independent support to ensure that they are not simply ad hoc
ways of deriving the correct order.
Despite these weaknesses of Damonte (2005)’s approach, it is quite valuable. In particu-
lar, his syntactification of Brinkmann (1995)’s approach provides a compellingway ofmod-
eling the near-paraphrase relation between the theme-object and goal-object structures.
Most of the problems regarding the use of functional projections and the holistic effect are
related to the fact that he relates the theme-object structure to the goal-object structure via
movement. Movement alone does not affect semantics, so he must posit that certain move-
ments only occur when certain semantic criteria are met. Of course, the reason Damonte
(2005) must use movement is related to his desire to explain the near-paraphrasability of
the two structures in a syntactic approach, coupled with Baker (1988a)’s UTAH. If we re-
ject the UTAH, then we no longer need to posit that the relation between the theme-object
and goal-object structure is transformational. This is, in fact, the view that themost popular
syntactic approaches to argument structure take nowadays (see, e.g., Alexiadou et al. 2015;
Beck & Johnson 2004; Borer 2005b; Embick 2004; Folli & Harley 2005, 2007, 2020; Hale &
Keyser 1993a, 2002, 2005; Harley 2002, 2008, 2011, 2013; Kratzer 1996; Kratzer:1994 1994;
Marantz 1984; Pylkkänen 2002, 2008; Ramchand 2008). Under this view, rather than lexical
meanings containing information that is projected into structures, structures produce par-
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ticular kinds of meanings. The fact that Agents are in the specifier of vP, for instance, is not
because of a linking rule that requires Agents to be placed in there. Instead, when some-
thing is merged in Spec,vP, the semantics of v result in it being interpreted as an Agent.
As a result, linking rules are no longer required, and the UTAH is redundant, as it derives
from the syntactic and semantic properties of functional heads.29 Predictability then goes
the other way around: rather than predicting an argument’s position from its meaning, we
predict its meaning from its position (relative to other syntactic elements).
If we no longer have thismotivation to retain a transformational analysis, it is possible to
make use of the basic idea of P-incorporation, while hopefully addressing some of the prob-
lems that result from the derivational approach. This iswhat I hope to have accomplished in
chapters 3 and 4 by proposing a non-derivational P-conflation analysis. This allowedme to
address the holistic effect and avoid some of the problems of Damonte (2005)’s approach.
The data motivating the non-derivational approach I take was presented in chapter 2,
where I showed that in both the theme-object and goal-object structures, it is possible to
modify a constituent consisting of the verb and its object. Under a derivational approach,
this is not expected to be possible, especially when adopting the small clause structure that
Damonte (2005) does. Thus, my approach improves on the basic idea behind Damonte
(2005)’s P-incorporating/conflation analysis, while addressing the disadvantages noted
above.
5.2.3.3 D’Elia (2016)’s Non-transformational Approach
D’Elia (2016)’s approach differs from Larson (1990, 2014)’s and Damonte (2005)’s in
that he proposes that the underlying structures of theme-object and goal-object uses of
spray/load verbs are different. His proposal rests on a particular implementation of Perl-
mutter & Postal (1984)’s Universal Alignment Hypothesis, which proposes that arguments
higher on an ordered hierarchy of theta-roles are always initially projected in positions
higher than arguments lower on this hierarchy (cf. example (6) earlier this chapter and
surrounding discussion). The implementation of theUAH thatD’Elia (2016) adopts is Rein-
29Though note that in Borer (2005a,b, 2013)’s system, it is the syntax that derives the semantics—though she
is not explicit about how compositionality works using standard terminology.
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hart (1996, 2000, 2002, 2016)’s theta system.
The theta system differs from previous approaches to theta-role hierarchies in that it
treats theta-roles as feature clusters consisting of the binary and privative features [±c]
(cause) and [±m] (mental awareness). The details are not relevant to evaluating the merits
of D’Elia (2016)’s approach to the spray/load alternation, which only makes reference to
two theta-roles: [−m] (Source or Subject Matter) and [−c] (Goal, Recipient, or Benefactor).
I will continue the discussion of D’Elia (2016)’s analysis by using the terms “Source” and
“Goal” to refer to these feature values, with the only difference related to this being in how
his analysis relates to the theta system more generally, which is beside the main point of
this section.
The upshot of D’Elia (2016)’s implementation of Reinhart (2002)’s theta system is that
arguments are projected in a way consistent with a theta-role hierarchy that places Goal
higher than Source. This means that both the theme-object and goal-object structures must
place the Source lower than the Goal. This leads D’Elia (2016) to adopt essentially the mir-
ror image of Larson (1990, 2014)’s analysis. Recall that Larson (1990) proposed that the
Goal uniformly occurred lower than the Source/Theme in the initial structure, as in (58).
D’Elia (2016) proposes precisely the opposite, as shown in (74).30
30D’Elia (2016)’s goal-object structure does not include v, in contrast to Larson (2014)’s update to Larson
(1990)’s analysis. For this reason, I have not included v in these structures like I did in the discussion of Larson



























As shown, the Goal projects in a position higher than the Source in both structures, re-
gardless of whether it projects as a DP or a PP. Because of this move, D’Elia (2016)’s anal-
ysis is not transformational like Larson (1990, 2014)’s: while the verb still moves in both
of these analyses, the goal only moves in Larson (1990, 2014)’s approach. Larson (1990,
2014) must require the Goal to move higher than the Theme/Source in order to capture the
facts about frozen scope in (54–55), while these facts require no additional movement in
D’Elia (2016)’s account. In addition, movement of the verb to a higher projection does not
take place in the Theme/Source object structure, unlike in Larson (1990, 2014)’s approach,
where both structures involve VP shells. In this, D’Elia (2016) follows Janke & Neeleman
(2012), who propose that both VP shell and non-VP shell structures are possible.
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5.2.3.3.1 Evidence
I will return to the questions of how D’Elia (2016)’s approach fares with regards to
the desiderata in (11) in section 5.2.3.3.3. Before this, it is worth exploring one of the ad-
vantages of D’Elia (2016)’s presentation of his approach in detail. In particular, he collects
evidence from numerous syntactic diagnostics that bear on the correct structural analysis
of the goal-object structure, which represents an improvement over previous approaches.
What is particularly nice about his presentation of this evidence is that he presents not only
much data that supports his view, but also much data that is problematic for it. He leaves
the problems posed by the problematic data unresolved. Nevertheless, it is worth present-
ing these data because it will allow the reader to see that the analysis I presented in chapter
2 naturally accounts for them, despite my approach being motivated by concerns entirely
different from D’Elia (2016)’s. In this way, D’Elia (2016)’s data, including the data that are
problematic for him, provide additional independent support for my structural analysis of
spray/load verbs.
Some of this evidence we have seen already; for instance, he cites the well-known scope
freezing facts presented in (54–55), repeated here for convenience.
(75) a. John loaded a box onto every truck. (∃ > ∀; ∀ > ∃)
b. John loaded a truck with every box. (∃ > ∀; ★∀ > ∃)
These facts indicate that the goal is structurally higher than the theme in the goal-object
structure. Even though the structural analysis itself does not explain why QR of the theme
is impossible in the goal-object structure, it is consistent with the only scope possibility that
exists.
Additional evidence for the goal scoping over the theme in the goal-object structure
comes from the unavailability of pair-list readings of wh-questions. Pair-list readings are
only possible when a quantifier scopes over some position in which the wh-word occurs
(Aoun & Li 1989; May 1988).
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(76) a. Which booki did you give ti to every student? (Pair-list)
b. Which sheeti did he drape ti over every armchair? (Pair-list)
(Bruening 2001, (5))
As can be seen in (76b), a pair-list reading is possible for the theme-object structure of
spray/load verbs—in this case, with the verb drape. In contrast, this is not possible in the
goal-object structure.
(77) a. Which studenti did you give ti every book? (★Pair-list)
b. Which armchairi did he drape ti with every sheet? (★Pair-list)
c. Which walli did he spray ti with every color of paint? (★Pair-list)
(Bruening 2001, (6))
(78) a. Which sheeti did he drape every armchairi with ti? (Pair-list)
b. Which color of painti did he spray every wall with ti? (Pair-list)
D’Elia (2016) does not provide the relevant minimal pairs in (78) to establish that the goal
c-commands the theme in the goal-object structure, but they seem to indicate that it does.
In addition, the goal can bind a variable in the theme in the theme-object structure, but
the theme cannot bind a variable in the goal in the goal-object structure.
(79) a. Maud draped a sheet that matched itsi color over every armchairi.
b. ★ Maud draped an armchair that matched itsi color with every sheeti.
(Bruening 2001, (13))
(80) a. Maud draped every sheeti over an armchair that matched itsi color.
b. Maud draped every armchairi with a sheet that matched itsi color.
Again, the minimal contrasting examples in (80) are not provided by D’Elia (2016), but
they pattern as expected under his approach. Note, however, that these patterns show us
only a fact about the goal-object structure, which is that in the structure that the semantics
interprets, the goal is be c-commanded by the theme. It does not tell us much about the
theme-object structure, since QR of the goal might be possible in that structure, barring
some reason to think it is not. As we will continue to see, much of the evidence for the
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theme-object structure that D’Elia (2016) proposes in (74a) is simply equivocal, not saying
much conclusively one way or the other.
The next piece of evidence D’Elia (2016) discusses is deverbal event nominalizations.
He presents data that shows that the theme-object structure has an event nominalization,
while the goal-object structure does not.
(81) a. The loading of the hay onto the wagon
b. The loading of the wagon with hay (reported as ★ in D’Elia 2016)
(D’Elia 2016, (226a,229a))
However, while it seems clear that the theme-object event nominalization in (81a) is possi-
ble, I strongly disagree with the judgment he reports for (81b). I find this example entirely
acceptable, and in fact quite unremarkable. A quick Google search of "loading of the
wagon with" revealed around 10,500 results, most of which were relevant naturally occur-
ring counterexamples. Replacing wagon with truck returned even more results—around
85,800. All of these occurred in various contexts, including in job descriptions and in le-
gal proceedings and websites. I conclude that the judgment reported for (81b) is simply
mistaken.
What is more interesting about these event nominalizations is a contrast that D’Elia
(2016) does not make much of, given that it is masked by the ungrammatical judgment
reported in (81b). Interestingly, I agree with this contrast: in a theme-object event nomi-
nalization, the theme can promote to become a genitive, while the goal cannot do so in a
goal-object event nominalization.
(82) a. The paint’s spraying onto the wall
b. ★ The wall’s spraying with the paint
(D’Elia 2016, (227a′,230a′))31
The analysis of the goal-object structure I proposed in chapter 3 that explained this contrast
by means of a null preposition that is present in the goal-object structure.
31Note that the original example in D’Elia (2016)’s (222a′) reads the paint’s spraying of the wall; while this
is grammatical, it is likely to have a source different from the theme-object structure, given the absence of the
locative preposition. I do not know whether this was a typo or intentional in the original.
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Another piece of evidence D’Elia (2016) provides has to do with do so anaphora, which
can replace a verb and its object, and optionally adjuncts as well.32 Crucially, do so must
include a verb’s object; the object cannot be a contrastive remnant.
(83) a. John ate dinner at five, and Bill did so at six.
b. ★ John ate lunch at noon, and Bill did so dinner at six.
D’Elia (2016) shows that in the theme-object structure, do so obligatorily includes the theme;
and he claims that in the goal-object structure, it must include both the theme and the goal.
(84) Source/Theme-object:
a. If John stacked the books onto anything, he did so onto shelves.
b. ★ If John stacked anything onto shelves, he did so the books.
(D’Elia 2016, (243a,c))
(85) Goal-object:
a. ★ If John sprayed the wall with anything, he did so the paint.
b. ★ If John sprayed anything with the paint, he did so the wall.
(D’Elia 2016, (247a,b))
32D’Elia (2016) also provides examples of sluicing andmultiple sluicing, but both structures seem to behave
identically, making the diagnostic of limited utility. I present the examples here for completeness.
(i) a. John loaded something onto the truck but I don’t know what.
b. John loaded the boxes onto something but I don’t know what.
c. John loaded the truck with something but I don’t know what.
d. John loaded something with boxes but I don’t know what.
(D’Elia 2016, (234))
(ii) a. John loaded somebody onto something but I don’t know who onto what.
(e.g., a passenger onto a plane)
b. John loaded somebody with something but I don’t know who with what.
(e.g., a workman with tools to carry)
(D’Elia 2016, (238))
D’Elia (2016) reports that (ii-b) is onlymarginally acceptable for him, but I do not share this judgment; it seems
fully acceptable to me. Perhaps loading a person with something instead of a goal could be considered an odd
scenario, which might be responsible. Replacing somebodywith something andwhowith what is also fine for me,
though of course saying what with what is not stylistically great.
(iii) John loaded something with something, but I don’t knowwhat with what. (e.g., a truck with boxes)
Since I do not have the original contrast, I cannot say whether this is relevant to the judgment D’Elia (2016)
reports.
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D’Elia (2016) takes the ungrammaticality of (85a) to indicate that the verb and both argu-
ments form a constituent in the goal-object structure, while the verb and only the theme or
the verb and only the goal do not. However, it is unclear that this is what the data really
show. In particular, adding with to a sentence like (85a) produces an acceptable sentence.
(86) If John sprayed the wall with anything, he did so with the paint.
This is entirely expected, since contrastive remnants of do so anaphora cannot omit prepo-
sitions.
(87) ★ Bill ate dinner at five, and Bill did so six. (cf. (83a))
All that (85a) shows then, is that this well-known property of do so anaphora applies no
less in goal-object structures than anywhere else. It does not show that a constituent in the
goal-object structure that includes the verb and the goal must also include the theme.
The final piece of evidence that D’Elia (2016) provides to support his analysis has to do
with floating quantifiers. A floated quantifier is possible after the object in both structures.
(88) a. Sam loaded the boxes all into the lorry.
b. Sam loaded the trucks all with the boxes.
(D’Elia 2016, (251a,253a))
It is unclear to me exactly how this supports his argument, given that he does not posit that
the (surface) object in either structuremoves in away thatwould strand a quantifier. In fact,
he explicitly distinguishes his analysis from Larson (1990, 2014)’s by claiming that theme-
objects do not move. But this leaves the origin of the floated quantifier in (88a) mysterious.
Similarly mysterious is how the goal-object can strand a quantifier in (88b)—especially
given D’Elia (2016)’s claim that the verb moves to assign it Case in its base position. This
would seem to indicate that it should not have reason to move to a higher position in a way
that would strand a quantifier.
To be fair to D’Elia (2016), most of the data he provides is not directly aimed at sup-
porting his analysis of the spray/load alternation. Instead, his goal is to provide a unified
analysis of the spray/load alternation and the dative alternation, based on Janke & Neele-
man (2012)’s analysis of the latter. This means that the majority of the data he provides is
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aimed as establishing that there exists a parallel between the double-object dative structure
and the goal-object spray/load structure, rather than establishing evidence for the particu-
lar structural analysis he advocates. In the end, given the problematic data related to event
nominalizations and do so anaphora, the clearest data provided has to do with scope: in
the goal-object structure, the goal c-commands the theme, as shown by frozen scope, the
unavailability of pair-list readings, and the impossibility of variable binding from the latter
into the former. Crucially, the flexible scope and variable binding afforded in the theme-
object structure does not tell us anything except that QR of the goal is possible in those
structures. Since QR is generally possible, we glean little evidence for D’Elia (2016)’s pro-
posed theme-object structure one way or the other as a result.
5.2.3.3.2 Problems
In addition to providing evidence that D’Elia (2016) claims to support his analysis, he
also provides much data that inveighs against it. What these data seem to show is that the
goal in the goal-object structure does indeed form a constituent with the verb that excludes
the theme. They also show that movement of the goal in the goal-object structure is more
restricted than movement of the theme. Of course, the analysis I presented in chapters 2
and 3 is consistent with much of these data, and in others intentionally designed to explain
these exceptions, while retaining an explanation of the data that support D’Elia (2016)’s
approach.
The first fact that D’Elia (2016) notes is that the theme can become a subject of non-
agentive uses of spray/load verbs, but the goal cannot.
(89) a. The paint sprayed onto the wall. (unaccusative)
b. The paint sprayed the wall. (non-agentive transitive)
c. ★ The wall sprayed with the paint.
d. ★ The wall sprayed the paint.
(D’Elia 2016, (263,265b))
The analysis in chapter 3 explained these facts by proposing that a null preposition conflates
with the verb in the goal-object structure. This results in restrictions on the movement of
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the goal.




Interestingly, he also notes that either argument can be the complement of of in an -ing
nominal—nearly contradicting the ungrammatical judgment he reported for (81b) that I
earlier disputed.
(91) a. The loading of hay
b. The loading of trucks
(D’Elia 2016, (272))
Interestingly, in at least some cases, prepositions can be absorbed in synthetic compounds
(Roeper & Siegel 1978; Tom Roeper, p.c.).
(92) a. ballroom-dancing (dance in a ballroom)
b. pan-frying (fry in a pan)
c. sky-diving (dive through the sky)
d. spoon-feeding (feed with a spoon)
Thus, my analysis that posits P-conflation is not inconsistent with both theme and goals
allowing for compounding. However, given these sorts of facts, it is unclear that D’Elia
(2016)’s analysis predicts the wrong thing here—rather than (90b) telling us that the goal
is an object, it could just be that the preposition introducing the goal in the theme-object
structure can be absorbed by compounding. As such, this diagnostic can teach us little.
D’Elia (2016) also shows that when spray/load verbs occur with particles, the word right
can modify the particle only when it occurs after the object.
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(93) a. ★ He loaded right up the goods onto the wagon.
b. He loaded the goods right up onto the wagon.
c. ★ Peter loaded right up the wagon with the goods.
d. Peter loaded the wagon right up with the goods.
(D’Elia 2016, (275a,b; 276a,b))
Interestingly, this also occurs with particles with non-spray/load verbs.
(94) a. John looked up the number.
b. John looked the number up.
c. ★ John looked right up the number.
d. John looked the number right up.
Assuming that right can only modify a stranded particle as the data here show, the analysis
I provide in chapter 2 is consistent with these facts, if we assume that one thing I did not
show is movement of the object to a higher position where it receives structural Case.
Finally, D’Elia (2016) provides evidence from various A-movements: wh-movement,
tough movement, and relativization. Interestingly, there is a difference between double-
object dative structures and goal-object spray/load structures. In the former, A-movement
of the recipient is degraded (Hornstein & Weinberg 1981); while in the latter, A-movement
of the goal is perfectly acceptable.33
(95) Wh-movement:
a. ? Who did John give a book?
b. What did John load with the books?
(96) Tough movement:
a. ★ Eager students are easy to lend books.
b. Empty trucks are easy to load with boxes.
33D’Elia (2016) does not provide quite the right examples for these cases; instead he provides examples like
What did John load the truck with?, which showmovement of the second DP. What is relevant for the comparison
to double-object dative structures is the movement of the first DP.
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(97) Relativization:
a. ?? The student that John gave a book was at the library.
b. The boxes that John loaded with the books were large.
Whilemy analysis does not explain this difference, since it is not concernedwith the double-
object dative structure, it is consistent with it.
In sum, what we learn from D’Elia (2016)’s problematic data is relatively little, except
for the rather clear fact that there are restrictions on themovement of the goal in the goal-ob-
ject structure that do not exist for theme objects in the theme-object structure. The remain-
ing problems for his account have to do with his attempt to unify the double-object dative
structure with the goal-object spray/load structure, since they pattern differently. Since my
account does not propose that the goal-object structure is identical to the double-object
structure, my account would not predict this similarity. Insofar as the restrictions noted
above seem to target the double-object dative structure specifically, they are expected to be
possible with other structures in general, and thus the facts are consistent withmy account,
even if an explanation of why additional restrictions on double-object structures exist is out-
side my purview.
5.2.3.3.3 Evaluation
Many of the problems for D’Elia (2016)’s approach are similar to the problems I dis-
cussed for Larson (1990, 2014)’s approach, since simply flipping the order of the arguments
and notmoving the verb in the Theme/Source-object structure does not really changemuch
of that discussion. As such, the discussion here will be relatively brief.
One thing that does change relates to the facts about scope and c-command in (56)
and (57). As a consequence of the lack of movement in the Theme/Source-object structure
that D’Elia (2016) proposes in (74a),his approach does not directly account for these scope
facts. While the possibility of both scope relations for quantifiers shown in (54–55) could
be due to the possibility of covert Quantifier Raising, it is unlikely that this could account
for the binding facts and NPI licensing facts in (56) and (57), since QR is typically unable
to license anaphors and NPIs.
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(98) Principle A binding:34
a. John wrote a book about himself.
b. ★ A book about himself struck John on the head.
(99) NPI licensing:
a. No one kicked anyone.
b. ★ Anyone kicked no one.
D’Elia (2016)’s proposal is thus incompatible with the facts about Principle A binding and
NPI licensing shown in (56) and (57), which shows that the verb’s object c-commands the
object of the preposition.
Unlike Larson (1990, 2014), D’Elia (2016) does not directly address the existence of the
prepositions in each structure.35 He does not claim that one structure is derived from the
other by a (lexical) process of passivization that would demote/promote one argument
to/from an adjunct, instead claiming that they are simply both possible basic structures,
where both phrases are arguments. Precisely what the acquisition and productivity of the
acquisition consists of seems instead to reside for him in whether the Theme/Source or the
Goal is more salient, which he studies by means of an experiment that manipulates the
relative distance of each argument in participants’ visual fields. This could be seen to corre-
late with the manner/result distinction, since one could claim that manner verbs typically
make salient their Theme/Source argument, while result verbs would make salient their
Goal argument. In this respect, his explanation of the alternation and productivity would
be similar to Gropen and Pinker’s view (Gropen 1989; Gropen et al. 1991a,b; Pinker 1989),
but perhaps more subtle since it would not be about manner or result per se, but instead
about which argument is made more salient by the verb in a particular context. This could
explain why in some circumstances, verbs that typically encode only result, for instance,
can be used in the theme-object structure as in (17a); and verbs that typically encode only
34My examples here involve Principle A anaphors inside subjects, rather than Principle A anaphors as sub-
jects. This is because Principle A anaphors as subjects are likely ungrammatical for independent reasons. See
Rizzi (1990) and Woolford (1999), a.o., for discussion.
35In D’Elia (2016)’s conclusion, he tentatively explores an analysis where with plays a role similar to the
one that Gwith and GHAVE plays in Pesetsky (1995, ch. 5)’s approach to double-object constructions, but he
ultimately does not fully endorse it and leaves the question open. He does not address the presence of the
locative preposition at all.
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manner can be used in the goal-object structure as in (43a). Thus, D’Elia (2016)’s approach
to acquisition and productivity could be seen to represent a nuanced update to the popular
view established by Gropen and Pinker.
As it is his main goal, D’Elia (2016) naturally accounts for the predictability of the rel-
ative positions of the arguments based on linking, since in both structures the same argu-
ments occur in the same relative positions. Regarding the linear positions of the arguments,
D’Elia (2016) adopts the commonview that there is an adjacency requirement on accusative
Case assignment; thus, whichever argument is realized as a DP must occur immediately to
the right of the verb in order to receive Case. This, in fact, is what forces the movement of
the verb in (74b): it must move to a position left of the wall in order to assign it accusative
Case; if this did not occur, the derivation would ultimately fail. Presumably, the verb can
only assign one Case,36 explaining why the other argument must be realized as a PP. How-
ever, what regulates the identity of this preposition as a locative preposition or with is not
fully addressed in D’Elia (2016)’s account (see fn. 35).
The paraphrasability of the two structures is naturally accounted for—they are, after all,
the same structure modulo the precise identity of the prepositions. However, what remains
unclear is exactly why the paraphrase is inexact—that is, what the source of the holistic
effect is. Perhaps it is related to the idea of salience affecting whether the theme or the goal
is expressed first: if something is holistically effected, it may bemore salient than something
that is not. However, it is not clear that this need be the case, since salience depends on
many things. D’Elia (2016) simply does not address this point in his analysis, so there is
little more to say than to note that it is not explained.
5.2.3.4 Mateu (2000, 2017)’s Non-transformational Approach
Mateu (2000, 2017)’s analysis combines the importance ofmanner and result roots from
Pinker (1989) and an idea from Mulder (1992) that goal-object spray/load verbs involve a
36This is being somewhat generous—D’Elia (2016) assumes that the structure in (74b) is identical to the
double-object dative structure, and proposes that the verb assigns Case to both arguments: once in its base
position, and once in the higher position. Thus, it is unclear why the verb in (74b) could not assign Case to
both arguments, obviating the need to project P.
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small clause whose head describes a result state.37,38 Mateu (2000, 2017)’s investigation
relates the spray/load alternation to three distinct syntactic contrasts.
The first of these contrasts is Talmy (1991, 2000)’s distinction between satellite-framed
and verb-framed languages. This difference relates to which of the manner and path of
a bounded motion event is encoded in an adjunct (= satellite) and which is encoded in
the verb. Satellite-framed languages typically encode manner in the verb and path in an
adjunct, while verb-framed languages typically encode path in the verb and manner in an
adjunct. English, for instance, is a satellite-framed language, while Spanish is a verb-framed
37Mulder (1992)’s original analysis differs from Mateu (2000, 2017) in two respects: the first is that the PP
in both structures is considered an adjunct, with the small clause that the verb takes consisting of the object
and a (often phonologically null) predicate whose semantics entail total affectedness of that object, which is
to account for the holistic effect. The second difference has to do with be- prefixation in Dutch: Mulder (1992)
proposes that in cases without be- prefixation in Dutch, there is no small clause and the verb directly takes an
object. He proposes that in such cases, the event described by the verb is interpreted as an event of creation.
For instance:


























“He sprays the car with paint.”
To describe the difference in interpretation between (i-a) and (i-b), Mulder (1992) says (p. 182):
“[(i-a)] means ‘give the car a new finish’. It implies that the paint is an integrated part of the car.
This would be typically done by a garage. One could say that spuiten ‘spray’ has an effected [n.b.
not affected – MW] object, de auto ‘the car’. The old car is simply the raw material for the new
car. By contrast, the sentence in [(i-b)] typically implies ruining a car, by spraying paint all over
it. The paint that is sprayed on is definitely not an integrated part of the car.”
Despite this approach, I do not find the proposal that (i-a) describes a creation event convincing; if we instead
propose that the presence of be- is optional but contributes some additional meaning, it would bring Mulder
(1992)’s approach more in line with Mateu (2000, 2017)’s, barring the difference in the status of the PP. The
status of the PP ultimately makes little difference in the presentation of the identical core idea underlying
both approaches, which Mateu (2000, 2017) works out in more detail. Thus, I focus on Mateu (2000, 2017)’s
implementation of the result-incorporation idea, even though the basic idea may be found in Mulder (1992).
38See Alexiadou &Anagonostopoulou (2013) for a similar analysis of the clear alternation, exemplified here:
(i) a. John cleared the dishes from the table.
b. John cleared the table of the dishes.
While the clear alternation is often reduced to the spray/load alternation, it is not obvious to me that this should
be the case. For one thing, the clear alternation occurs with only four verbs in English: clean, clear, drain, and
empty (Levin 1993, sec. 10.3), while the spray/load alternation is much more widespread. For another thing,
these verbs all behave quite differently from spray/load verbs in non-agentive contexts, since they allow both
theme and source subjects (e.g., The clouds cleared from the sky, The sky cleared (?of clouds)), while spray/load verbs
do not (e.g., Paint sprayed (?onto the wall), ★The wall sprayed with paint). (An exception is clean, which disallows
any non-agentive use: ★The dishes cleaned (from the table), ★The table cleaned (of dishes). See chapter 3 for more
details. Due to this and other differences, I do not intend my claims to necessarily extend to clear verbs, though
the similar behavior of the alternation suggests some underlying similarity even if this similarity is not identity.
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language. While in neither case is this absolute, it is a general trend regarding howmanner
and path are expressed in each language.











“Juan ran into the room.”
The second contrast is Pinker and Gropen’s (Gropen 1989; Gropen et al. 1991a,b; Pinker
1989) distinction betweenmanner and result as it relates to the spray/load alternation, though
as we will see, Mateu (2017) ends up making rather different claims from Pinker and
Gropen regarding the importance of this distinction to the alternation. Rather than focus-
ing on standard alternating verbs, however, Mateu (2000, 2017) addresses data where the
alternation is only licensed in the presence of an additional overt element that encodes a
result state (cf. (17b)).
(101) a. Gertrude sewed buttons on the dress.
b. Gertrude sewed up the entire dress with buttons.
c. ★ Gertrude sewed the entire dress with buttons.
d. John poured water into the glass.
e. % John poured the glass full with water. (= (17b))
f. ★ John poured the glass with water.
(Mateu 2017, (1,3))
The final contrast that is relevant to Mateu (2000, 2017)’s analysis is a distinction be-
tween incorporation and conflation (e.g., Folli & Harley 2005, 2020; Hale & Keyser 1993a;
Harley 2005; Haugen 2009; Mateu 2012). Incorporation is when a root head-moves from
a lower position to form a complex head with a higher head, while conflation is when a
root directlymerges with another head.39 The distinction is particularly relevant in theories
where all verbal heads are assumed to be underlyingly null, like Distributed Morphology,
as the distinction is considered to delimit the possible ways that such null verbal heads
39Other terms used to refer to this distinction are “internal merge,” which corresponds to incorporation,
as the root comes from an existing node in the derivation and is thus internal; and “external merge,” which
corresponds to conflation, as the root enters the derivation when merged.
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acquire phonological and semantic/conceptual content. In combination with a theory that
assumes a split VP that distinguishes between process and result subevents (cf. Folli &
Harley 2005; Ramchand 2008), a standard assumption is that verbs that denote manner/
process receive phonological and semantic content via conflation, while verbs that denote
result states receive phonological and semantic content via incorporation. For instance, the
manner verb dance is assumed to involve conflation, while the result verb enter is assumed
to involve incorporation, as shown (based on Mateu 2017, (14)).
(102) a. vP



















By assumption, the complex head [v
√IN vGO] in (102b) is pronounced as the surface verb
enter.
To combine these three ideas, Mateu (2000, 2017) proposes that the availability of con-
flation is restricted in verb-framed languages, which tend to express result in the verb. Un-
der the assumption that result is expressed in a position lower than manner within the VP,
we are naturally led to the idea that verbs in verb-framed languages acquire phonological
content via incorporation, while verbs in satellite-framed languages acquire phonological
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content via conflation. A consequence of this way of thinking is that verb-framed languages
will not display patterns like those in (101), where the spray/load alternation is licensed by
the presence of some overt head that encodes result. This is because verb-framed languages
require result to be incorporated—under Mateu (2000, 2017)’s analysis, this requirement
can be seen as precisely what makes them verb-framed languages to begin with.
Thus, in verb-framed languages like Catalan, Mateu (2000, 2017) claims the spray/load
alternation involves two different base-generated small clause structures like those in (1).





















































In contrast to verb-framed languages like Catalan, satellite-framed languages are typ-
ically more flexible. In particular, Mateu (2017) notes that satellite-framed languages al-
most always have both verb-framed and satellite-framed structures, while verb-framed lan-
guages typically allow only verb-framed structures. As such, languages like English are
expected to have two strategies by which they can form the locative alternation: incorpora-
tion of a result head into a light verb, which is the only option in a verb-framed language
like Catalan; and conflation of a manner head into a light verb, in which case a separate
result head should be licensed. This is precisely what Mateu (2017) claims occurs in ex-
amples like (101): in these cases, the separate result head indicates that the surface verb is


















(based on Mateu 2017, (24b))
Mateu (2017) relates the availability of this kind of derivation to the possibility of using pour
in the goal-object structure only when the result state is specified by full. This is because
pour is assumed to not lexicalize result in adult English. As such, it cannot head ResultP. If
40Note that Mateu (2017) labels the head that introduces the external argument Voice, and a main verbal
head v, following standard notation in the Distributed Morphology framework. I continue to represent the
head that introduces the external argument as v here for consistency and distinguish it from the light verbal
heads by the using subscripts with the latter, but the choice of what label to assign to the external-argument-
introducing head does not affect Mateu (2017)’s analysis.
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a result state is left unspecified, then there would be no head of ResultP, and as such pour


































To account for uses of pour in the goal-object frame without a specified result state in child
English as in (6),Mateu (2017) follows Pinker (1989)’s proposal that this reflects the child’s
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incomplete knowledge of what pour lexicalizes. In the child’s grammar, pour may well lexi-
calize result, and as such √POUR can head the small clause ResultP, just as √CARREGA can in
the Catalan examples in (104). Then, the child forms the goal-object structure by incorpo-
ration just as adult speakers of Catalan do.
Similar facts go the other way around, too: if a verb lexicalizes result, it can only head a
ResultP in adult English, and thus the goal-object structure can only be formed by incorpo-
ration, as with fill. Thus, only the goal-object structure is possible in adult usage, while the
theme-object structure is possible in child English because the child may posit that √FILL
is available as a manner root that could be conflated with the light verb. Likewise, in lan-
guages where fill can occur in both the theme-object and goal-object structures like Hindi,
Mandarin, and German as in (117–119), the verb is assumed to lexicalize manner and not
result. A better translation of भर bhar,装 zhuāng, and füllen for such languages, then, would
be something more like put into or insert rather than fill (Pao 1996; Rosen 1996).
To account for languages where the spray/load alternation often involves prefixation of
a prepositional element like German (see section 5.2.1.2 above, as well as chapter 3, sec-
tion 3.3), Mateu (2017) follows Mulder (1992)’s proposal that the prefix originates as the
head of the ResultP small clause and incorporates into the verb that is formed by manner
conflation. This makes sense of the distribution of the word vol ‘full’ in Dutch, which can
only occur if the prefix is absent. Both Mulder (1992) and Mateu (2017) argue that in such
cases, the PP is demoted to an adjunct, with the small clause consisting just of the goal and
the prefix or vol ‘full.’ Their reasons for doing this relate to the possibility of extraposition,
omission, and clefting inDutch. Iwill not review the arguments, but just report the analysis.
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If the head of ResultP is be-, it head-moves into the verb due to a morphophonological
requirement.41
For cases when the prefix is optional, Mateu (2017) assumes that two different deriva-
tions are involved. When the verb bears no prefix, it is derived via incorporation. When the
verb is prefixed, it receives (most of) its phonological content via conflation and the head
of ResultP is the prefix, which head-moves into the verb as proposed by Mulder (1992).


























“They loaded the wagon with hay.”
41Though Mateu (2017) does not say this directly, this means we could consider prefixed cases to involve




















In the end, Mateu (2017) proposes that the reason that the spray/load alternation is more
productive in satellite-framed languages like English than in verb-framed languages like
Catalan (cf. Lewandowski 2014) is because verb-framed languages can only derive the al-
ternation via result incorporation, while satellite-framed languages can derive the alterna-
tion in both this way and via manner conflation.42
How does Mateu (2000, 2017)’s analysis fare regarding our four criteria of acquisition/
productivity, the near-paraphrasability of each structure, the predictability of argument
realization, and the holistic effect? Since the analysis draws heavily on the approach of
Pinker and Gropen (Gropen 1989; Gropen et al. 1991a,b; Pinker 1989), wemight expect it to
fare similarly with regards to acquisition and productivity. Acquisition would presumably
relate to a child acquiring the general processes of conflation and incorporation, as well as
the specificmeanings of particular roots. However, there are important differences between
Mateu (2017)’s claims and the original claims of Pinker and Gropen. In particular, Pinker
42Mateu (2017) also discusses some predictions of his analysis for the related clear-alternation (see fn. 38),
the details of which are not immediately relevant to presenting the core ideas of his analysis.
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and Gropen claim that verbs that denote only manner will occur in only the theme-object
structure, verbs that denote result will only occur in the goal-object structure, and verbs
that denote a manner that leads to a predictable result state occur in both structures. We
might interpret the last claim in Mateu (2017)’s approach as applying to verbs that have
both manner and result interpretations available. Mateu (2000, 2017) details how to derive
some of the exceptions to this claim in a general way, by proposing that verbs that have
only manner interpretations are compatible with goal-object structures if some other head
specifies a result state.
But on the other hand, in some cases Mateu (2017) proposes that a verb that denotes
only a result state can occur in both structures. In fact, in his account, this is the onlyway that
a verb-framed language can display the alternation, as in (104) above. As such, the putative
link between the theme-object structure and manner roots, and between the goal-object
structure and result roots, is entirely eliminated in Mateu (2000, 2017)’s approach unless
we stipulate that the link betweenmanner verbs and the theme-object structure applies only
in satellite-framed languages. This seems to be the case despite the fact that Mateu (2017)
presents the rest of his analysis following the proposal regarding the Catalan alternation in
(104) as though the link is still present.
Similarly, it is unclear why the goal-object structure must be derived by result incor-
poration even in languages that allow manner conflation. Mateu (2017) does not address,












This is especially problematic given that Mateu (2017) does assume that (certain parts of)
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prepositions like into and onto can serve as the head of ResultP in manner conflation struc-
tures. Given a semantics for with that invokes central coincidence (Hale 1986; Rapoport
2014), which can plausibly characterize a result state, it is unclear what would rule this
out. This would mean that manner roots should be able to occur in the goal-object struc-
ture, provided that with heads ResultP. Thus, under careful consideration, Mateu (2017)’s
approach entirely severs the proposed link between the theme-object structure andmanner
roots and between the goal-object structure and result roots, since his system seems to be
flexible enough to allow either kind of root to occur in either structure without making fur-
ther stipulations. Such stipulations would have to be specific to satellite-framed languages
in order to retain the core idea of his analysis that the alternation is only derived via result
incorporation in verb-framed languages. Thus, Mateu (2000, 2017)’s analysis falls short in
accounting for restrictions on the productivity of the alternation.
Regarding the near-paraphrasability of the two structures, Mateu (2000, 2017)’s anal-
ysis is rather vague. Presumably, the similarities in meaning are due to the identical roots
involved. But it is difficult to determine if this goes beyond an intuition. In particular, in
what sense is a manner root the same as a result root, even if both have the same pronuncia-
tion?We have the intuition that themeanings are related, but it is unclearwhatwould relate
them, given that each must be associated with a distinct interpretation. In the absence of
a system that would derive similar meanings for, e.g., conflated manner-denoting √SPRAY
and incorporated result-denoting √SPRAY, we would simply have to stipulate the overlap
in their meanings and thus the near-paraphrasability of the two structures. Interestingly,
we have to do the same thing even when there is only way of deriving the alternation, as in
Catalan. Note that in examples like (104), the root must combine with the two arguments
in precisely the opposite order to derive the alternation in verb-framed languages. As such,
the semantics associated with the root must be different in each structure. Any overlap in
conceptual meaning would simply have to be stipulated, since we would really be dealing
with contextual allosemy or else two different roots, with different meanings.
Continuing with this line of thinking, it becomes clear that Mateu (2000, 2017)’s ap-
proach fails to account for the predictability of each argument’s position based on themean-
ing it receives. Again, this is most obvious in cases like (104), where the very same roots
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takes its arguments in the opposite order. As such, we cannot predict whether the specifier
of ResultP is the theme or the goal, and likewise for the complement.
Finally, Mateu (2000, 2017)’s analysis does not directly address the holistic effect. One
might assume that the structure associated with result incorporation is associated with the
holistic effect. Whatever is the subject of the result state might be expected to define it.
Something nice about this view is that it would account not only for the holistic effect with
the goal-object structure, but also with the theme-object structure, since that also involves a
ResultP headed by a preposition. However, whether this represents a valid way of thinking
under Mateu (2000, 2017)’s approach is unclear, given that he does not directly address
this question.
Where Mateu (2000, 2017)’s analysis goes beyondmany others, though, is in its careful
attention to cross-linguistic patterns in the spray/load alternation. However, given the fact
that both structures are expected to be possible for both manner and result verbs under his
analysis, it is unclear whether his system would be expected to overgenerate. In addition,
the restrictions on goal-object structures with manner roots might be explainable in other
ways. For instance, suppose that for some independent reason, the goal-object structure im-
poses a result interpretation on a verb root. If the verb root lacked some additional element
that supported such an interpretation, the result would be ill-formed. This is more in line
with Pinker (1989)’s original proposal regarding (17b). A particle or an adjective might
provide the support necessary to achieve a result reading of the relevant root, as in sew up
or pour full. The fact that such uses are still somewhat degraded for many speakers would
then be explained as a result of the fact that even in the presence of such support, a result
reading for the verb root might be difficult to achieve. In contrast, the degradedness of such
cases in unexpected in Mateu (2000, 2017)’s approach, since the root is only interpreted as
denoting manner in such cases, which is the root’s typical use.
Mulder (1992)’s observations regarding the complementary distribution of be- and vol
‘full’ inDutchmight also be explainable in otherways. I see twopossibilities. The first relates





















“His daughter has her room full-hung with Vince posters.” (lit.)
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If we thus assume that vol ‘full’ in (107c) is generated in a complex head with the verb,
we could explain the complementary distribution by assuming that it takes up the same
slot that be- would appear in. What would distinguish be- and vol would be that vol could
be stranded when the verb root head-moves to a higher position since it is a separable
prefix. In contrast, be- could not be stranded, since it is an inseparable prefix. This approach
would essentially treat vol like particles in English, which are able to be stranded when the
verb head-moves (Johnson 1991). Like vol, particles in English are incompatible with overt
prefixes (Keyser & Roeper 1992).
(112) a. John cleaned the counter.
b. John recleaned the counter.
c. John cleaned the counter up.
d. ★ John recleaned the counter up.
Thus, the incompatibility of vol and be- need not relate to them both occupying the head of
ResultP. Instead, it could be that they would initially have to occupy the same prefix slot of
the verb, with the possibility of independent vol due to the possibility of stranding it when
the verb head-moves to a higher position, perhaps vAGENT (see the discussion in chapter 2,
section 2.2).
Another possibility is related to themeaning of be- in German. (This is more speculative
with regards to the claims about Dutch specifically, since I have not been able to verify that
the same meaning of be- exists in Dutch). In particular, Brinkmann (1995) notes that for
verbs inGerman that occur only optionallywith be- in the goal-object structure, the presence
of be- requires that the movement of the theme be to the surface of the goal. Consider (32),
repeated here as (113).
43https://context.reverso.net/translation/dutch-english/volhangen
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“When leaving for the ski vacation, theMillers pack their car(’s interior) as





































“When leaving for the ski vacation, the Millers pack their car(’s trunk and
roof) as if they will be away for half a year.”
If wemake the assumption that the samemeaning contrastmight exist in Dutch, then the in-
compatibility of vol and be- can be easily explained as a semantic effect. Be- requires that the
goal be interpreted as a surface, while vol ‘full’ would naturally require it to be interpreted
as a container. If we suppose that asserting that one thing is simultaneously a surface and
a container is incoherent semantically, we derive the incompatability straightforwardly. If
one of these alternative explanations regarding the complementary distribution of be- and
vol is on the right track, we lose the motivation for positing that these are the head of Re-
sultP.
In the end, then,Mateu (2000, 2017)’s proposal regarding two possibleways of deriving
the spray/load alternation is quite interesting. However, it seems to overgenerate, and the
facts that it explains might be more easily explained in other ways. In addition, we saw
in chapter 2 that the small clause structure where the small clause is headed by the verb
root fails to account to for certain readings of again in goal-object structures, which indicate
that the verb and the object form a constituent that excludes the result state. Mateu (2000,
2017)’s analysis also fails to account for the behavior of non-agentive and nominal uses of
spray/load roots.44
44There are more syntactic analyses of spray/load verbs that I have not delved into in this section. One exam-
ple is Borer (2005b)’s analysis, who proposes that either argument can occur in the specifier of an aspectual
projection reserved for internal arguments, and the other can merge with the root. I do not address this anal-
ysis in particular because Borer (2005b)’s analysis does not address any of the concerns in (11); it does not
address acquisition and productivity, near-paraphrasability, linking, or the holistic effect. This does not neces-
sarily mean that it fails to account for them, just that it does not take up those questions and thus is difficult to
evaluate by the metrics we have been employing in the course of this discussion. It comes closest to addressing
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5.3 My Approach
Having presented a critical evaluation of previous approaches, I attempt to explain here
how my approach could fare with regards to the four desiderata I have focused on. These
have played a more limited role in motivating my analysis than in previous analysis, so it
is worth making sure that my approach does not preclude adequately addressing them. If
my account prevented an explanation of any of the four desiderata, this could signal the
existence of serious flaws. No less than any other, my account must provide some way in
which those desiderata could be explained, even if I do not provide a full explanation here.
Thus, even though my analysis has at least two clear empirical advantages over previous
analyses in that it accounts for the possible readings of again and the syntactic asymmetry
of theme and goal objects, it is worth scrutinizing how it might fare on these four desider-
ata that have played a large role in shaping the literature on the spray/load alternation to
date. If my analysis has inadvertently rendered addressing any one of these four desiderata
impossible, it could constitute a serious misstep.
Prior to a discussion of the four desiderata, I briefly speak to the issue of the relation
between manner and result readings and the spray/load alternation. The idea that manner-
denoting roots occur in theme-object structures and result-denoting roots occur in goal-
object structures is one that has enjoyed a lot of popularity in the literature on the spray/
load alternation. Yet in my account, spray/load verbs always denote simple predicates of
eventualities. I thus respond to the questions: is there a relation betweenmanner and result
roots and the different structures implicated in the spray/load alternation? If so, how is this
relation captured in my analysis, given that the meaning of the verb root remains the same
in both structures?
Following this, I address the four desiderata directly, with more focus on acquisition,
since I have not directly raised the question of acquisition throughout the analysis. In con-
trast, though my primary focus was not on the other three desiderata, I have incorporated
the holistic effect, since the object occurs in an aspectual projection associated with effects related to telicity.
However, even this is inadequate, since the holistic effect is not the same thing as telicity; see (27) and sur-
rounding discussion, as well as Beavers (2006, 2017). In addition, Borer (2005a,b, 2013)’s system relies on a
notion of how semantics works that is quite different fromwhat is standard, and which is not fully formalized,
making it difficult to present her approach briefly and clearly.
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discussion of them throughout where appropriate. Thus, I summarize how my account
addresses them.
5.3.1 Manner/result and P-conflation
I will briefly comment here on some potential relations between the P-conflation anal-
ysis and the manner/result approach to describing which verbs alternate (Beavers 2017;
Pinker 1989; Rappaport & Levin 1985, 1988), as well as cross-linguistic variation in the al-
ternation.45
The manner/result approach to the spray/load alternation holds that verbs that denote
a manner predicate occur in the theme-object structure, while verbs that denote a result
occur in the goal-object structure. Verbs that alternate are manner verbs whose denotation
is associated with a particular result state. This idea has played a large role in accounts
of the spray/load alternation, particularly in those accounts primarily aimed at addressing
questions of acquisition (Gropen 1989; Gropen et al. 1991a,b; Pinker 1989), but also in others
(e.g., Mateu 2000, 2017).
My approach has not made a direct connection between manner/result and the spray/
load alternation, in contrast to these previous accounts. Nevertheless, the descriptive gen-
eralization linking manner with theme-object structures and result with goal-object struc-
tures has enjoyed a great deal of popular support in the literature. The fact that I have not
made this contrast a feature of my account might require us either to question therefore the
accuracy of this generalization, or else to determine whether there is some way of integrat-
ing it.
As far as I can tell, the primary evidence for the link between manner/result and be-
havior in the spray/load alternation is at the level of intuitions, but it seems to me mostly
solid. Lists of verbs that alternate and do not alternate were included in the appendix to
chapter 4, and most seem to fall under this generalization. There are a few that do not in
my judgment, which I list here.
45The following discussion has benefitted greatly from the comments of two anonymous Linguistic Inquiry
reviewers.
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(114) a. Alternating non-manner verbs:
cultivate, load, stock
b. Theme-object only non-manner verbs:
install, place, position, put, set
c. Goal-object only manner verbs:
bombard, ripple
What is most instructive, however, are comparisons of some alternating and non-alternat-
ing verbs that seem potentially ambiguous. One might be tempted to classify these verbs
as either manner-or result-denoting based solely on their behavior in the alternation, but
comparing them leads one to question whether such classifications would have any exter-
nal validity. Consider the following sets of verbs; the first member alternates, but the rest
do not.
(115) a. wrap (alternates), ring (goal-object only), coil, wind (theme-object only)
b. spray (alternates), splash (theme-object only46)
c. cram (alternates), tuck, wedge (theme-object only)
More examples could surely be found, but these suffice to illustrate the point. For instance,
considering that wrap alternates, it seems attractive to consider it as denoting a manner of
motion (wrapping) that produces a particular result state (a covered exterior, or something
a bit more specific). But we also have to ask why the same sort of meaning isn’t available
to non-alternating verbs like ring, which occurs in only the goal-object structure, yet also
seems intuitively to entail a particular circularmanner ofmotion in the samewaywrapdoes.
Further complicating this particular set are the verbs coil and wind, which we could think
of as denoting similar result states to the one wrap putatively entails, and yet only occur in
the theme-object structure.
Further issues are raised by interspeaker variation. One speaker reports to me that for
them, spray alternates, while spritz and spread cannot occur in the goal-object structure,
46Note that it is of course possible to say something like John splashed the boy with water. But the reading this
receives is an irrelevant instrumental adjunct reading, not one in which the boy is holistically affected by being
with water. This contrasts with the behavior of spray, which does have this reading. This verb is also not listed
among the spray/load verbs in Levin (1993)’s comprehensive survey of English verb alternations.
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making sentences like John spread the muffin with jam ungrammatical for them (Seth Cable,
p.c.). While these verbs are listed as alternating in Levin (1993)’s survey, we must have
a theory of grammar that allows us to account for differences in speakers’ I-languages.
Under the manner/result hypothesis, one would have to claim that for this speaker, spray
denotes a manner that produces a predictable result state, while spritz and spread produce
no predictable result state. Such a move seems difficult to defend except as a way to rescue
the hypothesis linkingmanner and result to the spray/load alternation.Other speakers allow
alternating uses of verbs like fill, discussed briefly in chapter 1:
(116) % The chef filled the mixture into the zucchini.
If any verb is canonically taken to encode a result state in the context of the spray/load al-
ternation, it might be fill. Yet such uses are possible for some speakers. We would have to
claim that for these speakers, fill does not encode a result state, but a manner, again with
little independent supporting evidence.
Nevertheless, the majority of verbs do seem intuitively to adhere to the manner/result
generalization at a descriptive level, the complications discussed above notwithstanding.
Given the popularity this idea has enjoyed in the literature, it seems difficult to claim that
there is no connection between manner/result and the spray/load alternation. We are thus
left with the question of its status.
In this spirit, I will suggest a different way of looking at the connection between the
spray/load alternation andmanner/result.47 Rather than saying that a verb root comes with
a manner or result denotation, and that this lexical semantic property determines its syn-
tactic behavior, we might consider the opposite view, where the structure that a verb root
occurs in influences how it is interpreted. That is, structure determines interpretation rather
than the other way around.
Now, howwould this idea explain the association betweenmanner readings and theme-
object structures, on the one hand, and result readings and goal-object structures, on the
other, under my analysis? To begin, it is worth clarifying something: whether a verb occurs
in the theme-object structure or the goal-object structure is, in my analysis, a purely syntac-
47This is inspired by a Linguistic Inquiry reviewer’s comments and Borer (2005a,b, 2013).
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tic fact that cannot be derived from lexical semantics. Instead, certain verb roots syntacti-
cally require that theymergewith only vTHEME or only PLOC∅ , while others are flexible enough
to permit merger with either. I therefore propose that it is this underivable lexicosyntactic
fact that derives the association of manner and result interpretations with particular uses
of spray/load verbs.
Consider first the theme-object structure, associated with manner readings of a verb
root. In my analysis, the verb in a theme-object structure merges with vTHEME. The semantics
of this functional head that describes an event participant that undergoes movement. Thus,
in the theme-object structure, the verb (which is a complex head consisting of the verb root
plus vTHEME) encodes movement. Movement, of course, is associated with manner of motion
readings. Thus, while a manner of motion is not necessarily entailed (see cases like load)
the common impression of amanner reading of theme-object uses of spray/load verbs arises
because the syntax of these structures results in a semantics where the verb encodes the
motion of the theme.
Next, consider the goal-object structure, associated with result readings of a verb root.
In my analysis, the verb in a goal-object structure merges with PLOC∅ . The semantics of PLOC∅
encodes the endpoint of a path of motion (i.e., a goal). Thus, the verb (which comprises the
verb root and PLOC∅) profiles the endpoint of a path and not what moves along this path in
a goal-object structure. Given that the verb encodes information about the goal of an event,
the impression of a result reading of the verb root arises naturally.
Now, the question is why verbs that do not alternate are associated with manner or
result readings. This follows from what I have just said. Non-alternating spray/load verbs
require merger with either vTHEME or else with PLOC∅ . Those verbs that can only merge with
vTHEME will of course always encode the movement of an event participant, and thus come
to be associated with a manner reading exclusively. In contrast, those verbs that can only
mergewith PLOC∅ will always encode the endpoint of a path, and correspondinglywill come
to be associated with a result reading exclusively. Meanwhile, verbs that can merge with
either vTHEME or PLOC∅ will be associated with both manner and result readings.
The manner/result proposal has played a large role in popular accounts of the acqui-
sition of the spray/load alternation; Pinker (1989) proposes that children overextend the
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alternation (as shown in some examples in chapter 1) because they have not yet devel-
oped adult-like meanings of non-alternating spray/load verbs. For instance, children may
use verbs like fill in the theme-object structure because they have not yet determined that
it makes reference only to a result state. In my approach, this idea is reversed. Children
may use verbs like fill in the theme-object structure because they have not yet acquired the
idiosyncratic syntactic property of fill that it can merge only with PLOC∅ .48 If children have
not acquired this syntactic property of fill, it will be possible for them to associate it with
a manner reading, when they merge it with vTHEME. In this way, we can reformulate Pinker
(1989)’s semantic bootstrapping proposal; instead, it may be that the spray/load alternation
and the meaning of the relevant verbs is acquired via a process of syntactic bootstrapping
(see Gleitman 1990, et seq.).49
With regards to cross-linguistic variability, we now have a way of approaching puzzles
such as why English fill into is degraded compared to fill with, while the Hindi, Mandarin
Chinese, and German equivalents in (117–119) are equally acceptable. (These examples are
repeated from chapter 1, (14–15).)
48With caveats regarding inter-speaker variation for examples like fill the mixture into the zucchini, discussed
above.
49An important caveat to note here relates to reported contrasts like the following:
(i) a. ★ John poured the glass with water.
b. % John poured the glass full with water.
Pinker (1989) relates this contrast to the manner/result hypothesis: pour encodes only a manner, and so typ-
ically cannot occur in the goal-object structure which requires a result state. However, when a result state is
explicitly specified with full, it is possible to use pour in the goal-object structure. However, we must stipulate
in his account that spray denotes a manner that produces a predictable result state, while pour does not—even
though we might be able to imagine one (e.g., covered with whatever was poured). Still, this does not absolve
my account of accounting for the contrast. Something worth noting is that there is suggestive evidence that
pour in its goal-object use might have a different syntax than the one I have proposed. In particular, it does not
seem as though again can occur after the object.
(ii) a. ★ John poured the glass again full with water.
b. ★ John poured the glass full again with water.
This points to goal-object uses of pour possibly having different analysis. However, in my account pour would
have to disallow a small clause syntax, since otherwise a small clause structure for theme-object uses would
also presumably be possible. In addition, I do not find the example in (i-b) entirely acceptable, so it is difficult
for me to investigate its syntax directly. For this reason, I raise the issue here, but must leave a solution to future
research.
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“You have filled the entire room with nails.”
























































“I filled the bottle with some water.”


























“John filled the glass with water.”
As discussed above, particular roots in particular languages may prohibit, permit, or re-
quire merger with vTHEME or PLOC∅ . If a root permits merger with only vTHEME in a particular
language, it will only be able to occur in the theme-object structure. In a similar way, if a
root can merge only with PLOC∅ , then it will only occur in the goal-object structure. This
could lead to different kinds of meanings being associated with these verb roots by virtue
of their differing syntax; interestingly, Pao (1996) proposes regardingMandarin Chinese装
zhāng ‘fill’ that it does not necessarily encode a state of fullness. My proposal would derive
this from its greater syntactic flexibility compared to English fill (for most speakers).
In this way, my account is compatible with idiosyncrasy within semantic domains,
which we have seen occurs both internal to English, as well as cross-linguistically. Previ-
ous accounts that derive the alternation from meaning would have difficulty accounting
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for this kind of idiosyncrasy, as they should predict it would not exist. Since I derive the
association in the opposite way, a few leaks of the sort described are not surprising.
Another way in which the spray/load alternation might vary cross-linguistically has to
do with the possibility that my analysis might not be the only way to derive it. In particular,
the Hungarian data presented in chapter 3, example (18) suggest that the goal-object struc-
ture in Hungarian is not derived by the incorporation of PLOC∅ , because an overt PLOC prefix
(optionally) occurs in the theme-object structure, while the goal-object structure involves
a perfective prefix.






















































“The peasant loaded the wagon (with hay).”
While the morphological reflex of the alternation in Hungarian suggests that it may still be
derived, it may be derived in a different way from how the spray/load alternation is derived
in English and German.50 In addition, there may be non-morphological means of deriving
the spray/load alternation. A different way of deriving the alternation might place different
restrictions on the kinds of verbs that can alternate, which could appear as cross-linguistic
differences; see the discussion ofMateu (2000, 2017) above. Since inmy account the English
spray/load alternation is derived from the interaction of lexical idiosyncrasy regarding the
ability to merge with PLOC∅ with general syntactic and semantic principles, nothing would
in principle rule out another language making use of these same syntactic and semantic
principles to derive an alternation that looks like the spray/load alternation in a different
way (though of course, such amove is to be disfavored, andwould need to bewell justified).
50Though see footnote 6 in chapter 3 for important qualifications regarding the fact that these Hungarian
data may prove misleading.
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5.3.2 Comparison with Previous Approaches
The previous approaches described above, address different sets of facts about spray/
load verbs, and do so in different ways from my approach. It is worth examining why I
believe my approach represents an improvement upon those ones. There are two things
worth considering in making such an evaluation.
(121) a. Does my analysis provide a way of accounting for the behavior of the
spray/load alternation identified in Rappaport & Levin (1988) and Pinker
(1989) in principle?
b. Does my analysis improve upon previous analyses beyond accounting for
the novel facts in ?
I repeat the list based on Rappaport & Levin (1988) and Pinker (1989) from chapter 1, (11)
here for ease of reference.
(122) a. The productivity and acquisition of the alternationmust be accounted for;
b. The near paraphrase relation between the two variants must be captured;
c. The linking of the arguments should be predictable in terms of their theta-
roles;
d. The affected interpretation of the goal as direct argumentmust be accounted
for.
Make no mistake—I do not have a full account of how my analysis could explain every fact
in (122). As the prior literature has shown, accounting for those facts is no small feat in
itself, and I have primarily focused on a different set of facts entirely. But what is crucial
is providing some reassurance that the questions posed by these facts can be asked in a
sensible way in the approach I have developed, and that there are avenues of investigation
into them that remain open. If my analysis were to make it impossible to provide a way of
even stating these questions, it would be inadequate however many other facts it were to
account for.
The second point, in (121b), is aimed higher. A clear improvement of my analysis over
previous analyses is that it directly addresses facts that have often been overlooked in the
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literature on the spray/load alternation. But failing to address certain facts to be no great
sin of an analysis. All analyses leave behind an obstinate empirical detritus of known un-
knowns andunknownunknowns,which is to be expected. For this reason, it isworth asking
whether there is merit to my approach beyond the specific set of facts I address, and the
specific proposals I advocate. The goal here is to evaluate whether I have provided a useful
perspective, which could inform investigations of argument structure and the syntax-se-
mantics interface more generally. I postpone a detailed response to this point to chapter
6.
5.3.2.1 Adequacy of the Approach: Acquisition
There are four things to address in (122): acquisition, the semantic relationship between
the theme-object and goal-object structures, argument linking, and the holistic effect. I will
describe here howmy analysis provides ways of investigating these questions in turn, even
though I do not have fully worked out answers to these questions.
First, acquisition. In my approach, acquisition of the spray/load alternation is achieved
once a child has reached a lexicon and a grammar comprising the following.
(123) a. Lexicon: (a) an extensible set of verb roots that can be merged with either
THEME or PLOC∅ , (b) a set of locative prepositions (including with with the
meaning of physical possession as central coincidence), and (c) a closed
set of functional heads including v, THEME, PLOC∅ , and CAUSE.
b. Syntax: Merge, including parallel uses, which allows for structures with
multidominance.
c. Semantics: FunctionApplication andEvent Identification. (FunctionCom-
position required for non-agentive transitive uses.)
I assume by hypothesis that Merge, Function Application, Event Identification, and Func-
tion Composition are innate. Children do not have to acquire them, as they are given byUni-
versal Grammar. (I will also assume that parallel uses of Merge do not need to be acquired
in any special way, but are made available in the specification of Merge by Universal Gram-
mar.) Thus, the question of acquisition comes down to the lexicon, and learning the idiosyn-
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crasies of particular lexical items. This is entirely in line with how Pinker (1989) frames the
question of acquisition, though differences between his approach and mine make different
kinds of answers available to each of us, as I will describe shortly.
Regarding the lexicon, I will assume that a set of functional heads is made available by
Universal Grammar, including v, THEME, and CAUSE. I find it less likely that PLOC∅ is among
this set, for the simple reason that the meanings and number of prepositions vary across
languages. Given that PLOC∅ is a preposition, the default position should be that it could
vary similarly. Thus, children must acquire PLOC∅ , but they are given v, THEME, and CAUSE,
which are presumably available and used in all languages.
Thus, what remains of the acquisition problem in my account is the following: children
must acquire a set of verb roots that can occur with either THEME or PLOC∅ , and they must
acquire some locative prepositions (including PLOC∅). However, it is worth noting that the
alternation in my account really does not depend on the existence of the locative PP in
the theme-object structure nor the with PP in the goal-object structure. As shown in chap-
ters 2 and 3, goal-object structures with locative PPs and APs are possible. So while the
acquisition of overt locative prepositions is required to display the full pattern of what we
classically think of as the spray/load alternation, we could reduce this to the acquisition of
verb roots and PLOC∅ , if we consider transitive uses of spray/load verbs with PPs to exemplify
the same alternation as their counterparts with PPs (i.e., John loaded the boxes, John loaded the
truck).
In otherwords, we could boil down the acquisition problem even further by eliminating
the PP that follows the object, which is extraneous to the alternation itself in my approach,
since it is simply a special case of a resultative structure. Eliminating this also means that
parallel uses ofMerge are not required to derive the alternation, since the structureswithout
PPs do not seem to involve multidominance (though given that parallel uses of Merge are
given by Universal Grammar in my view, this would not affect anything). Ultimately, then,
what children must learn to acquire the spray/load alternation is a set of verbs, along with
information about whether those verbs can, must, or may occur with either THEME or PLOC∅ .
The fact that children overextend the alternation could be taken to reflect a non-adult-like
understanding of this property of particular verbs.
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However, Pinker (1989) argues that children’s extension of the alternation does not
seem to reflect just an imperfect understanding of syntax, but of semantics. Inmy approach,
the acquisition is driven by syntax. But I believe there is merit in Pinker (1989)’s lexical
semantic approach, and merit to the manner/result contrast, which my account does not
directly address. As a way of beginning to address this concern, in an admittedly merely
suggestive way, I will propose that the link between the syntax of spray/load verbs and their
lexical semantics might reveal a principle of the syntax/semantics interface that constrains
acquisition.
(124) The Goal-Preposition Principle:
DPs that are semantically interpreted as goals are always arguments of a prepo-
sition.
To consider why the Goal-Preposition Principle is necessary, consider that without it, noth-
ing would rule out children acquiring a non-alternating goal-object verb without PLOC∅ , as
shown.
(125) JVPK =





where cover(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1 iff 𝑒 is a covering whose goal is the surface of 𝑥.
But this version of cover would not be expected to show the same properties as goal-object
uses of verbs that involved PLOC∅ . In particular, it should be possible to formnominalizations
of this cover that referred to the goal, and to promote the goal to a subject position, barring
these possibilities being ruled out independently. I argued that what generally blocks those
things is the fact that goal-object structures involve PLOC∅ , so if a child acquired a version
of cover that did not involve PLOC∅ , these things should be possible. The Goal-Preposition
Principle blocks this possibility: it proposes that goals are universally introduced as argu-
ments of a preposition as a principle of Universal Grammar. Thus, once a child learns that
some argument is interpreted as a goal, they know that it must have been introduced by a
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preposition. Grammars that do not meet this criteria are not part of the child’s hypothesis
space.
The Goal-Preposition Principle thus creates a link between the syntax for spray/load
verbs I have proposed and semantic facts related to how their arguments are interpreted.
How this link relates to the proposed link between manner/result and the spray/load alter-
nation is a topic I must leave for future investigation (though see the discussion in chapter
3, section 5.3.1). But what is crucial more generally is that there is a way of defining the
acquisition problem in my approach, and even possibly a way of defining an initially plau-
sible condition on the syntax/semantics interface that makes investigating acquisition of
the spray/load alternation possible under my approach. The fact that my approach offers a
straightforward avenue of investigation into acquisition despite being aimed at very differ-
ent goals constitutes strong proof of its general applicability.
5.3.2.2 Adequacy of the Approach: Other Facts
The most significant general improvement of my approach over previous approaches
is that it provides a full detailed syntax and a fully detailed compositional semantics for
sentences with spray/load verbs. As should be clear from the preceding discussion, prior
approaches have failed to do this. While I have not addressed acquisition in detail, I have
addressed the other facts in (122) indirectly throughout the development of my analysis.
Here I summarize how I have done so.
The near-paraphrase relation between the theme-object and goal-object structures is
due to the overlapping sets of lexical and functional heads they involve: (v,) V, a locative
preposition (overt or PLOC∅), and CAUSE. The reason the two structures of the spray/load
alternation constitute near-paraphrases in my view thus has to do with the fact that the
functional heads they contain create event structures that are composed in similar ways:
both structures involve an event whose idiosyncratic properties are given by an identical
lexical root (e.g., √spray), and which cause a state consisting of a locative relation holding
between two entities.
Note that I showed in chapters 2 and 3 that other kinds of result states can occur with
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spray/loadverbs aswell, includingAPs and locative relations in goal-object sentences. ((126b)
is repeated from chapter 3, (45).)
(126) a. John sprayed the well full of water. (AP result)
b. John sprayed the first door onto the second one.
(non-with goal-object structure)
However, these sentences do not show a near-paraphrase relationship with a theme-object
structure. The explanation of these generalizations are thus restricted to the kinds of near-
paraphrase relationships identified by Rappaport & Levin (1988), which uniformly involve
a locative relation between two sentences.
So, what explains the near-paraphrase relation between the following sentences is not
accidental: the sentences are constructed in such a way that they are near-paraphrases.
(127) a. John sprayed the paint onto the wall.
b. John sprayed the wall with the paint.
If we had chosen different kinds of result states, no near-paraphrase relationship would
exist. For instance, if we had chosen to use into instead of onto in (127a), then the sentence
would no longer be a near-paraphrase of (127b). This is because √spray idiosyncratically
requires PLOC∅ to be interpreted as picking out the surface of its argument as the goal of the
spraying event. Thus, the reason the sentences have similar meanings is partly because we
have chosen an overt preposition that has a similar meaning to PLOC∅ in this context, even
though we didn’t have to do this. In addition, we have chosen to specify result states that
both involve locative relations: contact between one thing and another’s surface, and central
coincidence. This is not a requirement.
More generally, the reason these sentences are near-paraphrases are because they have
been constructed that way. Asking us to provide an account of this property is thus much
like asking to provide an account of why all the walls in my apartment are white: because
someone chose to paint them that color. They didn’t have to be painted that color, or even
painted at all. In the same way, the sentences in (127) didn’t have to be near-paraphrases—
they were chosen (almost certainly unconsciously) to exemplify the alternation because
they are near-paraphrases.
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Turning to the question of linking, I follow Borer (2005b) and Harley (2011) that Rap-
paport & Levin (1988)’s framing is best reversed. In lexicalist approaches like Rappaport &
Levin (1988)’s, a verb comes with its arguments pre-specified in its lexical entry. Linking
rules can access (parts of) the meanings of these arguments in service of determining cer-
tain properties of their syntax. But neo-constructionist approaches like Borer (2005b)’s and
Harley (2011)’s reject the premise that a verb comes with its arguments already specified.
Instead, argument structure is syntactically constructed by combining a verb rootwith func-
tional heads. These functional heads are what specify the arguments and the role(s) they
play in the eventuality described by the verb. Thus, rather than treating the interpretations
of arguments as given and their syntactic positions are derived, we can treat the syntactic
positions of arguments as given, and ask how their interpretations are derived. Once we
make this move, it is the semantics of the functional heads that add arguments that are of
interest. These semantics can be defined using standard tools of compositional semantics
as I did in chapter 3, and constitute a model of the linking properties of spray/load verbs.
Finally, I follow Rapoport (2014) in attributing the holistic effect to the semantics ofwith
in the goal-object structure. To account for the holistic effect in the theme-object structure,
I proposed that the functional head THEME introduces an incremental theme to a sentence’s
argument structure. Because incremental themes are linked to telicity, this makes an inter-
esting prediction: the holistic effect in theme-object sentences should only be present when
they are quantized, and thus should only arise with telic VPs. In contrast, the holistic effect
should be present in goal-object structures regardless of the goal object’s status as quan-
tized or non-quantized, provided the preposition with is used. This prediction is borne out.
(128) Theme-object structure:
a. John sprayed paint onto the wall (for hours), but there was paint left over.
(no holistic effect, non-quantized theme)
b. John sprayed the paint onto the wall (in an hour), #but there was paint
left over. (holistic effect, quantized theme)
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(129) Goal-object structure:
a. John sprayed walls with the paint (for hours), #but each wall had barely
a speck of paint on it. (holistic effect, non-quantized goal)
b. John sprayed the walls with the paint (in an hour), #but each wall had
barely a speck of paint on it. (holistic effect, quantized goal)
The link between quantization and the holistic effect for themes but not goals supports the
view that the source of the effect is different in theme-object and goal-object structures.
A plausible source for the effect in the theme-object structure is the incremental theme
relation invoked by THEME, which ensures that if the theme is quantized, it measures out
the eventuality: themoment when the paint is used up defines the endpoint of the spraying
eventuality. In contrast, a plausible source for the holistic effect in the goal-object structure
is the semantics ofwith as described by Rapoport (2014), since the effect is present whether
the goal is quantized or not. Furthermore, the effect can disappear in goal-object structures
that do not use with (provided that an alternative that would not produce the effect on its
own is chosen).
(130) Context: John set up a series of doors in front of the wall. Then, he took a pneu-
matic air hose, and ...
John sprayed (the) doors onto the wall.
There is no obvious holistic effect here: the doors do not have to be completely affected by
having been sprayed with compressed air—the most likely scenario is one in which the
air does not materially affect the doors in any way, except by causing it to move. The fact
that no holistic effect arises with either quantized or non-quantized goals in the goal-object
structure when with is replaced with a preposition that does not have a similar semantics
shows that the source of the effect is the meaning of with, just as described in Rapoport
(2014). Finally, no holistic effect seems to arise in goal-object sentences that simply lack a
PP altogether.
(131) John sprayed the door.
In my judgment, (131) carries no entailment that the door is completely affected by the
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spraying. It does not entail, for instance, that the door is uniformly coated in whatever
unspecified material was sprayed.51
Thus, there is no unified holistic effect in my view: there is an interpretation associated
with the theme-object structure that ensures quantized themesmeasure out the eventuality,
and there is a preference to choose a preposition in the goal-object structure that leads
to an interpretation where the goal is completely affected. These independent facts have
conspired to give rise to the impression of a unified holistic effect, but closer examination
reveals this to be illusory.
Essentially, then, my argument regarding the desiderata in (122) is that acquisition is
(primarily) a question of syntax rather than semantics, while the other three points refer
to behaviors that are revealed to be mirages under closer inspection. The idea that there is
necessarily a near-paraphrase relation between the theme-object and goal-object structures
is based onparticular sentences that seem to have been chosen to have that property to begin
with. Considering a broader range of possible sentences with theme-object and goal-object
structures reveals this to be accidental, since many possible sentences can be constructed
in each that do not have a near-paraphrase counterpart in the alternative structure. The
idea that an argument’s interpretation determines its syntactic behavior has no place in my
theory: instead, an argument’s syntactic position leads to the interpretation it receives via
standard mechanisms of semantic composition. Syntactic restrictions on the positions of
functional heads will create a link between an argument’s interpretation and its syntactic
position. Finally, the holistic effect as a unified phenomenon does not exist; instead, the
51A small complication is the fact (discussed in the appendix to chapter 3) that some verbs that occur only in
the goal-object structure can occur with in in place of with. In my judgment, these uses still display the holistic
effect.
(i) The storm blanketed the countryside in snow.
Nevertheless, it is not clear that this is a deathblow to the idea that with is primarily responsible for the holistic
effect. In particular, the in used here does not seem to have the usual semantics associated with in; the sentence
does not mean that the countryside is in(side) the snow, but that the snow is on the countryside. The semantics
of this special use of in might have additional properties that could lead to it producing a holistic effect. In
addition, these verbs, unlike (131), seem to display the holistic effect even in the absence of a PP, suggesting
that maybe it is the verb itself that encodes the holistic effect in these cases.
(ii) The storm blanketed the countryside.
The most natural reading of (ii) is, I posit, one in which the countryside is completely affected in some way by
the storm (though the effect itself is left unspecified). This suggests that these particular verbs are responsible
for the holistic effect in these cases, rather than with. Further investigation is, of course, needed.
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putative holistic effect is the combination of the existence of an incremental theme object
in the theme-object structure; and the meaning of with, which is often used in goal-object
structures.
5.3.2.3 Open Issues
Of course, my analysis like any suffers from its share of issues. I levied criticism on some
of these points in my discussion of previous accounts, and it is thus worth being explicit
about the fact that my account is subject to similar criticisms. Other issues are simply raised
by the fact that my analysis is unclear with regards to some important points. I flag these
here as topics for future research.
First, consider the status of the commonplace with PP that occurs in goal-object uses.
In my discussion of prior approaches, I criticized treating this PP as an adjunct, due to
various pieces of evidence indicating that it behaved more like an argument (including its
inability to be omitted with certain verbs, its order relative to other PPs, etc.). In accounts
like Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s, this PP is an argument, and such accounts are not subject
to these criticisms. However, my account does not treat the with PP as an argument. Is it
subject to the same criticisms I made of accounts that treat it as an adjunct?
I believe the answer to this question resides in further investigation. My account posits
that the with-phrase is in fact somewhere between an argument and an adjunct—it is a
resultative small clause. The behavior of arguments of resultative predicates seems to fall
somewhere between the behavior of verbal arguments and adjuncts (see Williams 2015,
ch. 13 for an overview). It is my hope that this intermediate status would be able to make
sense of the conflicting intuitions and judgments regarding the status of the with PP as an
argument or an adjunct. However, I have not investigated thematter in enough detail to say
more.
Related to this concern is that my account has no immediately obvious way of account-
ing for the fact that some verbs require expressing a “theme”52 in the goal-object structure
or a goal in the theme-object structure. I repeat the relevant data from (16–19) here.
52Recall that in chapter 4, section 4.2.1, I presented evidence that the complement of with is not actually
interpreted as a theme.
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(132) Theme optional, goal optional:
a. John loaded the hay (onto the wagon).
b. John loaded the wagon (with the hay).
(133) Theme optional, goal obligatory:
a. John stuffed the feathers ★ (into the pillow).
b. John stuffed the pillow (with the feathers).
(134) Theme obligatory, goal optional:
a. John piled the stones (onto the deck).
b. John piled the deck ★ (with the stones).
(135) Theme obligatory, goal obligatory:
a. John slathered the plaster ★ (onto the walls).53
e. John slathered the walls ★ (with the plaster).
(Beavers 2017, (59–62))
In my approach, the non-object argument is not a semantic or syntactic argument of the
verb. Thus, it is unclear how verb-specific information could ensure its realization.
A suggestion I will make here is has to do with the fact that verbs sometimes have a
say in what kinds of resultative predicates can combine with them. I repeat some relevant
examples from chapter 3 here.
(132) a. John wiped the table clean.
b. ★ John wiped the table dirty.
(133) a. John painted the table red.
b. ★ John painted the table clean.
53Some I have spoken to dispute this judgment. Regardless, other verbs seem to show the same pattern more
clearly:
(i) a. John crammed the boxes into the storage cabinet.
b. John crammed the storage cabinet with the boxes.
c. ★ John crammed the boxes.
d. ★ John crammed the storage cabinet.
Thus, the point remains even if the judgment Beavers (2017) reports is disputable.
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In particular, certain verbs display idiosyncratic restrictions with regards to the resultatives
they can combine with. Wipe can combine with clean as a resultative secondary predicate,
but not dirty. In contrast, paint can combine with red as a resultative secondary predicate,
but not clean—even though the latter can combine with wipe. This shows us that verbs have
some say in what their resultative secondary predicates can be, however these restrictions
may be implemented grammatically. Once we have evidence that a verb can enforce selec-
tional restrictions on the resultatives that can combine with it, it is perhaps not so big a leap
to suppose that certain verbs could require resultatives of a certain kind. However, absent
an idea about how such selectional restrictions arise, it is unclear whether this idea could
be used to address the issues for my analysis that (132–135) raise.54
Another set of facts not explained in my account (though these facts are not explained
in many accounts) are those in (49d), repeated here.
(134) a. He spread glue on the paper.
b. He spread the paper with glue.
c. He spread a map on the bed.
d. # He spread the bed with a map.
(Iwata 2008, ch. 3, (30,32))
The semantics I have proposed for with would not seem to properly exclude (134d). One
could imagine that the central coincidence relation would require the kind of necessary
accompaniment that could only be satisfied in a scenario where the with-object is stuck to
the with-subject. However, this does not seem to be generally true of with, as the following
example shows.
(135) You can find the bed with the map in the general’s quarters.
54An addition minor issue has to do with the fact that I have proposed that the common use of with in the
goal-object structure has a non-linguistic source, which I presented evidence for in chapter 3, around example
45, which showed a “double-goal” structure. Such double-goal structures do not seem to be available for verbs
that Beavers (2017) identifies as having an obligatorily expressed theme.
(i) Scenario: The board was hanging from a string that ran over a tree branch. John piled some things
on the board, causing it to descend until it touched the ground.
# John piled the board onto the ground.
It appears that whatever selectional restrictions are at play here would require the use of a with PP with such
verbs (provided (i) is representative, which I am not sure of).
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The only suggestion I can make, which is admittedly unsatisfying, is that the nature of
direct causation may be responsible. A spreading whose goal is the bed might result in
states of the bed being with glue, but not states of the bed being with a map. This could be
because the spreading does not directly cause the state of the bed being with a map; in the
most natural reading, the bed is with a map because the map was already on it, and the
spreading simply happens once the map is already present. Thus, it is difficult to consider
the spreading eventuality to be the direct cause of the state of the bed being with the map.
This might account for why verbs like load do not show the same restriction; the kind of
idiosyncratic motion load’s eventuality encodes involves translational motion rather than
extension in space, so a loading event can directly cause the bed to be in a state of being
with amap (providedwe think of themap as large enough to count as being associatedwith
the spatial extent of the volume defined by the bed in the way with requires). Whether this
suggestion is reasonable depends, of course, on the precise characterization of the notion of
physical possession that I arguedwith invokes. If physical accompaniment does not require
spatial coextension, then the explanation seems more reasonable than if it does. Of course,
the latter iswhat I proposedmight account for the holistic effect (followingRapoport 2014),
though there were some exceptions to that behavior I discussed.
This discussion reveals a more general criticism, which is that precisely how with gives
rise to the holistic effect in goal-object structures is not entirely clear. I argued that it is
due to an interaction of with’s semantics of physical possession as central coincidence with
pragmatic factors. However, the idea that physical possession requires co-location along
the spatial extent of the entity that controls that relation is somewhat vague. Why couldn’t
physical possession simply involve control over the location of another entity, without re-
quiring the spatial extent of the two entities to coincide as Rapoport (2014) proposes? It
seems that more investigation into the semantics of physical possession and central coin-
cidence is needed to determine whether this approach to the meaning of with can really
explain the holistic effect or whether more is needed. The hope is that it could: if the holis-
tic effect in goal-object structures is due to the meaning of with, then we would have some
hope of achieving a truly explanatory account. Retreating to a sui generis link between the
holistic effect and the syntactic position of objects of spray/load verbs puts us back at finding
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new ways to state the existence of the effect without having a way to truly understand it.
Another shortcoming of my account has to do with cross-linguistic variability in the
spray/load alternation. I have focused here entirely on English data, and as suchmy account
is not intended as a universal account of the spray/load alternation. Indeed, I suggested that
there might not be a unified spray/load alternation cross-linguistically. Perhaps other lan-
guages lack PLOC∅ , and would thus derive an alternation similar to the spray/load alterna-
tion but in a different way. The similarity of these alternations to the spray/load alternation
would then need to be accounted for in a natural way. It is possible that additional exten-
sions would need to be made to account for small variations such as, e.g., the lack of an
overt head corresponding to with in the goal-object structure in Mandarin, the use of di ‘of’
where in Italian and cognates in other Romance languages where English might use with,
the use of be- ‘in’ in Hebrew in place of the same, the use of in in English non-alternating
goal-object verbs, and so on. These seem to me promising topics for future research.
Finally, it might be possible to criticize my characterization of my analysis as deriving
the alternation in the syntax. In particular, Beavers (2017) view that Goldberg (1995)’s and
Iwata (2008)’s Construction Grammar approaches reduce to a lexicalist approach is based
on the fact that they must say which lexical items can occur in which constructions to avoid
overgeneration. Of course, I must say this, too, by saying that some verbsmay combinewith
either vTHEME or PLOC∅ , while others can combine with only one or the other. This restriction
must be stated at the level of individual lexical items.
But whether this criticism is valid depends onwhether one thinks that positing the exis-
tence of a lexicon entails that an approach is essentially lexicalist. Every account recognizes
that some facts about particular lexical items must be simply memorized; trivially, at least
any phonological and semantic properties of lexical items cannot be derived. Most theories
also recognize the need to state syntactic idiosyncrasies over lexical items, with few to no
exceptions.55 Nearly any theory runs the risk of being labeled “lexicalist” by these strict cri-
55Borer (2005a,b, 2013) claims to be an exception in this regard, since she posits that lexical items have no
grammatical properties. However, in her system functional items are associated with grammatical properties,
which would entail a lexicon that allows for stating properties of individual items, regardless of whether we
call these lexical or functional. Furthermore, this result in her claiming that ill-formed sentences judged as un-
grammatical are ill-formed uniformly because they have incongruous meanings (note that this does not mean
they cannot compose semantically, but just that the resulting interpretation is incompatible with encyclopedic
knowledge). This would seem to run the risk of reducing the study of ungrammatical sentences to the study
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teria. It might be better to distinguish theories on a continuum of lexicalism, based on how
much generative power they attribute to the lexicon. In this respect, my theory is weighted
more towards the syntax. The only generative power present in the lexicon in my system is
the power of particular lexical items to prevent or require the application of particular syn-
tactic operations that might involve other specific lexical items. But all building of structure
is accomplished by the syntax, and the lexical semantics of words does not directly project
into syntax (only indirectly, by means of the syntactic diacritics they bear and the restric-
tion that theymust produce a structure that can compose semantically). To claim that every
theory that recognizes lexical idiosyncrasy is lexicalist is in some sense technically correct,
but misses important differences that are worth recognizing. The same could be said with
regards to Construction Grammar; though I do not take such an approach, it has important
differences from a lexicalist approach that are worth not glossing over simply because one
must recognize lexical idiosyncrasy. The important commonality of my approach and Con-
struction Grammar approaches is that they are focused primarily on capturing regularity
in language over idiosyncrasy. Lexicalist approaches are of course, focused on this as well,
but by putting some of the regularities of language in the same place as the idiosyncrasies,
runs the risk of the regularity itself becoming idiosyncratic.





In chapters 2 and 3, I presented my analysis of the syntax and semantics of spray/load
verbs. Then, in chapter 5, I showed how this compared to previous analyses with regards to
different kinds of facts that have been identified as crucial in describing the spray/load alter-
nation. Nevertheless, several questions remain to be addressed. What is the general picture
of argument structure that emerges from the detailed study of the syntax and semantics of
spray/load verbs in light of the analysis I presented? In other words, once we have subjected
spray/load verbs to fission in order to determine their parts, what do we learn about how
those parts combine?
This chapter addresses some questions related to this general picture. First, I provide a
summary of the analysis developed in chapters 2 and 3. Then, I turn to the bigger picture,
addressing the following questions:
• What is the axiom of my approach?
• What defines the space of possible argument structure alternations?
While brief, the answers to these questions describe a research program with applications
that go beyond the spray/load alternation. What is crucial is not specific details of the anal-
ysis presented here, but instead the methodological and theoretical concerns, which all
relate to the integration of the study of argument structure with independently motivated
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approaches to syntax and semantics.
6.2 Summary of the Analysis
The analysis developed in chapters 2 and 3 is based on two sets of facts.1
(1) a. The readings that again can receive in different positions in sentences with
spray/load verbs reveal an apparent bracketing paradox (ch. 2).
b. The grammatical status of theme objects and goal objects of spray/load
verbs differ, as revealed by their asymmetric behavior in non-agentive uses
of spray/load verbs and nominalizations (ch. 3).
My analysis explains these facts in the following ways.
(2) a. The bracketing paradox in (1a) is best resolved by a syntaxwithmultidom-
inance (and leads to new questions about multidominance in general).
b. The asymmetry in (1b) is explained by goal-object uses of spray/load verbs
being derived via the conflation of a preposition with the verb.
In addition to thesemain points, chapter 4 also discusses how the atomic elements of spray/
load verbs I identify can be assembled in non-agentive transitive uses of spray/load verbs,
and the source of the holistic effect.
6.3 Methodological and Theoretical Evaluation
At the end of chapter 5, I showed how my analysis could naturally account for the four
desiderata of acquisition, near-paraphrasability, linking, and affectedness. In addition, it
was designed to account for previously overlooked facts related to again and non-agentive
uses. Are there any methodological and theoretical advantages to my approach, beyond
simply accounting for these newly considered facts? If my analysis turns out to be wrong,
is there merit in the approach I have taken? This question takes the discussion beyond the
spray/load alternation, since it is essentially asking if the methods I use could be applied
1I thank Seth Cable (p.c.) for suggesting this way of framing the empirical and theoretical contributions of
this dissertation.
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fruitfully to other questions.My answer to these questions comes in twoparts: first, I discuss
what I have considered to be the guiding principle of my approach; and second, I discuss
how this principle in combination with the tools of my analysis could be used to define the
space of possible argument structure alternations.
6.3.1 The Axiom
Any empirical phenomenon is compatible with a large number of possible analyses. We
cannot use mere data to determine what precisely a theory should look like. Instead, we
(consciously or otherwise) use metatheoretical principles that help us select the best the-
ory among these multitudes. For me, the overriding principle has been Chomsky (1965)’s
criterion of explanatory adequacy. Explanatory adequacy pushes us to select models of
grammar that achieve a correct description of a speaker’s competence in a principled way.
While I have, of course, not achieved full descriptive adequacy (there are too many recal-
citrant facts I have noted, and surely others I have not noted), the analysis I have chosen
is motivated by the theory that the faculty of language is minimal. In the present context,
this has meant that I have striven to make use of no otherwise unmotivated grammatical
modules or elements. Put another way, I have tried not to propose anything truly new;
instead, I have approached the spray/load alternation by treating it as involving particular
arrangements of independently well-motivated elements.
Explanatory adequacy as a guiding principle of linguistic analysis is well-motivated, of
course. Chomsky (1965) argues that one of the main tasks of linguistic theory should be
to account for language acquisition. Empirical study has shown that children do not have
access to or make use of data that would lead them to acquire the grammar they eventu-
ally do, which constitutes the basis for arguments from the Poverty of the Stimulus.2 This
means that there must be some aspects of grammar that are innate, forming part of Uni-
versal Grammar. The complexity of human language has led to a view of a rich Universal
2Much of the relevant evidence is summarized in Pinker (1994). Particularly interesting cases are those in
which children repeatedly continue to ignore overt corrections of sentences that are not in the adult grammar.
This shows that arguments that the stimuli children have access to is not impoverished, after all, must go a step
further to show that not only do children have access to the necessary disambiguating stimuli, but that they
actually use it. This last step is often crucially overlooked by those on both sides.
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Grammar, since many properties of language could not otherwise be acquired on the ba-
sis of evidence children receive. However, this motivation for a rich Universal Grammar
is balanced by Chomsky (1995)’s plea for a simplified Universal Grammar, based on the
criterion of evolution. The evolution of human language does not appear to have been grad-
ual, but instead occurred all at once. This motivates a simpler innate Universal Grammar,
since the evolution of a complex Universal Grammar is less likely than a simple one. Thus,
explanatory adequacy favors a theory of grammar that explains both acquisition and evo-
lution. This is best achieved with a simple Universal Grammar, as simplicity limits both
the number of kinds of rules that children have to acquire, as well as the content of Univer-
sal Grammar itself. If we can show that an adequate description of a particular linguistic
phenomenon requires no theoretical apparatus that does not have an indepedent life in the
grammar, we simplify acquisition, since a child will have more ways to arrive at the correct
grammar than they would in a scenario where the account of a particular grammatical phe-
nomenon requires reference to ad hoc machinery.3 At the same time, we simplify evolution
by treating a complex grammatical phenomenon as the interaction of simple parts. In this
case, all thatmust have evolved are those smallest parts of grammar and the rules governing
their interaction. An analysis that makes good use of independently well-motivated prop-
erties of the grammar thus does not complicate the problem of evolution, and an analysis
that dispenses with grammatical machinery it shows to be unnecessary simplifiesit.
While there are certainly open issues, my approach is aimed at achieving explanatory
adequacy by proposing a syntax and semantics for sentences with spray/load verbs that
requires no modules of grammar beyond those that are clearly required by the fact of lan-
guage itself. These are syntax, semantics, and phonology (though of course I have had
nothing to say specifically about the latter), whose status as necessary generative modules
of language is beyond reasonable debate. I have chosen to formulate my theory in a way
thatmakes no reference tomodules of grammar beyond these (wheremodules of grammar
are understood to define what is regular about language, and the lexicon is the requisite
storehouse of the idiosyncratic).
3A case in point is the kind of special machinery posited sometimes to account for the holistic effect that
applies to only spray/load verbs.
318
The syntax I propose involves multidominance, which I have argued is necessary to ac-
count for the readings that again can receive in sentences with spray/load verbs. Fortunately,
multidominance is well-motivated independently in accounts of a variety of grammatical
phenomena (see Citko 2005; Engdahl 1980; Gärtner 1997, 1999; Hiraiwa & Bodomo 2008;
Johnson 2012, 2018; Nunes 2001; Starke 2001). What I have done is merely shown one way
in which multidominance can explain certain grammatical phenomena. I have not needed
to invent a new syntax—I have merely made use of the tools of an existing syntax.
The semantics I use is standard. It consists of (at least) four operations, which are Func-
tion Application, Predicate Modification (and extensions like Event Identification), and
Function Composition. There is strong evidence that all of these rules of semantic com-
position are independently needed. The semantics I propose integrates well with the bi-
nary-branching syntax with multidominance I propose, requiring no special stipulations
to achieve the right results. While there are, of course, unresolved questions raised by the
syntax and semantics I propose, the basic elements of each fit together seamlessly.
Unlike theories such as Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s, I do not divorce syntax, semantics,
and linking. Put another way, a theory like Rappaport & Levin (1988)’s requires a module
of grammar that serves as an interface between lexical semantics and syntax (at least) at the
level of argument structure. This linkingmodule’s purpose is to state where each argument
present in the lexical semantic structure of a verb goes in a syntactic structure, as described
in chapter 5.
In contrast, my approach eschews linking rules. Instead, linking is derived from the
syntax and the semantics. No special module of grammar is needed to say, for instance,
that an argument interpreted as the agent of an eventuality goes in Spec,vP. Instead, this
comes from syntactic and semantic facts: v has a semantics that ensures the DP in its speci-
fier defines the agent of its eventuality argument, and syntax requires that v occur above V
in the functional sequence.4 Once we are able to state the relationship between arguments’
interpretations and their syntactic positions using the existing vocabulary of semantics and
4It is to be hoped that the functional sequence could itself be derived from the semantics of functional heads;
Kyle Johnson (p.c.) has suggested tome away of thinking about the semantics of thematic roles like v that aims
to achieve this, though there are still details to be worked out, and a presentation of his idea would take us too
far afield. Ramchand (2018)makes a related proposal about how to derive the functional sequence above v/VP
from the semantics of functional heads.
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syntax in this way, we sidestep the need for a specialized linking module, in line with pro-
posals by Borer (2005b) andHarley (2011) (a.m.o.). Being able to avoid the need for special
linking rules is an advantage of such approaches, since they allow us to simplify the gram-
mar. A child does not need to acquire linking rules, nor do we alternatively need to posit
that linking rules are part of Universal Grammar—all that is required is that a child recog-
nize particular arrangements of morphemes that are licensed by the syntactic and semantic
principles of Universal Grammar.
6.3.2 What Is an Alternation?
A successful descriptive theory of syntax and semantics accomplishes two things: it
provides a model that will (i) generate all sentences of any given language, and (ii) fail to
generate sentences that do not exist. My analysis has largely addressed point (i), with the
explicit goal of developing a model that generates all of the correct structures and interpre-
tations associated with sentences containing spray/load verbs. While I have not heretofore
focused on point (ii), it is equally important: how do we rule out sentences that do not
exist? We might refer to this as Kennedy’s question, after the famous quote by Robert F.
Kennedy: “Some mean see things as they are, and say why. I dream things that never were
and say why not.”5
There are two points worth making in response to this question. The first summarizes
how I propose ruling out impossible sentences specifically with spray/load verbs. The sec-
ond generalizes this point to describe what kinds of limits my theory places on the space
of possible argument structure alternations.
6.3.2.1 Impossible Sentences with Spray/load Verbs
Turning to the first point, the relevant question is why sentences with spray/load verbs
must have the particular syntax they do in my analysis. I have answered questions related
to this in chapters 2 and 3, so here I will just summarize what I said there. Perhaps the
5Calling this Kennedy’s question was suggested to me by Kyle Johnson (p.c.). The quote itself is a revision
of a line that George Bernard Shaw penned for act 1 of his play Back to Methuselah: “You see things; and you say
‘Why?’ But I dream things that never were; and I say ‘Why not?” John F. Kennedy is also associated with the
original version, which he quoted from Shaw in a 1963 address to the Irish Parliament.
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most obvious question is why multidominance is not only possible with spray/load verbs,
but seemingly required. Recall that the discussion in chapter 2 showed that a small clause
syntax for spray/load verbs does not seem to be available, as revealed by the obligatory
interpretation of the immediately post-verbal DP as the object of the verb even in structures
with resultative secondary predicates. I repeat the relevant examples here for reference.
(3) a. John sprayed the bucket dry.
= “John sprayed the bucket, with the result that the bucket became dry.”
≠ “John sprayed, with the result that the bucket became dry.”
b. Context: John squeezed the tube of icing over the cake, thereby drizzling
icing onto the cake while emptying the tube of icing.
# John drizzled the tube empty.
c. Context: John poured the contents of the glass into a bowl, thereby emp-
tying the glass while filling the bowl.
# John filled the glass empty.
d. Context: John took the contents of the truck and loaded them into ship-
ping containers, thereby leaving the truck bare.
# John loaded the truck bare.
In these cases, the post-verbalDP cannot be interpreted as only the subject of the result state.
If this were possible, the examples above should be felicitous in the contexts (or, in the case
of (3a), which I have not provided a context for, receive a different possible interpretation).
We know that these sentences should be felicitous if a small clause syntax were available
because interpretations are possible for resultativeswith non-spray/load verbs, as in Kratzer
(2005)’s example in (4).
(4) Context: John drank the tea in the teapot down to the last drop, so ...
John drank the teapot empty.
As Kratzer (2005) notes, the teapot is not the object of drink—John does not drink the teapot,
but the contents of the teapot. She argues that this supports a small clause syntax for such












(Kratzer 2005, fig. 2)
Thus, the semantics of (4) is that John’s drinking caused the state of the teapot’s emptiness.
In contrast, I have argued that this syntax and semantics is not available for spray/load
verbs. Instead, the syntax of examples like (3) involves multidominance. In fact, the possi-
bility of a resultative structure with multidominance is expected under my analysis—as I
mentioned in chapter 2, nothing prevents replacing the PP often associated with spray/load
verbs with some other kind of small clause predicate. In this case, all we have done is swap












The semantics that arises from this syntax is one that will require the bucket to be inter-
preted as the goal of the spraying event, ruling out the infelicitous possibilities in (3).
I propose that this behavior can be derived by positing that, as a contingent syntactic
fact, spray/load verbs are obligatorily transitive. Note that the semantics I provide for them
intentionally treats them as simple predicates of events (type ⟨𝑠, 𝑡⟩), so in my analysis, this
behavior cannot be derived from their semantics. What obligatorily transitive means, then,
322
is that spray/load verbs must merge with either vTHEME or PLOC∅ . A spray/load verb that does
not merge with one of these—when it is used as a verb—is prohibited.
The fact that spray/load verbs are obligatorily transitive may seem stipulative, but it is
not. It is, like most facts about lexical items, something that we know must be learned and
not innate. Many non-spray/load verbs are obligatorily transitive (e.g., devour), making this
a property of verbs that children must be able to acquire. The subcategorization properties
of particular verbs is not consistently obviously derivable from their semantics—as is made
clear because, e.g., eat is optionally transitive, the similar-in-meaning devour is obligatorily
transitive, and the yet again similar-in-meaning dine requires the use of the preposition on
to introduce an internal argument. Thus, whether a verb is obligatorily transitive cannot
be derived from its meaning. However children learn that devour is obligatorily transitive
while eat is notwill be the sameway that they can learn that spray/load verbs are obligatorily
transitive.
Oncewemake this observation, the availability of themultidominance structure and the
impossibility of non-multidominance structures is derived in an entirely predictable way.
The multidominance syntax for spray/load verbs is merely the result of putting an obligato-
rily transitive verb in a resultative structure. The fact that spray/load verbs are obligatorily
transitive means that they must take an object. Attempting to put them into a structure
where the resultative small clause has a specifier that differs from that object fails because
that specifier cannot be Case-licensed, as described in chapter 2. Thus, the Case filter, com-
bined with the status of spray/load verbs as obligatorily transitive, means that when spray/
load verbs occur in a resultative structure, they must involve multidominance. A different
syntax would either violate the obligatory transitivity of spray/load verbs (i.e., by failing
to merge the verb with vTHEME or PLOC∅ , which would produce an intransitive small clause
syntax), or else run afoul of the Case filter by merging an argument DP which cannot re-
ceive Case. Multidominance is how these requirements can be satisfied simultaneously,
and gives rise to the readings of again we examined in chapter 2. And of course, if we con-
sider sentences without resultative small clauses, then no multidominance is involved (as
I also discussed in chapter 2).6
6I will also note that I have intentionally left aside irrelevant non-resultative adjunct PPs. As an example,
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Another issue I have not addressed is that the PP must be “transitive,” too (by which I
mean that it must have a specifier and a complement).7 What makes this issue potentially
of concern is that not every PP is transitive. For instance, adjunct PPs are typically analyzed
as predicates of eventualities that compose with their sister via Predicate Modification.8
(7) John danced in the hallway.
a. JdanceK = λ𝑒.dance(𝑒) = 1
b. Jin the hallwayK = λ𝑒.in(𝑒 , the hallway) = 1
c. Jdance in the hallwayK = λ𝑒.dance(𝑒) ∧ in(𝑒 , the hallway) = 1
Why couldn’t we use a PP of this type as the complement of CAUSE? Since CAUSE semantically
takes an argument of type ⟨𝑠, 𝑡⟩, nothing would go obviously wrong.
However, there does appear to be a general restriction that CAUSE can only take small
clause complements, which is not specific to PPs. Small clauses, of course, must be transi-
tive. For instance, considering the following string, which has readings corresponding to
(at least) two distinct sentences.
(8) John saw the dog in the park.
a. John saw the dog, and that happened at the park. (adjunct PP reading)
b. John saw something, and that was the dog in the park.
(small clause PP reading)
Under common semantic analyses of these sentences, the PPs in each have the same se-
mantic type; they are predicates of eventualities. However, it is clear that they cannot be
the following string is ambiguous between a resultative reading and an adjunct reading of the PP.
(i) John sprayed the paint on the wall.
One reading is the resultative reading, where John’s spraying the paint causes the state of the paint being on
the wall. Another reading is one in which the John spraying the paint event takes place on the wall (e.g., if John
is standing on the wall while spraying paint). I have no reason to suppose that this reading corresponds to a
structure with multidominance, and have ignored it throughout, following the tradition of prior literature that
similarly considers such readings uninformative regarding the spray/load alternation. I have also argued that
something similar is possible when the preposition used is with, which can result in a resultative small clause
reading or an instrumental adjunct reading. This reading is also irrelevant to my analysis, since it would arise
in an entirely unremarkable way.
7And, of course, the cases with adjectives discussed in chapter 2 require a specifier in AP—but that is more
likely to be derived from the semantics of adjectives in a straightforward way.
8Though see Morzycki (2005) for a different view.
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substituted for one another. The dog in the park cannot be interpreted as an adjunct PP, which
would produce a semantics like the following.
(9) a. JseeK = λ𝑒.∃𝑥[see(𝑒 , 𝑥)] = 1
b. Jthe dog in the parkK = λ𝑒.in(𝑒 , the dog, the park) = 1
c. Jsee the dog in the parkK = λ𝑒.∃𝑥[see(𝑒 , 𝑥)] ∧ in(𝑒 , the dog, the park) = 1
This might be ruled out as semantically impossible: a single eventuality cannot be both
John seeing something and the dog in the park. The other case is slightly different, with the
meaning that would result being one in which what John sawwas an eventuality described
by in the park.
(10) a. JseeK = λ𝑃.λ𝑒.∃𝑒′[see(𝑒 , 𝑃(𝑒′))] = 19
b. Jin the parkK = λ𝑒.in(𝑒 , the park) = 1
c. Jsee in the parkK = λ𝑒.∃𝑒′[see(𝑒 , in(𝑒′, the park))] = 1
This readingmay ormay not be semantically coherent, but it is clearly not available. Instead,
it seems that we may need to distinguish between predicates of eventualities that can serve
as adjunct modifiers but not arguments, and predicates of eventualities that are proposi-
tions, which show the opposite behavior. Possibly a distinction between eventualities and
situations might make the right cut, with eventualities corresponding to (intransitive) ad-
junct PPs, and situations corresponding to (transitive) small clause argument PPs. Resul-
tatives seem to only allow small clauses that have (underlying) subjects, like the transitive
small clause PPs.
(11) a. John hammered [the metal into a sheet].
b. ★ John hammered [into a sheet].
For this reason, I do not believe my account requires a special stipulation to derive the
fact that the PPs of spray/load verbs must be transitive: this is a general requirement of
resultatives, and explains why a structure that would contain an object and an intransitive
small clause would be ruled out.
9The real semantics here is probably intensional, but I am simplifying this to an existential binder to avoid
overcomplicating things. I don’t believe it substantially affects the argument.
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Another question about the syntax of spray/load verbs has to do with the necessity of
PLOC∅ . Chapter 3 showed that the syntactic differences between theme objects and goal ob-
jects of spray/load verbs can be explained if goal objects are introduced by a phonologically
null preposition. This unifies the behavior of goal objects with objects of overt prepositions,
which similarly cannot promote to subject position in unaccusative structures, and are not
possible referents of (most) nominal uses of verbs. In contrast, theme objects do not dis-
play this behavior, and so we have no evidence that they are introduced by a preposition.
Upon observing these empirical patterns, we ask why this is. What is it that would rule out
introducing a goal object without the use of a preposition, which would produce symmet-
rical behavior between theme objects and goal objects in non-agentive and nominal uses of
spray/load verbs?
I do not have a full answer to this question, only speculation. One idea was presented
near the end of chapter 5: the Goal-Preposition Principle, which said that only a preposition
can introduce a DP interpreted as a goal. This, of course, is not an explanation, but an
attempt at a descriptive generalization, which may or may not be accurate. If it does turn
out to be accurate, one thought about what might underlie this generalization could relate
to the semantics of locations. In standard semantics, locations tend to be treated as entities,
of type 𝑒. But perhaps this is not quite right: after all, JJohnK is an entity—though of course,
we understand that JJohnK denotes not John’s location but John himself. In order to refer to
John’s location, we would need a preposition (e.g., on, with, near, etc.).One possibility this
raises is that locations, including goals, might be of a different semantic type from entities.
Much recent research has argued for amore complex syntax and semantics for prepositions
(see Cinque & Rizzi 2010; Fábregas 2007; Gehrke 2008; Kracht 2002; Radkevich 2010; Roy
& Svenonius 2009; Svenonius 2007, 2010). If this line of research is on the right track, it
might speak to a way of generalizing the Goal-Preposition Principle to state that all DPs
interpreted as locationsmust be introduced by prepositions.Whatwould remain amystery,
of course, would be why prepositions would be the only lexical class with the privilege of
having a semantics invoking locations. That would merit further research.
A related question has to do with the difference between vTHEME and PLOC∅ . If we accept
my proposal that these two functional heads are what introduce the internal arguments
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of spray/load verbs, we must ask why they impose a different grammatical status on the
objects they introduce. Put another way, why are goal objects subject to more restrictions
than theme objects? Why doesn’t the existence of vTHEME in theme-object structures give rise
to the same patterns seen in goal-object structures, given that it occurs in the same syntactic
position as PLOC∅? I presented an idea about this in chapter 3 that suggested it has to dowith
labeling: vTHEME merging with V should not create a labeling conflict, since v is part of the
extended projection of V. In contrast, PLOC∅ merging with V could create a labeling conflict,
which could be resolved by the merger of v in a higher position. This would account for
why P-stranding A-movement seems to be possible only when v has merged (in passives
and perhaps middles, but not in unaccusatives).
However, even this idea relies on my assignment of the two internal-argument-intro-
ducing heads to different syntactic categories: I called the theme-introducing head a v, and
I called the goal-introducing head a P. But why couldn’t I have proposed the opposite cate-
gorization, or that both are vs/Ps? If that move is made, what would differentiate the status
of each object? I do not have a full answer, but the difference may have to do with Case
assignment: vTHEME is not considered to be responsible for assigning Case to the syntactic
phrase that realizes its entity argument; while PLOC∅ is. If vTHEME were what assigned Case
to its argument, we would run the risk of rejecting Burzio (1986)’s generalization that ac-
cusative Case on an internal argument depends on there being an external argument. Per-
haps the fact that vTHEME does not assign Case, while PLOC∅ does, has to do with the syntactic
differences of their arguments. Maybe with fuller consideration this could do away with
the motivation for the labeling-based approach I sketched, though I do not see how this
idea would extend to all the relevant similar cases at present.
So, the reason spray/load verbs must look the way they do in my analysis is because
they are obligatorily transitive, and goals must be introduced by prepositions. But regard-
less of whether these generalizations are adequate, there is empirical evidence to favor the
use of multidominance and P-conflation to account for the syntax of spray/load verbs. What
remains more in question is whether my proposals about why multidominance and P-con-
flation are required with spray/load verbs are correct.10
10A fuller survey of the literature on P-conflation, including how it has been used and what it might yet be
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6.3.2.2 Restrictions on Multidominance
Something else that my system requires to produce the correct results are restrictions
on when multidominance is possible. Allowing Remerge and parallel uses of Merge could
produce many structures that would be semantically coherent yet which do not seem to ex-
ist. Most analyses that involve multidominance could massively overgenerate in this way.
Though I do not have full explanations of what restricts multidominance in the proper
ways, I describe some relevant problematic cases here and suggestions about where an-
swers might reside for some of them. Note that I do not show these structures in the usual
way that orders lexical items visually from left to right in approximately the order they are
spoken. Most of the time, this is because reversing the order shown for a particular phrase
results in greater visual clarity. This presentational choice does not carry any theoretical
implications.
To take one problematic case, a single DP cannot occur in both Spec,vP and Comp,VP.
This would produce a reflexive interpretation without a reflexive pronoun.
used forwould surely be of interest here. However, it would take us afield from the purposes of the dissertation,
which is focused on the spray/load alternation, and so I must leave it for a later day. My hope is that P-conflation
might be useful in analyses of locative alternations that involve an alternation between an overt and a null
preposition, including the swarm alternation, the meet alternation, and the wander alternation:
(i) Swarm alternation:
a. The bees swarmed in the garden.
b. The garden swarmed with (??the) bees.
(ii) Meet alternation:
a. John met with Bill.
b. John met Bill.
(iii) Wander alternation:
a. Bears roam in these woods.
b. Bears roam these woods.
However, there are clearly additional complications relating to these alternations that need to be carefully
considered before proposing an analysis in terms of P-conflation. See Levin (1993, sec. 1.4) for overviews of the
meet and wander alternations; and Levin (1993, sec. 2.3.4), Dowty (2001), and Hoeksema (2009) on the swarm
alternation.
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(12) ★ JvPK = λ𝑒.hit(𝑒 , John) ∧ AGENT(𝑒 , John) = 1
JvPK = λ𝑥.λ𝑒.hit(𝑒 , John) ∧ AGENT(𝑒 , 𝑥) = 1





While there are a limited number of verbs related to personal grooming where the reflex-
ive interpretation is possible without an overt reflexive (e.g., shave, wash (up), bathe, shower,
etc.), multidominance is almost certainly not the proper analysis of such cases, and is not
available more generally. Given the way I have described this problem makes a suggestion
clear: the answer might reside in a better understanding of the principles governing the re-
alization of reflexives and pronouns (Reinhart & Reuland 1993; Seth Cable, p.c.): wherever
a reflexive would have to go, multidominance is not possible. While this might accurately
describe the pattern, deriving it requires additional work.
Other cases pose a problem for my analysis specifically. For instance, what would rule
out a structure containing a spray/load verb where the multidominated phrase is the one in
the complement of the small clause?
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(13) ★ JVPK =
λ𝑒.spray(𝑒) ∧ GOAL(𝑒 , on(the wall) ∧














This structure, unlike the previous one, would not violate the binding theory. No errors in
semantic composition result. As such, it is difficult to seewhatwould rule out this structure.
However, it is clear that this structure is not possible. If it were, we would expect to be able
to get a reading of post-object again that would target V and the wall to the exclusion of
the paint (assuming that the paint moves to a higher position for structural Case), which is
clearly not available. Something that makes this issue more pressing is that Johnson (2018)













(based on Johnson 2018, (44))
Of course, one could imagine reasons to rule out the structure in (13). Note that along the
left branch, the multidominated DP the wall is structurally higher than the DP in Spec,PP.
This might lead to it getting targeted for structural accusative Case assignment. However,
this could result in two problems: one might be that the preposition’s need to assign Case
would go unmet as a result, and/or that the paint would no longer be able to get Case.
However, these ways of ruling out (13) would also rule out the structure in (14). While
HAVE is shown as not being a preposition, it is posited to assign Case to the second object
of a double-object construction, while structural Case is assigned to the first object (this
accounts for the behavior of double-object passives, for instance). As such, any explanation
that would rule out (13) based on Case theory would also almost certainly rule out (14) as
well. One could take this as evidence against Johnson (2018)’s proposal, but I do not believe
it would be very strong evidence. Instead, whatever rules out (13) would probably have to
be related to some other syntactic difference between HAVE and overt locative prepositions,
or else to the existence of PLOC∅/THEME in one structure but not necessarily the other. I have
no suggestions about how this might work, and will leave it as a mystery.
One could of course come up with many other examples that a grammar with paral-
lel uses of Merge would generate but which are unattested.11 This is just a sampling of a
11Some of these additional examples might be easily ruled out given appropriately new ways of formulat-
331
larger theoretical problem that arises whenMerge is allowed to apply in ways that produce
structures with multidominance. However, I would suggest that this is not really a short-
coming of systems that make use of multidominance. Allowing Merge to apply in all ways
consistent with its definition as the simplest possible syntactic operation achieves greater
explanatory adequacy with regards to the question of the evolution of the faculty of lan-
guage. Rather than being tasked with determining what rules out cases like (12) and (13),
we would be forced to come up with ways of stipulating restrictions on the application of
Merge that would serve no purpose beyond preventing the derivation of such structures. It
is my view that the better approach is to allow Merge to apply freely in all ways consistent
with its simplest possible definition. Instead of constraining Merge, we should seek expla-
nations of why some structures it produces turn out to be ill-formed. We close the door on
limiting the flexibility of Merge, but open the window of a research program investigating
the constraints required in a system that allows multidominance.
6.3.2.3 The Architecture of the System and the Limits of Flexibility
Having provided this (admittedly incomplete) response to the question of why spray/
load verbs cannot have a syntax other than the one they do according to my analysis, we
can turn by way of conclusion to the broader question of what places limits on possible
alternations. An adequate answer to this requires a definition of what an alternation is in
my system. This definition implicitly places limits on what is possible.
To approach an answer to this question, a good first thing to note is that argument
structure is quite flexible. Most verbs can occur in many different argument structures, a
fact of central importance.
ing familiar constraints. For instance, structures that would involve non-cyclic long-distance multidominated
nodes would be ruled out by whatever the proper account of island constraints is according to a system with
multidominance. This would be because such cases would correspond exactly to sentences that are to be ruled
out by constraints on movement, once we reconceptualize movement as Remerge. The need for an explanation
of island constraints in systems that use the copy theory of movement is well-understood; systems that posit
Remerge may simply need to apply an additional set of constraints on representations, or else it may be the
case that the constraints that would rule out the structures discussed in this sectionwould be identical to island
constraints under the proper formulation.
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(15) a. John sneezed.
b. John sneezed a loud sneeze.
c. John sneezed his handkerchief soggy.
d. John sneezed the receipt across the room.
e. John sneezed Bill a tissue.
f. John sneezed his way to fame.
g. ★ John sneezed his handkerchief / the receipt / Bill / his way.
More examples could surely be constructed, including examples showing similar flexibility
for a variety of different verbs.What is relevant in the case of the particular examples in (15)
is that many would analyze the basic verb sneeze as a simple, intransitive verb. Yet it occurs
in transitive structures (with a cognate object) and several different kinds of resultatives
(including standard adjectival resultatives, directed motion resultatives, the double-object
structure, and the his way construction). This flexibility speaks quite strongly against locat-
ing the argument structure properties of a verb entirely in the verb, and towards positing a
generative process that allows a verb to enter into several different argument structures (à
la Borer 2005b). Following the dictates of parsimony leads us to posit that this generative
process is none other than the generative process our theory already requires to explain the
infinitude of syntax.
Of course, there must be some restrictions on flexibility: not every verb can occur with
every argument structure. Sneeze can only be transitive with a cognate object; the sentences
in (15g) are impossible. Cases where more complex argument structures are impossible
also exist; famously, Latinate verbs can occur in prepositional dative, but not double-object
structures, and so on. Our approachmust therefore balance flexibility and restriction—and
therein lies the game.
All reasonable theories of argument structure have some way of accounting for these
sorts of facts.My approach follows oneparticularway of thinking inspired byBorer (2005b)
and Harley (2011). This view is that argument structure is at its core quite flexible, and syn-
tactically constructed.A semantic proposal that goes quite nicelywith this view is that verbs
are only ever predicates of eventualities, and do not take any semantic argument other than
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an eventuality argument.12 Thus, all entity arguments must be introduced by functional
heads that invoke thematic relations (that is, relations between entities and eventualities).
Nevertheless, verbs may come with certain syntactic or semantic requirements, which lead
to some argument structures that conflict with these requirements being ruled out.13 For
instance, one thought about what would rule out (15g) is that sneeze might not be able
to merge directly with vTHEME or any other thematic head.14 Cognate objects might arise in
some other way (either via a different functional head, or along the lines proposed by Hale
& Keyser (2002)).
What I propose is that the limits of the flexibility of argument structure thus arise from
both the lexical properties of particular heads, and the general principles of syntax and se-
mantics. The particular heads in question presently are verbs and functional heads, which
in the domain of verbal argument structure all have a semantic type of the form ⟨, 𝑠𝑡⟩—a
relation between something of an arbitrary semantic type α and a predicate of eventualities.
Within this limit, the lexical properties of particular verbs are by definition idiosyncratic,
and so when we consider the limits of the systemwemay safely place them aside. What de-
fines the limits of argument structure in general, then, are what defines the limits of syntax
and semantics. In my system, the syntax consists of Merge. Merge can be applied to create
parallel structures that involvemultidominance relations, though such uses follow from the
definition of Merge with no further stipulation as I showed in chapter 2. The semantics con-
sists of four standard rules of composition: Function Application, Predicate Modification
(plus Event Identification as an extension), and Function Composition. The structures the
syntax creates must produce an LF that the semantics can interpret using these operations.
12Though see Kratzer (2003) for an argument against one pervasive implementation of this idea that would
equate the thematic roles of nearly all internal arguments by dubbing them themes. The reader will recall that
my use of THEME is intentionally restricted to entities that undergo motion. It is not intended to be the thematic
relation that holds of objects of other verbs that are sometimes called themes, like in dig a hole, plant a tree, cook a
meal, hit the fence, etc. In my view, those objects might enter into very different thematic relations, which might
be introduced by other functional heads.
13This idea differs from Borer (2005b)’s approach. She proposes that what rules out cases like those in (15g)
is not syntactic or semantic, since in her approach (further developed in Borer (2013)), lexical heads have no
syntactic or semantic properties. Thus, syntactic and semantic properties associated with individual lexical
items, such as obligatory intransitivity, are ineffable. Instead, world knowledge means that sentences like those
in (15g) receive anomalous interpretations, which leads to them being perceived as ungrammatical. But they
are not ungrammatical as such in Borer (2005b)’s proposal.
14Recall that I am using a more restricted definition of the semantic relation THEME than is typical; my use
only makes reference to event participants that undergo motion as part of the event.
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Under this view, argument structure alternations are nothing very special. They con-
sist, no less than anything else in syntax and semantics, of the interaction of idiosyncratic
lexical properties with the general principles and operations of the grammar. A particular
verbal argument structure consists of an arrangement of lexical and functional heads that
(i) satisfies the idiosyncratic requirements of those heads, (ii) can be generated by Merge,
and (iii) can be interpreted by the semantics. An argument structure alternation is thus
possible whenever a verb’s requirements can be satisfied in more than one structure that
obeys the laws of syntax and semantics.
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